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Introduction
REPORTER’S PREFACE
 Since the General Assembly adopted the Illinois Criminal Code of 1961, 
new insights have emerged regarding what a criminal code should address, 
and how it should do so. Moreover, the broader legal landscape has changed 
greatly. This Commission was predicated on the belief that — as was the case 
in 1961, and may well be the case again in another forty or fi fty years — the 
time was ripe to take a step back and conduct a panoramic review of the 
Illinois Criminal Code. The two volumes of this Final Report are the fruits of 
that review.
 The Proposed Criminal Code seeks to replace the current code with 
a clear, concise, and comprehensive set of provisions. Specifi cally, the 
Proposed Code seeks to include necessary provisions not contained in the 
current code; to eliminate unnecessary or inconsistent provisions of the 
current code; to revise existing language and structure to make the law easier 
to understand and apply; and to ensure that criminal offenses and legal rules 
are cohesive and relate to one another in a consistent and rational manner. 
At the same time, the Proposed Code aims to track the substantive policy 
judgments refl ected in the original Code and its subsequent amendments. 
When the process of clarifying and reconciling current provisions made such 
substantive choices necessary, the drafters have sought to explain and justify 
the proposed changes with commentary designed to assist the enacters, and 
ultimately the users, of the Proposed Code.
 In developing the Proposed Code, the drafters were guided by fi ve 
general drafting principles. First, the drafters have made an effort to use 
clear, accessible language and organization. One of the critical functions of 
a criminal code is to provide notice to citizens of what conduct is prohibited. 
Clear and accessible writing enables provision of true notice while also 
ensuring that no offender escapes liability because of an incomplete or 
ambiguous offense defi nition. More straightforward code provisions also 
promote development of clearer jury instructions, making it easier for jurors 
to fulfi ll their critical role. Even for members of the criminal justice system, 
who work with the criminal code every day and must be intimately familiar 
with its rules, plain-language expression is essential.
 Second, the Proposed Code endeavors to provide a comprehensive 
statement of rules. A criminal code must include all necessary rules governing 
liability. Comprehensiveness helps avoid inappropriate results. Courts, which 
decide individual cases and act independently of one another, cannot be as 
effective as a legislature in formulating coherent general doctrines that will 
work together as the provisions of a comprehensive code can and must. 
Moreover, an uncodifi ed rule is more likely to be applied differently in 
similar cases than a codifi ed rule, as the terms of the latter are fi xed, explicit, 
and available to all offi cials at each stage in the process.
 Third, the drafters have aimed to consolidate offenses. Perhaps 
inevitably, four decades of piecemeal modifi cation of the 1961 Code have 
led to the addition of hundreds of new offenses, many of which cover the 
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same conduct as previous offenses or appear in various other chapters of the 
Illinois Compiled Statutes rather than in the criminal code. Consolidation 
ensures against the confusion that results when one encounters, and must 
make sense of, multiple provisions that overlap or contradict, and also against 
the mistakes that ensue when one fails to notice, or fi nd, provisions that may 
apply to a given case. Consolidation also aids the task of proper grading, 
because it is nearly impossible to maintain consistent, proportional grading 
when offense defi nitions are based on insignifi cant, or incomprehensible, 
distinctions.  
 Fourth, the drafters have striven to grade offenses rationally and 
proportionally. One virtue of a recodifi cation project, relative to the usual 
piecemeal legislative additions and alterations to the criminal code, is 
the opportunity it provides for a general review of the system of grading 
offenses, considering how all offenses relate to one another rather than 
considering individual offenses in a vacuum. For a system of criminal justice 
to be fair, liability must be assigned according to the relative seriousness of 
the offense(s) committed. The drafters have sought to recognize all, and only, 
suitable distinctions among the relative severity of offenses and develop a 
scheme to grade each offense proportionally to its gravity in light of those 
distinctions.
  Finally, the Proposed Code seeks to retain all (but only) reasonable 
policy decisions embodied in current law. Because substantive policy 
decisions about the rules of the criminal law refl ect value judgments properly 
left to the legislature, the Proposed Code aims to follow the substance of 
current law wherever possible. In some places, however, current law contains 
multiple contradictory rules — and therefore no clear rule — on a subject. 
Other rules may have been sound when enacted, but no longer refl ect current 
realities or sensibilities and require expansion, alteration, or deletion. Still 
other current legal rules have been created by the courts through case law, 
rather than by the legislature through statutory enactment, and appear to be 
in direct tension with the governing statutory provision. In those situations 
where the existing legal rule seems clearly at odds with the goal of producing 
a rational, coherent criminal code, the drafters have had little choice but to 
modify the existing rule, using supporting commentary to the Proposed Code 
to describe and justify the proposed change.
 A few words are in order regarding issues that the Proposed Code does 
not address. First, the Proposed Code addresses substantive criminal law 
rules only. It excludes numerous provisions in the current code governing 
procedural, sentencing, and regulatory issues, retaining only the rules 
necessary to elaborate or explain the criminal code’s substantive prohibitions 
and rules. This does not mean, however, that the Proposed Code would 
eliminate those provisions. Rather, the Proposed Code was drafted with 
the understanding that such provisions would be retained, but moved to 
other chapters of the Illinois Compiled Statutes, by means of a “conforming 
amendments” bill to be enacted by the General Assembly contemporaneously 
with the new criminal code.
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 Second, the Proposed Code does not address certain categories of 
offenses. Drug offenses, weapon offenses, and various “crime-control” 
offenses designed primarily, if not exclusively, to combat ongoing criminal 
enterprises are not included in the Proposed Code. Here again, the exclusion 
of those offenses, and a number of narrow regulatory offenses addressed 
specifi cally to particular groups or corporations, does not refl ect any judgment 
about the wisdom of the current provisions governing such conduct. Rather, 
we anticipate the retention of the relevant current prohibitions, either outside 
the Code or within the (currently empty) Code Articles reserved for such 
offenses, through “conforming amendments” legislation that will bring 
forward all relevant current provisions.
 In many instances, the Code’s commentary explicitly states that a 
particular current offense, procedural or sentencing rule, or civil or regulatory 
provision should be preserved outside the Proposed Code by means of a 
“conforming amendment” to be presented to the General Assembly. Yet 
the commentary’s failure to include such a clear statement with respect to 
any particular provision — especially one that does not address an issue 
relating to substantive criminal law — should not be understood to indicate 
a recommendation that the provision in question should be eliminated. In 
the event that the General Assembly decides to adopt the Proposed Code, 
the drafters have prepared more detailed instructions (excluded, due to 
considerations of length, from these volumes) concerning the necessary 
conforming amendments.
 In other instances, language in the Proposed Code itself makes clear 
its intent to retain current law as to an issue. For example, the proposed 
provisions governing abortion (Section 4107) and charging an unlawful 
fee for an adoption (Section 4108) explicitly incorporate by reference the 
complicated regulatory schemes currently set forth in the Illinois Abortion 
Law of 1975 and the Adoption Compensation Prohibition Act, respectively. 
Similarly, the proposed bid-rigging offense (Section 3110) defi nes a Class 
3 felony criminalizing knowingly engaging in conduct that violates bidding 
rules currently codifi ed in Article 33E of the current code. Incorporating 
those rules by reference, but preserving their regulatory content outside 
Chapter 720, avoids cluttering the Code with technical regulatory provisions. 
At the same time, it is necessary to overtly incorporate the relevant offenses 
within the criminal code to avoid application of the rule (stated in proposed 
Section 902) that non-Code offenses can be graded no higher than Class 4 
felonies.
 As discussed above, the drafters have sought to retain reasonable policy 
decisions embodied in current law where possible. In recognition that such 
value judgments are best left to the legislature, the Proposed Code includes 
footnotes identifying several substantive policy issues for the General 
Assembly to resolve. Each footnote presents the arguments on both sides 
of the issue and states the Reporter’s recommendation, if any. Similarly, the 
language in proposed Section 1109 incorporating Recommendations 28 and 
61 of the Report of the Governor’s Commission on Capital Punishment is 
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bracketed in recognition that the General Assembly is still in the process 
of responding to that Commission’s proposed procedures and standards of 
adjudication for death-penalty cases. 
 As a fi nal matter, it is important to note that proposed Article 900 is not 
intended to address all issues (or indeed, any issues) regarding the sentencing 
and disposition of offenders. Rather, Article 900 deals only with those basic 
issues necessary to make clear the meaning of the Proposed Code’s general 
scheme of liability — for example, that offense grades defi ne a certain 
hierarchy; that the Code contemplates certain broad factors that will operate 
to aggravate an offense’s grade, and addresses those factors by imposing 
general aggravations rather than applying them to specifi c offenses; and 
that the Code anticipates a new scheme for imposing liability for multiple 
offenses, ensuring that each additional offense of conviction will contribute to 
an offender’s total punishment. The Proposed Code’s silence as to other, more 
complex sentencing issues does not indicate a lack of awareness or concern 
about such issues, but an understanding that they were beyond the scope of 
the present project. Moreover, the “authorized” terms of imprisonment and 
fi nes appearing in Article 900 are themselves tentative. The primary focus 
of the Commission’s work has been to ensure that the grading of different 
offenses is rational and proportional, and not to determine the appropriate 
absolute severity of punishment attaching to a grade. Accordingly, the 
proposed offense grades are intended only to convey the relative seriousness 
of offenses, and not the sentencing consequences of a conviction for any 
offense.
 On a personal note, I would like to thank the Commission’s staff for its 
excellent and invaluable work, often under diffi cult circumstances. T.R. Eppel 
and Scott England have both given dedicated service. We owe a great debt to 
Michael Cahill, Staff Director, for his inspired leadership. His contributions 
to this work have been enormous and unheralded.
 In closing, I would like to commend Illinois State offi cials for their 
foresight and commitment to explore the development of a new criminal 
code. The serious problems in the current Illinois Criminal Code are no 
worse than those existing in other American jurisdictions, and less serious 
than those in many. With no new national model in sight, such as a Model 
Penal Code Second, it was courageous of Illinois to take the lead in at least 
exploring how a “second wave” of American criminal law recodifi cations 
might be stimulated.
Paul H. Robinson
Reporter, Illinois Criminal Code Rewrite and Reform Commission
Chicago, January 2003
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HISTORY OF CCRRC WORK
BACKGROUND
 In 1954, the Governor and Supreme Court of Illinois, along with the 
Illinois State and Chicago Bar Associations, formed a Joint Committee to 
craft a new criminal code for Illinois. At the time, criminal provisions were 
scattered throughout more than 100 chapters of the Illinois statutes.1 Many 
of the offenses were contradictory and overlapping: for example, there were 
seventy-four sections involving forms of theft, and eighteen sections relating 
to assaults.2 Moreover, offense penalties were often disproportionate to the 
harm involved or in comparison to other offenses.3
 The Joint Committee began its task by studying the Model Penal Code 
and recently revised codes of other states. The Joint Committee then formed 
a subcommittee to handle the day-to-day drafting of the Proposed Code 
and report regularly to the full Committee. Some six years later, the Joint 
Committee had completed a draft Code to be presented to the General 
Assembly. While the new Code recodifi ed practically all criminal offenses, 
the Code featured few major changes to the substantive criminal law.4 For 
the most part, the Committee borrowed from prior criminal law, where that 
law’s dictates were rational and coherent, in defi ning offenses and setting 
penalties.5
 The Committee’s work received widespread support from practitioners, 
judges, academics, and legislators. Its Proposed Code was enacted in June 
1961 with few major revisions. After becoming effective on January 1, 1962, 
the Code appears to have been accepted by practitioners with little diffi culty 
or controversy.6
 In the years since 1961, however, numerous amendments have greatly 
reduced the utility and clarity of the original criminal code. The sheer 
volume of the code has increased from 72 pages as originally enacted to 
over 1,200 today.7 Nearly all of these amendments and additions were made 
1See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 (Smith Hurd 1964), Committee Foreword to Tentative 
Final Draft of the Proposed Illinois Revised Code of 1961 at vii [hereinafter Committee 
Foreword].
2See id.
3For example, stealing a horse was punished more seriously than stealing a more 
expensive automobile.  See id.
4See Charles H. Bowman, The Illinois Criminal Code of 1961, 50 ILL. B.J. 34, 35 (Sept. 
1961).
5See CLAUDE R. SOWLE, A CONCISE EXPLANATION OF THE ILLINOIS CRIMINAL CODE OF 1961 
(1961).
6For example, in a meeting on June 29, 1962, the Illinois State’s Attorneys Association 
reported that the Code was “working well in practice with only a few minor problems due 
primarily to unfamiliarity.”  Richard B. Austin, Joint Committee to Revise Criminal Code, 51 
ILL. B.J. 96 (1962).
7See Exec. Order No. 9 (May 4, 2000) (creating the Illinois Criminal Code Rewrite and 
Reform Commission).
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on an ad hoc basis and without a comprehensive review of the code as a 
whole. As a result, several fundamental problems plague the code, much 
as they plagued Illinois criminal law prior to 1961. Provisions overlap 
with or contradict other provisions. Offenses have became obsolete or 
out of touch with current societal norms. Penalties are disproportionate 
to the harm caused or in comparison with other provisions. Numerous 
major criminal offenses are defi ned in statutes outside the criminal code. 
Conversely, various procedural, sentencing, and regulatory provisions 
that properly belong elsewhere — in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
the Code of Corrections, or another chapter related to the provision’s 
subject matter — appear within the criminal code. Many pre-existing 
common law rules, though never codifi ed (and, quite possibly, deliberately 
rejected) by the General Assembly, remain in force through case law.8
FORMING THE COMMISSION
 By March 2000, the Criminal Code of 1961 had grown so outdated and 
unwieldy that Governor George Ryan issued an executive order creating 
the Illinois Criminal Code Rewrite and Reform Commission (“CCRRC” 
or “Commission”). In creating the CCRRC, Governor Ryan stated that “the 
numerous amendments and additions to the Criminal Code have made it 
overly complex and diffi cult to interpret and apply,” such that “a substantive 
re-codifi cation process is necessary to address the signifi cant changes in our 
society” and “to ensure a cohesive and fair approach to crime and punishment 
for the next century.”9
 Governor Ryan appointed more than thirty prominent Illinois law 
enforcement offi cials, prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges, and professors 
to serve as voting Commission members. Deputy Governor of Criminal 
Justice and Public Safety Matthew Bettenhausen was appointed Chairman of 
the Commission, and Mark Warnsing, counsel to the Governor, was named 
Executive Director. Governor Ryan also designated four Vice Chairs for the 
Commission: Joel Bertocchi, Illinois Solicitor General; Illinois Appellate 
Court Justice Robert Steigmann; Rita Fry, Cook County Public Defender; 
and Peter Bensinger, Chairman of the Illinois Criminal Justice Information 
Authority. In addition, four prominent Illinois professors were invited to 
assist the Commission: Northwestern University School of Law Professor 
Paul Robinson agreed to act as the Commission’s Reporter; University of 
Illinois College of Law Professors Wayne R. LaFave and Andrew Leipold 
accepted appointments as special counsel; and Illinois State University 
Professor Paula J. Pomeranke agreed to serve the Commission as a “plain 
English” drafting consultant.
8See generally Why a New Criminal Code?, CCRRC FINAL REPORT vol. 1 at 1st pg–last 
pg.
9Exec. Order, supra note 7.
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 In addition to the Commission members and staff, various other interested 
parties were invited to participate in the rewrite process. The Commission 
leadership and staff kept members of the Illinois General Assembly informed 
of the Commission’s progress in drafting the new Code. Tentative drafts 
and supporting materials were sent to the leaders of the respective Judiciary 
Committees of the General Assembly: Representatives Rick Winkel and 
Mary K. O’Brien and Senators Carl Hawkinson and John Cullerton.10 
Moreover, Commission leaders and staff met on several occasions with the 
legislative leaders and members of their staffs to explain the proposed drafts 
and receive comments on the project.11 Other interested parties not on the 
Commission were also involved in or informed of the drafting process. For 
example, proposed drafts and supporting materials were routinely sent to 
Robert P. Boehmer of the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, 
and in August 2002, a full draft of the Proposed Code with supporting 
commentaries was sent to the Criminal Law Section of the Illinois State Bar 
Association.
DEVELOPING A DRAFTING PROCESS
 The full Commission fi rst met on August 11, 2000. Prior to that meeting, 
the Reporter sent a letter to each Commission member including an agenda 
for the meeting and a package of sample materials, related to theft offenses, 
designed to help the Commission decide how the drafting process should 
proceed.12 The sample materials included proposed new theft provisions 
and, for purposes of background and comparison, theft provisions from the 
current criminal code, the original Criminal Code of 1961, the Model Penal 
Code, and the Report of the National Commission on Federal Criminal 
Law.13 Commissioners were asked to study the theft materials, focusing on 
two issues: fi rst, their thoughts about the proposed grading scheme for the 
theft offenses as compared to the existing Illinois provisions; and second, 
their view of the general theft offenses that were proposed to replace the 
numerous specialized theft offenses in the existing criminal code.
10See Letter from Matthew R. Bettenhausen to Representative Rick Winkel and Senator 
Carl E. Hawkinson, January 17, 2002 (on fi le with Commission staff).
11Senator Hawkinson, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, responded to the 
drafts with several suggestions, stating that he was a “strong supporter of the Commission’s 
task” and that, in general, he believed “the draft proposals refl ect progress in bringing better 
order to the categories and progress toward the goal of proportionality.”  See Letter from Carl 
E. Hawkinson to Matthew Bettenhausen, January, 2001 (on fi le with Commission staff).
12Also included for Commission review were selected readings on the principles of 
criminal code drafting, a proposed table of contents for the entire new Code, including a 
general part and all the specifi c offenses, and a sample of different commentary styles for the 
Code’s Offi cial Commentary.  Id.  
13The Reporter noted in his cover letter that the materials had not gone through the typical 
proposed drafting process, in that the background materials had not yet been annotated to 
include relevant Illinois case law and the proposed provisions had not been reviewed by a 
drafting committee.
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 Using these materials as a starting point, the Commission developed an 
initial drafting process. After reviewing current Illinois law and other relevant 
sources, the Reporter, with the help of the Commission staff, would generate a 
fi rst draft of proposed provisions. These drafts, along with a set of background 
materials similar to those distributed prior to the August 11 meeting, would 
be distributed to a small group of Commissioners and advisors for a period of 
review and comment. These reviewers would respond with comments on the 
proposed drafts, suggesting alternative draft formulations where the original 
proposal was seen as problematic. The Reporter and staff would then respond 
to the comments by either making the suggested changes, asking the reviewer 
follow-up questions, or fl agging the issue as a policy matter for discussion by 
the full Commission.
 Finally, the Reporter and staff would develop revised drafts for a similar 
process of review and comment by the entire Commission. The drafts were to 
be distributed to the full Commission with the relevant background materials 
and posted on the Commission’s website in a special “members only” area. 
The aim of the process was to create a written dialogue of comments and 
responses while highlighting those issues that required discussion and 
resolution by the full Commission.
 The Reporter initiated the review-and-comment process in September 
2000 by distributing drafts of the proposed property offenses (Articles 2100 
to 2400), with corresponding background materials, to the designated small 
group of reviewers.14 Each of these reviewers submitted written comments, 
to which the Reporter provided written responses that either provided further 
explanation regarding the proposal, adopted the reviewer’s suggested change, 
or highlighted the issue as a policy matter for consideration by the full 
Commission.
 This process resulted in a revised set of property drafts that were sent with 
the accompanying background materials to the full Commission on October 
6, 2000 for a second period of review and comment. Commissioners were 
asked to review the materials and respond with comments prior to the full 
Commission meeting scheduled for November 17, 2000. To further facilitate 
discussion of the drafts, each Commissioner was invited to participate in 
two small drafting sessions on October 24, 2000, one in Chicago and one in 
Champaign. In all, seventeen Commissioners and interested parties submitted 
written comments on the draft property offenses prior to the November 
14In addition to the Reporter, this group consisted of Vice Chairman Justice Robert 
Steigmann, Professor Andrew Leipold, Cook County Assistant Public Defender Jeffery 
Howard, Executive Director Mark Warnsing, and staff members Michael Cahill and Theodore 
Eppel (attorney Scott England had not yet joined the staff).  The staff also delivered advance 
copies of the proposed property offense drafts to the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Offi ce 
(“Offi ce”), inviting that Offi ce to participate in the review process, but the Offi ce did not 
designate an attorney to work with the staff in such a capacity.
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meeting.15 In response to these comments and discussions, the Reporter 
made various changes to the property drafts and identifi ed twenty-one policy 
issues for resolution by the full Commission, annotating the proposed draft 
to include footnotes explaining both sides of each policy issue.
 The Reporter sent an agenda and materials to Commissioners in advance of 
the November 17, 2000 meeting. Included in the materials were an annotated 
set of property offense drafts that refl ected all the changes agreed upon in the 
review-and-comment period, as well as the “pro-con” footnotes highlighting 
the twenty-one remaining issues for resolution by the full Commission. The 
staff also included a “redline” version of the drafts showing all changes that 
had thus far been made to the original tentative proposed draft; a fi rst draft of 
commentaries explaining the meaning and effect of the proposed provisions; 
a table showing the relative grades of the proposed property offenses; and 
a set of tables that matched the current Chapter 720 property offenses with 
their corresponding draft provisions, and vice versa.
 After full Commission debate, the process to this point would represent 
a complete cycle of the initially planned drafting process, which would then 
be repeated for each group of Proposed Code articles and for review of the 
accumulated articles in a complete Proposed Code draft.
CLARIFYING THE SCOPE OF THE PROJECT
 Governor Ryan charged the Commission to update the forty-year-old 
criminal code to make it “more fair for victims and defendants and easier to 
read and understand.”16 To accomplish this task, Governor Ryan asked the 
Commission to “conduct a comprehensive study and analysis of the existing 
criminal laws and the procedural and sentencing laws” of Illinois.17 Following 
such review, the Commission was to
[p]ropose simple and clear language and a coherent structure 
for the criminal statutes so that the Illinois criminal laws … 
will be more easily applied and understood by both the 
public and legal practitioners; [r]eview existing offenses…to 
15In addition to the reviewers mentioned above, the following Commissioners or members 
of their staffs submitted written comments on the draft property offenses:  Stephen W. Baker, 
Richard A. Devine, Don Hays, Walter Jones, William Quinlan, Mark Rotert, Chuck Schiedel, 
Patrick Tuite, Stewart Umholtz, and Gregory P. Vazquez.  Professor William Schroeder of 
Southern Illinois University School of Law also provided comments.
16News Release, May 4, 2000.
17Exec. Order, supra note 7.  Although Governor Ryan’s order advised the Commission to 
review the procedural and sentencing rules in addition to the criminal code, the Commission 
decided early in the process that it should fi rst focus solely on drafting a new criminal code 
before addressing procedural or sentencing issues.
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determine if the penalty provided is proportional to the 
seriousness of the offense committed and to the penalties 
provided for other offenses . . . and [p]ropose new provisions 
which address the changing nature of crime[.]18
 Although the Governor’s order forming the Commission provided 
a mandate for sweeping change, by the time the Commission had been 
in existence for a few months, it was clear that there was considerable 
debate among Commissioners as to the proper scope of the project. Some 
Commissioners favored a limited “redline” approach, believing that the core 
of the CCRRC’s mission was to eliminate unnecessary provisions rather 
than to revise existing provisions or create new ones. Others favored a more 
comprehensive overhaul of the current code.19 Vice Chair Peter Bensinger 
summarized the debate in an open letter to Chairman Matthew Bettenhausen, 
noting that the issue was “[w]hether the Commission should, in essence, 
correct the existing Criminal Code or provide the General Assembly with 
an opportunity to enact a new Code, drawing on the case law and legislative 
intent of the existing Code but not necessarily following the same exact 
format or language.”20 Mr. Bensinger supported the latter course, asserting 
that “the existing Criminal Code is not only in many cases redundant and 
contradictory but confusing and diffi cult to understand.”21 
 Commissioner and DuPage County State’s Attorney Joseph Birkett 
expressed a different view in an open letter to Reporter Paul H. Robinson.22 
Commissioner Birkett argued that the Commission should not “write a 
completely new Criminal Code for Illinois,” but should devote its resources 
“to an examination of current laws and suggest appropriate changes in the 
arrangement of the Code so that it is simplifi ed.”23
 The proper scope of the project was discussed at the November 17, 
2000 Commission meeting. To meet the concerns of the Commissioners 
who favored a more limited rewrite of existing criminal law, a revised 
drafting process was proposed. First, the Reporter committed the staff to 
working with Commissioners in advance of drafting proposed offenses to 
identify concerns with existing law. Second, the Reporter agreed to include 
case law, as well as the existing Code, in preparing background materials 
describing the current state of Illinois law. Most signifi cantly, the Reporter 
18Id.
19See Aaron Chambers, Clean-Up of State’s Criminal Code is Slow Going, CHI. DAILY L. 
BULL., Apr. 21, 2001.
20Letter from Peter Bensinger to Matthew Bettenhausen, Nov. 8, 2000 (on fi le with 
Commission staff).
21Id.
22Letter from Joseph E. Birkett to Paul H. Robinson, Oct. 24, 2000 (on fi le with 
Commission staff).
23Id.
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agreed to provide, for each proposed draft provision, detailed commentary 
explaining the provision’s relation to existing Illinois law — including the 
criminal code itself, its original commentary, other statutes, case law, and 
pattern jury instructions — and the bases for any proposed changes.24 As 
the drafting process went on, the staff also facilitated review and comment 
by Commissioners by providing other supporting materials, such as tables 
summarizing how the draft provisions corresponded to current provisions, 
tables listing the relative grade of punishment for each offense, and 
memoranda on relevant issues such as the history of the original Criminal 
Code of 1961 and the proper objectives and purposes of the current reform 
project.
PREPARING THE PROPOSED CODE AND COMMENTARY
 Under the revised process, the Reporter drafted proposed General Part 
provisions and the staff produced detailed commentaries to those provisions 
as well as relevant background materials. These materials were distributed to 
the entire Commission at the June 22, 2001 Commission meeting.25
 Commissioners met again on July 20, 2001 to discuss the General Part 
drafts.26 Due to the amount of materials the staff had distributed, it was 
agreed that Commissioners would have more time to review the General Part 
materials and provide written comments. Over the next three months, ten 
commissioners sent written comments on the General Part drafts, including 
many suggested changes that were incorporated by the Reporter or became 
the basis of seven “pro-con” footnotes highlighting policy issues for debate 
and resolution by the full Commission.
 In August 2001, Governor Ryan announced that he would not seek 
reelection in 2002. The Commission leadership and Reporter thus concluded 
it was necessary to complete the drafting process before January 2003, when 
the Governor’s term would conclude. To meet this goal, the Reporter and 
staff set their immediate agenda to draft proposed offenses and supporting 
materials for the remaining Special Part articles. In January 2002, the 
Reporter sent Commissioners the proposed drafts for much of the Special 
Part (Articles 2100 to 6200) with detailed commentaries, conversion 
tables illustrating how the draft provisions corresponded to current Illinois 
provisions, and grading tables showing the relative grade for each offense. At 
the same time, the Reporter sent more preliminary drafts for offenses against 
the person (Articles 1100 to 1500), for which the supporting materials had 
not yet been fi nalized.
24See Letter from Matthew Bettenhausen to Commissioners, Apr. 24, 2001 (on fi le with 
Commission staff).
25Following this meeting, the Reporter and staff met with attorneys from the Cook County 
and DuPage County State’s Attorneys’ and Public Defenders’ offi ces to discuss in detail the 
General Part drafts and commentaries.
26Cf. Letter from Matthew Bettenhausen to Commissioners, June 28, 2001 (on fi le with 
Commission staff).
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 In early March 2002, the Reporter sent Commissioners three sets of 
materials for review and discussion at the March 15, 2002 Commission 
meeting: (1) updated drafts of proposed Special Part Articles 2100 through 
6200, including 31 policy issues for Commission resolution;27 (2) an updated 
grading table showing the relative grades for all proposed offenses;28 and (3) a 
detailed memorandum explaining why a new criminal code was necessary in 
Illinois (reproduced in this Final Report as “Why a New Criminal Code?”).
 The March 15, 2002 Commission meeting focused primarily on the 
relative grading of offenses as shown in the grading tables prepared by 
the staff. Following the meeting, the Reporter revised the grades of several 
offenses to refl ect Commissioners’ comments and concerns. In April 2002, 
the Reporter sent revised grading tables to Commissioners along with revised 
drafts for the proposed offenses against the person (Articles 1100 to 1500), 
their corresponding commentaries, and background materials.
 In the ensuing months, recognizing that the upcoming change in 
administration placed effi ciency at a premium, the Reporter and staff 
worked to fi nalize the Proposed Code, the offi cial commentaries, and the 
other supporting materials. Because of the now-limited timetable, it was 
agreed that the Reporter should move forward to prepare a full “clean” 
and comprehensive version of the Code and its supporting commentary, 
rather than taking time for the Commission to discuss and resolve the broad 
policy issues already identifi ed and fl agged on the drafts. Nonetheless, the 
Reporter and staff highlighted in 39 “pro-con” footnotes those policy issues 
they thought the General Assembly would likely want to address, including 
some issues that had initially been raised by individual Commissioners, but 
not resolved by the full Commission. The staff reviewed the entire Proposed 
Code to ensure that terminology was consistent across its various Articles 
and updated and expanded the commentary to clarify all proposed revisions 
and their bases. This work was completed in December 2002.
 The resulting two-volume Final Report will be distributed to 
Commissioners, members of the General Assembly, each county’s State’s 
Attorney and Public Defender, and various other interested parties in the 
State, including the Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority and the 
Illinois and Chicago Bar Associations, law libraries in the State, and law 
professors inside and outside of the State who express an interest in the 
Commission’s work.
27The Reporter concluded that most of the issues highlighted for Commission resolution 
were value judgments properly best left to the Commission’s discretion, and thus offered no 
recommendation on 25 of the 31 issues, and only mild recommendations on the others.  See 
Letter from Matthew Bettenhausen to Commissioners, Mar. 7, 2001 (on fi le with Commission 
staff).
28The Reporter reminded Commissioners that the purpose of the grading tables was to 
foster discussion of the relative grading of offenses, for purposes of ensuring proportionality, 
and not the absolute sentence assigned to any offense grade, as the sentencing ranges for 
particular grades had not yet been determined.  See id. 
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WHY A NEW CRIMINAL CODE?
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
 In the forty years since the legislature adopted the Criminal Code of 
1961, thousands of individual changes to the law have led to numerous 
inconsistencies, redundancies, ambiguities, and contradictions in the Code. 
As was the case in 1961, the time is ripe to take a step back and conduct a 
more panoramic review of the Illinois Criminal Code.
 The Proposed Code seeks to replace the current code with a clear, 
concise, and comprehensive set of provisions. Specifi cally, the Proposed 
Code seeks to include necessary provisions not contained in the current code; 
to eliminate unnecessary or inconsistent provisions of the current code; to 
revise existing language and structure to make the Code easier to understand 
and apply; and to ensure that the offenses and rules contained in the Code are 
cohesive and relate to one another in a consistent and rational manner.
 In developing the Proposed Code, the drafters were guided by fi ve 
general drafting principles, set forth below. The fi rst three principles relate to 
the form of the Code; the fi nal two principles relate to its content.
1. Use clear, accessible language and organization
 One of the critical functions of a criminal code is to provide notice 
to citizens of what conduct is prohibited. Clear and accessible writing 
enables provision of true notice while also ensuring that no offender escapes 
liability because of an incomplete or ambiguous offense defi nition. More 
straightforward code provisions also promote development of clearer jury 
instructions, making it easier for jurors to fulfi ll their critical role. Even for 
members of the criminal justice system, who work with the code every day 
and must be intimately familiar with its rules, plain-language expression is 
essential. Current Illinois law, however, is often less clear than it could, and 
should, be.
 • Various current provisions, such as the mail-fraud provision, use 
undefi ned terms whose meaning is not obvious, and frequently 
employ legal terms of art without explaining their meaning. In 
such cases, users of the criminal code (including judges, lawyers, 
law enforcement offi cials, and jury members) must guess at the 
legislature’s intended meaning.
 • The current provisions regarding eavesdropping provide an example 
of poor structure, as they create a complicated maze of offenses, 
exceptions, defenses, and “exemptions.” Some acceptable conduct 
is noted within the offense defi nitions; some falls under a separate 
list of “affi rmative defenses;” some is elsewhere stated to be “not 
unlawful;” some is “not prohibited;” and some is “exempt” under 
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an entirely separate provision. These various exclusions frequently 
overlap one another, overlap defenses provided in the current code’s 
General Part, or both.
 • Current Illinois law contains numerous offenses that unnecessarily 
reiterate, or even undermine, General Part provisions. For 
example, many offenses are defi ned to prohibit certain conduct and 
“attempting” such conduct. This approach to defi ning offenses short-
circuits the general rules for attempts set forth in the General Part, 
under which attempts are distinguished from completed crimes for 
grading purposes.
 • Current law requires that the defendant prove the insanity defense 
by clear and convincing evidence, but all other excuses — and all 
nonexculpatory defenses — must be disproved by the State beyond 
a reasonable doubt. These evidentiary rules are inconsistent. If 
such a burden-shifting rule is appropriate for one excuse defense, it 
should also apply to other excuses — as well as to nonexculpatory 
defenses, which do not even involve any claim of blamelessness on 
the defendant’s part.
2. Provide a comprehensive statement of rules
 A criminal code must include all necessary rules governing liability. 
Comprehensiveness helps avoid inappropriate results. Courts, which decide 
individual cases and act independently of one another, cannot be as effective 
as a legislature in formulating coherent general doctrines that will work 
together as the provisions of a comprehensive code can and must. Moreover, 
an uncodifi ed rule is more likely to be applied differently in similar cases 
than a codifi ed rule, as the terms of the latter are fi xed, explicit, and available 
to all offi cials at each stage in the process. Following are a few examples of 
signifi cant provisions current law omits:
 • Current Chapter 720 contains no provision dealing with causation, an 
issue that is often critical in determining whether conduct constitutes 
a crime. 
 • Current Chapter 720 lacks a general provision governing when 
consent will preclude liability, although the absence of consent 
is defi ned as an offense element for many specifi c offenses. Mere 
use of the phrase “without consent” is inadequate because in 
various situations, a person’s agreement will not constitute valid 
legal consent (for example, where the person is incompetent or the 
“consent” is coerced). The current provisions fail to specify those 
situations clearly.
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 • The current code does not provide meaningful rules regarding 
convictions for multiple offenses or counts, but merely defi nes the 
term “included offense” and provides that “[n]o person shall be 
convicted of both the inchoate and the principal offense.” Such basic 
statements are inadequate to provide proper guidance in this complex 
area.
 • Chapter 720 does not provide an offense of “negligent homicide.” 
Thus a person who ignores a substantial and unjustifi able risk of 
killing someone else, and thereby does kill someone else, may 
escape liability entirely under current law.
 • Although current law includes a reckless homicide offense and 
a reckless conduct offense, there is no offense to cover reckless 
conduct that actually results in injury (short of death). The reckless 
conduct offense does not distinguish causing actual harm from 
merely “endangering” another. As a result, one who recklessly 
causes a catastrophe — by, for example, recklessly detonating an 
explosive for a construction project and severely injuring dozens of 
people — commits the same offense as one who merely creates a risk 
of physical pain to a single person.
3. Consolidate offenses
 The criminal code rewrite project provides a valuable opportunity to 
consolidate multiple offenses that overlap, contradict, or narrowly focus on 
particular instances of a general category of improper conduct. Consolidation 
also aids the task of proper grading, because it is nearly impossible to 
maintain consistent, proportional grading when offense defi nitions are based 
on insignifi cant, or incomprehensible, distinctions. The following are a few 
examples of the numerous problems that suggest enormous potential to 
consolidate offenses more effectively:
 • The sheer verbiage of current law is one indication of its failure to 
consolidate similar offenses. To take just one example, the current 
criminal code uses 25,461 words to defi ne its fraud offenses — and 
current statutes outside the code use at least another 44,205 words to 
defi ne additional fraud offenses — while the Proposed Code requires 
only 2,279 words to do so. Overall, the Proposed Code’s Special Part 
uses only 14.9 percent — less than 1/6 — of the words in the current 
code’s Special Part, and only 6.7 percent — about 1/15 — of the 
current Special Part plus other, non-criminal code statutory felonies.
 • Current Illinois law defi nes numerous serious crimes outside the 
criminal code. Hundreds of misdemeanors and Class 4 felonies are 
scattered throughout the Compiled Statutes, and more than eighty 
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offenses outside of Chapter 720 (many of which overlap, or simply 
restate, prohibitions inside of Chapter 720) are graded as Class 3 
felonies or higher. 
 • Current law frequently includes numerous narrow offenses in 
addition to, or instead of, a single, more general offense. In the area 
of property damage, for example, in addition to the current general 
offense, there are separate offenses for damaging library materials, 
delivery containers, anhydrous ammonia equipment, government-
supported property, and animal facilities, to name just a few. Even 
more exaggerated examples of needless multiplicity of offenses exist 
for such offense categories as theft, fraud, perjury, and falsifi cation. In 
many cases, these multiple offenses will impose varying sentencing 
grades without any apparent basis for the variation.
4. Grade offenses rationally and proportionally
 One virtue of a recodifi cation project, relative to the usual piecemeal 
legislative additions and alterations to the criminal code, is the opportunity it 
provides for a general review of the system of grading offenses, considering 
how all offenses relate to one another rather than considering individual 
offenses in a vacuum. The necessarily ad hoc process that has generated 
current law makes consistent grading diffi cult, if not impossible. An overall 
review reveals a great variety of grading problems and inconsistencies, of 
which the following are merely a few examples:
 • Current law grades eavesdropping more seriously than unauthorized 
videotaping, so that videotaping another person undressing in a 
locker room (or her own home) is a less serious offense than listening 
to another’s phone conversation.
 • The current theft offense aggravates punishment a full grade for 
thefts from the person and another full grade for thefts committed 
in a school or place of worship. As a result, taking less than $300 
in property from a person while in a school or place of worship is 
a Class 2 felony. Thus a student who takes another student’s lunch 
money out of his pocket is subject to the same punishment as a person 
who commits kidnaping, aggravated domestic battery, aggravated 
criminal sexual abuse, or ordinary theft of up to $100,000.
 • Some unexplained grading anomalies refl ect current law’s lack of 
clarity and failure to consolidate similar offenses. For example, 
current law defi nes the offense of bribery as a Class 2 felony, but 
also defi nes a separate offense covering “kickbacks” (an undefi ned 
term) and grades that offense as a Class 3 felony. At the same time, 
however, current law assigns the failure to report a bribe a lower 
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grade than the failure to report a “kickback” — an especially odd 
distinction since one would expect the public offi cials who receive 
bribe offers to be held to a higher reporting standard than the private 
citizens who receive “kickback” offers.
 • Current law defi nes a Class 1 felony for parents or guardians who 
allow another person to engage in various sexual acts with their 
children, without taking into account the severity of the underlying 
sexual offense. Under this scheme, a parent who condones another 
16-year-old’s intimate touching of her 16-year-old child on a date is 
exposed to the same liability as a parent who allows her 35-year-old 
live-in boyfriend to molest her 8-year-old child. 
 • Current law grades some forms of battery more seriously than 
second-degree murder (and provides no “provocation” mitigation for 
such batteries), so that injuring another person may be graded more 
seriously than killing the person.
 • The current consecutive-versus-concurrent grading scheme is too 
crude to properly deal with complex issues of liability for multiple 
offenses, as its “double-or-nothing” approach either completely 
trivializes all offenses other than the most serious one, or else 
imposes disproportionately lengthy sentences for multiple offenses 
whose cumulative harm may not refl ect the sentence imposed.
 • Although its basic sentencing scheme is crude, current law has 
developed a tangled web of provisions governing whether a 
concurrent or consecutive sentence is proper. That tortuous scheme 
has led to such anomalous results as the fi nding in one recent case 
that the maximum allowed (consecutive) sentence for a defendant’s 
fi ve offenses of conviction was less than — in fact, less than half 
of — the sentence for which he would have been eligible had he 
committed only one of the offenses.
5. Retain all (but only) reasonable policy decisions embodied in current law
 Because substantive policy decisions about the rules of the criminal law 
refl ect value judgments properly left to the legislature, the Proposed Code 
seeks to follow the substance of current law wherever possible. In some 
places, however, current law contains multiple contradictory rules — and 
therefore no clear rule — on a subject. Some rules may have been sound 
when enacted, but no longer refl ect current realities or sensibilities and 
require expansion, alteration, or deletion.
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• Chapter 720 contains a number of outdated offenses that do not 
belong in a modern criminal code, such as the offenses of adultery 
and fornication. Maintenance of dead-letter statutes of this kind only 
tends to invite abuse and to undermine the authority of the criminal 
law as a refl ection of the governed community’s sensibilities.
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WHY A NEW CRIMINAL CODE?
INTRODUCTION
 It has been forty years since the legislature adopted the Criminal Code 
of 1961. In that time, the code has been expanded and amended in numerous 
ways. Those subsequent alterations, however, have each sought to address the 
specifi c matter at hand, with little attention to the general effects of the change 
on the criminal code’s overall structure, its terminology, or its application. 
Meanwhile, four decades have passed without an overarching review of the 
criminal code as a whole to determine what modifi cations should, or must, 
be made to refl ect changing times, developing insights, and changes in the 
broader legal landscape. As a result, the current criminal code has numerous 
inconsistencies, redundancies, ambiguities, and contradictions. As was the 
case in 1961 — and may well be the case again in another forty or fi fty years 
— the time is ripe to take a step back and conduct a more panoramic review 
of the criminal code.
 The Proposed Code attempts to eliminate these problems and replace 
the current code with a clear, concise, and comprehensive set of provisions. 
Specifi cally, the Proposed Code seeks to include necessary provisions not 
contained in the current code; to eliminate unnecessary or inconsistent 
provisions of the current code; to revise existing language and structure to 
make the Code easier to understand and apply; and to ensure that the offenses 
and rules contained in the Code are cohesive and relate to one another in a 
consistent and rational manner. At the same time, the Proposed Code aims 
to track the substantive policy judgments refl ected in the original Code and 
its subsequent amendments. When the process of clarifying and reconciling 
current provisions made such substantive choices necessary, the drafters 
have sought to explain and justify the proposed changes with commentary 
designed to assist the enacters, and ultimately the users, of the Proposed 
Code.
 In developing the Proposed Code, the drafters were guided by fi ve 
general drafting principles, set forth below. The fi rst three principles relate to 
the form of the Code. Experience shows that proper form can aid, and poor 
form can hinder, a code’s ability to achieve its substantive functions. The fi nal 
two principles concern the Code’s content.
1. USE CLEAR, ACCESSIBLE LANGUAGE AND ORGANIZATION
 One of the critical functions of a criminal code is to provide notice to 
citizens of what conduct is prohibited. Indeed, the fundamental principle of 
legality — the requirement of a clear prior written prohibition as a prerequisite 
to criminal liability — underlies numerous constitutional and other core 
criminal-law rules, such as the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto 
laws and the constitutional invalidation of vague offenses. Providing notice 
also has obvious practical value, for citizens can hardly be expected to obey 
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the law’s commands if they are unaware of them, or cannot understand them. 
Accordingly, clear and accessible writing enables provision of true notice 
and ensures that no judgment is imposed that was not clearly intended and 
expressed by the legislature, and that no offender who violates the rules will 
escape liability because of an incomplete or ambiguous declaration of the 
law’s commands.
 The virtues of plain-language drafting extend beyond the direct 
imposition of liability. The criminal code serves functions beyond notifying 
the general public in advance of the law’s commands of them. The code is 
also the ultimate basis of guidance for lay juries, who must decide after the 
fact whether a criminal offense has been committed in a particular situation. 
More straightforward code provisions promote development of clearer jury 
instructions, making it easier for jurors to fulfi ll their role. Even (perhaps 
especially) for members of the criminal justice system, who work with the 
code every day, plain-language expression is essential. Law enforcement 
offi cers, for example, are charged with implementing the code’s rules 
fully and fairly. Yet these offi cers are not lawyers. No less than the general 
populace, their ability to perform their legal role is enhanced by clarity in the 
criminal law’s written expression.
 Further explanation of this goal follows, along with a representative, 
but by no means exhaustive, collection of examples of current Illinois law’s 
shortcomings in this area.29
A. Clear Language
 Several drafting methods promote the goal of clarity. First, effective 
communication calls for short, commonly used words, and avoidance of legal 
terms of art where possible. When such legal terms are used, they should be 
defi ned, and it should be easily apparent that the terms’ use is to be guided by 
the defi nition and not left to unguided speculation. One diffi culty with current 
law is that numerous important terms, many of which have no commonly 
understood meaning or are complex legal terms, are left undefi ned. In such 
cases, users of the criminal code (including judges, lawyers, law enforcement 
offi cials, and jury members) must guess at the legislature’s intended meaning. 
To avoid this problem, the Proposed Code includes a provision at the end of 
each Article that lists all defi ned terms used in that Article.
 Current law also sometimes impedes clear understanding by using 
undefi ned terms where similar defi ned terms exist. For example, current 
5/4-4 to 5/4-7 clearly defi ne the culpability levels of intent, knowledge, 
29For example, numerous other provisions use unclear language.  See, e.g., 720 ILCS 
5/2-4; 5/3-5(b); 5/4-8(c); 5/6-2(a); 5/12-4.8; 5/12-9(a); 5/12-21.6; 5/16-1.2; 5/16-3(b); 5/16B-
2(d); 5/16B-2.1; 5/17-1(A)(iii); 5/17-15; 5/17-17; 5/17-18; 5/17-22; 5/17B-10(b); 5/21-3(c); 
5/21-1.1; 5/21.2-2; 5/21.3-5; 5/24-1(c)(1)-(2); 5/24-1.2(5) & (6); 5/24-1.2-5(5) & (6); 5/24-
1.5(a); 5/26-1(a)(1); 5/29A-1 & -2; 5/31A-1.2(e); 5/31-5; 5/32-10; 5/32-11; 5/32-12; 5/33C-2 
& -3; 5/33E-6(a); 5/33E-16; 125/2; 130/2; 130/2a; 135/1; 135/1-1(l); 150/4.1; 300/1; 360/1; 
540/1; 660/2.
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recklessness, and negligence. Nevertheless, numerous current Illinois 
provisions employ other culpability requirements, such as “specifi c intent,”30 
“having reason to know,”31 “reasonably should know,”32 “wil[l]fully,”33 
“maliciously,”34 “fraudulently,”35 “designedly,”36 or a combination of 
the foregoing and others.37 The Proposed Code rejects the use of such 
outmoded, and undefi ned,38 culpability terms in defi ning offenses. Rather, the 
Proposed Code exclusively uses the culpability levels of intent, knowledge, 
recklessness, and negligence, which are the nearly universal norm for modern 
criminal codes.
30See 720 ILCS 5/6-3(a).
31See 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(2) & (a)(3); 5/12-11; 690/2; see also 20 ILCS 1805/94a(b)(1); 
625 ILCS 5/18c-7502(a)(iii).
32See 720 ILCS 5/11-20.1; 5/12-21; 5/20-1.1; 5/24-1.2; 5/24.6-20; 5/29B-1; 510/11.
33See 720 ILCS 5/12-4.8; 5/12-9(a); 5/12-21.6; 5/16-1.2; 5/16-3(b); 5/16B-2(d); 5/17-15; 
5/17-22; 5/17B-10(b); 5/21-.2-2; 5/32-10; 5/33C-2; 5/33C-3; 5/33E-16; 130/2; 130/2a; 150/
4.1; 660/2; see also, e.g., 15 ILCS 520/23; 30 ILCS 230/2b; 35 ILCS 5/1301; 35 ILCS 130/22 
& /23; 55 ILCS 5/3-11019; 205 ILCS 5/49; 205 ILCS 620/8-1; 205 ILCS 635/4-4; 205 ILCS 
690/36; 215 ILCS 5/1023; 410 ILCS 535/27; 625 ILCS 5/4-103.2(a)(7).
34See 720 ILCS 5/16B-2.1; see also, e.g., 20 ILCS 2305/2.
35See 720 ILCS 5/16G-15(a); 5/17-13; 5/17-16; 5/33C-1; 5/33C-4; see also, e.g., 20 ILCS 
4020/22; 35 ILCS 130/22; 35 ILCS 200/21-306(a)(2); 310 ILCS 10/25.04; 320 ILCS 25/9.
36See 720 ILCS 5/17-17.
37See 720 ILCS 5/17-1(A)(iii) (“wilfully, and with . . . specifi c intent”); 5/17-18 (“wilfully 
and designedly”); 5/21-1.1 (“wilfully and maliciously”); 5/32-11 (“wickedly and willfully”); 
125/2 (“[w]ilfully obstructs or interferes with . . . specifi c intent”); 300/1 (“willfully and 
maliciously”); 360/1 (“wilfully and maliciously”); 540/1 (“wilfully, corruptly and falsely”); 
see also, e.g., 55 ILCS 5/3-14043 (“wilfully, corruptly and falsely”); 105 ILCS 10/9 (“wilfully 
and maliciously”); 210 ILCS 85/65.17 (“wilfully or wantonly”); 605 ILCS 10/28 (“wilfully, 
maliciously and forcibly”); 610 ILCS 95/1 (“willfully and maliciously”); 625 ILCS 5/11-503 
(“willful or wanton disregard”).
38Currently, there are no pattern jury instructions defi ning culpability levels other than 
intent, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence.  See IPI (CRIMINAL) 5.01 et seq. (4th ed. 
2000).  The pattern jury instructions, like current 5/4-5 and 5/4-6, contain language equating 
“knowingly” with “willfully,” and “recklessly” with “wantonly.”  See IPI (CRIMINAL) 5.01 & 
5.01B (4th ed. 2000).  Current 5/4-5 and 5/4-6 provide, however, that such equivalence does 
not exist where a statute “clearly requires a different meaning.”  See 720 ILCS 5/4-5; 5/4-6.  It 
is unclear, therefore, whether “willfully” should be considered synonymous with “knowingly” 
for the numerous current offenses specifying both culpability levels with respect to a single 
element or set of elements.  Cf., e.g., 720 ILCS 5/12-4.8 (“knowingly and willfully”); 5/12-
9(a) (“knowingly and willfully”); 5/17B-10(b) (“willfully facilitates, aids, abets, assists, or 
knowingly participates in a known violation”); 130/2 (“knowingly or wilfully”); 130/2a 
(“knowingly or wilfully”).    
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 As an example of the type of legalese the Proposed Code seeks to avoid, 
current law defi nes the offense of “party to fraudulent land conveyance” as 
follows:
A person who is a party to a fraudulent conveyance of lands, 
tenements or hereditaments, goods or chattels, or a right 
or interest issuing out of the same, or to a bond, action, 
judgment, or enforcement thereof; contract or conveyance 
had, made, or contrived, with intent to deceive and defraud 
others, or to defeat, hinder, or delay creditors or others of 
the their just debts, damages, or demands, or who is a party 
as stated in this Section, at any time wittingly and willingly 
puts in use, avow, maintain, justify, or defend the same or 
any of them as true, and done, had, or made in good faith, 
or upon good consideration, or sells, aliens, or assigns any 
of the lands, tenements, goods, chattels, or other things 
mentioned in this Section, to him or her conveyed as stated 
in this Section, or any part thereof, is guilty of a business 
offense and shall not be fi ned exceeding $1,000.39
Because it uses numerous opaque, yet undefi ned terms — such as “fraudulent 
conveyance,” “tenements,” “hereditaments,” “chattels,” “wittingly and 
willingly,” “good faith,” “good consideration,” “aliens,” and “assigns” — this 
provision does not clearly communicate its prohibitions to the public, to 
members of the criminal justice system, or perhaps even to experienced 
attorneys and judges. The Proposed Code defi nes a corresponding, but 
briefer and clearer, offense to punish one who “destroys, removes, conceals, 
encumbers, transfers, or otherwise deals with any property with intent to 
defeat or obstruct the claim of any creditor.”40 
 Similarly, the current mail-fraud provision imposes liability on one who
devises or intends to devise any scheme or artifi ce to defraud 
or obtain money or property by means of false or fraudulent 
pretenses, representations or promises, or to sell, dispose 
of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or 
furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit security 
obligation, security, or other article, or anything represented 
to be or intimidated [sic] or held out to be such counterfeit 
or spurious article.41
39720 ILCS 5/17-14.
40Section 3112(1)(a).  The proposed Section also differs from the current provision by 
requiring knowledge that proceedings for the benefi t of creditors are pending or imminent 
to ensure that the defendant’s conduct is suffi ciently blameworthy to warrant criminal 
sanctions.
41720 ILCS 5/17-23(b)(1).
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The current provision was likely designed to serve as a comprehensive 
catchall offense, but its vague and overlapping terms — such as “devises,” 
“scheme or artifi ce to defraud,” “fraudulent pretenses, representations, or 
promises,” “counterfeit,” and “spurious” — serve only to make its scope less 
clear.42 In fact, when the mail-fraud provision’s language is analyzed and 
considered in light of other current code provisions, it becomes clear that 
the provision is redundant. The Proposed Code does not include a specifi c 
offense for “mail fraud,” in recognition that other general offenses (such as 
theft or attempted theft) already cover such conduct.43
 Similarly, the organization of individual provisions, as well as the 
overall organization of the code (discussed below), affects a criminal 
code’s comprehensibility. For example, the current provisions regarding 
eavesdropping — two of which are set out in the margin — create a 
complicated maze of offenses, exceptions, defenses, and “exemptions.”44 
42Elsewhere, the provision states that a “‘scheme or artifi ce to defraud’ includes a scheme 
or artifi ce to deprive another of the intangible right to honest services,” but it does not provide 
any insight as to what a “scheme or artifi ce” is.  720 ILCS 5/17-23(e)(1).
43See, e.g., Sections 2102 (theft by taking), 2103 (theft by deception).
44Two of the relevant provisions (there are also several others) read as follows:
§ 720 ILCS 5/14-2.  Elements of the offense; affi rmative defense
 Sec. 14-2. Elements of the offense; affi rmative defense. 
 (a) A person commits eavesdropping when he:
  (1) Knowingly and intentionally uses an eavesdropping device 
for the purpose of hearing or recording all or any part of any conversation 
or intercepts, retains, or  transcribes electronic communication unless he 
does so (A) with the consent of all of the parties to such conversation 
or electronic communication or (B) in accordance with Article 108A or 
Article 108B of the “Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963,” approved 
August 14, 1963, as amended [725 ILCS 5/108A-1 et seq. or 725 ILCS 
5/108B-1 et seq.]; or
  (2) Manufactures, assembles, distributes, or possesses any 
electronic, mechanical, eavesdropping, or other device knowing that or 
having reason to know that the design of the device renders it primarily 
useful for the purpose of the surreptitious hearing or recording of oral 
conversations or the interception, retention, or transcription of electronic 
communications and the intended or actual use of the device is contrary to 
the provisions of this Article; or
  (3) Uses or divulges, except as authorized by this Article or 
by Article 108A or 108B of the “Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963,” 
approved August 14, 1963, as amended [725 ILCS 5/108A-1 et seq. or 725 
ILCS 5/108B-1 et seq.], any information which he knows or reasonably 
should know was obtained through the use of an eavesdropping device.
  (b) It is an affi rmative defense to a charge brought under this Article 
relating to the interception of a privileged communication that the person 
charged:
 1. was a law enforcement offi cer acting pursuant to an order of 
interception, entered pursuant to Section 108A-1 or 108B-5 of the Code 
of Criminal Procedure of 1963 [725 ILCS 5/108A-1 et seq. or 725 ILCS 
5/108B-1 et seq.]; and                                                           (continued…)
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44(…continued)
  2. at the time the communication was intercepted, the offi cer 
was unaware that the communication was privileged; and 
 3. stopped the interception within a reasonable time after 
discovering that the communication was privileged; and 
 4. did not disclose the contents of the communication.
  (c) It is not unlawful for a manufacturer or a supplier of eavesdropping 
devices, or a provider of wire or electronic communication services, their 
agents, employees, contractors, or venders to manufacture, assemble, sell, or 
possess an eavesdropping device within the normal course of their business 
for purposes not contrary to this Article or for law enforcement offi cers and 
employees of the Illinois Department of Corrections to manufacture, assemble, 
purchase, or possess an eavesdropping device in preparation for or within the 
course of their offi cial duties.
  (d) The interception, recording, or transcription of an electronic 
communication by an employee of the Illinois Department of Corrections 
is not prohibited under this Act, provided that the interception, recording, or 
transcription is:
 (1) otherwise legally permissible under Illinois law;
 (2) conducted with the approval of the Illinois Department of 
Corrections for the purpose of investigating or enforcing a State criminal 
law or a Department rule or regulation with respect to persons committed 
to the Department; and
 (3) within the scope of the employee’s offi cial duties.
§ 720 ILCS 5/14-3.  Exemptions
  Sec. 14-3. Exemptions.  The following activities shall be exempt from the 
provisions of this Article:
  (a) Listening to radio, wireless and television communications of any sort 
where the same are publicly made;
  (b) Hearing conversation when heard by employees of any common carrier 
by wire incidental to the normal course of their employment in the operation, 
maintenance or repair of the equipment of such common carrier by wire so long 
as no information obtained thereby is used or divulged by the hearer;
  (c) Any broadcast by radio, television or otherwise whether it be a 
broadcast or recorded for the purpose of later broadcasts of any function where 
the public is in attendance and the conversations are overheard incidental to the 
main purpose for which such broadcasts are then being made;
  (d) Recording or listening with the aid of any device to any emergency 
communication made in the normal course of operations by any federal, state 
or local law enforcement agency or institutions dealing in emergency services, 
including, but not limited to, hospitals, clinics, ambulance services, fi re 
fi ghting agencies, any public utility, emergency repair facility, civilian defense 
establishment or military installation;
  (e) Recording the proceedings of any meeting required to be open by the 
Open Meetings Act, as amended [5 ILCS 120/1 et seq.];
(continued…)
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44(…continued)
  (f) Recording or listening with the aid of any device to incoming telephone 
calls of phone lines publicly listed or advertised as consumer “hotlines” by 
manufacturers or retailers of food and drug products. Such recordings must be 
destroyed, erased or turned over to local law enforcement authorities within 24 
hours from the time of such recording and shall not be otherwise disseminated. 
Failure on the part of the individual or business operating any such recording 
or listening device to comply with the requirements of this subsection shall 
eliminate any civil or criminal immunity conferred upon that individual or 
business by the operation of this Section;
  (g) With prior notifi cation to the State’s Attorney of the county in which it 
is to occur, recording or listening with the aid of any device to any conversation 
where a law enforcement offi cer, or any person acting at the direction of law 
enforcement, is a party to the conversation and has consented to it being 
intercepted or recorded under circumstances where the use of the device is 
necessary for the protection of the law enforcement offi cer or any person 
acting at the direction of law enforcement, in the course of an investigation 
of a forcible felony, a felony violation of the Illinois Controlled Substances 
Act [720 ILCS 570/100 et seq.], a felony violation of the Cannabis Control 
Act [720 ILCS 550/1 et seq.], or any “streetgang related” or “gang-related” 
felony as those terms are defi ned in the Illinois Streetgang Terrorism Omnibus 
Prevention Act [740 ILCS 147/1 et seq.]. Any recording or evidence derived as 
the result of this exemption shall be inadmissible in any proceeding, criminal, 
civil or administrative, except (i) where a party to the conversation suffers great 
bodily injury or is killed during such conversation, or (ii) when used as direct 
impeachment of a witness concerning matters contained in the interception 
or recording. The Director of the Department of State Police shall issue 
regulations as are necessary concerning the use of devices, retention of tape 
recordings, and reports regarding their use;
  (h) Recordings made simultaneously with a video recording of an oral 
conversation between a peace offi cer, who has identifi ed his or her offi ce, and 
a person stopped for an investigation of an offense under the Illinois Vehicle 
Code [625 ILCS 5/1-100 et seq.];
  (i) Recording of a conversation made by or at the request of a person, 
not a law  enforcement offi cer or agent of a law enforcement offi cer, who is a 
party to the conversation, under reasonable suspicion that another party to the 
conversation is committing, is about to commit, or has committed a criminal 
offense against the person or a member of his or her immediate household, and 
there is reason to believe that evidence of the criminal offense may be obtained 
by the recording; and 
  (j) The use of a telephone monitoring device by either (1) a corporation 
or other business entity engaged in marketing or opinion research or (2) a 
corporation or other business entity engaged in telephone solicitation, as 
defi ned in this subsection, to record or listen to oral telephone solicitation 
conversations or marketing or opinion research conversations by an employee 
of the corporation or other business entity when:
 (i) the monitoring is used for the purpose of service quality 
control of marketing or opinion research or telephone solicitation, the 
education or training of employees or contractors engaged in marketing or 
opinion research or telephone solicitation, or internal research related to 
marketing or opinion research or telephone solicitation; and
(continued…)
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44(…continued)
 (ii) the monitoring is used with the consent of at least one 
person who is an active  party to the marketing or opinion research 
conversation or telephone solicitation  conversation being monitored.  
No communication or conversation or any part, portion, or aspect of the 
communication or conversation made, acquired, or obtained, directly 
or indirectly, under this exemption (j), may be, directly or indirectly, 
furnished to any law enforcement offi cer, agency, or offi cial for any 
purpose or used in any inquiry or investigation, or used, directly or 
indirectly, in any administrative, judicial, or other proceeding, or divulged 
to any third party.
  When recording or listening authorized by this subsection (j) on telephone 
lines used for marketing or opinion research or telephone solicitation purposes 
results in recording or listening to a conversation that does not relate to 
marketing or opinion research or telephone solicitation; the person recording 
or listening shall, immediately upon determining that the conversation does 
not relate to marketing or opinion research or telephone solicitation, terminate 
the recording or listening and destroy any such recording as soon as is 
practicable.
  Business entities that use a telephone monitoring or telephone recording 
system pursuant to this exemption (j) shall provide current and prospective 
employees with notice that the monitoring or recordings may occur during 
the course of their employment. The notice shall include prominent signage 
notifi cation within the workplace.
  Business entities that use a telephone monitoring or telephone recording 
system pursuant to this exemption (j) shall provide their employees or agents 
with access to personal-only telephone lines which may be pay telephones, that 
are not subject to telephone monitoring or telephone recording.
  For the purposes of this subsection (j), “telephone solicitation” means a 
communication through the use of a telephone by live operators:
 (i) soliciting the sale of goods or services;
 (ii) receiving orders for the sale of goods or services;
 (iii) assisting in the use of goods or services; or
 (iv) engaging in the solicitation, administration, or collection of 
bank or retail credit accounts.
  For the purposes of this subsection (j), “marketing or opinion research” 
means a marketing or opinion research interview conducted by a live telephone 
interviewer engaged by a corporation or other business entity whose principal 
business is the design, conduct, and analysis of polls and surveys measuring the 
opinions, attitudes, and responses of respondents toward products and services, 
or social or political issues, or both.
720 ILCS 5/14-2, 5/14-3.
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Some acceptable conduct is noted within the offense defi nitions (“unless he 
does so . . .”, “except as authorized . . .”); some activity is protected by an 
“affi rmative defense;” some is “not unlawful;” some is “not prohibited;” and 
some is “exempt.” These various exclusions frequently overlap one another, 
overlap defenses provided in the current code’s General Part, or both. The 
proposed provision covers the same substantive ground as the current law’s 
numerous exceptions, defenses, not-offenses, and exemptions, but does so in 
less space and clearer fashion by defi ning the offense to require intercepting 
a “private” communication and setting forth three explicit defenses.45 
45The provision reads as follows:
Section 2401.  Interception of Electronic or Oral Communications
(1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he knowingly intercepts any 
private electronic or oral communication by means of any intercepting device other than 
equipment being used by a communications common carrier in the ordinary course of its 
business.
(2)  Defi nitions.
(a)  “Contents,” when used with respect to any electronic or oral communication, 
includes any information concerning the identity of the parties to such communication 
or the existence, substance, or meaning of that communication.
(b)  “Electronic communication” means any communication made in whole or 
in part through the use of facilities for the transmission of communications by the 
aid of electronic, microwave, radio, cable, satellite, or other connection between 
the point of origin and the point of reception furnished or operated by any person 
engaged as a common carrier in providing or operating such facilities for the 
transmission of communications.
(c)  “Intercepting device” means any electronic, mechanical, or other device 
or apparatus that can be used to intercept an electronic or oral communication, but 
does not include:
(i) equipment that a communications common carrier, in the ordinary 
course of its business, furnished to a subscriber or user, or specifi cally 
authorized a subscriber or user to use, and that was being used by the subscriber 
or user in the ordinary course of business; or
(ii) a hearing aid or similar device being used to correct subnormal 
hearing.
(d)  “Interception” of an electronic or oral communication means the visual or 
aural acquisition, or the recording by any means, of all or part of the contents of the 
communication.
(e)  “Private electronic communication” means an electronic communication 
sent by a person with an expectation that such communication is not subject to 
interception under circumstances justifying such expectation.
(f)  “Private oral communication” means any oral communication uttered by a 
person with an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception 
under circumstances justifying such expectation.
(continued…)
ILL Code  Vol Ia   xxxi 6/30/03, 3:35:12 PM
xxxii
Proposed Illinois Criminal Code
45(…continued)
(3)  Defenses.  It is a defense to prosecution under this Section or Section 2405 
that:
(a) the parties to the communication consented to the interception, disclosure, 
or use in question; or
(b) the person was authorized by law to engage in the interception, disclosure, 
or use in question; or
(c) (i)  the interception in question was made by or at the request of a party to 
the communication who reasonably believed that the communication would provide 
evidence of an offense that another party to the communication had committed, or 
would commit, against him or a household member; or 
(ii) the disclosure or use in question involved an interception described in 
Subsection (3)(c)(i) and was for the purpose of prosecuting an offense.
(d)  Acquiescence is Consent.  A party to a communication who continues the 
communication after receiving a disclosure that the communication is subject to 
interception thereby consents to any subsequent interception, or disclosure or use of 
the interception, that falls within the scope of the disclosure.
(4)  Grading.  The offense is a Class 3 felony.
Section 2401. Note that this provision also replaces several other current provisions, 
in addition to 5/14-2 and 5/14-3. See, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/14-1 (defi ning such terms as 
“eavesdropping device” and “electronic communication”); 5/14-4 (grading eavesdropping 
offense).
46See, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/16B-2; 5/16D-3; 5/17-6; 5/17-23; 5/21-1.5; 5/24-3.5; 5/29B-1.
47See 720 ILCS 5/8-4.
 In some cases, the current code’s language, though it may not represent 
the clearest or simplest method of expressing a rule, has been “defi ned” and 
clarifi ed over time by judicial decisions. For this reason and for the mere 
sake of stability, the drafters have sought to maintain the language of current 
law whenever that language would give a reader adequate notice of the 
provision’s intended meaning. Where modifi cation of existing language is 
considered necessary, the drafters have prepared commentary to explain the 
relation between the proposed language and existing statutory language, as 
explicated by current precedent.
B. Clear Organization
 A criminal code, and each of its provisions, must be effectively organized 
so that each component’s meaning and function are plain and all provisions 
are easily found. For example, it invites confusion when issues for which 
there are rules of general application are addressed a second time in specifi c 
offense provisions. Current Illinois law contains numerous offenses that 
unnecessarily reiterate, or even undermine, General Part provisions. 
For example, many offenses are defi ned to prohibit certain conduct and 
“attempting” such conduct.46 For unexplained reasons, this approach to 
defi ning offenses short-circuits the general rules for attempts set forth in 
the General Part, under which attempts are distinguished from completed 
crimes for grading purposes.47 Similarly, several current offenses are defi ned 
ILL Code  Vol Ia   xxxii 6/30/03, 3:35:14 PM
xxxiii
Introduction
to include anyone who aids, solicits, or conspires with another in planning 
or committing the offense,48 even though general rules covering accomplice 
liability, solicitations, and conspiracies are defi ned in the General Part.49 
The Proposed Code ensures consistency by avoiding offense defi nitions that 
revisit, or revise, rules already included in the General Part.
 Finally, a criminal code’s various rules should be classifi ed sensibly, to 
ensure that meaningfully different rules are distinguished and similar rules 
are treated alike. For example, the Proposed Code’s organization separates 
justifi cations, excuses, and nonexculpatory defenses.50 Recognizing such 
distinctions is important because a defense’s function as a justifi cation, an 
excuse, or a nonexculpatory defense has signifi cant legal implications.51 
Current Illinois law, however, is not organized to accurately distinguish 
between these three defense types.52
 The failure to properly establish such distinctions has resulted in 
inconsistent rules, such as the rules involving the burdens of proof for general 
defenses. Current law requires that the defendant prove the insanity defense 
48See, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/10-7; 5/17-20; 5/31-7; 5/31A-1.2.
49See 720 ILCS 5/5-2 (complicity); 5/8-1 (solicitation); 5/8-2 (conspiracy).
50Justifi cation defenses, such as self-defense and use of force in defense of property, 
immunize conduct that avoids a harm or evil that is objectively worse than the offense 
itself.  Excuse defenses, such as insanity and immaturity, operate to exculpate persons who 
cannot properly be held responsible for objectively harmful conduct. Finally, nonexculpatory 
defenses, such as entrapment and the statute-of-limitations defense, provide exemptions for 
liability because — even though the actor’s conduct is objectively harmful and the actor is 
responsible for it — some alternative societal interest is deemed to be more important than the 
assessment of criminal liability.
51For example, a person enjoying a self-defense justifi cation may be assisted by others, 
and may not legally be interfered with.  On the other hand, an aggressor is entitled to resist 
a person who enjoys an excuse because he mistakenly believes himself to be acting in self-
defense; such a person, even if excused, is not justifi ed.  Moreover, because justifi cations 
recognize conduct that is socially acceptable, and often desirable, it is sensible to require the 
prosecution to prove that conduct was not justifi ed.  Excuses and nonexculpatory defenses, in 
contrast, operate to prevent liability for harmful conduct that would ordinarily constitute an 
offense.  Accordingly, and because the state-of-mind or other evidence relevant to an excuse or 
nonexculpatory defense is frequently within the control of the defendant, it is sensible to shift 
the burden of proof to the defendant for those defenses, as the Proposed Code does.
52Chapter 720 improperly treats compulsion and — by defi ning several justifi cations to 
protect one who “reasonably believes” himself to be justifi ed — mistake as to a justifi cation 
as justifi cations, rather than excuses.  See 720 ILCS 5/7-11 (compulsion); see also 5/7-1; 5/7-
2; 5/7-3; 5/7-5; 5/7-6; 5/7-9; 5/7-13.  The Proposed Code categorizes both of these defenses 
as excuses, as they relate to the actor’s mental state rather than to whether the act itself is 
objectively justifi ed.
 Current Illinois law also does not recognize nonexculpatory defenses as a distinct class 
of defenses. As a result, current law treats some nonexculpatory defenses, such as the statute-
of-limitations defense, as “rights of the defendant,” while improperly placing entrapment 
among the justifi cation defenses. See 720 ILCS 5/3-5 to -8 (limitation provisions); 5/7-12 
(entrapment).
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by clear and convincing evidence, but all other excuses must be disproved by 
the State beyond a reasonable doubt once the defendant has introduced some 
evidence on the issue.53 These evidentiary rules differ for no obvious reason.54 
Since excuse defenses are all the same in terms of their underlying principles 
and their central issue (the defendant’s blameworthiness for an admitted 
violation), they should be treated similarly in terms of the burden of proof, as 
is done in the Proposed Code.55
 Similarly, current law requires the State to disprove certain nonexculpatory 
defenses beyond a reasonable doubt.56 This is plainly inconsistent with the 
rule shifting the burden of proof to the defendant for the insanity excuse. 
If such a burden-shifting rule is appropriate for an excuse defense — under 
which the defendant would be considered blameless in committing the 
offense — it should also apply to nonexculpatory defenses, which involve no 
claim of blamelessness. The Proposed Code employs such a rule.57
2. PROVIDE A COMPREHENSIVE STATEMENT OF RULES
 It is critical not only that a criminal code say things clearly, but that it 
say everything that needs to be said. A criminal code must be comprehensive 
as well as comprehensible. Failure to provide all necessary provisions will 
necessarily lead to either or both of two results: (1) failures of justice, as the 
code’s omissions and “loopholes” lead to liability where none is deserved or 
allow an offender to avoid deserved punishment; or (2) a de facto delegation 
of authority to the courts (or usurpation of authority by the courts), as 
judicial interpretations try to fi ll in the gaps left by the legislature. The costs 
of the fi rst result are obvious. Yet the alternative of judicial intervention, 
however necessary to achieve sensible or just results in individual cases, may 
53See 720 ILCS 5/6-2(e); 5/6-4.
54Similarly, although current 5/3-2(b) requires the state to disprove any affi rmative 
defense other than insanity beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant may bear the burden 
of proving the applicability of certain offense “exemptions” and “exceptions” that are not 
“affi rmative defenses.”  See, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/24-2(h) (regarding “exemptions” to fi rearm 
offenses for peace offi cers, members of military, and others, “[t]he defendant shall have the 
burden of proving such an exemption”); People v. Smith, 374 N.E.2d 472, 476 (Ill. 1978) 
(construing 5/24-2).  Section 107(3) avoids such anomalies by defi ning “affi rmative defense” 
to mean “any defense or mitigation other than one that operates by negating a required element 
of an offense” and providing a default rule that affi rmative defenses must be disproved beyond 
a reasonable doubt.
55Section 501(6) adopts a compromise position between current law’s inconsistent 
rules, and places the burden of persuasion on the defendant to prove an excuse defense by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
56See, e.g., People v. Latona, 664 N.E.2d 424, 431 (Ill. App. 1994) (once defendant has 
raised entrapment defense, State must prove beyond reasonable doubt that defendant was not 
entrapped).
57Proposed Section 601(4) provides that, as with excuses, the defendant must prove a 
nonexculpatory defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
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ultimately impose costs as well. The interests of advance notice (discussed 
above), democracy, and legal consistency and coherence suggest that the 
legislature, rather than the courts, must bear the primary responsibility for 
creating criminal law rules.
 Insisting on comprehensiveness leads to several important benefi ts. First, 
comprehensiveness helps avoid inappropriate results. Courts, which decide 
individual cases and act independently of one another, cannot be as effective 
as a legislature in formulating coherent general doctrines that will work 
together as the provisions of a comprehensive code can and must. Second, an 
uncodifi ed rule is more likely to be applied differently in similar cases than a 
codifi ed rule, as the terms of the latter are fi xed, explicit, and available to all 
offi cials at each stage in the process. 
 Further explanation of this goal follows, along with a representative, 
but by no means exhaustive, collection of examples of current Illinois law’s 
shortcomings in this area.58 
A. General Part Rules
 Current Chapter 720 contains no provision dealing with causation, an 
issue that is often critical to the determination of whether conduct constitutes 
a crime. Whenever an offense defi nition requires that the offender cause a 
particular result (such as homicide’s requirement that the offender cause 
another person’s death), a potential question arises as to whether a given 
actor’s conduct had a suffi cient causal connection to the prohibited result to 
58For example, in the General Part, the Proposed Code introduces several other currently 
omitted provisions that govern important common issues and make clear the relationships 
between various parts of the Code.  See, e.g., Sections 108 (defi ning “bodily harm” and “great 
bodily harm”); 501 (general rules governing excuse defenses); 201 (making clear bases of 
liability); 202 (categorizing and defi ning offense elements); 205(6) (proof of more culpable 
mental state satisfi es requirement of less serious one); 254 (rules governing conviction of 
multiple grades of an offense); 303 (rules governing transferred intent); 400 (clarifying that 
justifi cation, excuse, and nonexculpatory defenses bar liability); 411 (general rules governing 
justifi cation defenses); 415 (justifi cation defense for persons with special responsibilities 
for others); 601 (general rules governing nonexculpatory defenses); 805 (defense to certain 
inchoate offenses for defendants who are victims or whose conduct is inevitably incident to 
the offense); 806 (defense to inchoate offenses for persons who renounce offenses and prevent 
their commission).
 The proposed Special Part also includes several offenses not recognized in current 
law. See, e.g., Sections 1205 (causing mental injury or mental distress to children); 2402 
(damaging or destroying private correspondence); 2403(1)(a) (eavesdropping committed other 
than by use of “eavesdropping device”); 2404 (unlawfully gaining access to information other 
than through use of computers); 3104 (simulating objects of special value); 3109(2) (breach of 
duty to act disinterestedly); 5307(1)(a)(iii) (escape by persons civilly committed under statutes 
other than Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act); 6205 (abuse of corpse).
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support criminal liability. Because of the signifi cance of the causation issue, 
the Proposed Code includes a provision defi ning standards for determinating 
whether an act is the legal cause of a result.59
 Current Chapter 720 similarly lacks a general provision governing when 
consent will preclude liability, although the absence of consent is defi ned 
as an offense element for many specifi c offenses.60 Mere use of the phrase 
“without consent” fails to provide the rules required to properly determine 
liability, however, because in various situations, a person’s agreement will not 
constitute valid legal consent (for example, where the person is incompetent 
or the “consent” is coerced). The current code defi nes consent at one point, 
but the applicability of that defi nition is explicitly limited to certain specifi c 
offenses.61 The current code also sometimes narrows its language to exclude 
those who are “unable to give knowing consent,”62 but does not explain whom 
this category would contain and, by using this language in some places but 
not others, suggests that the risk of ineffective consent is a concern only for 
certain offenses. The Proposed Code defi nes a general consent defense and 
provides detailed rules regarding its scope, thus ensuring that the Code is 
clear in explaining when consent will provide a valid defense and consistent 
in its treatment of consent from one offense to another.63
 The current Illinois Code also does not provide meaningful rules to 
control multiple simultaneous offense convictions or their consequences. 
Rather, the current code merely defi nes the term “included offense” and 
provides that “[n]o person shall be convicted of both the inchoate and the 
principal offense.”64 The current code’s failure to deal comprehensively with 
these critical issues has left the Illinois courts to fall back on the so-called 
59See Section 203.
60See, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/9-1(c)(3); 5/9-1.2(c); 5/9-2.1(e); 5/9-3.2(d); 5/10-1(b); 5/10-5(b); 
5/11-23(a); 5/12-4(c); 5/12-14(a)(7); 5/12-14.1(a)(3); 5/12-16(a)(7); 5/12-16.2(d); 5/14-
2(a)(1); 5/15-2; 5/16-3(a); 5/20-1(a); 240/1.
61See 720 ILCS 5/12-17(a).
62See, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/12-13(a)(2) (criminal sexual assault); 5/12-15(a)(2) (criminal 
sexual abuse); cf. 5/12-32(a) (ritual mutilation; offense occurs if victim does not consent or is 
“under such circumstances that the defendant knew or should have known that the victim was 
unable to render effective consent”).
63See Section 251.
64720 ILCS 5/8-5; see 720 ILCS 5/2-9 (defi ning “included offense”).
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“one-act, one-crime” rule. The basis of that rule is unclear,65 and the rule itself 
is confused, if not incoherent. One thing that is clear is that the rule is not to 
be taken literally, as Illinois law sometimes does allow one act to constitute 
more than one crime. A person who explodes a single bomb that kills 20 
people, or fi res a single bullet that kills two people, should not be found to 
have committed “one crime” based on “one act” — and would not, because 
of the conceptually groundless “multiple victim” exception to the “one-act, 
one-crime” rule.66 The Proposed Code replaces the “one-act, one-crime” rule 
with a statutory provision that establishes a coherent and consistent scheme 
for limiting convictions for multiple related offenses.67
65Federal precedent makes clear that the U.S. Constitution does not require such a rule. 
See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 N.E.2d 359, 368-69 (1983) (“Where . . . a legislature specifi cally 
authorizes cumulative punishment under two statutes, regardless of whether those two statutes 
proscribe the ‘same’ conduct . . . , a court’s task of statutory construction is at an end and 
the prosecutor may seek and the trial court or jury may impose cumulative punishment 
under such statutes in a single trial.”); Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 340 (1981) 
(“[T]he question of what punishments are constitutionally permissible is no different from the 
question of what punishment the Legislative Branch intended to be imposed.  Where Congress 
intended . . . to impose multiple punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate 
the Constitution.”).
The current criminal code also does not establish any such rule.  Indeed, the Legislature 
likely intended to abolish the rule for many cases in which it is applied.  See 730 ILCS 5/5-
8-4(a) (mandating consecutive sentences in certain circumstances “for offenses which were 
committed as part of a single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change 
in the nature of the criminal objective”).  Cf. People v. Rodriguez, 661 N.E.2d 305, 310 (Ill. 
1996) (Heiple, J., concurring) (noting that 5/5-8-4(a) “overrules” one-act, one-crime rule).
 Further, the Illinois courts have not explained, or even addressed, whether some other 
source such as the Illinois Constitution may support the rule. In fact, in People v. King, 
which is the leading case on the one-act, one-crime rule, the Illinois Supreme Court explicitly 
recognized that “[m]ultiple convictions and consecutive sentences have been permitted against 
claims of double jeopardy for offenses based on a single act but requiring proof of different 
facts.” 363 N.E.2d 838, 844 (Ill. 1977) (citing Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958); 
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1931)). 
66See, e.g., People v. Shum, 512 N.E.2d 1183, 1202 (Ill. 1987) (upholding murder and 
feticide convictions for “single physical act” of killing mother because “[i]n Illinois it is well 
settled that separate victims require separate convictions and sentences”); People v. Hanks, 
528 N.E.2d 1044, 1047-48 (Ill. App. 1988) (“We conclude defendant was properly convicted 
of two offenses of aggravated arson against two victims resulting from defendant’s single act 
of arson.”); People v. Mercado, 456 N.E.2d 331 (Ill. App. 1983) (upholding three convictions 
for reckless homicide arising from single automobile accident).
 The meaning of “one act” has consistently been drawn narrowly so that a defendant will 
be found to have performed “multiple acts” allowing multiple convictions. See, e.g., People v. 
Green, 557 N.E.2d 939, 942 (Ill. App. 1990) (affi rming consecutive sentences for two offenses 
premised on defendant’s possession of cocaine because “the armed-violence conviction could 
be based upon the contents of the right-hand pocket, while the possession with intent to deliver 
could be based upon the six tested bags of the nine bags subsequently found in the left-hand 
pocket”).
67See Section 254.
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B. Special Part Offenses
 The current code sometimes fails to criminalize conduct that merits 
criminal liability. For example, Chapter 720 does not provide an offense 
of “negligent homicide.” As a result, a person whose inattentiveness to a 
substantial and unjustifi able risk of killing another person causes another’s 
death, may escape liability entirely under current law. The Proposed Code 
joins the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions with modern criminal 
codes68 by imposing liability for negligent homicide.69
 In other cases, the current code’s failure to defi ne suitable offenses means 
prosecution is only possible for less serious offenses, resulting in punishment 
that falls short of the relative gravity of the offense. For example, Chapter 
720 criminalizes “knowingly” causing a catastrophe (as a Class X felony), 
but does not specifi cally criminalize either recklessly causing a catastrophe 
or creating a substantial risk of a catastrophe.70 Under current law, those acts 
would count only as ordinary reckless conduct or reckless property damage, 
both of which are graded as Class A misdemeanors.71 Similarly, the current 
reckless conduct offense does not account for the extent of harm resulting 
from the conduct — indeed, the offense does not even distinguish causing 
actual harm from merely “endangering” another. As a result, one who 
recklessly causes a catastrophe — by, for example, recklessly detonating an 
explosive for a construction project and severely injuring dozens of people 
— commits the same offense as one who merely creates a risk of physical 
pain to a single person. The Proposed Code avoids such anomalous results 
by including, between the extremes of knowingly causing a catastrophe and 
recklessly endangering another, intermediate offenses covering different 
levels of recklessly caused harm.72
3. CONSOLIDATE OFFENSES
 A third goal is consolidation of all criminal offenses. Perhaps inevitably, 
four decades of piecemeal modifi cation of the 1961 Code have led to the 
addition of hundreds of new offenses, many of which cover the same conduct 
as previous offenses (but, in some cases, provide for confl icting levels of 
punishment) or appear in various other Chapters of the Illinois Compiled 
Statutes rather than in the criminal code.
 It is not only redundant, but potentially counterproductive or self-
contradictory, to add extra offenses whose prohibitions are identical to an 
existing offense; or to add prohibitions against narrow, specifi c forms of 
68See Model Penal Code § 210.4 (defi ning negligent homicide offense); id. cmt. n.30 
(noting that of 34 states with revised codes as of 1980, all but 5 codes include negligent 
homicide offense).
69See Section 1105 (grading the offense as a Class 4 felony). 
70See 720 ILCS 5/20.5-5.
71See 720 ILCS 5/12-5; 5/21-1(1)b).
72See Sections 1202, 2204.
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conduct in addition to (or in lieu of) a more general prohibition against all 
such relevant conduct; or to scatter serious crimes throughout the State’s 
statutory code instead of ensuring that all relevant offenses appear within 
the criminal code, where their signifi cance and relation to one another is 
clear. Consolidation ensures against the confusion that results when one 
encounters, and must make sense of, multiple provisions that overlap73 or 
contradict, and also against the mistakes that ensue when one fails to notice, 
or fi nd, provisions that may apply to a given case. Consolidation ensures the 
briefest, clearest statement of the criminal law’s rules, while also exposing 
and eliminating inadvertent omissions, duplications, and inconsistencies 
in the statutory scheme. The consolidation goal has two aspects. First, all 
criminal offenses must be defi ned within the criminal code itself, and not 
elsewhere. Second, superfl uous specifi c offenses must be eliminated in favor 
of a reduced number of offenses that are defi ned as broadly as is feasible.
 As to the fi rst element, a statutory scheme in which a signifi cant number 
of important offenses are defi ned outside of the criminal code will have at 
least three shortcomings. First, and most obviously, the likelihood of notice 
to the public diminishes as the dispersion of criminal provisions in the 
state’s laws increases. It is simply much easier for the layperson to educate 
herself about the state’s criminal law if that law can be found in one place. 
A second, and subtler, “notice” problem will affect the legislature itself. If 
crimes are spread throughout the state statutory code, the legislature will 
be less likely to view the criminal law as a consistent, unifi ed scheme. A 
new offense may be placed outside the code, making it less likely that the 
legislature will consider how that offense fi ts within the existing matrix of 
criminal offenses. Additionally, the criminal code itself may be amended 
without consideration of the amendment’s impact on offenses outside the 
code. Third, the existence of criminal offenses outside the code will generate 
problems of statutory construction. For example, it may not be clear whether 
the legislature expected the criminal code’s “default” culpability provision 
to apply to uncodifi ed offenses. In short, the possibility of criminal offenses 
appearing outside the criminal code undermines the entire project of setting 
aside a separate criminal code within the overall state code scheme.
 Current Illinois law defi nes numerous serious crimes outside the criminal 
code. Hundreds of misdemeanors and Class 4 felonies are scattered throughout 
the Compiled Statutes, and more than eighty offenses appearing outside 
Chapter 720 — many of which overlap, or simply restate, prohibitions in 
current Chapter 720 — are graded as Class 3 felonies or higher. For example, 
the Illinois Public Aid Code defi nes several “public assistance fraud” 
offenses — graded as high as Class 1 felonies — that overlap substantially 
with several Chapter 720 offenses, such as (among others) theft, state benefi ts 
73According to interpretive canons, such overlapping provisions must be read so that none 
renders any other superfl uous — a task which frequently requires courts to distort the meaning 
of one provision in order to accommodate another.
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fraud, public aid wire fraud, and public aid mail fraud.74 Similarly, the Illinois 
Vehicle Code defi nes several vehicle theft offenses that are principally aimed 
at “chop shops” in the business of receiving stolen vehicles, and grades the 
offense of organizing an “aggravated vehicle theft conspiracy” as a Class X 
felony, although all of the relevant conduct — vehicle theft, receiving stolen 
vehicles, and conspiracy to commit either of those offenses — is covered by 
(and graded differently by) provisions in Chapter 720.75
 Within the criminal code itself, consolidation is no less important. 
Formulation of an offense in one provision, rather than many, reduces 
uncertainty as to the nature and scope of the banned conduct. A general 
prohibition avoids confusion and grading inconsistency. At the same time, 
it reduces the need for the legislature to enact additional prohibitions in the 
future, because a more general provision is more easily adapted to changing 
circumstances.
 Current Illinois offenses often fail to realize this goal of consolidation 
within a single, general offense. This occurs in two ways. In some cases, 
Chapter 720 criminalizes specifi c forms of conduct in lieu of a broader 
prohibition against such conduct generally. For example, the current forgery 
offense applies only to “documents apparently capable of defrauding” 
others,76 but does not apply to other sorts of potentially forged writings, 
necessitating numerous offenses to prohibit forging specifi c types of 
writings.77 Similarly, current Illinois law contains no general offense banning 
false written statements made to obtain property or credit, but instead contains 
various offenses prohibiting false statements made in specifi c contexts.78
74Compare 305 ILCS 5/8A-1 et seq. (public assistance fraud), with, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/16-1 
(theft); 5/17-6 (state benefi ts fraud); 5/17-9 (public aid wire fraud); 5/17-10 (public aid mail fraud).
75Compare, e.g., 625 ILCS 5/4-103 to -108 (Vehicle Code provisions), with 720 ILCS 
5/16-1(a)(1) (defi ning offense of theft by taking); 5/16-1(a)(4) (defi ning offense of receiving 
stolen property); 5/16-1(b) (grading theft offenses).  Cf. 5/16-1(b)(2) (cross-referencing 
Vehicle Code provisions for purposes of recidivism aggravation for theft).
76See 720 ILCS 5/17-3.
77See, e.g., 5/17-7 & -18 (corporate stock); 5/17-23 (Universal Price Code labels); 5/
17B-5(ii) (food stamps and authorizations); 250/14 to /16 (credit and debit cards); 5 ILCS 
175/10-140(b) (electronic signature devices); 15 ILCS 335/14A(b)(3) (government-issued 
identifi cation cards); 20 ILCS 1605/14.2 (lottery tickets); 35 ILCS 130/22 (cigarette tax 
stamps and imprints); 625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(2) (vehicle identifi cation numbers); 625 ILCS 
5/4-105 (vehicle title and registration documents).  
78See, e.g., 20 ILCS 4020/22 (“false or fraudulent representations” to obtain benefi ts 
provided by Prairie State 2000 Authority Act); 35 ILCS 130/25 (“false or fraudulent” tax 
returns); 105 ILCS 425/26(1) (“false or misleading” statements to infl uence persons to enroll 
in private business and vocational school); 305 ILCS 5/8A-16(b)(1) (“false and misleading” 
statements in proposing, offering, selling, soliciting, or providing health care services or health 
plans); 720 ILCS 5/16-3.1(a) (“false reports” of theft, destruction, damage or conversion of 
property); 720 ILCS 5/17-1(C)(1) (“false statements” to obtain accounts with or credit from 
fi nancial institutions); 720 ILCS 5/17-6(a) (“misrepresentations” relating to eligibility for state 
benefi ts programs); 720 ILCS 5/17-22(a) (“false information” on employment applications 
for certain agencies providing services to mentally or developmentally disabled persons); 720 
ILCS 5/33E-15 (“false entries” in books, reports, or statements of local government unit or 
school district); 720 ILCS 250/3 (“false statements” to obtain credit or debit cards).
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 In other cases, Chapter 720 includes narrow, specifi c offenses in addition 
to a broader prohibition against such conduct generally. For example, although 
one provision in current Chapter 720 covers theft generally, a number of 
other provisions in Chapter 720 prohibit the same underlying conduct 
— theft by taking (or its attempt) — in the context of specifi c circumstances 
or forms of property.79 The same situation exists for assault offenses80 and 
property damage offenses.81 Similarly, in addition to its general perjury 
offense,82 current Illinois law contains numerous offenses criminalizing 
false statements made under oath or affi rmation about particular matters, in 
particular documents, and in particular proceedings.83
79Compare 5/16-1 (general theft offense), with, e.g., 5/16A-3(a) (retail theft); 5/16B-2(a) 
(library theft); 5/16E-3(a)(1) & (4) (delivery container theft).
80Compare 5/12-3 (general “battery” offense) with, e.g., 5/12-1 (assault); 5/12-2 
(aggravated assault); 5/12-3.1 (battery of an unborn child); 5/12-3.2 (domestic battery); 5/12-
3.3 (aggravated domestic battery); 5/12-4 (aggravated battery); 5/12-4.1 (heinous battery); 
5/12-4.2 (aggravated battery with a fi rearm); 5/12-4.2-5 (aggravated battery with a machine 
gun or a fi rearm equipped with any device or attachment designed or used for silencing the 
report of a fi rearm); 5/12-4.3 (aggravated battery of a child); 5/12-4.4 (aggravated battery of 
an unborn child); 5/12-4.6 (aggravated battery of a senior citizen).
81Compare 5/21-1 (general property damage offense), with, e.g., 5/16B-2.1 (damage to 
library materials); 5/16E-3(a)(3) (defacing delivery containers); 5/21-1.5 (tampering with 
or damaging anhydrous ammonia equipment); 5/21-4 (damaging government supported 
property); 215/4 (damaging an animal facility).
82See 720 ILCS 5/32-2(a).
83These overlapping perjury offenses create unnecessary and undesirable confusion.  For 
example, several provisions prohibit the making of a “false oath or affi rmation,” rather than the 
making of a “false statement” under that oath or affi rmation.  See, e.g., 225 ILCS 41/15-75(a) 
(oath or affi davit required by Funeral Directors and Embalmers Licensing Code); 225 ILCS 
305/36(b) (oath or affi rmation required by Illinois Architecture Practice Act of 1989); 225 
ILCS 410/4-20(4) (oath or affi rmation required by Barber, Cosmetology, Esthetics, and Nail 
Technician Act of 1985).  This phrasing suggests, contrary to current 5/32-2(a), that only one 
conviction is appropriate for one who tells several lies under a single oath.
Moreover, some offenses do not explicitly impose 5/32-2(a)’s requirement that a false 
statement be material, but then confusingly proclaim that those who commit them are liable 
for “perjury.”  See, e.g., 110 ILCS 1010/8 (false statement in notice fi led pursuant to Section 
4 of Academic Degree Act); 225 ILCS 60/58 (false statement under Medical Practice Act of 
1987); 225 ILCS 203/90(a) (false statement under oath or affi davit required by Boiler and 
Pressure Vessel Repairer Regulation Act); 225 ILCS 446/190(a) (false statement under oath 
or affi davit required by Private Detective, Private Alarm, Private Security, and Locksmith Act 
of 1993).
 Finally, whereas current 5/32-2(e) grades perjury as a Class 3 felony, current Illinois 
law sometimes provides different grades for overlapping perjury offenses. See, e.g., 55 ILCS 
5/1-5013 (swearing falsely concerning right to vote; Class 4 felony); 225 ILCS 41/15-75(a)(6) 
(oath or affi davit required by Funeral Directors and Embalmers Licensing Code; Class A 
misdemeanor); 225 ILCS 410/4-20(4) (oath or affi rmation required by Barber, Cosmetology, 
Esthetics, and Nail Technician Act of 1985; Class B misdemeanor); 235 ILCS 5/10-1(c) 
(making false statement in obtaining liquor license; petty offense).
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 One useful way to get a rudimentary sense of current law’s failure to 
consolidate offenses is to assess its sheer verbiage. The Proposed Code 
manages to criminalize the same substantive conduct as current law while 
using far fewer offense defi nitions to do so. For example, the Proposed 
Code article on fraud offenses (Article 3100) uses only 8.6 percent of the 
words making up the corresponding offenses in current Chapter 720 (2,182 
versus 25,461 words) — and when corresponding felony offenses outside 
Chapter 720 are taken into account, that fi gure falls to 3.1 percent (2,182 
versus 69,666 words). Similarly, the article covering public order and safety 
offenses (Article 6100) uses only 9.8 percent of the words in corresponding 
Chapter 720 offenses (1,251 versus 12,810), and only 3.1 percent of the 
words when felonies outside Chapter 720 are added (1,251 versus 40,133). 
Overall, the Special Part of the Proposed Code uses only 14 percent — or less 
than one-seventh — of the words in the current Special Part (17,378 versus 
124,505), and only 6.3 percent — or about one-sixteenth — of the current 
Special Part plus other statutory felonies (17,378 versus 277,852 words). 
If anything, the latter fi gure understates the discrepancy, as misdemeanors 
outside Chapter 720 have not been considered, and the provisions outside 
Chapter 720 frequently use one section to impose criminal liability for any 
violation of an entire set of regulations. 
 The above examples of current Illinois law’s shortcomings in this area 
are representative, but by no means exhaustive.84 
84Including the examples discussed in the text, there are over two dozen offenses 
outside Chapter 720 that are graded as Class 1 and Class 2 felonies.  See 5 ILCS 175/10-140 
(fraudulent use of signature device; Class 2 felony); 5 ILCS 175/15-210, -215 (fraudulent 
use or request of electronic signature certifi cate; Class 2 felony for each); 5 ILCS 175/15-
220 (fraudulent use of signature device of certifi cation authority; Class 2 felony); 20 ILCS 
3520/45 (making false statement or report in document before Department of Commerce; 
Class 2 felony); 30 ILCS 320/4 (fraudulently using state seal or signature; Class 2 felony); 
35 ILCS 130/22, /23, /29 (counterfeiting or forging cigarette tax stamps, or selling cigarettes 
or other tobacco products with forged stamps; Class 2 felony for each); 35 ILCS 505/15 
(evading motor fuel sale tax, fi ling false return or report to Department of Revenue, or selling 
dyed diesel fuel; Class 2 felony for each); 205 ILCS 685/7 (structuring transaction to evade 
currency reporting requirements; Class 2 felony); 415 ILCS 5/44(b)-(c) (endangering another 
by disposing hazardous waste; Class 2 felony); 625 ILCS 5/11-401 (failing to stop when 
involved in auto accident involving death; Class 2 felony); 625 ILCS 5/11-501 (DUI; Class 2 
felony); 625 ILCS 5/18c-7502 (removal of railroad property resulting in serious bodily injury; 
Class 2 felony); 625 ILCS 45/3A-21 (forging certifi cate or sticker relating to watercraft; Class 
2 felony); 730 ILCS 5/3-6-4 (escaping from correctional institution; Class 2 felony); 730 ILCS 
5/5-8A-4.1 (failing to comply with home-monitoring program while armed; Class 1 felony); 
765 ILCS 835/1(b) (causing property damage in cemetery; Class 2 felony); 815 ILCS 5/14 
(aggravated securities fraud; Class 2 felony); 815 ILCS 515/5 (aggravated home repair fraud; 
Class 2 felony); 815 ILCS 705/25 (false or misleading statement in selling franchise; Class 2 
felony).
(continued…)
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84(…continued)
In addition to the examples discussed in the text, the Proposed Code also introduces 
several other offenses generally criminalizing conduct that current Illinois law criminalizes 
only in particular contexts.  Compare, e.g., Section 808 (possessing instruments of crime), 
with, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/16-6 (possessing coin-operated machine key or device); 720 ILCS 5/16-
15 (possessing theft-detection shielding device); 720 ILCS 5/19-2 (possessing burglary tools). 
Compare Section 3102(1) (tampering with writing, record, or device), with, e.g., 720 ILCS 
5/17-20 (tampering with utility meters); 720 ILCS 5/17-21 (tampering with service meters); 
10 ILCS 5/29-6 (tampering with election materials); 240 ILCS 40/15-45(c)(3) (tampering 
with grain records).  Compare Section 5202(1)(a) (making false written statement to mislead 
public servant), with, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/33C-2 (false statement to infl uence certifi cation of 
minority- and female-owned business); 720 ILCS 5/33E-14 (false statement to infl uence 
consideration of vendor applications); 20 ILCS 3520/45(b) (false statement to infl uence 
bonding-assistance action of Department of Commerce and Community Affairs); 205 ILCS 
690/36 (false statement to deceive Commission of Banks and Real Estate); 220 ILCS 5/6-106 
(false statement to infl uence Illinois Commerce Commission); 225 ILCS 330/43(c) (false 
statement to obtain license or registration to practice as professional land surveyor).  Compare 
Section 5202(1)(b) (omitting information from written statement to mislead public servant), 
with, e.g., 205 ILCS 657/90(h) (omitting information from document fi led under Transmitters 
of Money Act); 240 ILCS 40/15-45(c) (fi ling “misleading” grain records with Department of 
Agriculture); 305 ILCS 5/8A-15 (omitting material fact from document related to government-
funded or -mandated health plan).  Compare Section 5202(2) (making false written statement 
on form bearing notice false statement is punishable), with, e.g., 35 ILCS 200/21-290(d) (false 
statement in tax scavenger sale registration application); 305 ILCS 5/8A-2(b) (false statement 
in public aid benefi t application).  Compare Section 5203(1)(a)(i) (falsifying document used 
by government for record), with, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/33E-15 (false entry in document of local 
government or local school district); 20 ILCS 1605/16 (submitting false information under 
Illinois Lottery Law); 20 ILCS 3520/45(a) (submitting false statement or report to Department 
of Commerce and Community Affairs); 415 ILCS 5/44(a) (submitting false information under 
Environmental Protection Act).  Compare Section 5203(1)(a)(ii) (making a false entry in or 
alteration of document required to be kept for information of government), with, e.g., 35 ILCS 
130/14 (records required under Cigarette Tax Act); 35 ILCS 505/15(3.5) (documentation 
required under Motor Fuel Tax law); 205 ILCS 657/90(h) (documents required under 
Transmitters of Money Act); 420 ILCS 40/39(b)(2) (documents issued by Department of 
Nuclear Safety).  Compare Section 5303(1) (obstructing administration of law), with, e.g., 720 
ILCS 5/33C-3 (obstructing investigation of qualifi cations of business requesting certifi cation 
as minority- or female-owned business); 225 ILCS 650/19(A) (obstructing performance of 
duties under Meat Poultry and Inspection Act); 225 ILCS 735/5(g) (obstructing performance of 
duties under Timber Buyers Licensing Act); 240 ILCS 40/15-45(e) (obstructing performance 
of duties under Grain Code); 815 ILCS 370/6 (obstructing performance of duties under Motor 
Fuel and Petroleum Standards Act).
 Overlapping offenses are also a recurring problem in current law. Compare, e.g., 5/17-
1(B)(a) (general prohibition against causing another to execute document by deception), 
with, e.g., 5/17-13 (causing another to enter real estate contract); 35 ILCS 200/21-306(a)(3) 
(contract involving indemnity judgment proceeds); 50 ILCS 105/4.5(2) (certain government 
contracts); 815 ILCS 515/3 (home repair contracts); 815 ILCS 602/5-95 (business opportunity 
contract); 815 ILCS 705/25 (franchise agreement). Compare 720 ILCS 5/33-1 (general 
bribery offense), with, e.g., 5/33-4b (bribery to excuse persons from jury duty); 5/33E-7(a) 
(“kickbacks”); 5/33E-8 (bribery of inspectors employed by public contractors); 645/1 & /2 
(bribery involving members of General Assembly); 30 ILCS 500/50-25 (bribery to not bid on 
State contract); 225 ILCS 650/19(B) (bribery to infl uence meat and poultry inspector); 230 
ILCS 10/18(d)(1) (bribery to infl uence Gaming Board member). Compare 720 ILCS 5/31-
6(a) (general offense criminalizing escape from penal institution) with 730 ILCS 5/3-6-4(a) 
(escape from penal institution of Adult Division).
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4. GRADE OFFENSES RATIONALLY AND PROPORTIONALLY
 For a system of criminal justice to be fair, liability must be assigned 
according to the relative seriousness of the offense(s) committed. It is critical 
that a criminal code’s system of grading offenses recognize all, and only, 
suitable distinctions among the relative severity of offenses and develop a 
scheme to grade each offense proportionally to its gravity in light of those 
distinctions.
 In most cases, determinations of “seriousness” refl ect value judgments as 
to which reasonable people might differ, and as to which the legislature (as the 
most direct political voice of the people) should have the ultimate authority. 
Accordingly, the drafters of the Proposed Code have sought to defer to the 
grading determinations instantiated in existing Illinois law where possible. In 
some cases, however, broad examination of current grading determinations 
reveals logical inconsistencies that, it is presumed, the legislature would 
have sought to avoid had it been aware of them. Such inconsistencies may 
develop for several reasons. As new offenses are added to a criminal code, 
the legislature may neglect to consider how the grade of each new offense 
relates to the grades for other, preexisting offenses. As noted earlier, the sheer 
increase in the number of offenses, especially offenses outside the criminal 
code itself, makes it diffi cult to maintain consistency — assuming one even 
manages to locate and consider all relevant offenses. In any event, the shared 
experience of various jurisdictions is that over time, proportionality in the 
grading of offenses diminishes.
 One of the virtues of a broad recodifi cation effort is the opportunity it 
provides to review the grading system as a whole, considering how all offenses 
relate to one another rather than considering individual offenses in a vacuum. 
Following such a review, the drafters have altered the grades of certain 
offenses where doing so seems necessary to maintain any legitimate sense 
of proportionality. In addition, a “change” in grading in the Proposed Code 
has sometimes been necessitated by the consolidation of offenses. Because 
current law often contains multiple offenses that overlap and prohibit the 
same conduct (as discussed in Section 3 above), but might impose different 
grades for that conduct, it is simply impossible to follow “current law” on the 
matter, and it becomes necessary to choose a single, consistent grade for the 
prohibited conduct.
 The task of grading offenses has three goals: each offense’s grading 
scheme must recognize all relevant distinctions between degrees of the 
offense; that scheme must avoid introduction of irrelevant distinctions; and 
the overall grading scheme must maintain proportionality across offenses. 
We discuss each of these three goals in turn, and conclude with a discussion 
of the related, but distinct issue of creating rules to govern the “overall grade” 
— that is, the total amount of liability — where more than one offense has 
been committed.
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 Further explanation of this goal follows, along with a representative, 
but by no means exhaustive, collection of examples of current Illinois law’s 
shortcomings in this area.85
A. Consistently Recognize Appropriate Distinctions
 
 The Proposed Code seeks to ensure that the grading for each offense 
recognizes all relevant distinctions in the relative seriousness of various 
forms of an offense. In most cases, current law refl ects such distinctions, 
and the proposed offenses’ grading distinctions will tend to track existing 
distinctions. In a few cases, however, current law’s grading for offenses 
seems too crude, failing to recognize legitimate distinctions of degree.
 For example, one offense enacted after the 1961 Code defi nes a Class 
1 felony for parents or guardians who allow another to engage in various 
sexual acts with their children, without taking into account the severity of 
the underlying sexual offense.86 Under this scheme, a parent who condones 
another 16-year-old’s intimate touching of her 16-year-old child on a date 
is exposed to the same liability as a parent who allows her 35-year-old live-
in boyfriend to molest her 8-year-old child. The Proposed Code refi nes the 
grading of the offense by adjusting the grade of the offense based on the 
severity of the underlying harm.87
 Likewise, current law grades any theft of lost or mislaid property as a 
petty offense, regardless of its value.88 Under the current scheme, the theft 
of a mistakenly delivered priceless work of art would be graded the same 
85To list just a few more examples, current law grades unsworn falsifi cation to authorities 
as anything from a petty offense, see, e.g., 235 ILCS 5/10-1(c) (false statement related to 
obtaining a liquor license), to a Class 1 felony, see, e.g., 305 ILCS 5/8A-2(b) (false statement 
in application for public assistance).  Cf. Section 5202(4) (uniformly grading such offenses as 
Class A misdemeanor).
Current law grades an actual escape from prison less seriously than the mere possession 
in prison of a tool that may be used in an escape.  See 720 ILCS 5/31-6(b) (escape; Class 2 
felony); 5/31A-1.1(i) (possession; Class 1 felony).  Cf. Section 5307 (escape; Class 2 felony); 
5309(3)(a) (possession; Class 3 felony).  Current law also grades possession of an explosive or 
catastrophic agent as a Class 1 felony, which is the same as the grade for using such an agent 
in a deliberate attempt to cause a catastrophe.  See 720 ILCS 5/20-2, 5/20.5-6; cf. Section 2205 
(providing lower grade for mere possession, a more preliminary offense, than for intentional 
attempt).
 See also 720 ILCS 5/8-2(c) (grading conspiracies to commit various offenses, such as 
prostitution, weapons offenses, and gambling offenses, more seriously than the object offense, 
although conspiracy is an inchoate offense). Cf. Section 807 (grading all conspiracies one 
grade lower than object offense).
86See 720 ILCS 150/5.1.  But see People v. Maness, 732 N.E.2d 545 (Ill. 2000) 
(invalidating 150/5.1 as unconstitutionally vague).
87See Section 1301(3)(e) (grading offense at one grade lower than it would be for the 
person engaging in the prohibited sexual conduct).
88See 720 ILCS 5/16-2.
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as the theft of a misplaced wallet. The Proposed Code recognizes grading 
distinctions for all forms of theft, whether by taking, by deception, or 
involving lost property, according to the value of the property stolen.89
B. Avoid Irrelevant or Unclear Distinctions
 Another goal of the Proposed Code is to avoid the inconsistency that 
results when seemingly similar offenses are graded differently. This goal 
represents the other side of the offense-degree coin from the goal discussed 
immediately above; in addition to recognizing all relevant distinctions, the 
Code must refuse to recognize “distinctions” that do not or should not exist.
 For example, current law defi nes the offense of bribery as a Class 2 
felony, but also defi nes a separate offense to cover “kickbacks” and grades 
that offense as a Class 3 felony.90 Although current law fails to defi ne the term 
“kickback,” it appears to be nothing more than a particular form of bribe, and 
there is no clear reason to suppose that it merits a different punishment from 
that for other forms of bribery.91 This is an example of a situation where, as 
discussed above, current law is internally inconsistent, or at least ambiguous, 
thereby complicating any effort to track to its stated policy judgments. The 
Proposed Code creates only one bribery offense and ordinarily grades it as a 
Class 2 felony.92
 Similarly, the current code defi nes bigamy as a Class 4 felony, but defi nes 
a separate Class A misdemeanor for knowingly marrying a bigamist.93 There 
is little reason to punish a person who knowingly marries a bigamist less 
severely than the bigamist, as each person causes the same harms (desertion 
and possible injury to spousal property interests; deception of civil and 
possibly religious authorities). Moreover, this distinction contravenes normal 
rules of accountability, under which a knowing accomplice to bigamy would 
be liable for the same offense and punishment as the bigamist.94 The Proposed 
Code grades bigamy and marrying a bigamist the same.95
89See Section 2109 and commentary.  Liability for theft of lost or mislaid property 
receives a reduced grade relative to other forms of theft.  See Section 2108(2).
90See 720 ILCS 5/33-1; 5/33E-7.
91Another somewhat puzzling distinction is that, although current law assigns bribery a 
higher grade than giving kickbacks, it also assigns the failure to report a bribe a lower grade 
than the failure to report a kickback.  See 720 ILCS 5/33E-7(b); 5/33-2.  This distinction is 
especially unusual in that one would expect public offi cials (who receive bribe offers) to be 
held to a higher standard of accountability and affi rmative duty than private-citizen contractors 
(who, under the terms of the current provision, receive kickback offers).  The Proposed Code 
grades the failure to report any type of bribe as a Class 4 felony or Class A misdemeanor, 
depending on the status of the person failing to report.  See Section 5102.
92See Section 5101 and commentary.
93See 720 ILCS 5/11-12 to -13.
94See 720 ILCS 5/5-1 to -3 (establishing complicity rules); Section 301 (same).
95See Section 4102.
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C. Maintain Proportionality Between Various Offenses 
 The two goals discussed above relate to decisions about grading specifi c 
offenses or degrees of offenses. A third objective in grading criminal offenses 
is to ensure that grading remains rational when the grades of different 
offenses are compared with one another. In other words, a criminal code must 
maintain proportionality of grading across offenses and make certain that the 
relative level of liability for different offenses parallels the relative harm or 
wrong they refl ect.
 Although the drafters of the Proposed Code have deferred, where 
possible, to the apparent legislative determinations regarding the relative 
harm of each offense that current grading levels refl ect, in a few instances 
a comparison of different offenses reveals grading discrepancies contrary to 
any sense of proportionality. For example, consider current law’s grading 
of the theft offenses. The current theft offense aggravates punishment a full 
grade for thefts from the person and another full grade for thefts committed 
in a school or place of worship.96 As a result, taking less than $300 in property 
from a person while in a school or place of worship is a Class 2 felony.97 
Thus a student who takes another student’s lunch money out of his pocket 
is subject to the same punishment as a person who commits kidnaping, 
aggravated domestic battery, aggravated criminal sexual abuse, or ordinary 
theft of up to $100,000.98 The Proposed Code eliminates the full grade 
aggravation for thefts from the person — whose additional harms are more 
properly addressed through assault or robbery provisions — and reduces the 
aggravation for thefts committed in a school or place of worship.99
 The current code also contains three offenses that provide, for discharging 
a fi rearm in the direction of another, grades ranging from a Class 1 felony to 
96720 ILCS 5/16-1(b).
97See 720 ILCS 5/16-1(b)(4.1).
98See 720 ILCS 5/10-1(c) (kidnaping); 5/12-3.3(b) (aggravated domestic battery); 5/12-
16(g) (aggravated criminal sexual abuse); 5/16-1(b)(5) (theft).
99See Section 2109 and commentary.  Proposed Section 2109(8) grades thefts from a 
school or place of worship based upon double the value of the property.  Under the proposed 
scheme, the student who takes another student’s notebook or calculator would only be subject 
to a Class A misdemeanor for thefts under $150 and a Class 4 felony for thefts between $150 
and $500.
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a Class X felony with a minimum imprisonment term of 12 years, depending 
on the potential victim’s occupation and the type of fi rearm involved.100 
The grading for these offenses, which do not require any resulting injury 
or death, is unduly severe when compared to the grading for other current 
offenses criminalizing endangerment or actual infl iction of injury or death. 
For example, recklessly killing another person is only a Class 3 felony under 
current 5/9-3; even second-degree murder is only a Class 1 felony under 
current 5/9-2. Knowingly causing a catastrophe — which, in this context, 
requires “serious physical injury to 5 or more persons” — is a Class X felony 
under current 5/20.5-5, making it less serious than some fi rearm discharge 
offenses where no injury occurs. “Reckless conduct,” which is similar to 
the discharge offenses in criminalizing risk-creation as opposed to actual 
infl iction of injury, is a mere Class A misdemeanor under current 5/12-5.
 Although it is certainly more serious than most of the other conduct 
covered by the current offense of “reckless conduct,” the act of fi ring a gun in 
another’s direction, without any explicitly required culpability as to causing 
bodily harm, and without the requirement of any actual resulting harm or 
injury, is less serious than knowingly causing a catastrophe, knowingly 
killing another under the infl uence of an extreme disturbance, or recklessly 
killing another person. The Proposed Code adopts the view that the conduct 
in question is more properly treated as a combination of a weapons offense 
and endangerment (or, where injury or death occurs, an assault or homicide 
offense) than as a distinct offense. This scheme enables the amount of 
liability to refl ect the actual amount of harm caused.
 Other examples of disproportionate grading are plentiful. For example, 
current law grades certain forms of battery more seriously than second-degree 
murder (and provides no “provocation” mitigation for such batteries).101 The 
Proposed Code grades the homicide offense the same as current law, but 
creates one assault offense whose grade varies depending upon the amount 
of harm caused, the nature of the conduct, and the status of the victim, but 
100Current 5/24-1.2 grades knowingly discharging any type of fi rearm in the direction 
of a building or vehicle one “reasonably should know to be occupied” as a Class 1 felony, 
but aggravates the offense to a Class X felony where the offense occurs near a school, and 
to a Class X felony with a minimum imprisonment term of ten years where the fi rearm is 
discharged in the direction of certain categories of person (such as peace offi cers, emergency 
medical technicians, and teachers).  Current 5/24-1.2-5 is similar to 5/24-1.2, but only applies 
to “machine guns” and guns equipped with silencers; current 5/24-1.2-5 grades discharging 
such a fi rearm in the direction of an ordinary person as a Class X felony, and aggravates the 
offense to a Class X felony with a minimum term of 12 years where the fi rearm is discharged 
in the direction of certain persons, as noted above.  Finally, current 5/24-3.2(b) treats recklessly 
discharging a fi rearm known to be loaded with an “armor piercing bullet” as a Class X felony 
where the bullet strikes another.
101See 720 ILCS 5/12-4.1 (heinous battery; Class X felony); 5/12-4.2 (aggravated battery 
with a fi rearm; Class X felony); 5/12-34 (female genital mutilation; Class X felony); 5/9-2 
(second degree murder; Class 1 felony).
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never exceeds the penalty for a deliberate homicide.102 Likewise, current 
law grades eavesdropping more seriously than unauthorized videotaping,103 
meaning that someone who videotapes another person undressing in a locker 
room (or her own home) would be punished less severely than someone who 
listens to another’s phone conversation. The Proposed Code defi nes a single 
offense covering violations of this type and imposes a consistent grade.104
D. Develop a Rational Scheme of Liability for Multiple Offenses
 An additional goal of the Proposed Code moves beyond grading 
individual offenses, and even beyond issues of proportionality in grading 
different offenses, to consider broader grading issues that arise from the 
challenging problem of “overall grading” of multiple offenses. All too often, 
this problem is met with “solutions” that themselves compromise the goals of 
rationality and proportionality in grading.
 Some of the problems in the current grading scheme probably relate 
to current law’s concurrent-versus-consecutive system for sentencing 
multiple offenses. Except in certain circumstances, current law requires 
that all sentences for multiple offenses be served concurrently.105 Where 
the exceptions apply, the defendant must serve a full consecutive term for 
each relevant conviction. This double-or-nothing approach creates one set 
of undesirable results where offenders may serve no additional jail time for 
committing additional offenses, and a different but equally undesirable set 
of results where offenders may face disproportionately lengthy sentences for 
multiple offenses whose cumulative harm is not great.
 Current law’s general rule requiring concurrent sentences for multiple 
convictions has the regrettable consequence of trivializing, to the point of 
complete irrelevance, all offenses other than the single most serious one. In 
what is probably an effort to avoid this result, the current Illinois Code defi nes 
various “combination offenses” which have the effect of ensuring that, where 
certain independent offenses are committed together, they will be treated as 
a distinct offense with an enhanced grade to guarantee that each separate 
harm is refl ected in some additional amount of liability. For example, current 
law defi nes the offense of “aggravated arson,” a Class X felony, to cover 
situations where arson results in bodily harm.106 Without such an offense, the 
102See Section 1103(3) (“fi rst-degree manslaughter”; analogous offense to current 
second-degree murder offense); Section 1201 (assault).
103See 720 ILCS 5/14-4 (eavesdropping; Class 4 felony); 5/26-4(d) (unauthorized 
videotaping; Class A misdemeanor).
104See Section 2403(3) (unlawful eavesdropping or surveillance; Class A misdemeanor).
105For a discussion of current law rules on consecutive and concurrent sentencing, see the 
commentary for Section 906.
106See 720 ILCS 5/20-1.1(b); see also 720 ILCS 5/12-4.2 (“aggravated discharge of a 
fi rearm,” offense combining assault and fi rearm offenses; Class X felony); 5/12-11 (“home 
invasion,” offense combining burglary, assault, and fi rearm offenses; Class X felony); 5/18-2 
(“armed robbery,” offense combining robbery and fi rearm offenses; Class X felony).
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arsonist who also causes bodily harm would serve only the Class 2 sentence 
for arson, because any sentence imposed on a separate conviction for causing 
the injury would be served concurrently. Yet the new “combination offenses” 
are themselves problematic because the need to elevate the grade frequently 
results in grading for such offenses that is disproportionate to their total 
harm, and to the grading for other offenses. In short, to avoid the problems 
that arise from the crude concurrent-or-consecutive system for multiple 
convictions, the current code defi nes additional individual offenses, but the 
grading of those offenses ultimately raises serious proportionality problems 
as well — so that the fundamental problem of ensuring appropriate grading 
remains unsolved, and may even be worsened.
 At the same time, current law has developed a complicated maze of 
provisions to defi ne, but also to limit, the circumstances under which the 
usual concurrent-sentence rule may be avoided and an offender may be 
sentenced to consecutive sentences.107 Perhaps not surprisingly, the current 
sentencing scheme has been the subject of extensive litigation, often resulting 
in contradictory or illogical court decisions.108 For example, current law 
limits the total aggregate sentence for all consecutive sentences committed 
as part of a single course of conduct to the sum of the maximum terms for 
the two most serious offenses.109 In a recent case interpreting this rule, the 
Illinois Supreme Court held that the governing statutes required a maximum 
(consecutive) sentence for the defendant’s fi ve offenses of conviction that was 
less than — in fact, less than half of — the sentence for which he would have 
been eligible had he committed only one of the offenses.110
 The Proposed Code addresses all these problems by introducing a system 
ensuring that each additional offense of conviction leads to additional, but 
incrementally less, liability. Thus, no offense is trivialized with a concurrent 
sentence, and the disproportionality of consecutive sentences is avoided.111
107Under 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a), consecutive sentences for multiple offenses are mandatory 
when the offenses are committed as part of a single course of conduct and:  (i) one of the 
offenses was fi rst degree murder, a Class X felony, or Class 1 felony, and the defendant 
infl icted serious bodily injury; or (ii) one of the offenses was a form of criminal sexual assault; 
or (iii) one of the offenses was armed violence based on one of eleven different predicate 
offenses. Current 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(b) requires consecutive sentences under precisely the 
same circumstances as subsection (a), but where the offenses were not committed as part of 
a single course of conduct.  Even in cases that do not fi t any of the above circumstances, the 
court may still sentence a multiple offender to a consecutive sentence in cases where the court 
fi nds that such a sentence is necessary to protect the public from further criminal conduct by 
the defendant.  See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(b).
108Cf. GINO V. DIVITO, SENTENCING AND DISPOSITION GUIDE 34-45 (2000) (discussing 
cases).
109See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(c)(2).
110See People v. Pullen, 733 N.E.2d 1235, 1239 (Ill. 2000) (holding defendant was subject 
to a 28-year maximum consecutive sentence for committing multiple Class 2 felonies, even 
though defendant would have been eligible for up to a 60-year sentence, as a Class X offender 
under 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3(c)(8), had he committed only one offense).
111See Section 906 and commentary.
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5. RETAIN ALL — BUT ONLY — RATIONAL, DEFENSIBLE POLICY DECISIONS 
EMBODIED IN CURRENT LAW
 Substantive policy decisions about the rules of the criminal law — such 
as what conduct should be criminalized and what adjudicative rules should 
govern the imposition of criminal liability112 — refl ect value judgments that 
are properly made by the legislature rather than a group of drafters. For this 
reason, the Proposed Code seeks to follow the substance of current law 
wherever possible.
 In some places, however, current law contains multiple contradictory 
rules — and therefore no clear rule — on a subject. Other rules may 
have been sound when enacted, but no longer refl ect current realities or 
sensibilities and require expansion, alteration, or deletion. Still other current 
legal rules have been created by the courts through case law, rather than 
by the legislature through statutory enactment, and appear to be in direct 
tension with the governing statutory provision. In those situations where the 
existing legal rule seems clearly at odds with the goal of producing a rational, 
coherent criminal code, the drafters have been forced to modify the existing 
rule, using supporting commentary to the Proposed Code to describe and 
justify the proposed change.
 Further explanation of this goal follows, along with a representative, 
but by no means exhaustive, collection of examples of current Illinois law’s 
shortcomings in this area.113 
A. Consistent and Rational Use of Culpability Requirements in Defi ning 
Offenses
 In creating the Criminal Code of 1961, the drafters recognized the 
importance and diffi culty of comprehensively defi ning and employing “the 
112A third substantive category, offense grading, is discussed in Section 4 above.
113Included here are other examples of current policies that are diffi cult to reconcile 
with the existing statutory scheme.  First, current Illinois law has resurrected the concepts of 
“specifi c intent” and “general intent,” which the original 1961 Code rejected in favor of the 
culpability requirements defi ned in 5/4-3 (“Mental state”).  Accordingly, the 1961 version 
of 5/6-3(a) provided that intoxication must “negative[] the existence of a mental state which 
is an element of the offense.”  ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 ¶ 6-3 (Smith-Hurd 1964).  However, 
subsequent judicial decisions, instead of reading “mental state” to refer to the culpability 
terms defi ned in the Code, read it to refer to the concepts of general and specifi c intent.  See, 
e.g., People v. Berlin, 270 N.E.2d 461, 463 (Ill. App. 1971) (fi nding intoxication to be no 
defense to robbery because robbery is not a specifi c intent offense).  The courts’ continued 
use of the concept of “specifi c intent” — which later made its way into an amendment to 5/6-
3(a) — disregarded the 1961 Code’s deliberate rejection of this concept.  The Proposed Code 
completely abandons the concepts of general and specifi c intent in favor of the culpability 
terms defi ned in Article 200.
(continued…)
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mental states which are elements of the various specifi c offenses.”114 Despite 
their efforts, in some respects current law is casual or imprecise in its use 
of culpability requirements in defi ning offenses, leading to interpretive 
diffi culties.
 Perhaps the most signifi cant issue in this area is the courts’ consistent 
failure to apply current 720 ILCS 5/4-3(b) properly, if at all, to offenses. That 
provision states that where an offense does not prescribe a particular mental 
state, “any mental state defi ned in Sections 4-4, 4-5 or 4-6 [defi ning intent, 
knowledge, and recklessness] is applicable.”115 The provision’s own language 
makes clear that a person may be found liable based on a showing of any of 
the three specifi ed mental states.116 However, the Illinois Supreme Court has 
113(…continued)
Second, the current scheme improperly elevates culpability requirements for inchoate 
offenses relative to completed offenses.  The current formulation for attempt increases the 
culpability level for all elements of the substantive offense to “intent,” which may cause 
improper results or confusion.  For example, the offense of murder requires only that the actor 
“kn[ew] that [his] acts create[d] a strong probability of causing death or great bodily harm,” but 
Illinois courts, following current 5/8-4, have required that attempted murder requires “specifi c 
intent” (see above) as to all elements of the offense.  See, e.g., People v. Kraft, 478 N.E.2d 1154 
(Ill. App. 1985) (reversing conviction for attempted murder where jury instructions allowed 
conviction if defendant acted with knowledge that his actions created a strong probability of 
death, but not with intent to kill).  Proposed Article 800 requires that for each inchoate offense, 
the person need act intentionally only with respect to the conduct that would bring about the 
underlying offense, but act with the culpability required by the underlying offense for all other 
elements.  See proposed Sections 801 to 803 and their corresponding commentaries.
 Third, Illinois law is confused as to the proper standard for attempt liability. Under 
current 5/8-4(a), attempt liability requires conduct constituting a “substantial step” toward 
commission of an offense. However, although the substantial step test’s true focus is on how 
far an actor has gone from the beginning of the causal chain leading to the offense, Illinois 
courts have sometimes read the provision as creating a “dangerous proximity” test, which 
focuses on how close to the end of the causal chain he has come. See People v. Smith, 593 
N.E.2d 533, 537 (Ill. 1992) (fi nding that defendant did not commit attempted armed robbery 
where defendant was armed and searching for jewelry store in stolen car he intended to use 
as getaway car, because defendant had not identifi ed target jewelry store, and thus it would 
be “improper to conclude that defendant came within a dangerous proximity to success.”). 
Rather than asking whether there was suffi cient evidence for the jury to fi nd that the defendant 
had taken a substantial step toward the offense, the Smith court engaged in an independent 
inquiry as to how far away the defendant was from completing the offense. That analysis both 
misreads the statute and improperly takes the substantial step determination away from the 
jury. The commentary to proposed Section 801 makes clear that the proper focus is on how far 
the actor has gone from the beginning of the causal chain leading to the offense, and that the 
issue is to be decided by the trier of fact.
114720 ILL. ANN. STAT. 5/4-3, Committee Comments — 1961, at 144 (West 1993).  See 
also Francis A. Allen, Criminal Law Revision in Illinois:  A Progress Report, 39 CHI. B. REC. 
21 (Oct. 1957) (“One of the most important [sections of the Code] relates to defi ning the 
various mental states required to establish criminal liability.”).
115720 ILCS 5/4-3(b).
116720 ILL. ANN. STAT. 5/4-3, Committee Comments — 1961, at 152 (West 1993) (referring 
to Model Penal Code § 2.02(3), comment at 127 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955), which states that 
“unless the kind of culpability suffi cient to establish a material element of an offense has been 
prescribed by law, it is established if a person acted [intentionally], knowingly, or recklessly 
with respect thereto”).
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interpreted current 5/4-3 as requiring the court to choose which one of the 
three mental states should apply to a given offense.117 This reading distorts 
the clear intent of the legislature and inappropriately restricts the culpability 
requirements for various offenses. This same provision is standard in modern 
American criminal codes, based as it is on Model Penal Code Section 2.02(3), 
and other states have had no such diffi culty in its proper interpretation.118 
 The courts’ error may be due to the fact that the current code lacks a 
provision, of the kind included in the Model Penal Code and most codes 
based on it (like Illinois’),119 stating that proof of a more serious degree of 
culpability satisfi es an offense defi nition requiring a lower level of culpability. 
Accordingly, under current law, culpability levels are seen as mutually 
exclusive — for example, a “knowing” act will not satisfy a requirement 
of a “reckless” act. The Proposed Code cures this defect by including the 
currently omitted provision, so that, for example, when an offense requires 
recklessness as to an element, it is clear that “the requirement is also satisfi ed 
by proof of intent or knowledge as to the element.”120 With such a provision in 
place, it becomes clear that where no mental state is specifi ed as to an offense 
element and absolute liability was not intended, the default requirement of 
recklessness will be applied to that element, but proof of intent or knowledge 
will satisfy the requirement as well.
117See, e.g., People v. Gean, 573 N.E.2d 818, 822 (Ill. 1991) (“[W]hen a statute neither 
prescribes a particular mental state nor creates an absolute liability offense, then either intent, 
knowledge or recklessness applies.  In the case at bar, we believe knowledge is the appropriate 
mental element.”); People v. Terrell, 547 N.E.2d 145, 158 (Ill. 1989) (“[T]he legislature 
clearly did not intend the aggravated criminal sexual assault statute to defi ne a strict liability 
or public welfare offense.  Accordingly, a mental state of either intent or knowledge implicitly 
is required[.]”).  See also People v. Nunn, 396 N.E.2d 27, 29-31 (Ill. 1979) (reading knowledge 
requirement into vehicle “hit and run” offense based upon legislative history and prior enacted 
version of the statute, without any reference to 5/4-3).
118More than a dozen other states’ codes provide that recklessness, or a higher culpability 
level, be “read in” where an offense defi nition does not explicitly prescribe a culpability 
requirement.  See ALA. CODE § 13A-2-4; ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-2-203; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 
251; HAW. REV. STAT. § 702-204; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3201; MO. REV. STAT. § 562.021; N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 12.1-02-02; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:2-2; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.21; 18 PA. 
CONS. STAT. § 302; TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-301; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.02; UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 76-2-102.
 Unlike the Illinois courts, courts in other jurisdictions have not interpreted such read-
in provisions to require a selection of a single governing culpability requirement. See, e.g., 
Upshur v. State, 420 A.2d 165, 168 (Del. 1980) (applying read-in provision to carrying and 
possessing deadly weapons); State v. Eastman, 913 P.2d 57, 66 (Haw. 1996) (applying read-in 
provision to abuse of family or household member and holding that “the prosecution needs 
only to prove the lowest of the three alternative levels of culpability, i.e. recklessness, in order 
to satisfy the state of mind requirement”); State v. Howard, 926 S.W.2d 579, 587 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 1996) (applying read-in provision to aggravated sexual battery); North v. State, 598 
S.W.2d 634, 636 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (applying read-in provision to aggravated rape). 
119See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(5); id. cmt. at 247 n.39 (listing 19 states with similar 
provision as of 1985).
120Section 205(6).
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 A related issue is the courts’ occasional failure to follow the current 
statutory rule that a person must have culpability “with respect to each 
element” of an offense, unless absolute liability is clearly intended.121 That 
rule requires that, with respect to each element of an offense, it must be 
proved that the defendant possessed either (1) the culpability level stated in 
the offense defi nition, or (2) where no culpability level is stated, the “default” 
level of recklessness noted above.122 Yet Illinois courts often conclude that no 
culpability is required as to certain elements of offenses, although there is no 
suggestion that the legislature intended absolute liability as to the element in 
question.123 In some cases, this conclusion may not affect the outcome, as the 
evidence may support an inference of culpability even though the court does 
121720 ILCS 5/4-3(a).
122Current 5/4-3(b) states: 
If the statute defi ning an offense prescribed a particular mental state with respect to the 
offense as a whole, without distinguishing among the elements thereof, the prescribed 
mental state applies to each such element.  If the statute does not prescribe a particular 
mental state applicable to an element of an offense (other than an offense which involves 
absolute liability), any mental state defi ned in Section 4-4, 4-5 or 4-6 is applicable.
720 ILCS 5/4-3(b).  The drafters of the 1961 Code clarifi ed the operation of 5/4-3(b) in their 
committee comments:
Often, a single mental-state word, such as “knowingly,” is placed in a position where 
grammatically it may apply to all elements of the offense.  To so apply it for the purposes 
of legal interpretation seems logical, since the intent that it shall not apply to certain 
elements of the offense may be expressed readily by a different sentence structure . . 
. . Or a provision may be so phrased that the mental state expressed applies only to 
some of the elements of the offense and not to others, although no indication appears 
that absolute liability is intended to attach to the others.  In either situation, the logical 
conclusion seems to be that the intended mental state to be implied is intent, knowledge, 
or recklessness . . . .
 
720 ILL. ANN. STAT. 5/4-3, Committee Comments — 1961, at 152 (West 1993).
123See, e.g., People v. Jones, 495 N.E.2d 1371, 1372-73 (Ill. App. 1986) (requiring no 
culpability as to fact that another person owned property in prosecution, under 720 ILCS 
5/21-1(a), for “knowingly damaging . . . property of another”); People v. Wright, 488 N.E.2d 
1344, 1349 (Ill. App. 1986) (fi nding that 720 ILCS 24-1(a)(7), which prohibits “knowingly … 
possess[ing] . . . a shotgun having one or more barrels less than 18 inches in length,” did not 
require that “the defendant in fact know the shotgun’s barrel measured less than 18 inches”).
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not require that inference.124 In other cases, however, the failure to require 
culpability encourages, and directly leads to, imposition of strict liability — a 
result that contradicts both the fundamental principles of criminal liability 
and the stated intent of the General Assembly as expressed in the current code 
itself.
 The Proposed Code addresses these problems in two ways. First, the 
Code explicitly details, in both the proposed provisions and commentary, 
how the culpability rules are designed to function.125 Second, the Proposed 
Code takes care to ensure that every offense is drafted with these rules in 
mind.126
 Inconsistencies in imposing culpability requirements also exist in current 
law’s treatment of inchoate offenses: attempt, conspiracy, and solicitation. 
The current law holding that there can be no offense of “attempted second-
124For example, in People v. Rickman, 391 N.E.2d 1114, 1118 (Ill. App. 1979), the court 
seemingly ignored the clear language of the aggravated battery statute, which required that a 
person, “in committing a battery, intentionally or knowingly cause great bodily harm.”  The 
defendant, who, while attempting to escape a security guard’s grasp, fell on the guard’s ankle 
and caused it to break, claimed on appeal that he did not know his actions would result in great 
bodily harm to the victim.  In rejecting the defendant’s claim, the court ruled that the statute 
did not require any culpability as to the resulting great bodily harm:  “the state need only show 
that he knowingly scuffl ed with [the victim] and that [the victim] received great bodily harm 
as a result of the scuffl e.”  Id.
 Rather than ignoring the clear language of the aggravated battery offense, the court 
could have reached the same result by fi nding that there was suffi cient evidence for the fact 
fi nder to infer the requisite knowledge as to the resulting harm. See People v. Smith, 464 
N.E.2d 685, 688 (Ill. App. 1984) (affi rming conviction for knowingly causing bodily harm, 
despite defendant’s claim that she accidently cut victim, based on conclusion that it was not 
unreasonable for lower court to infer that defendant was consciously aware serious injury was 
practically certain to result from her brandishing a knife and struggling with security guard).
125See Section 205 and commentary.  Section 205(2) provides:  “When an offense 
defi nition contains a stated culpability requirement, that requirement shall apply to all 
subsequent objective elements within the grammatical clause in which it appears and any 
subsequent objective elements to which common usage would suggest the legislature intended 
it to apply.”
 Section 205(3) provides: “When no culpability requirement is specifi ed with regard to an 
objective element, a requirement of recklessness is applicable, except [where absolute liability 
is intended].”
126For example, the proposed arson offense states: 
(1) Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if, by means of fi re or 
explosive, he knowingly:
 (a) damages a building or habitable structure of another or a vital public 
facility; or  
 (b) damages any property, whether his own or another’s, with the intention 
that insurance be collected for such loss.
Section 2201(1). The structure clearly indicates that the prescribed culpability requirement 
(knowingly) is intended to apply to each of the offense elements contained in subsections (a) 
and (b).
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degree murder” (or “attempted manslaughter”)127 leads to the anomalous, 
and clearly undesirable, result that many would-be killers are punished more 
severely where the intended victim lives than if they had successfully killed 
the victim. The Proposed Code, on the other hand, recognizes that causing 
the resulting harm of an offense — in this case, death — should, if anything, 
lead to greater punishment than failed efforts to cause that result under the 
same precise circumstances. Both attempted murder under the infl uence of 
an extreme disturbance128 and attempts based on unreasonable mistakes as to 
justifi cations129 are punished more severely than the corresponding completed 
offenses under the Proposed Code. 
B. Elimination of the “Common Design” Rule for Complicity Liability
 A related situation in which the courts have effectively encouraged strict 
liability, despite statutory declarations to the contrary, arises in the complicity 
context. The current complicity provision defi nes the circumstances in which 
127People v. Lopez, 655 N.E.2d 864, 867 (Ill. 1995) (holding that the offense of “attempted 
second-degree murder” does not exist, because “one cannot intend either a sudden and intense 
passion due to serious provocation or an unreasonable belief in the need to use deadly force. 
. . [, or] to unlawfully kill while at the same time intending to justifi ably use deadly force”). 
Cases that would otherwise be treated as attempted second-degree murder are thus treated as 
attempted fi rst-degree murder, an offense which is graded more seriously than a completed 
second-degree murder.  See 720 ILCS 5/8-4(c)(1) (attempted fi rst-degree murder; Class X 
felony subject to further aggravation); 5/9-2 (second-degree murder; Class 1 felony).
 This result is rooted in the current inchoate offenses’ culpability requirement that the 
offender must act “with intent that an offense be committed” or “with intent to commit a 
specifi c offense.” Such language has the effect of requiring intent as to all of the substantive 
offense’s objective elements — including those for which a lesser culpability level is required 
to prove the completed offense. 
128The Proposed Code recognizes “attempted fi rst-degree manslaughter” as an offense 
and grades it as less serious than the completed offense.  See Sections 801 & 807 and 
corresponding commentary.  Attempted fi rst-degree manslaughter is a possible offense under 
the Proposed Code because, unlike the current attempt provision, Section 801 does not require 
that the offender act “with intent to commit a specifi c offense.”  720 ILCS 5/8-4(a).  Section 
801 requires, rather, intent only to “engage in the conduct that would constitute the offense” 
— and explicitly provides that “the culpability required for commission of the offense,” rather 
than an elevated requirement of intent, governs the substantive offense’s other objective 
elements.  See Section 801 and corresponding commentary.
129Under Article 1100 and proposed Section 801, attempts based on unreasonable 
mistakes as to justifi cations would not count as any form of attempted homicide:  Section 511 
precludes liability for attempted murder, and the Proposed Code does not generally support 
liability for attempted reckless or negligent homicide.  Article 1200, however, includes specifi c 
offenses governing reckless conduct resulting in danger or injury short of death, which will 
typically allow for conviction of a Class 3 or Class 4 felony for attempts committed under 
reckless mistakes as to justifi cations.  Where the current rules sometimes result in the anomaly 
that an attempt is graded much higher than the completed offense, the Proposed Code’s 
approach ensures that attempts under reckless mistakes are always punished less severely than 
recklessly causing death.  Cf. Section 1104(2) (grading reckless homicide as Class 2 felony).
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a person will be held criminally accountable for the conduct of another.130 
In addition to these explicit statutory rules, however, the Illinois courts 
have resurrected a common law rule of accountability for which there is no 
statutory authority:131 the “common design” rule, which imposes liability 
on persons for any acts in furtherance of a common criminal design or 
agreement, whether or not the person had any culpability toward (or even 
awareness of) those acts.132
 As noted above, imposition of strict liability is contrary both to the 
defi ned statutory scheme and to any accepted basis for imposing criminal 
liability.133 It is particularly unusual in the complicity context, as it means 
that a person may be found liable as an accomplice even where, based on his 
lack of culpability, he would have no liability if he himself had personally 
committed the crime. Further, the common-design rule is unnecessary, as 
its most common application — to impose liability for homicide — can be 
accomplished by applying the felony-murder rule in appropriate situations, 
130According to the statute, there are three situations in which complicity liability is 
appropriate:  (a) having the culpability required by an offense, the defendant causes another 
person (who has no culpability) to perform the conduct prohibited by that offense; or (b) the 
statute defi ning the offense makes the defendant so accountable; or (c) with intent to promote 
the commission of an offense, the defendant aids, abets, or attempts to aid in the planning or 
commission of the offense.  See 720 ILCS 5/5-2; see also id., Committee Comments — 1961, 
at 177 (West 1993) (“It will be observed that liability under this subsection requires proof of 
an ‘intent to promote or facilitate . . . commission’ of the substantive offense.”).
131See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 6.8(b), at 
158 n.25 (1986) (noting that Illinois statute has been construed to provide for common-design 
liability although statute itself does not so provide).
132See, e.g., In re W.C., 657 N.E.2d 908, 923-24 (Ill. 1995) (fi nding juvenile defendant 
accountable for murder under common-design rule where defendant, who knew co-defendant 
was armed and planned to kill victim, hit victim with a stick before co-defendant shot fl eeing 
victim); People v. Taylor, 646 N.E.2d 567, 571-72 (Ill. 1995) (fi nding defendant accountable 
for murder under common-design rule, although defendant did not participate in planning or 
execution of a plan to murder the victim, because defendant knew co-defendant wanted to 
kill victim, knew co-defendant was armed, remained with group during and after murder, and 
fl ed when police arrived on scene); People v. Terry, 460 N.E.2d 746, 749 (Ill. 1984) (fi nding 
defendant liable for murder where defendant shared common design to commit battery against 
victim and victim died after being stabbed by co-defendant); People v. Morgan, 364 N.E.2d 
56, 59-60 (Ill. 1977) (upholding conviction for murder where defendant watched others beat 
victim to death, but did not participate, because defendant was present at scene and shared 
common design with co-defendants to take money from victim); People v. Kessler, 315 N.E.2d 
29, 32 (Ill. 1974) (fi nding defendant accountable for attempted murder, although defendant 
was in getaway car when co-defendant shot and wounded tavern owner, because defendant had 
joined in common design to burglarize tavern).
133See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 131, at § 6.8(b) at 158 (“The ‘natural and probable 
consequence’ rule of accomplice liability . . . is inconsistent with more fundamental principles 
of our system of criminal law. . . . [G]eneral application of [that] rule of accomplice liability 
is unwarranted.”).
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instead of adopting a much broader rule effectively allowing “misdemeanor 
murder” accomplice liability, even when no such liability may be available 
for the principal killer himself.134
 The proposed complicity provision expressly rejects the common-design 
rule to the extent that it permits the imputation of another’s conduct to one 
who lacks any culpability with respect to that conduct.135
C. Elimination of the “Limited Authority” Doctrine for Burglary and 
Home Invasion
 Illinois courts currently hold, under the “limited authority” doctrine, that 
any person who enters a building or vehicle with the intent to commit a felony 
or theft — even if the person has the owner’s permission or the property is 
open to the public — does so “without authority” (and thereby satisfi es the 
requirements of the burglary, home invasion, or vehicle invasion offense). 
This conclusion is based on the determination that “authority to enter . . . [a] 
building open to the public . . . extends only to those who enter with a purpose 
consistent with the reason the building is open.”136
 The “limited authority” doctrine contradicts the language and goals of 
the existing intrusion offenses. Under the doctrine, one offense element 
(intent to commit a crime) automatically establishes another (the separate 
statutory “without authority” element), making the second totally irrelevant 
and ultimately meaning that any entry into any building will translate the 
attempted crime (usually theft) into burglary. This completely eliminates 
any distinction between burglary and theft, and often ends up punishing 
an attempt, or even less than an attempt, to commit theft more severely 
than the completed theft would be punished. For example, under the rule, a 
teenager who enters a supermarket planning to shoplift a candy bar, but who 
is caught, is guilty of burglary (a Class 2 felony) instead of theft (a Class A 
misdemeanor). Such a result violates any sense of proportional punishment.
 The Proposed Code does not incorporate the “limited authority” doctrine 
and, to emphasize its rejection of the rule, further requires that a burglary 
(and, by reference, a home invasion) occur “at a time when the premises are 
not open to the public.”137
134See, e.g., People v. Terry, 460 N.E.2d 746, 750 (1984) (“Defendants argue that the 
common-design rule should be abolished because it creates a ‘misdemeanor murder rule.’  We 
agree that the rule does impose liability for murder even though a misdemeanor was originally 
intended.”).
135See Section 301 and corresponding commentary.
136People v. Weaver, 243 N.E.2d 245, 248 (Ill. 1968) (upholding burglary conviction 
where defendant entered laundromat during business hours with intent to commit theft); see 
also People v. Peeples, 616 N.E.2d 294, 325 (Ill. 1993) (applying “limited authority” doctrine 
to home invasion). 
137See Sections 2301 and 2302 and corresponding commentaries.
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D. Revising the Insanity Defense
 Since the 1961 Code was adopted, the legislature has adopted provisions 
that limit the scope of the insanity defense, largely due to a perception that 
the insanity defense has been subject to abuse. However, various studies 
(in Illinois and elsewhere) strongly suggest this assumption is empirically 
unsound.138  Meanwhile, additional policy concerns call these limitations into 
question.
138It has been well-documented that the lay public has an exaggerated sense of how often 
the insanity plea is used as well as how often verdicts of “not guilty by reason of insanity” 
(NGRI) are granted.  For example, people generally believe, wrongly, that the insanity defense 
is commonly an issue in criminal trials.  One study found that people thought that thirty-
eight percent of all defendants charged with a crime pleaded NGRI.  See Valerie P. Hans, An 
Analysis of Public Attitudes Toward the Insanity Defense, 24 CRIMINOLOGY 393, 406 (1986); 
see also Eric Silver et al., Demythologizing Inaccurate Perceptions of the Insanity Defense, 
18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 63, 67-68 (1994).  In reality, an insanity plea is exceedingly rare, 
raised in a fraction of a percent of even felony cases.  See, e.g., Lisa A. Callahan et al., The 
Volume and Characteristics of Insanity Defense Pleas:  An Eight-State Study, 19 BULL. AM. 
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 331, 334 (1991).  (Note that this is less than one percent of all felony 
cases, while the lay subjects estimated insanity pleas for 38% of all persons charged with any 
crime.  See also Richard A. Pasewark & Hugh McGinley, Insanity Plea:  National Survey of 
Frequency and Success, 13 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 101 (1985) (reporting median rate of one plea 
per 873 reported crimes).  Also contrary to popular belief, more than half of the few cases 
where an insanity plea is introduced involve nonviolent offenses.  See HENRY J. STEADMAN ET 
AL., BEFORE AND AFTER HINCKLEY: EVALUATING INSANITY DEFENSE REFORM 111 (1993); see also 
Callahan et al., supra, at 336.)
In addition, it has been reported that even in the rare cases in which the insanity defense is 
sought, it is usually not granted, yet the public perception is that it is commonly granted.  See, 
e.g., Callahan et al., supra, at 334 (reporting average acquittal rate of 26% on NGRI pleas); 
Pasewark & McGinley, supra, at 106 (reporting success rate of 15% of pleas); Hans, supra, at 
406 (reporting study indicating that public believes over 36% of all NGRI claims, constituting 
perceived 14% of all criminal cases, result in NGRI verdict); Mary Frain, Professor Says 
Insanity Defense Seldom Works, TELEGRAM & GAZETTE (Worcester, MA), Jan. 19, 1996, at B1 
(quoting chair of psychiatry at the University of Massachusetts Medical Center as saying that 
general public believes the insanity defense is used in 20 to 50 percent of all criminal cases).
Claims that the defense is abused and employed to manipulate juries are also belied 
by the fact that most NGRI pleas are not contested, and the vast majority of NGRI verdicts 
— 93%, in one study — are reached through negotiated pleas or rendered by judges in bench 
trials, rather than by juries.  See Michael L. Perlin, A Law of Healing, 68 U. CIN L. REV. 407, 
425 (2000) (“Nearly 90% of all insanity defense cases are ‘walkthroughs’ — stipulated on the 
papers.”); Callahan et al., supra, at 334.  Another refutation of the abuse concern is the fact 
that most NGRI acquittees have signifi cant histories of treatment for mental illness.  See, e.g., 
Michael R. Hawkins & Richard A. Pasewark, Characteristics of Persons Utilizing the Insanity 
Plea, 53 PSYCHOL. REP. 191, 194 (1983); STEADMAN ET AL., supra, at 56.
 These massive misconceptions regarding the practical signifi cance of the insanity defense 
fuel the general sense that the insanity defense is being abused and that something must be 
done to limit the abuse. See Michael L. Perlin, “The Borderline Which Separated You From 
Me”: The Insanity Defense, the Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and the Culture of 
Punishment, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1375, 1375 & nn.5-6 (1997) (citing polls suggesting that “ninety 
percent [of Americans] believe that the insanity plea is overused”).
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 For example, current law provides for a “guilty but mentally ill” verdict 
(“GBMI”) as a supposed compromise between a verdict of not guilty by 
reason of insanity (NGRI) and a conviction.139 Although this verdict was 
meant to reduce NGRI acquittals, the number of NGRI verdicts in Illinois 
actually increased after the GBMI verdict was enacted.140 The GBMI verdict 
is troublesome because it has no legal signifi cance whatever,141 yet distracts 
the jury into considering the technical clinical issue of whether an offender 
needs psychiatric treatment, although the determination of guilt should be 
the jury’s sole responsibility. Moreover, because current rules prohibit the 
jury from fi nding out that an NGRI verdict does not result in the defendant’s 
release from custody,142 there is a signifi cant likelihood that juries will 
erroneously conclude that the GBMI verdict is either necessary to ensure 
that the defendant is not unconditionally released, or the only appropriate 
way to guarantee needed psychological treatment for the defendant, or both. 
Another counterintuitive, and troubling, aspect of the GBMI verdict is that 
although mental illness is normally thought to mitigate culpability, offenders 
found GBMI receive longer average sentences than offenders who are simply 
found guilty.143 This strongly hints that GBMI is being used to usurp the role 
of civil commitment (protecting society from persons who present a danger 
for the future) rather than to fulfi ll the role of criminal liability (sanctioning 
offenders for their blameworthy conduct in the past).
 Likewise, the legislature recently eliminated the “volitional” rule of the 
insanity excuse, despite research that demonstrates strong public support for 
an excuse of persons whose mental illness substantially impairs their ability to 
control their conduct.144 This standard merits re-inclusion, as it covers persons 
who are clearly not blameworthy, and there is no demonstrated risk that 
inclusion of such a standard in the insanity defense will lead to inappropriate 
acquittals — or, indeed, that it will change the outcome of insanity-defense 
cases at all.145 Further, current Illinois law recognizes a volitional-impairment 
defense where the impairment results from involuntary intoxication. There 
is no obvious explanation for why substantial control impairment should 
excuse in that context, but the same impairment should not excuse when it 
results from mental illness.
139See 720 ILCS 5/6-2(c), (d).
140See Christopher Slobogin, The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict:  An Idea Whose Time 
Should Not Have Come, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 494, 507 (1985). 
141GBMI is not a “middle position” in terms of its consequences; it has the same effect 
as a guilty verdict, see 730 ILCS 5/5-2-6(a), even in terms of the defendant’s receiving a 
psychological evaluation, which is required for all convicts.  See 730 ILCS 5/3-8-2; cf. 730 
ILCS 5/5-2-6(b) (giving IDOC discretion as to whether GBMI convicts receive treatment).
142See 730 ILCS 5/5-2-4 (providing that NGRI acquittee is to be remanded for 
psychological evaluation and treatment); People v. Stack, 613 N.E.2d 1175, 1183-84 (Ill. App. 
1993) (upholding Illinois rule that jury is not to learn of consequences of NGRI verdict).
143See STEADMAN ET AL., supra note 138, at 117-19.
144See PUB. ACT 90-593 (1998).
145See Callahan et al., supra note 138.
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 Finally, current law requires the defendant to prove the insanity defense 
by clear and convincing evidence, while all other excuse defenses must be 
disproved by the state beyond a reasonable doubt.146 There is little rational 
reason for imposing different burdens for different excuses, and the clear-
and-convincing burden for insanity seems unnecessary considering that 
approximately one percent of felony cases involve an insanity defense, and 
only about 25 percent of those few cases result in a NGRI verdict.147
 The Proposed Code refl ects these policy concerns in rejecting the 
GBMI verdict, reinstating the volitional rule, and requiring the defendant 
to prove any excuse defense, including insanity, by a preponderance of the 
evidence.148
E. Eliminating Archaic And/or Obsolete Offenses
 Chapter 720 contains a number of outdated offenses that do not belong in 
a modern criminal code. The Proposed Code attempts to identify and eliminate 
these offenses. For example, the proposed Article covering “offenses against 
the family” removes the current offenses of adultery and fornication.149 All 
indications are that these provisions are currently unenforced, despite the 
fact that there is no special diffi culty in identifying such offenders. Such non-
enforcement can only refl ect a conscious decision that imposition of criminal 
liability for these offenses is improper, or at least a waste of State resources. 
Maintenance of dead-letter statutes of this kind only tends to invite abuse 
and to undermine the authority of the criminal law as a comprehensive and 
accurate refl ection of the governed community’s sense of what behavior is 
suffi ciently improper to merit imposition of punishment.150 
146See 720 ILCS 5/6-2(e); see also commentary for Section 501.
147See Callahan et al., supra note 138.
148See Sections 501 and 504 and corresponding commentaries.
149See 720 ILCS 5/11-7 (adultery); 5/11-8 (fornication).
150For other specifi c offenses eliminated by the Proposed Code, see, for example, 
720 ILCS 5/32-11 (barratry); 5/32-12 (maintenance); 5/32-13 (unlawful clouding of title); 
5/37-1 (maintaining public nuisance); 300/1 (statements derogatory to banking institutions); 
315/1 (mutilation of horses’ tails); 355/1 (misrepresentation of pedigree and registration of 
a stallion or jack).  Where the conduct prohibited by these offenses is genuinely harmful 
and blameworthy, it should fall within the more general prohibitions of another proposed 
provision.  For example, mutilation of horses’ tails may constitute a violation of Section 6207 
(cruelty to animals).
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CONCLUSION
 The creation of the Illinois Criminal Code Rewrite and Reform 
Commission represents a rare and profound opportunity to eradicate the 
numerous inconsistencies and contradictions that currently plague Illinois 
criminal law. In nearly all cases, the needed corrections are signifi cant, but 
should not be at all controversial, for it is usually possible to clean up the 
form and structure of the law without altering its fundamental goals or rules. 
The Proposed Code both simplifi es and rationalizes the statutory criminal 
law of Illinois. It is rooted in the values and policy judgments of the present, 
but its language, organization, and comprehensive scope promise to better 
serve those interests in the future.
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Part I: General Provisions
ARTICLE 100.  PRELIMINARY PROVISIONS
Section 101. Short Title and Effective Date
Section 102. Principle of Construction; General Purposes
Section 103. Applicability
Section 104. Civil Remedies Preserved
Section 105. State Criminal Jurisdiction
Section 106. Place of Trial
Section 107. Burdens of Proof; Permissive Inferences
Section 108. Defi nitions
Section 101.  Short Title and Effective Date
 (1)  This Act shall be known and may be cited as the “Criminal Code 
of 2003.”
 (2)  This Code shall take effect on January 1, 2004.
Section 102.  Principle of Construction; General Purposes
 (1)  Principle of Construction.  The provisions of this Code shall be 
construed according to the fair import of their terms but when the language 
is susceptible of differing constructions, and remains so after resort to 
general principles of statutory interpretation and available indicia of 
legislative intent, it shall be interpreted to further these general purposes:
 (a) to forbid and prevent the commission of offenses;
 (b) to defi ne the acts and mental states that constitute each offense, 
and limit the condemnation of conduct as criminal when it is without fault;
 (c) to prescribe penalties that are proportionate to the seriousness 
of the offense; and
 (d) to prevent arbitrary or oppressive treatment of persons 
accused or convicted of offenses.
 (2)  Effect of Commentary.  The commentary accompanying this Code 
may be used as an aid in construing the provisions of this Code.
 (3)  Effect of Heading.  No heading contained in this Code shall be 
interpreted to govern, limit, modify, or in any manner affect the scope, 
meaning, or intent of a provision.
 (4)  Partial Invalidity.  The invalidity of any provision of this Code 
shall not affect the validity of the remainder of this Code.
 (5)  Savings Provisions.  The provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of 
“An Act to revise the law in relation to the construction of the Statutes,” 
approved March 5, 1874, as amended [5 ILCS 70/2, 5 ILCS 70/3 and 
5 ILCS 70/4], shall apply in all constructions of this Code.
Section 103.  Applicability
 (1)  No conduct constitutes an offense unless it is defi ned as an offense 
in this Code or in another statute of this State.
 (2)  The provisions of Part I of this Code are applicable to offenses 
defi ned by other statutes, unless this Code otherwise provides.
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 (3)  This Section does not affect the power of a court to punish for 
contempt or to employ any sanction authorized by law for the enforcement 
of an order or civil judgment.
Section 104.  Civil Remedies Preserved
 This Code does not bar, suspend, or otherwise affect any right or 
liability to damages, penalty, forfeiture, or other remedy authorized by law 
to be recovered or enforced in a civil action, for any conduct which this 
Code makes punishable; and the civil injury is not merged in the offense.
Section 105.  State Criminal Jurisdiction
 (1)  A person is subject to prosecution in this State for an offense that 
he commits, while either within or outside this State, by his own conduct or 
that of another for which he is legally accountable, if:
 (a) the offense is committed either wholly or partly within this 
State; or
 (b) the conduct outside the State constitutes an attempt to 
commit an offense within this State; or
 (c) the conduct outside the State constitutes a conspiracy to 
commit an offense within this State, and an act in furtherance of the 
conspiracy occurs in this State; or
 (d) the conduct within this State constitutes aid, or an attempt, 
solicitation, or conspiracy, to commit in another jurisdiction an offense 
under the laws of both this State and such other jurisdiction.
 (2)  Defi nition.  An offense is “committed partly within this State” if:
 (a) conduct that is an element of the offense, or
 (b) a result that is an element of the offense,
occurs within this State.
 (3)  Permissive Inference.  If the body of a homicide victim is found 
within this State, the trier of fact may infer that the death occurred within 
this State.
 (4)  Omission Liability.  An offense that is based on an omission to 
perform a duty imposed by the law of this State is committed within this 
State, regardless of the location of the defendant at the time of the omission.
Section 106.  Place of Trial 
 (1)  An offense may be tried in any county in which the requirements 
of criminal jurisdiction under Section 105 have been satisfi ed.
 (2)  Omission Liability.  An offense based on an omission to perform 
a duty imposed by the law of this State may be tried in the county in which 
the defendant or a victim resides.
 (3)  Objection Waived.  All objections to the place of trial are waived 
unless made before trial.
 (4)  Navigable Water.  If an element of the offense occurs on any 
navigable water bordering this State, the offense may be tried in any county 
adjacent to any portion of such navigable water.
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Section 107.  Burdens of Proof; Permissive Inferences
 (1)  Presumption of Innocence.  A defendant is presumed innocent 
until proven guilty.
 (2)  Burden of Persuasion.  The burden is on the State:
 (a) to prove all elements of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt;
 (b) to disprove all exceptions, exemptions, defenses, and 
mitigations beyond a reasonable doubt, unless this Code expressly 
provides otherwise; and
 (c) to prove by a preponderance of the evidence all other facts 
required for liability, unless this Code expressly provides otherwise.
 (3)  Burden of Production.
 (a)  Burden on the State.  An offense shall be presented to 
the trier of fact only if the State has presented suffi cient evidence, 
considered in the light most favorable to the State and all reasonable 
inferences therefrom, to allow a rational factfi nder to fi nd that all 
required elements of the offense have been proven, and any exemptions 
or exceptions have been disproved, beyond a reasonable doubt.
 (b)  Burden on the Defendant.  An affi rmative defense or 
mitigation shall be presented to the trier of fact only if there exists 
suffi cient evidence, considered in the light most favorable to the 
defendant and all reasonable inferences therefrom, to allow a rational 
factfi nder to fi nd that all requirements of the defense or mitigation are 
proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
 (c)  Defi nition.  An “affi rmative defense or mitigation” is any 
defense or mitigation other than one that operates by negating a 
required element of an offense.
 (4)  Permissive Inferences.  When the Code establishes a permissive 
inference with respect to any fact, it has the following consequences:
 (a) when there is evidence of the facts that give rise to the 
inference, the issue of the existence of the inferred fact must be 
submitted to the trier of fact, unless the Court is satisfi ed that the 
evidence as a whole clearly negatives the inferred fact; and
 (b) when the issue of the existence of the inferred fact is 
submitted to the trier of fact, the Court shall charge that while the 
inferred fact must, on all the evidence, be proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the law declares that the trier of fact may regard the facts giving 
rise to the inference as suffi cient evidence of the inferred fact.
Section 108.  Defi nitions
 Unless a particular context clearly requires a different meaning:
 “Abortion” has the meaning given in Section 1106.
 “Acquittal” has the meaning given in Section 605.
 “Act” has the meaning given in Section 204.
 “Adulterated” has the meaning given in Section 3106.
 “Affi rmative defense or mitigation” has the meaning given in 
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Section 107.
 “Alcoholic liquor” has the meaning given in 235 ILCS 5/1-3.05.
 “Another” means a person or persons as defi ned in this Code other 
than the defendant.
 “Association” has the meaning given in Section 701.
 “Bodily harm” means substantial physical pain, illness, or any 
impairment of physical condition, and includes great bodily harm.
 “Cannabis” has the meaning given in Section 5309.
 “Catastrophe” has the meaning given in Section 2204.
 “Catastrophic agent” has the meaning given in Section 2204.
 “Circumstance element” has the meaning given in Section 202.
 “Community policing volunteer” has the meaning given in 
Section 1201.
 “Conduct” means an act, a series of acts, or a failure to act when 
bound by a legal duty to act.
 “Conduct element” has the meaning given in Section 202.
 “Consequence” has the meaning given in Section 303.
 “Contents” has the meaning provided in Section 2401.
 “Controlled substance” has the meaning given in Section 5309.
 “Conviction” has the meaning given in Section 605.
 “Corporate agent” has the meaning given in Section 701.
 “Correctional employee” has the meaning given in Section 5308.
 “Correctional institution” has the meaning given in Section 5309. 
 “Correctional offi cer” has the meaning given in Section 414.
 “Course or pattern of criminal activity” has the meaning given in 
Section 905.
 “Credit card” has the meaning given in Section 3108.
 “Criminal organization” has the meaning given in Section 905.
 “Custodial offi cer” has the meaning given in Section 5302.
 “Cutting tool” has the meaning given in Section 5309.
 “Damaging” property has the meaning given in Section 2206.
 “Dangerous weapon” has the meaning given in Section 1501.
 “Dealer” has the meaning given in Section 2105.
 “Debit card” has the meaning given in Section 3108.
 “Deception” has the meaning given in Section 2103.
 “Defraud” has the meaning given in Section 3101.
 “Delinquent minor” has the meaning given in 705 ILCS 405/5-105(3).
 “Deprive” has the meaning given in Section 2102.
 “Desecrate” has the meaning given in Section 6111.
 “Dwelling” has the meaning given in Section 2301.
 “Dwelling of another” has the meaning given in Section 2301.
 “Electronic communication” has the meaning given in Section 2401.
 “Electronic contraband” has the meaning given in Section 5309.
 “Element” has the meaning given in Section 202.
 “Excuse defense” has the meaning given in Section 501.
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 “Family member” has the meaning given in Section 1201.
 “Financial institution” has the meaning given in Section 2107.
 “Firearm” has the meaning given in Section 1501.
 “Firearm ammunition” has the meaning given in Section 5309.
 “Force” includes confi nement or restraint.
 “Force likely to cause death or great bodily harm” has the meaning 
given in Section 414.
 “Forcible offense” means an offense whose elements involve the use 
or threat of physical force or violence against any individual or the creation 
of a risk of death or great bodily harm.
 “Great bodily harm” means bodily harm that:
 (a)  creates a substantial risk of death, or
 (b)  causes serious, permanent disfi gurement, or protracted loss 
or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.
Great bodily harm includes death or a life-threatening disease.
 “Habitable structure” has the meaning given in Section 2201.
 “He” means a “person,” as defi ned in this Section.
 “High managerial agent” has the meaning given in Section 701.
 “Highly secured premises” has the meaning given in Section 2303.
 “Household member” has the meaning given in Section 1201.
 “Hypodermic syringe” has the meaning given in Section 5309.
 “Improper termination” has the meaning given in Section 605.
 “Inchoate offense” has the meaning given in Section 254. 
 “Included offense” has the meaning given in [current 720 ILCS 5/2-9].
 “Includes” or “including” means comprehending among other 
particulars, without limiting the generality of the foregoing word or phrase.
 “Instrument of crime” has the meaning given in Section 808.
 “Intentionally” has the meaning given in Section 206.
 “Intercepting device” has the meaning given in Section 2401.
 “Interception” has the meaning given in Section 2401.
 “Intoxication” has the meaning given in Section 302.
 “Involuntary intoxication” has the meaning given in Section 506.
 “Item of contraband” has the meaning given in Section 5309.
 “Justifi cation defense” has the meaning given in Section 411.
 “Knowingly” has the meaning given in Section 206.
 “Law enforcement authorities” means public servants who are 
authorized by law or by governmental agencies to engage in or supervise 
the prevention, detection, investigation, or prosecution of offenses.
 “Loiter” has the meaning given in Section 6108.
 “Mental disease or defect” has the meaning given in Section 504.
 “Mentally handicapped person” means a person who suffers from a 
long-term and disabling mental impairment resulting from disease, injury, 
functional disorder, or congenital condition.
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 “Mislabeled” has the meaning given in Section 3106.
 “Negligently” has the meaning given in Section 206.
 “Negligent mistake” has the meaning given in Section 207.
 “Nonexculpatory defense” has the meaning given in Section 601.
 “Objective elements” has the meaning given in Section 202.
 “Obscene” has the meaning given in Section 6204.
 “Obstructing” has the meaning given in Section 6109.
 “Obtain” has the meaning given in Section 2102.
 “Offense committed partly within this State” has the meaning given in 
Section 105.
 “Owner” has the meaning given in Section 2102.
 “Peace offi cer” means any person who by virtue of his offi ce or public 
employment is vested by law with a duty to maintain public order or to 
make arrests for offenses, whether that duty extends to all offenses or is 
limited to specifi c offenses.
 “Penal custody” has the meaning given in Section 1304.
 “Person” means a human being who has been born alive, public or 
private corporation, government, partnership, or unincorporated association.
 “Physically handicapped person” means a person who suffers from 
a long-term and disabling physical characteristic, resulting from disease, 
injury, functional disorder, or congenital condition.
 “Place open to public view” has the meaning given in Section 6201.
 “Place of worship” means a church, synagogue, mosque, temple, or 
other building, structure, or place used primarily for religious worship and 
includes the grounds of a place of worship.
 “Primary culpability required by the offense charged” has the meaning 
given in Section 511.
 “Private electronic communication” has the meaning given in 
Section 2401.
 “Private oral communication” has the meaning given in Section 2401.
 “Private place” has the meaning given in Section 2403.
 “Property” means anything of value, including real estate, tangible 
and intangible personal property, contract rights, choses-in-action and other 
interests in or claims to wealth, admission or transportation tickets, captured 
or domestic animals, food and drink, electric or other power, personal 
services, telephone service, access to electronic services, programs, or data, 
recorded sounds or images, and lottery tickets.
 “Property of another” has the meaning given in Section 2102.
 “Public” inconvenience, annoyance or alarm has the meaning given in 
Section 6103.
 “Public park” has the meaning given in Section 1305
 “Public place” has the meaning given in Section 6107.
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 “Public servant” means any person, including a peace offi cer, who is:
 (a)  authorized to perform any offi cial function on behalf of, 
and is paid by, the United States or this State or any of its political 
subdivisions, or 
 (b)  elected to offi ce pursuant to statute, or appointed to an offi ce 
that is established by statute, and whose qualifi cations and duties are 
prescribed by statute, to discharge a public duty for the United States 
or this State or any of its political subdivisions.
 “Public service” has the meaning given in Section 2207.
 “Put forward” has the meaning given in Section 3102. 
 “Pyramid sales scheme” has the meaning given in Section 3114.
 “Reasonable belief” or “reasonably believes” means a belief that the 
person is not negligent in holding.
 “Reasonable mistake” has the meaning given in Section 207.
 “Receiving” has the meaning given in Section 2105.
 “Recklessly” has the meaning given in Section 206.
 “Reckless mistake” has the meaning given in Section 207.
 “Result element” has the meaning given in Section 202.
 “School” means a public, private, or parochial elementary or 
secondary school, community college, college, or university, and includes 
the grounds of the school.
 “Securities” has the meaning given in 815 ILCS 5/2.1.
 “Services” has the meaning given in Section 2106.
 “Severely or profoundly mentally retarded person” has the meaning 
given in Section 1401.
 “Sexual conduct” has the meaning given in Section 1302.
 “Sexual intercourse” has the meaning given in Section 1301.
 “State” or “this State” means the State of Illinois, and all land and 
water in respect to which the State of Illinois has either exclusive or 
concurrent jurisdiction, and the air space above such land and water.  “Other 
State” means any state or territory of the United States, the District of 
Columbia, or the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
 “Statute” means the Constitution of this State or an Act of the General 
Assembly of this State.
 “Stolen” has the meaning given in Section 2105.
 “Storage structure” has the meaning given in Section 2303.
 “Substantive offense” has the meaning given in Section 254.
 “Suicide” has the meaning given in Section 1107.
 “Tool to defeat security mechanisms” has the meaning given in 
Section 5309.
 “Torture” has the meaning given in Section 1201.
 “Unborn child” has the meaning given in Section 1106.
 “Unemancipated minor” has the meaning given in Section 4104.
 “Unjustifi ed” conduct has the meaning given in Section 416.
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 “Vital public facility” has the meaning given in Section 2201.
 “Voluntary and complete renunciation” has the meaning given in 
Section 806.
 “Voluntary intoxication” has the meaning given in Section 302.
 “Weapon” has the meaning given in Section 5309.
 “Writing” has the meaning given in Section 3101.
 “Youth emergency shelter” has the meaning given in 225 ILCS 10/2.21.
ILL Code  Vol Ib   10 6/30/03, 3:47:33 PM
11
Part I: General Provisions
ARTICLE 200.  BASIC REQUIREMENTS OF OFFENSE LIABILITY
Section 201. Basis of Liability
Section 202. Offense Elements Defi ned
Section 203. Causal Relationship Between Conduct and Result
Section 204. Requirement of an Act; Omission Liability; 
 Possession Liability
Section 205. Culpability Requirements
Section 206. Culpability Requirements Defi ned
Section 207. Ignorance or Mistake Negating Required Culpability
Section 208. Mental Disease or Defect Negating Required Culpability
Section 209. Defi nitions
Section 201.  Basis of Liability
 Subject to the provisions of this Article, a person is liable for an 
offense if he:
(1)  (a) satisfi es all the elements of an offense, and does not 
satisfy the requirements of any bar to liability, contained in 
Article 800 of this Code or in Part II of this Code or in a statute 
of this State outside of this Code, or
 (b) if an element of the offense is missing, it is imputed to 
him by a provision of Article 300, and
 (2) does not satisfy the requirements of any defense provided in 
Articles 250, 400, 500, or 600 of this Code.
Section 202.  Offense Elements Defi ned
 (1)  The “elements” of an offense refer to:
 (a) (i) such conduct, or
 (ii) such attendant circumstances, or
 (iii) such result of conduct, and
 (b) such culpability requirements, as defi ned in Sections 205 
and 206, as are contained in the offense defi nition or the provisions 
establishing the offense grade or the severity of the punishment.
 (2)  Defi nitions. 
 (a)  A “conduct element” is that part of an offense that requires 
an offender’s act or failure to perform a legal duty.
 (b)  A “result element” is any change of circumstances required 
to have been caused by the person’s conduct.
 (c)  A “circumstance element” is any objective element that is not 
a conduct or result element.
 (d)  The “objective elements” of an offense include conduct, 
attendant circumstances, and result elements, but not culpability 
requirements.
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Section 203.  Causal Relationship Between Conduct and Result
 (1)  Conduct is the cause of a result if:
 (a) the conduct is an antecedent but for which the result in 
question would not have occurred; and
 (b) the result is not too remote or accidental in its occurrence, 
and not too dependent upon another’s volitional act, to have a just 
bearing on the actor’s liability or on the gravity of his offense; and
 (c) the relationship between the conduct and result satisfi es any 
additional causal requirements imposed by the Code or by the law 
defi ning the offense.
 (2)  Concurrent Causes.  Where the conduct of two or more persons 
each causally contributes to a result and each alone would have been 
suffi cient to cause the result, the requirement of Subsection (1) of this 
section is satisfi ed as to both persons.
Section 204.  Requirement of an Act; Omission Liability; Possession 
 Liability
 (1)  Either Act or Omission to Perform Duty Required.  A person is 
not guilty of an offense unless his liability is based upon an act or a failure 
to perform a legal duty.
 (2)  Either Act or Omission to Perform Duty Suffi ces.  Unless an 
offense clearly states otherwise, either an act or a failure to perform a legal 
duty may satisfy any conduct element of any offense.
 (3)  Possession an Act.  Possession is an act, as required by Subsection 
(1), if the person:
 (a) knowingly procured or received the thing possessed, or
 (b) was aware of his control thereof for a suffi cient time to have 
been able to terminate his possession.
 (4)  Defi nition.  An “act” is a bodily movement, whether voluntary or 
involuntary.
Section 205.  Culpability Requirements
 (1)  To be guilty of an offense, a person must have some level of 
culpability, as defi ned in Section 206, as to every objective element of the 
offense, except as provided by Subsection (4).
 (2)  Application of Stated Culpability Requirement.  When an offense 
contains a stated culpability requirement, that requirement shall apply to 
all subsequent objective elements within the grammatical clause in which 
it appears and any subsequent objective elements to which common usage 
would suggest the legislature intended it to apply.
 (3)  Absence of a Stated Culpability Requirement.  When no culpability 
requirement is specifi ed with regard to an objective element, a requirement 
of recklessness is applicable, except as provided in Subsection (4).
 (4)  Absolute Liability.  When no culpability requirement is specifi ed 
with regard to an objective element, no culpability is required as to that 
element if:
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 (a)  the offense is a misdemeanor, or a petty or business offense, 
that is not punishable by incarceration or by a fi ne exceeding $500, or
 (b)  the statute defi ning the offense clearly indicates a legislative 
purpose to impose absolute liability as to that objective element.
 (5)  Culpability as to Criminality Not Required.  No level of 
culpability as to whether conduct constitutes an offense, or as to the 
existence, meaning, or application of the law defi ning an offense, is required 
by an offense, unless the offense expressly provides that it is required.
 (6)  Proof of Greater Culpability Satisfi es Requirement for Lower.  
When the law requires negligence as to an objective element, the 
requirement is also satisfi ed by proof of intent, knowledge, or recklessness 
as to the element.  When the law requires recklessness as to an objective 
element, the requirement is also satisfi ed by proof of intent or knowledge 
as to the element.  When the law requires knowledge as to an objective 
element, the requirement is also satisfi ed by proof of intent as to the 
element.
Section 206.  Culpability Requirements Defi ned
 (1)  Intentionally.  A person acts intentionally or with intent:
 (a) with respect to conduct, if it is his conscious object to engage 
in such conduct, or, as the case may be, to have another engage in such 
conduct;
 (b) with respect to a circumstance, if he hopes or believes that 
such circumstance exists; and
 (c) with respect to a result, if it is his conscious object to cause 
such result.
 (d)  Requirement of Intention Satisfi ed if Intention Conditional.  
When a particular intention is required by an offense, the requirement 
is satisfi ed although such intention is conditional, unless the condition 
negatives the harm or wrong sought to be prevented by the law 
defi ning the offense.
 (2)  Knowingly.  A person acts knowingly or with knowledge:
 (a) with respect to conduct, if he is aware that he is engaging in 
such conduct, or, as the case may be, is aware that another is engaging 
or will engage in such conduct;
 (b) with respect to a circumstance, if he believes there is a high 
probability that such circumstance exists; and
 (c) with respect to a result, if he is practically certain that his 
conduct will cause such result.
 (3)  Recklessly.  A person acts recklessly:
 (a) with respect to conduct, if he consciously disregards a 
substantial and unjustifi able risk that he or another person is engaging 
in or will engage in such conduct;
 (b) with respect to a circumstance, if he consciously disregards a 
substantial and unjustifi able risk that such circumstance exists; and
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 (c) with respect to a result, if he consciously disregards a 
substantial and unjustifi able risk that his conduct will cause such 
result.
 (d)  Disregard Must be a Gross Deviation.  The person’s 
disregard of the risk must constitute a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the 
person’s situation.
 (4)  Negligently.  A person acts negligently:
 (a) with respect to conduct, if he fails to be aware of a substantial 
and unjustifi able risk that he or another person is engaging in or will 
engage in such conduct;
 (b) with respect to a circumstance, if he fails to be aware of a 
substantial and unjustifi able risk that such circumstance exists; and
 (c) with respect to a result, if he fails to be aware of a substantial 
and unjustifi able risk that his conduct will cause such result.
 (d)  Failure to be Aware Must be a Gross Deviation.  The 
person’s failure to be aware of the risk must constitute a gross 
deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would 
exercise in the person’s situation.
Section 207.  Ignorance or Mistake Negating Required Culpability
 (1)  Subject to the limitations of Sections 303 and 304, a required 
culpable mental state is not satisfi ed if it is negatived by a person’s 
ignorance or mistake as to a matter of either fact or law.
 (2)  Correspondence Between Mistake Defenses and Culpability 
Requirements.  Any mistake as to an element of an offense, including a 
reckless mistake, will negate the existence of intention or knowledge as to 
that element.  A negligent mistake as to an element of an offense will negate 
the existence of intention, knowledge, or recklessness as to that element. 
A reasonable mistake as to an element of an offense will negate intention, 
knowledge, recklessness, or negligence as to that element.
(3)  Defi nitions.
 (a)  A “reckless mistake” is an erroneous belief that the actor is 
reckless in forming or holding.
 (b)  A “negligent mistake” is an erroneous belief that the actor is 
negligent in forming or holding.
 (c)  A “reasonable mistake” is an erroneous belief that the actor 
is non-negligent in forming or holding.
Section 208.  Mental Disease or Defect Negating Required Culpability
 Evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect is 
admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that the defendant did or did not 
have a required culpable mental state.
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Section 209.  Defi nitions
 (1)  “Act” has the meaning given in Section 204.
 (2)  “Circumstance element” has the meaning given in Section 202.
 (3)  “Conduct element” has the meaning given in Section 202.
 (4)  “Elements of an offense” has the meaning given in Section 202.
 (5)  “Intentionally” has the meaning given in Section 206.
 (6)  “Knowingly” has the meaning given in Section 206.
 (7)  “Mental disease or defect” has the meaning given in Section 504.
 (8)  “Negligently” has the meaning given in Section 206.
 (9)  “Negligent mistake” has the meaning given in Section 207. 
 (10)  “Objective elements” has the meaning given in Section 202.
 (11)  “Reasonable mistake” has the meaning given in Section 207.
 (12)  “Recklessly” has the meaning given in Section 206.
 (13)  “Reckless mistake” has the meaning given in Section 207.
 (14)  “Result element” has the meaning given in Section 202.
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ARTICLE 250.  DEFENSES RELATED TO THE OFFENSE HARM OR WRONG
Section 251. Consent
Section 252. Customary License; De Minimis Infraction; and Conduct 
 Not Envisaged by Legislature as Prohibited by the Offense
Section 253. Prosecution When the Defendant Satisfi es the 
 Requirements of More than One Offense
Section 254. Conviction When the Defendant Satisfi es the 
 Requirements of More than One Offense or Grade
Section 255. Defi nitions
Section 251.  Consent
 (1)  In General.  The consent of the victim to conduct charged to 
constitute an offense or to the result thereof is a defense if such consent 
negatives an element of the offense or precludes the infl iction of the harm or 
wrong sought to be prohibited by the law defi ning the offense.
 (2)  Consent to Bodily Harm.  When conduct is charged to constitute 
an offense because it causes or threatens bodily harm, consent to the 
infl iction or threat of such harm is a defense if:
 (a) the bodily harm caused or threatened by the conduct 
consented to is not serious; or
 (b) the conduct and the harm are reasonably foreseeable hazards 
of joint participation in a lawful athletic contest or competitive sport.
 (3)  Ineffective Consent.  Unless otherwise provided by this Code or 
by the law defi ning the offense, assent does not constitute consent if:
 (a) it is given by a person who is legally incompetent to authorize 
the conduct charged to constitute the offense; or
 (b) it is given by a person who by reason of youth, mental 
disease or defect, or intoxication is manifestly unable, or known by the 
actor to be unable, to make a reasonable judgment as to the nature or 
harmfulness of the conduct charged to constitute the offense;
 (c) it is given by a person whose improvident consent is sought 
to be prohibited by the law defi ning the offense; or
 (d) it is induced by force, duress, or deception of a kind sought to 
be prohibited by the law defi ning the offense.
Section 252.  Customary License; De Minimis Infraction; and Conduct 
Not Envisaged by Legislature as Prohibited by the Offense
 The court shall dismiss a charged offense if, having regard to the 
nature of the conduct charged to constitute an offense and the nature of the 
attendant circumstances, it fi nds that the defendant’s conduct:
 (1) was within a customary license, neither expressly negatived by the 
person whose interest was infringed nor inconsistent with the purpose of the 
law defi ning the offense;
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 (2) caused a harm or wrong too trivial to warrant the condemnation of 
conviction; or
 (3) did not actually cause the harm or wrong sought to be prohibited 
by the law defi ning the offense.
 (4)  Requirement of Written Statement.  The court shall not dismiss a 
charged offense under this Section without fi ling a written statement of its 
reasons.
 (5)  Burden of Persuasion on Defendant.  The defendant has the 
burden of persuasion for this defense and must prove such defense by a 
preponderance of the evidence.
Section 253.  Prosecution When the Defendant Satisfi es the 
Requirements of More than One Offense
 (1)  When the same conduct of a defendant may establish the 
commission of more than one offense, the defendant may be prosecuted for 
each such offense.  
 (2)  Limitation on Separate Trials.  If the several offenses based on 
the same act are known to the proper prosecuting offi cer at the time of 
commencing the prosecution and are within the jurisdiction of a single 
court, they must be prosecuted in a single prosecution, except as provided in 
Subsection (3).
 (3)  Separate Trials.  When two or more offenses are charged as 
required by Subsection (2), the court may order that one or more of such 
charges be tried separately, as provided in 725 ILCS 5/114-8.
Section 254.  Conviction When the Defendant Satisfi es the 
Requirements of More than One Offense or Grade
 (1)  Limitations on Conviction for Multiple Related Offenses.  The 
trier of fact may fi nd a defendant guilty of any offense, or grade of an 
offense, for which he satisfi es the requirements for liability, but the court 
shall not enter a judgment of conviction for more than one of any two 
offenses if:
 (a) the two offenses are based on the same conduct and: 
 (i) the harm or wrong of one offense is:
 (A)  entirely accounted for by the other offense, or
 (B)  of the same kind, but lesser degree, than that of 
the other offense; or
 (ii) the two offenses differ only in that:
 (A) one is defi ned to prohibit a designated kind 
of conduct generally and another to prohibit a specifi c 
instance of such conduct, or
(B) one requires a lesser kind of culpability than the 
other; or
 (iii) the offenses are defi ned as a continuing course of 
conduct and the defendant’s course of conduct was uninterrupted, 
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unless the law provides that specifi c periods of such conduct 
constitute separate offenses; or
 (b) one offense consists only of an inchoate offense toward 
commission of:
 (i) the other offense, or
 (ii) a substantive offense that is related to the other offense 
in the manner described in Subsection (1)(a);
 (c) each offense is an inchoate offense toward commission of a 
single substantive offense; or
 (d) the two offenses differ only in that one is based on the 
defendant’s own conduct and another is based on the defendant’s 
accountability, under Section 301, for another person’s conduct; or
 (e) inconsistent fi ndings of fact are required to establish the 
commission of the offenses.
 (2)  Entry of Judgment.  Where Subsection (1) prohibits multiple 
judgments of conviction, the court shall enter a judgment of conviction for 
the most serious offense  among the offenses in question, including different 
grades of an offense, of which the defendant has been found guilty.
 (3)  Defi nitions.
 (a)  “Inchoate offense” means any offense defi ned in Article 800 
of this Code.
 (b)  “Substantive offense” means any offense other than an 
inchoate offense.
Section 255.  Defi nitions
 (1)  “Bodily harm” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (2)  “Conduct element” has the meaning given in Section 202.
 (3)  “Deception” has the meaning given in Section 2103.
 (4)  “Element” has the meaning given in Section 202.
 (5)  “Force” has the meaning given in Section 108.  
 (6)  “Inchoate offense” has the meaning given in Section 254.
 (7)  “Intoxication” has the meaning given in Section 302.
 (8)  “Mental disease or defect” has the meaning given in Section 504.
 (9)  “Property” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (10)  “Result element” has the meaning given in Section 202.
 (11)  “Substantive offense” has the meaning given in Section 254.
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ARTICLE 300.  IMPUTATION OF OFFENSE ELEMENTS
Section 301. Accountability for the Conduct of Another
Section 302. Voluntary Intoxication
Section 303. Divergence Between Consequences Intended or 
 Risked and Actual Consequences
Section 304. Mistaken Belief Consistent with a Different Offense
Section 305.  Defi nitions
Section 301.  Accountability for the Conduct of Another
 (1)  Accountability.  A person is legally accountable for conduct of 
another person if:
 (a) having the culpability required by the offense, he causes such 
other person to perform the conduct constituting the offense; or
 (b) having the culpability required by the offense,*1 he 
intentionally aids,*2 solicits, or conspires with such other person in the 
planning or commission of the offense; or
 (c) the statute defi ning the offense makes him so accountable.
 (2)  Exception to Accountability.  Notwithstanding Subsection (1), a 
person is not so accountable for the conduct of another, unless the statute 
defi ning the offense provides otherwise, if:
 1Issue:  Should the Proposed Code incorporate the common-law “common-design” 
rule, which imposes complicity liability for all crimes in furtherance of a common criminal 
design or agreement on all parties to the agreement, whether or not they foresaw, knew about, 
or ratifi ed those crimes?
 Yes:  The common-design rule makes it easier to convict an offender’s confederates 
without a complex and diffi cult evidentiary showing of culpability.
 No:  The common-design rule inappropriately allows for liability based on negligence, 
or even in the absence of culpability as to the offense.  The original 1961 Code sought to 
eliminate the common-design rule, which was then resurrected in case law.  To the extent 
such a complicity rule is considered necessary or desirable in the homicide context, it can be 
addressed directly through a felony-murder rule. 
 Reporter:  Strongly recommends against expanding liability beyond the current 
complicity provision.
 2Issue:  Should sellers of goods and services have a special exemption from complicity 
liability arising from goods employed to commit a crime?
 Yes:  Allowing complicity for merchants generates the possibility of criminal liability 
of salespersons based solely upon their failure to refuse sale to customers of items that are 
open for public sale.  Section 301 should have a special defense for commercial sellers of legal 
goods.
 No:  Section 301’s culpability requirements will ensure that the only merchants subject 
to liability are those who have all the culpability required for the offense and who provide the 
needed goods while consciously aware of a substantial risk that their goods or services will be 
used for the criminal purpose.  Such persons deserve blame for their culpable facilitation of 
crime.
Reporter:  No recommendation.
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 (a) he is a victim of the offense committed; or
 (b) his conduct is inevitably incident to commission of the 
offense; or
 (c) before commission of the offense, he terminates his efforts to 
promote or facilitate its commission and:
 (i) wholly deprives his prior efforts of their effectiveness, or
 (ii) gives timely warning to the proper law enforcement 
authorities, or
 (iii) otherwise makes proper efforts to prevent the 
commission of the offense.
 (3)  Exemption from Offense Lost Through Accountability.  A person 
who is legally incapable of committing a particular offense himself may 
be convicted of the offense based on his accountability for the conduct of 
another person who commits the offense, unless such liability would be 
inconsistent with the purpose of the provision establishing his incapacity.
 (4)  Unconvicted Principal or Confederate No Defense.  A person who 
is legally accountable for the conduct of another may be convicted upon 
proof that the objective elements of the offense are satisfi ed, although the 
other person claimed to have committed the offense has not been prosecuted 
or convicted, has been convicted of a different offense or degree of offense, 
or has been acquitted.
 (5)  Complicity in Uncommitted Offense.  A person who would have 
been accountable for the offense conduct of another under Subsection (1) 
if the other had committed the offense is guilty of an attempt to commit the 
offense.
 (6)  Attempted Complicity.  A person who attempts to aid, solicit, or 
conspire with another in the planning or commission of an offense under 
Subsection (1) is guilty of an attempt to commit the offense, whether or not 
the offense is attempted or committed by the other person.
Section 302.  Voluntary Intoxication
 (1)  Except as provided in Section 506, a person’s intoxication at the 
time of committing an offense is not a defense unless it negatives a required 
culpability element of the offense.
 (2)  When recklessness is a required element of the offense, if the 
person, due to voluntary intoxication, is unaware of a risk of which he 
would have been aware had he been sober, such unawareness is immaterial.
 (3)  Defi nitions.
 (a)  “Intoxication” means a disturbance of mental or physical 
capacities resulting from the introduction of substances into the body.
 (b)  “Voluntary intoxication” means intoxication caused by 
substances that the actor knowingly introduces into his body, the 
tendency of which to cause intoxication he knows or ought to know, 
unless he introduces them pursuant to medical advice or under such 
circumstances as would afford a defense to a charge of an offense.
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Section 303.  Divergence Between Consequences Intended or 
 Risked and Actual Consequences
 (1)  When culpability as to a particular consequence of a person’s 
conduct is required by an offense and a consequence that actually occurs is 
not that designed, contemplated, or risked by the person, as the case may be, 
the required culpability nonetheless is established if the actual consequence 
differs from the consequence designed, contemplated, or risked only in the 
respect that:
 (a) a different person or different property is injured or affected, 
or
 (b) the consequence intended, contemplated, or risked was 
as, or more, serious or extensive an injury or harm than the actual 
consequence.
 (2) Defi nition.  “Consequence” means a result element of an offense 
and the attendant circumstance elements that characterize the result.
Section 304.  Mistaken Belief Consistent with a Different Offense
 Although ignorance or mistake would otherwise provide a defense 
under Section 207 to the offense charged, the defense is not available if the 
defendant would be guilty of another offense of the same, or a higher, grade 
had the situation been as he supposed.
Section 305.  Defi nitions
 (1)  “Circumstance element” has the meaning given in Section 202.
 (2)  “Consequence” has the meaning given in Section 303.
 (3)  “Intoxication” has the meaning given in Section 302.
 (4)  “Law enforcement authorities” has the meaning given in 
Section 108.
 (5)  “Objective elements” has the meaning given in Section 202.
 (6)  “Property” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (7)  “Result element” has the meaning given in Section 202.
 (8)  “Voluntary intoxication” has the meaning given in Section 302.
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ARTICLE 400.  JUSTIFICATION DEFENSES
Section 400. General Defenses
Section 411. General Provisions Governing Justifi cation Defenses.
Section 412. Lesser Evils
Section 413. Execution of Public Duty
Section 414. Law Enforcement Authority
Section 415. Use of Force by Persons with Special Responsibility for 
 Care, Discipline, or Safety of Others
Section 416. Defense of Person
Section 417. Defense of Property
Section 418. Use of Force by Aggressor
Section 419. Use of Force Likely to Cause Death or Great Bodily Harm
Section 420. Defi nitions
Section 400.  General Defenses
 The defenses provided in Articles 400, 500, and 600 bar conviction 
even if all elements of the offense charged have been satisfi ed.
Section 411.  General Provisions Governing Justifi cation Defenses
 (1)  Defi nition.  A “justifi cation defense” is any defense described in 
this Article.
 (2)  Superiority of More Specifi c Justifi cations.  The justifi cations 
provided in Section 412 (Lesser Evils) or Section 413 (Execution of Public 
Duty) are not available if the factual circumstances of a claimed justifi cation 
are described in one of the other provisions of this Article.
 (3)  Multiple Justifi cations.  Except as provided in Subsection (2), if 
a person’s conduct satisfi es the requirements of more than one justifi cation 
defense, all such justifi cation defenses are available.
 (4)  Assistance of, Resistance to, and Interference With Justifi ed 
Conduct.  Except as otherwise provided by law, conduct that is justifi ed may 
not lawfully be resisted or interfered with, and lawfully may be assisted by 
any person.
 (5)  Causing the Justifying Circumstances No Bar to a Justifi cation 
Defense.  The fact that a person has caused the circumstances giving rise to 
the need for justifi ed conduct shall not prevent his conduct constituting the 
offense from being held to be justifi ed.
 (6)  Liability for Culpably Causing Justifying Circumstances.
 (a)  Notwithstanding Subsection (5), a person commits an 
offense if, acting with the culpability required by the offense, he 
causes the circumstances that justify himself or another to engage in 
the conduct constituting the offense.
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 (b)  Defense.  A person may have a general defense to his 
conduct giving rise to liability under Subsection (6)(a).
Section 412.  Lesser Evils
 Conduct is justifi ed if:
 (1) it is immediately necessary to avoid a harm or wrong; and
 (2) the harm or wrong avoided by such conduct is greater than that 
sought to be prevented by the law defi ning the offense charged; and
 (3) a legislative purpose to exclude the justifi cation claimed does not 
otherwise plainly appear.
Section 413.  Execution of Public Duty
 Conduct is justifi ed if it is required or authorized by:
 (1)  the law defi ning the duties or functions of a public servant or the 
assistance to be rendered to such servant in the performance of his duties; or 
 (2)  the law governing the execution of legal process; or  
 (3)  the judgment or order of a competent court or tribunal; or  
 (4)  any other provision of law imposing a public duty.
Section 414.  Law Enforcement Authority
 (1)  Peace Offi cer’s Use of Force in Making an Arrest or Detention.
 (a)  The conduct of a peace offi cer, or any person whom he has 
summoned or directed to assist him, is justifi ed if it is necessary to 
effect a lawful arrest or detention.
 (b)  Limitation.  Force likely to cause death or great bodily harm 
is not justifi ed under subsection (1)(a) unless:
 (i) such force is necessary to prevent the arrest from being 
defeated by resistance or escape; and
 (ii) the person to be arrested:
 (A) has committed or attempted a forcible felony 
that involves the infl iction or threatened infl iction of great 
bodily harm, or
 (B) is attempting to escape by use of a deadly 
weapon, or
 (C) otherwise indicates that he will create a risk to 
human life or infl ict great bodily harm unless arrested 
without delay.
 (c)  Invalid Warrant.  Conduct by a peace offi cer making an 
arrest pursuant to an invalid warrant is justifi ed if the conduct would 
have been justifi ed if the warrant were valid, unless he knows that the 
warrant is invalid.
 (2)  Private Person’s Use of Force in Making an Arrest.
 (a)  Lawful Arrest.  The conduct of a private person who makes, 
or assists another private person in making, a lawful arrest is justifi ed 
to the same extent as if he were summoned or directed by a peace 
offi cer to make such arrest, except that he is not justifi ed in the use 
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of force likely to cause death or great bodily harm unless such force 
is immediately necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm to 
himself or another.
 (b)  Unlawful Arrest.  The conduct of a private person who is 
summoned or directed by a peace offi cer to assist in making an arrest 
that is unlawful is justifi ed to the same extent as if the arrest were 
lawful, if the private person does not know that the arrest is unlawful.
 (3)  Use of Force to Prevent an Escape.
 (a)  Escape from Custody.  The conduct of a peace offi cer or 
other person who has an arrested or lawfully detained person in his 
custody or presence is justifi ed if:
 (i) necessary to prevent the escape of the arrested person 
from custody, and
 (ii) it would be justifi ed if performed to arrest such person.
 (b)  Escape from a Correctional Institution.  The conduct of a 
correctional offi cer or peace offi cer, including the use of force likely to 
cause death or great bodily harm, is justifi ed if immediately necessary 
to prevent the escape from a correctional institution of a person 
lawfully detained in such institution under sentence for an offense or 
awaiting trial or commitment for an offense.
 (4) Defi nitions.
 (a)  “Correctional offi cer” means any person employed to 
supervise and control inmates incarcerated in, or in the custody of, a 
correctional institution.
 (b)  “Force likely to cause death or great bodily harm”
   (i) includes:
 (A) the fi ring of a fi rearm in the direction of a person, 
even though no intent exists to kill or infl ict great bodily 
harm; and
 (B) the fi ring of a fi rearm at a vehicle in which a 
person is riding; and
   (ii) does not include discharge of a fi rearm using 
ammunition designed to disable or control a person without 
creating the likelihood of death or great bodily harm.
Section 415.  Use of Force by Persons with Special Responsibility for 
Care, Discipline, or Safety of Others
 The use of force upon or toward the person of another is justifi ed if:  
(1) (a)  the defendant is a parent, guardian, teacher or other person 
similarly responsible for the care or supervision of a person less than 
18 years old, or the defendant is a person acting at the request of such 
responsible person, and the force is necessary to safeguard or promote 
the welfare of the person less than 18 years old or others, or
 (b)  the defendant is the guardian or other person similarly 
responsible for the general care and supervision of a mentally 
handicapped person, and the force is necessary to safeguard or 
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promote the welfare of such person, including the prevention of his 
misconduct, or, when such person is in a hospital or other institution 
for his care and custody, for the maintenance of reasonable discipline 
in the institution; and
 (c)  the force used does not create a substantial risk of causing 
death, great bodily harm, extreme pain or mental distress, or gross 
degradation; or
 (2)  the defendant is a doctor or other licensed medical professional, or 
a person assisting a doctor at his direction, and:
   (a)  the force is necessary to administer a recognized form of 
treatment that is adapted to promoting the physical or mental health of 
the patient, and 
 (b)  the treatment is administered with the consent of the patient 
or, if the patient is a person less than 18 years old or an incompetent 
person, with the consent of his parent or guardian or other person 
legally competent to consent in his behalf, or the treatment is 
administered in an emergency when no one competent to consent can 
be consulted and a reasonable person, wishing to safeguard the welfare 
of the patient, would consent; or  
 (3)  the defendant is a correctional offi cer, and:
 (a)  the force used is necessary to enforce the lawful rules or 
procedures of a correctional institution, and
 (b)  if deadly force is used, its use is otherwise justifi able under 
this Article; or
 (4)  the defendant is a person responsible for the safety of an airplane, 
train, motor vehicle, vessel, or other carrier or a person acting at his 
direction, and 
 (a)  the force used is necessary to prevent interference with the 
operation of the carrier or obstruction of the execution of a lawful 
order, and
 (b)  if deadly force is used, its use is otherwise justifi able under 
this Article; or
 (5)  the defendant is a person who is authorized or required by law to 
maintain order or decorum in an airplane, train, motor vehicle, vessel, or 
other carrier or in a place where others are assembled, and:
 (a)  the force used is necessary for such purpose, and 
 (b)  the force used does not create a substantial risk of causing 
death, bodily harm, or extreme mental distress.
Section 416.  Defense of Person
 (1)  The use of force against an aggressor is justifi ed when and to the 
extent such conduct is immediately necessary to defend oneself or another 
person against the aggressor’s use of unjustifi ed force.
 (2)  Defi nition.  “Unjustifi ed” conduct is conduct that satisfi es the 
objective elements of an offense and is not justifi ed by this Article.
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Section 417.  Defense of Property
 The use of force against an aggressor is justifi ed when and to the 
extent such conduct is immediately necessary to prevent or terminate the 
aggressor’s unjustifi ed trespass on or other unjustifi ed interference with 
either real property or personal property that is lawfully in one’s possession 
or in the possession of another who is a family member or household 
member or of a person whose property one has a legal duty to protect.
Section 418.  Use of Force by Aggressor or Arrestee
 The justifi cations described in this Article are not available to a person 
who:
 (1) initially provokes the use of force against himself, unless:
(a) (i)  the force in response to his provocation is so great that 
he is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, and
 (ii)  he has exhausted every less harmful means to escape 
such danger; or
 (b)  in good faith, he withdraws from physical contact with 
the assailant and indicates clearly to the assailant that he desires to 
withdraw and terminate the use of force, but the assailant continues or 
resumes the use of force; or
 (2) is resisting an arrest, whether lawful or unlawful, unless:
 (a)  the force being used to effect the arrest is unjustifi ed, and 
 (b)  he is in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, and
 (c)  he has exhausted every less harmful means to escape such 
danger.
Section 419.  Use of Force Likely to Cause Death or Great Bodily Harm
 Unless expressly provided otherwise by this Article, the use of force 
likely to cause death or great bodily harm is justifi ed only if such force is 
immediately necessary to prevent:
 (1) death or great bodily harm to oneself or another, or
 (2) the commission of a forcible felony.
Section 420.  Defi nitions
 (1)  “Bodily harm” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (2)  “Correctional institution” has the meaning given in Section 5309.
 (3)  “Correctional offi cer” has the meaning given in Section 414.
 (4)  “Element” has the meaning given in Section 202.
 (5)  “Family member” has the meaning given in Section 1201.
 (6)  “Firearm” has the meaning given in Section 1501.
 (7)  “Force” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (8)  “Force likely to cause death or great bodily harm” has the 
meaning given in Section 414.
 (9)  “Forcible felony” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (10)  “Great bodily harm” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (11)  “Household member” has the meaning given in Section 1201.
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 (12)  “Justifi cation defense” has the meaning given in Section 411. 
 (13)  “Mentally handicapped person” has the meaning given in 
Section 108.
 (14)  “Peace offi cer” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (15)  “Public servant” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (16)  “Unjustifi ed” has the meaning given in Section 416.
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ARTICLE 500.  EXCUSE DEFENSES
Section 501. General Provisions Governing Excuse Defenses
Section 502. Involuntary Acts; Involuntary Omissions
Section 503. Impaired Consciousness
Section 504. Insanity
Section 505. Immaturity; Transfer to Juvenile Court
Section 506. Involuntary Intoxication
Section 507. Duress
Section 508. Ignorance Due to Unavailable Law
Section 509. Reliance Upon Offi cial Misstatement of Law
Section 510. Reasonable Mistake of Law Unavoidable by Due Diligence
Section 511. Mistake as to a Justifi cation
Section 512.   Defi nitions
Section 501.  General Provisions Governing Excuse Defenses
 (1)  Defi nition.  An “excuse defense” is any defense described in this 
Article.  
 (2)  Conduct for Which a Person Is Excused Is Not Justifi ed; 
Assistance of, Resistance to, and Interference With Excused Conduct.  
Except as otherwise provided by law, conduct for which a person is excused 
is not justifi ed, and may be resisted and interfered with as justifi ed by law.  
A person who assists conduct for which another is excused, is not excused 
for his assistance solely because the principal actor is excused.
 (3)  Causing the Excusing Conditions No Bar to an Excuse Defense.  
The fact that a person has caused the conditions giving rise to an excuse 
under this Article shall not prevent him from being excused for his offense.
 (4)  Liability for Culpably Causing Excusing Conditions.
 (a)  Notwithstanding Subsection (3), a person commits an 
offense if, acting with the culpability required by the offense, he 
causes the conditions that excuse himself or another for engaging in 
the offense.
 (b)  Defense.  A person may have a general defense to his 
conduct giving rise to liability under Subsection (4)(a).
 (5)  Mistake as to an Excuse Is No Defense.  Except as otherwise 
provided by law, it is no defense that a person mistakenly believes he has an 
excuse defense.
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 (6)  Burden of Persuasion.  Unless expressly provided otherwise by 
this Article, the defendant carries the burden of persuasion on all excuse 
defenses by a preponderance of the evidence.*3
Section 502.  Involuntary Acts; Involuntary Omissions
 (1)  Involuntary Act.  A person is excused for his offense if his liability 
is based upon an act and the act is not a product of the person’s effort or 
determination.
 (2)  Involuntary Omission.  A person is excused for his offense if his 
liability is based upon an omission, and:
 (a) the person is mentally or physically incapable of performing 
or otherwise cannot reasonably be expected under the circumstances 
to perform the omitted act; or
 (b) the person would be liable for an offense, and would be 
denied a justifi cation defense, if he performed the omitted act.
Section 503.  Impaired Consciousness
 A person is excused for his offense if, at the time of the offense:
 (1) he suffers a physiologically confi rmable disease or defect not 
specifi cally recognized or rejected as a basis for exculpation by another 
excuse provision in this Article, and
 (2) as a result, he:
 (a) does not perceive the physical nature or foresee the physical 
consequences of his conduct, or
 (b) does not know his conduct is wrong or criminal, or
 (c) is not suffi ciently able to control his conduct so as to be justly 
held accountable for it.
 3Issue:  Should the defendant bear the burden of persuasion for excuse defenses?
 Yes:  Excuses apply only to conduct that is unjustifi ed and considered criminal, and all 
excuses involve information and evidence uniquely in the possession of the defendant.  For 
both of these reasons, it is appropriate to shift the burden to the defendant for excuses.  Current 
law places the burden on the defendant (to prove by “clear and convincing” evidence) for the 
excuse of insanity.  There is no reason to distinguish that excuse from all others.
 No:  Because excuses are defenses of exculpation, the prosecution should bear the 
burden of disproving excuses beyond a reasonable doubt.
 Reporter:  Recommends having the defendant bear the burden of persuasion.
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Section 504.  Insanity*4 
 A person is excused for his offense if, at the time of the offense:
 (1) he suffers from a mental disease or defect, and
 (2) as a result, he:
 (a) does not perceive the physical nature or foresee the physical 
consequences of his conduct, or
 (b) does not know his conduct is wrong or criminal, or
 (c) is not suffi ciently able to control his conduct so as to be justly 
held accountable for it.
 (3)  Defi nition.  “Mental disease or defect” does not include:
 (a) an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or 
otherwise antisocial conduct, or
 (b) intoxication itself.
Section 505.  Immaturity; Transfer to Juvenile Court
 The court shall dismiss a prosecution of a person for his offense if, at 
the time of the offense:
 (1) he lacks the maturity of an adult, and
 4Issue:  Should the Code include a provision allowing for a “guilty but mentally ill” 
verdict?
 Yes:  The GBMI verdict provides a useful “middle ground” for juries who believe a 
defendant is mentally ill, and in need of treatment, but not criminally insane.  The verdict does 
not undermine the insanity defense; the jury retains the authority to fi nd a defendant not guilty 
by reason of insanity in appropriate cases.  Jury confusion could be addressed by changes in 
jury instructions.
 No:  The GBMI verdict responds to a false concern that the insanity defense is being 
successfully abused.  And even if the insanity excuse were being abused, a more rational 
response would be to shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant, a step that Illinois has 
already taken.  GBMI is not a “middle position” in terms of its consequences; it has the same 
effect as a guilty verdict (see 730 ILCS 5/5-2-6(a)), even in terms of the defendant’s receiving 
a psychological evaluation, which is required for all convicts.  See 730 ILCS 5/3-8-2; cf. 730 
ILCS 5/5-2-6(b) (giving IDOC discretion as to whether GBMI convicts receive treatment). 
Moreover, even if it were proper to use GBMI verdicts to reduce insanity acquittals, the 
evidence suggests that their effect in Illinois, peculiarly enough, has been to increase such 
acquittals.
 If a determination needs to be made of a convicted offender’s need for psychological 
treatment, it can be more effi ciently and effectively made by the court (or correctional 
offi cials) than by the jury.  Having such criminal justice professionals make the determination 
would also eliminate the risk of confusion and distraction that exists in the current GBMI 
system, which intertwines the distinct issues of criminal blameworthiness for a past offense 
and present or future clinical treatment needs.  Jury confusion between the two issues is 
particularly troublesome because it may induce juries to think about preventive detention 
issues when they should be thinking about blameworthiness.  (Further, the focus on preventive 
detention will itself be poorly informed, as the jury is not likely to know that an insanity 
acquittal does not lead to a release from custody, but to mandatory psychological evaluation 
and treatment.)
 Reporter:  Recommends against including a GBMI verdict.
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 (2) as a result, he:
 (a) does not foresee the physical consequences of his conduct, or
 (b) does not know his conduct is wrong or criminal.
 (3)  Presumptions.  A person:
 (a) less than 12 years of age at the time of the offense shall 
be conclusively presumed to have satisfi ed the requirements of this 
excuse;
 (b) less than 16 years of age at the time of the offense shall 
be conclusively presumed to have satisfi ed the requirements of 
Subsection (1) of this Section, and shall be presumed, subject to 
rebuttal by proof, to have satisfi ed the requirements of Subsection (2) 
of this Section.
 (4)  Transfer to Juvenile Court.  A person who is excused under this 
Section, [but who is subject to the jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court,] shall 
be referred to the Juvenile Court, which shall have exclusive jurisdiction 
over all further proceedings in the matter.
Section 506.  Involuntary Intoxication
 A person is excused for his offense if, at the time of the offense:
 (1) he is involuntarily intoxicated, and
 (2) as a result, he:
 (a) does not perceive the physical nature or foresee the physical 
consequences of his conduct, or
 (b) does not know his conduct is wrong or criminal, or
 (c) is not suffi ciently able to control his conduct to be justly held 
accountable for it.
 (3)  Defi nition.  “Involuntary intoxication” means any intoxication that 
is not voluntary intoxication.
 (4)  Nothing in this Section shall be deemed to preclude liability under 
Section 501(4).
Section 507.  Duress
 A person is excused for his offense if, at the time of the offense:
 (1) he is coerced to perform the offense conduct by a threat that a 
person of reasonable fi rmness in the person’s situation would have been 
unable to resist, and
 (2) as a result, he is not suffi ciently able to resist the offense conduct 
so as to be justly held accountable for it.
 (3)  Factors to be Considered in Determining Whether a Person of 
Reasonable Firmness in the Person’s Situation Would Have Been Unable to 
Resist the Threat.  In determining whether a person of reasonable fi rmness 
in the person’s situation would have been unable to resist the threat coercing 
the person, as required by Subsection (1), the following factors are among 
those that shall be considered:
 (a) relating to the extent of the threat, the imminence of the 
threat, the seriousness of the harm threatened, the nature of the harm 
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threatened (e.g., physical, economic, emotional, or other), the object 
of the threat (e.g., the person himself, a relative, or business associate), 
the unlawfulness of the threat, and the source of the threat (e.g., 
another person or natural forces); and
 (b) relating to the extent of harm caused by the person, the 
seriousness of the harm caused in relation to the harm threatened and 
the availability of less harmful but equally effective alternatives to 
avoiding the threat.
Section 508.  Ignorance Due to Unavailable Law
 A person is excused for his offense if:
 (1) before the conduct constituting the offense was committed, the 
law relating to the offense was not made available in a way that would give 
notice to the reasonable person, and
 (2) the person makes a reasonable mistake regarding that law, and
 (3) as a result, at the time of the offense, the person does not know his 
conduct is criminal.
 (4)  Factors to be Considered in Determining Whether the Law was 
Not Made Available to the Reasonable Person.  In determining whether 
a law was not made available in a way that would give notice to the 
reasonable person and whether the defendant’s mistake was reasonable, as 
required by Subsections (1) and (2), the following factors are among those 
that shall be considered:  whether the law was published, the nature of the 
publication, whether the law imposes an unpredictable duty, the length of 
the period between enactment of the law and the commission of the offense, 
and the diligence exercised by the defendant to determine the law.
Section 509.  Reliance Upon Offi cial Misstatement of Law
 A person is excused for his offense if:
(1) he reasonably relies upon an offi cial misstatement of law, and
(2) he makes a reasonable mistake as to that law, and
 (3) as a result, at the time of the offense, the person does not know his 
conduct is criminal.
 (4)  Factors to be Considered in Determining the Reasonableness of 
the Person’s Reliance.  In determining whether a person made a reasonable 
mistake of law because he relied upon an offi cial misstatement of law, as 
required by Subsections (1) and (2), the following factors are among those 
that shall be considered:  whether the offi cial statement of law was a statute 
or judicial decision later overruled, whether the person whose statement 
the defendant relied upon had the authority to interpret the law, whether 
the person relied upon was responsible for administration or enforcement 
of the law, whether the defendant’s reliance was upon a specifi c grant 
of permission from an authorized offi cial, and whether the overall 
circumstances demonstrate that it was reasonable for a person exercising 
due diligence to rely on the statement of the law.
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Section 510.  Reasonable Mistake of Law Unavoidable by Due Diligence
 A person is excused for his offense if:
 (1) he pursues with due diligence all reasonably viable means 
available to ascertain the meaning and application of the offense to his 
conduct, and
 (2) he honestly and in good faith concludes that his conduct is lawful 
in circumstances where a law-abiding and prudent person would also so 
conclude, and
 (3) as a result, at the time of the offense, the person does not know his 
conduct is criminal.
Section 511.  Mistake as to a Justifi cation
 A person is excused for his offense if:
 (1) he makes a mistake as to whether his conduct is justifi ed, which is:
 (a) a reasonable mistake, or
 (b) is less culpable than the primary culpability required by the 
offense charged, and
 (2) as a result, at the time of the offense, the person does not know his 
conduct is criminal.
 (3)  Defi nition.  The “primary culpability required by the offense 
charged” means:
 (a) the culpability required for a result element of the offense 
charged, or
 (b) if there is no result element, the culpability required for the 
circumstance element most central to the harm or wrong sought to be 
prohibited by the offense.
Section 512.  Defi nitions
 (1)  “Circumstance element” has the meaning given in Section 202. 
 (2)  “Excuse defense” has the meaning given in Section 501.
 (3)  “Involuntary intoxication” has the meaning given in Section 506.
 (4)  “Justifi cation defense” has the meaning given in Section 411.
 (5)  “Mental disease or defect” has the meaning given in Section 504.
 (6)  “Primary culpability required by the offense charged” has the 
meaning given in Section 511.
 (7)  “Reasonable mistake” has the meaning given in Section 207.
 (8)  “Result element” has the meaning given in Section 202.
 (9)  “Voluntary intoxication” has the meaning given in Section 302.
ILL Code  Vol Ib   33 6/30/03, 3:47:54 PM
34
Proposed Illinois Criminal Code — Volume I
ARTICLE 600.  NONEXCULPATORY DEFENSES
Section 601. General Provisions Governing Nonexculpatory Defenses
Section 602. Prosecution Barred if Not Commenced Within Time
Limitation Period
Section 603. Entrapment
Section 604. Unfi tness to Plead, Stand Trial, or be Sentenced
Section 605. Former Prosecution for Same Offense as a Bar to Present
Prosecution
Section 606. Former Prosecution for Different Offense as a Bar to
Present Prosecution
Section 607. Former Prosecution in Another Jurisdiction as a Bar to
Present Prosecution
Section 608. Prosecution Not Barred Where Former Prosecution Was
Before Court Lacking Jurisdiction or Was Fraudulently
Procured by Defendant or Resulted in Conviction Held Invalid
Section 609. Defi nitions
Section 601.  General Provisions Governing Nonexculpatory Defenses
 (1)  Defi nition.  A “nonexculpatory defense” is any defense or bar to 
prosecution or bar to pleading, trial, or sentencing described in this Article.
 (2)  Mistake as to a Nonexculpatory Defense Is No Defense.  Except 
as otherwise provided by this Code, it is no defense that a person mistakenly 
believes he has a nonexculpatory defense.
 (3)  Conduct Subject to a Nonexculpatory Defense Is Not Justifi ed; 
Assistance of, Resistance to, and Interference With Conduct Subject to a 
Nonexculpatory Defense.  Except as otherwise provided by law, conduct 
for which a person has a nonexculpatory defense is not justifi ed, and may 
be resisted and interfered with as justifi ed by law.  A person who assists 
conduct for which the principal actor has a nonexculpatory defense, does 
not have a defense based solely upon the nonexculpatory defense of the 
principal actor.
 (4)  Burden of Persuasion on Defendant.  Unless expressly provided 
otherwise, the defendant has the burden of persuasion for a nonexculpatory 
defense and must prove such defense by a preponderance of the evidence.*5 
 5Issue:  Should the defendant bear the burden of persuasion for nonexculpatory defenses?
 Yes:  Like excuses, nonexculpatory defenses apply to conduct that is unjustifi ed and 
criminal — but unlike excuses, nonexculpatory defenses involve no claim by the defendant 
that he is not blameworthy or deserving of punishment.  Rather, nonexculpatory defenses 
prevent liability in the service of some other social goal, such as curbing police misconduct 
or preventing prosecution of old offenses.  Accordingly, the case for placing the burden of 
persuasion on the defendant to show that such a defense applies is even stronger for these 
defenses than for excuses.
 No:  The burden of persuasion for these defenses currently rests with the State, and 
it should remain there.  Because these defenses frequently operate to prevent misconduct 
by State offi cials, the State should be required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that no 
misconduct has occurred.
 Reporter:  Recommends having the defendant bear the burden of persuasion.
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 (5)  Determination by Court.  Unless expressly provided otherwise, the 
defenses in this Article are to be determined by the court.
Section 602.  Prosecution Barred if Not Commenced Within Time 
 Limitation Period
 (1)  Time Limitations.  A prosecution is barred unless commenced 
within the following time periods from the time the offense is committed:
 (a) a prosecution for a Class [X plus] or Class X felony may be 
commenced at any time;
 (b) a prosecution for a Class 1 felony must be commenced within 
10 years;*6
 (c) a prosecution for any other felony must be commenced within 
5 years;*6
 (d) a prosecution for any other offense must be commenced 
within 2 years.
 (2)  Extended Periods.  If the period prescribed in Subsection (1) has 
expired, a prosecution nevertheless may be commenced:
 (a) within one year after discovery of the offense by an aggrieved 
party who is himself not a party to the offense, but in no case shall this 
provision extend the period of limitation otherwise applicable by more 
than 3 years; and
 (b) for any offense of which the alleged victim is less than 18 
years old, within one year of the alleged victim attaining the age of 18 
years.
 (3)  Start of the Limitation Period.  The period of limitation starts to 
run on the day after the offense is committed.  An offense is committed 
either when every element of the offense occurs, or, if a legislative purpose 
to prohibit a continuing course of conduct plainly appears, at the time when 
the course of conduct or the defendant’s complicity therein is terminated.
 6Issue:  Should the Proposed Code extend the limitation periods for felonies beyond 
those now provided in current law?  (The proposed provision extends the limitation period for 
felonies to 5 or 10 years from the current 3 years set in 720 ILCS 5/3-5.)
 No:  Limitation periods continue to serve the important goals of preventing stale 
prosecution, encouraging prompt investigation, and placing a reasonable limit on the long arm 
of the law.  If a long period of time has passed, the community impulse for punishment may 
have passed.  And, indeed, punishment may no longer be necessary because the defendant may 
be rehabilitated.
 Yes:  Changing circumstances have diminished the need for short limitation periods, 
and have underscored signifi cant problems with such periods.  New forensic science advances 
(including, but not limited to, DNA testing) have made it possible to fi nd highly reliable 
evidence that remains long after the commission of an offense.  At the same time, trial 
procedures that did not exist when limitation periods were fi rst created at common law now 
give defendants full opportunity to highlight the weaknesses, if any, of old evidence.  The 
rationale that an offender may have reformed after a prolonged period is an argument for 
lenient sentencing rather than absolute exoneration — and ignores the fact that limitation rules 
bar prosecution of old crimes by career criminals as well as by reformed citizens.
 Reporter:  No recommendation.
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 (4)  Commencement of Prosecution.  A prosecution is commenced 
when an indictment is returned or an information or complaint is fi led.
 (5)  Period of Limitation Tolled.  The period of limitation does not run 
during any time when:
 (a) the defendant is not usually and publicly resident within this 
State; or
 (b) the defendant is a public servant, if the offense charged is 
theft of public funds while in public offi ce; or
 (c) a prosecution against the defendant for the same conduct is 
pending in this State.
 (6) Period During Which Prosecution is Pending.  A prosecution is 
pending from the time it is commenced through the fi nal disposition of the 
case, including the fi nal disposition of the case upon appeal.
Section 603.  Entrapment
 (1)  A person has a defense if:
 (a) the person engages in an offense because he is induced to 
do so by a law enforcement authority, or an agent acting in knowing 
cooperation with such an authority, and
 (b) the authority’s or agent’s conduct creates a substantial risk 
that a reasonable law-abiding person would have been induced to 
commit the offense, and
 (c) the person was not predisposed to commit the offense.
 (2)  The defense afforded by Subsection (1) is unavailable when 
causing or threatening bodily harm is an element of the offense charged.
 (3)  A defendant may raise the defense afforded by Subsection (1) only 
if he fi rst admits that he performed the conduct constituting the offense for 
which he seeks to raise the defense. 
Section 604.  Unfi tness to Plead, Stand Trial, or be Sentenced
 (1)  A defendant may not be required to plead, stand trial, or be 
sentenced if, because of his mental or physical condition, he is unable to 
understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him or to 
assist in his defense.
 (2)  The application of this rule is governed by Chapter 725, Article 
104 (Fitness for Trial, to Plead or to be Sentenced).
Section 605.  Former Prosecution for Same Offense as a Bar to Present 
 Prosecution
 When a prosecution is for a violation of the same provision of the 
statutes and is based upon the same facts as a former prosecution, it is 
barred by such former prosecution if:
 (1) the former prosecution resulted in an acquittal.  There is an 
“acquittal” if the prosecution resulted in a fi nding of not guilty by the trier 
of fact or in a determination that there was insuffi cient evidence to warrant a 
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conviction.  A fi nding of guilty of an included offense is an acquittal of the 
inclusive offense, although the conviction is subsequently set aside.
 (2) the former prosecution was terminated, after the information or 
complaint was fi led or the indictment was returned, by a fi nal order or 
judgment for the defendant, which has not been set aside, reversed, or 
vacated, and that necessarily required a determination inconsistent with 
a fact or a legal proposition that must be established for conviction of the 
offense.
 (3) the former prosecution resulted in a conviction.  There is a 
“conviction” if the prosecution resulted in a judgment of conviction that has 
not been reversed or vacated, a verdict of guilty that has not been set aside 
and that is capable of supporting a judgment, or a plea of guilty accepted 
by the court.  In the latter two cases failure to enter judgment must be for a 
reason other than a motion of the defendant.
 (4) the former prosecution was improperly terminated.  Except 
as provided in this Subsection, there is an “improper termination” of a 
prosecution if the termination is for reasons not amounting to an acquittal, 
and it takes place after the fi rst witness is sworn but before verdict.  
Termination under any of the following circumstances is not improper:
 (a)  The defendant consents to the termination or waives, by 
motion to dismiss or otherwise, his right to object to the termination.
 (b)  The trial court fi nds that the termination is necessary 
because:
 (i) it is impossible to proceed with the trial in conformity 
with law; or
 (ii) there is a legal defect in the proceedings that would 
make any judgment entered upon a verdict reversible as a matter 
of law; or
 (iii) prejudicial conduct, in or outside the courtroom, makes 
it impossible to proceed with the trial without injustice to either 
the defendant or the State; or
 (iv) the jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or
 (v) false statements of a juror on voir dire prevent a fair 
trial.
 (5)  Defi nition.  “Included offense” has the meaning given in [current 
720 ILCS 5/2-9].
Section 606.  Former Prosecution for Different Offense as a Bar to 
Present Prosecution
 Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different provision of the 
statutes than a former prosecution or is based on different facts, it is barred 
by such former prosecution under the following circumstances:
 (1)  The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a conviction 
and the subsequent prosecution is for:
 (a) any offense of which the defendant could have been convicted 
on the fi rst prosecution; or
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 (b) any offense based on the same conduct or arising from the 
same criminal episode for which the defendant was tried on the fi rst 
prosecution, if such offenses were known to the prosecuting offi cer 
at the time of the commencement of the fi rst trial and were within the 
jurisdiction of the same court that tried the fi rst prosecution, unless the 
court ordered a separate trial of the charge of such offense; or
 (c) the same conduct, unless:
 (i) the offense of which the defendant was formerly 
convicted or acquitted and the offense for which he is 
subsequently prosecuted each requires proof of a fact not 
required by the other and the law defi ning each of such offenses 
is intended to prevent a substantially different harm or wrong, or
 (ii) the second offense was not consummated when the 
former trial began.
 (2)  The former prosecution was terminated, after the information 
or complaint was fi led or the indictment was returned, by an acquittal 
or by a fi nal order or judgment for the defendant that has not been set 
aside, reversed, or vacated and which acquittal, fi nal order, or judgment 
necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact that must be 
established for conviction of the second offense.
 (3)  The former prosecution was improperly terminated and the 
subsequent prosecution is for an offense of which the defendant could have 
been convicted had the former prosecution not been improperly terminated.
Section 607.  Former Prosecution in Another Jurisdiction as a Bar to 
Present Prosecution
 When conduct constitutes an offense within the concurrent jurisdiction 
of this State and of the United States or another State, a prosecution in any 
such other jurisdiction is a bar to a subsequent prosecution in this State 
under the following circumstances:
 (1)  The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or in a conviction 
and the subsequent prosecution is based on the same conduct, unless:
 (a) the offense of which the defendant was formerly convicted or 
acquitted and the offense for which he is subsequently prosecuted each 
requires proof of a fact not required by the other and the law defi ning 
each of such offenses is intended to prevent a substantially different 
harm or wrong, or
 (b) the second offense was not consummated when the former 
trial began; or
 (2)  The former prosecution was terminated, after the information 
or complaint was fi led or the indictment was returned, by an acquittal 
or by a fi nal order or judgment for the defendant that has not been set 
aside, reversed, or vacated and which acquittal, fi nal order, or judgment 
necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact that must 
be established for conviction of the offense of which the defendant is 
subsequently prosecuted.
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Section 608.  Prosecution Not Barred Where Former Prosecution Was 
Before Court Lacking Jurisdiction or Was Fraudulently Procured 
by Defendant or Resulted in Conviction Held Invalid
 A prosecution is not a bar within the meaning of Sections 605 to 607 
under any of the following circumstances:
 (1)  The former prosecution was before a court that lacked jurisdiction 
over the defendant or the offense; or
 (2)  The former prosecution was procured by the defendant without 
the knowledge of the appropriate prosecuting offi cer and with the purpose 
of avoiding the sentence that might otherwise be imposed; or
 (3)  The former prosecution resulted in a judgment of conviction that 
was held invalid in a subsequent proceeding.
Section 609.  Defi nitions
 (1)  “Acquittal” has the meaning given in Section 605.
 (2)  “Bodily harm” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (3)  “Conviction” has the meaning given in Section 605.
 (4)  “Element” has the meaning given in Section 202.
 (5)  “Improper termination” has the meaning given in Section 605.
 (6)  “Included offense” has the meaning given in [current 720 ILCS 
5/2-9].
 (7)  “Law enforcement authorities” has the meaning given in Section 
108.
 (8)  “Nonexulpatory defense” has the meaning given in Section 601.
 (9)  “Public servant” has the meaning given in Section 108.
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ARTICLE 700.  LIABILITY OF CORPORATIONS AND
OTHER NON-HUMAN ENTITIES
Section 701. Liability of Corporation [or Unincorporated Association]
Section 702. Relationship to Corporation [or Unincorporated
 Association] No Limitation on Individual Liability or
 Punishment
Section 703. Defi nitions
Section 701.  Liability of Corporation [or Unincorporated Association]*7 
 (1)  A corporation [or unincorporated association] may be prosecuted 
for the commission of an offense if:
  (a) (i) the offense is a misdemeanor, or a petty or business 
offense, or 
the offense provision indicates a legislative purpose to provide 
liability for a corporation [or association]; and
 (ii) a corporate agent performs the offense conduct while 
acting in behalf of the corporation [or association] within the 
scope of his offi ce or employment, except that if the law defi ning 
the offense designates the corporate agents for whose conduct the 
corporation [or association] is accountable or the circumstances 
under which it is accountable, such provisions shall apply; or
 (b) the offense consists of an omission to discharge a specifi c 
duty of affi rmative performance imposed on corporations [or 
unincorporated associations] by law; or
 (c) [in the case of a corporation,] the commission of the offense 
is authorized, requested, commanded, or performed, by the board of 
directors or by a high managerial agent who is acting in behalf of the 
corporation [or association] within the scope of his employment.
 (2)  Due Diligence Defense.  It is a defense to a prosecution 
under Subsection (1)(a) that the corporation [or association] proves by 
a preponderance of the evidence that a high managerial agent having 
 7Issue:  Should Article 700’s provisions apply to unincorporated associations as well as 
to corporations?
 Yes:  Unincorporated associations should merit criminal liability to the same extent 
as corporations, as such associations often resemble corporations in every respect except 
for the fact they have not formally incorporated.  The concerns with deterrence of criminal 
conduct and punishment of a collective criminal enterprise are present with unincorporated 
associations no less than with corporations.
 No:  The imposition of liability on a corporation is based on a legal fi ction 
— corporations are not independent, autonomous entities, and thus cannot have criminal 
culpability, even assuming they may engage in “conduct” — and should be narrowly drawn. 
Current 5/5-4 and 5/5-5 do not apply to unincorporated associations.
 Reporter:  No recommendation.
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supervisory responsibility over the conduct constituting the offense 
exercised due diligence to prevent the commission of the offense, unless:
 (a) such a defense would be inconsistent with the legislative 
purpose of the statute defi ning the offense, or
 (b) the offense is one for which absolute liability is imposed.
 (3)  Defi nitions.
 (a)  “Corporate agent” means any director, offi cer, servant, 
employee, or other person who is authorized to act in behalf of the 
corporation [or unincorporated association].
 (b) “High managerial agent” means an offi cer of the corporation 
[or unincorporated association], or any other corporate agent who has 
a position of comparable authority for the formulation of policy or the 
supervision of subordinate employees in a managerial capacity.
 [(c) “Association” means a trust, partnership, government or 
governmental subdivision or agency, or two or more persons having a 
joint or common economic interest.]
Section 702.  Relationship to Corporation [or Unincorporated 
 Association] No Limitation on Individual Liability or Punishment
 (a)  Membership in Corporation [or Association] No Shield from 
Liability.  A person is legally accountable for offense conduct that 
he performs, or causes to be performed, in the name or in behalf of a 
corporation [or unincorporated association] to the same extent as if the 
conduct were performed in his own name or behalf.
 (b)  Punishment for Individuals Applies.  An individual who has 
been convicted of an offense by reason of his legal accountability for the 
conduct of a corporation [or unincorporated association] is subject to the 
punishment authorized by law for an individual upon conviction of such 
offense, although only a lesser or different punishment is authorized for the 
corporation [or association].
Section 703.  Defi nitions
 (1)  “Association” has the meaning given in Section 701.
 (2)  “Corporate agent” has the meaning given in Section 701.
 (3)  “High managerial agent” has the meaning given in Section 701.
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ARTICLE 800.  INCHOATE OFFENSES
Section 801. Criminal Attempt
Section 802. Criminal Solicitation
Section 803. Criminal Conspiracy
Section 804. Unconvictable Confederate No Defense
Section 805. Defense for Victims and for Conduct Inevitably Incident
Section 806. Defense for Renunciation Preventing Commission of the
 Offense
Section 807. Grading of Criminal Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy
Section 808. Possessing Instruments of Crime
Section 809. Defi nitions
Section 801.  Criminal Attempt
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person is guilty of attempt to commit an 
offense if, acting with the culpability required for commission of the offense 
and intending to engage in the conduct that would constitute the offense 
given his perception of the circumstances, he takes a substantial step toward 
commission of the offense.
 (2)  Conduct Constituting a Substantial Step.
 (a)  Conduct shall not be held to constitute a substantial step 
toward commission of the offense under Subsection (1) unless it 
is strongly corroborative of the person’s intention to engage in the 
offense conduct.
 (b)  Where a person believes he has completed the conduct 
constituting the offense or believes that he has completed the last 
act needed to cause the result element of the offense, he satisfi es the 
substantial step requirement contained in Subsection (1).
Section 802.  Criminal Solicitation
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person is guilty of solicitation to commit an 
offense if, acting with the culpability required for commission of the offense 
and intending to bring about the conduct that would constitute the offense 
given his perception of the circumstances, he intentionally commands, 
encourages, or requests another person to engage in such conduct or in an 
attempt to commit such conduct.
 (2)  Uncommunicated Solicitation.  It is immaterial under Subsection 
(1) of this Section that the person fails to communicate with the person 
he solicits to commit an offense, if his conduct is designed to effect such 
communication.
Section 803.  Criminal Conspiracy
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person is guilty of conspiracy to commit an 
offense if, acting with the culpability required for commission of the offense 
and intending to bring about the conduct that would constitute the offense 
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given his perception of the circumstances, he agrees with another person or 
persons that one or more of them will engage in such conduct or an attempt 
or solicitation to commit such conduct.
 (2)  Conspiracy With Multiple Criminal Objectives.  If a person 
conspires to commit a number of offenses, he is guilty of only one 
conspiracy so long as such multiple offenses are the object of the same 
agreement or continuous conspiratorial relationship.
 (3)  Overt Act.  No person may be convicted of conspiracy to commit 
an offense unless an overt act in pursuance of such conspiracy is alleged and 
proved to have been done by him or by a person with whom he conspired.
Section 804.  Unconvictable Confederate No Defense
 It is no defense for a person who solicits or conspires with another to 
commit an offense that such other person:
(1) has not been prosecuted or convicted, or
(2) has been convicted of a different offense or grade, or
(3) lacked the capacity to commit an offense, or
(4) has been acquitted.
Section 805.  Defense for Victims and for Conduct Inevitably Incident
 Unless otherwise provided by the Code or by the law defi ning the 
offense, it is a defense to soliciting or conspiring to commit an offense that:
 (a) the person is the victim of the offense; or
 (b) the offense is so defi ned that the person’s conduct is 
inevitably incident to its commission.
Section 806.  Defense for Renunciation Preventing Commission of the 
 Offense
 (1)  In any prosecution for attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy in which 
the offense contemplated was not in fact committed, it is a defense that, 
under circumstances manifesting a voluntary and complete renunciation 
of his criminal purpose, the defendant prevented the commission of the 
offense.
 (2)  Voluntary and Complete Renunciation Defi ned.  A renunciation is 
not “voluntary and complete” within the meaning of this section when it is 
motivated in whole or in part by: 
 (a) a belief that circumstances exist that pose a particular 
threat of apprehension or detection of the accused or another 
participant in the criminal enterprise or that render more diffi cult the 
accomplishment of the criminal purpose; or
 (b) a decision to postpone the criminal conduct until another 
time or to transfer the criminal effort to another victim or another but 
similar object.
 (3)  Burden of Persuasion on Defendant.  The defendant has the 
burden of persuasion for this defense and must prove such defense by a 
preponderance of the evidence.
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Section 807.  Grading of Criminal Attempt, Solicitation, and 
 Conspiracy
 Attempt, solicitation, and conspiracy are offenses of one grade lower 
than the most serious offense that is attempted or solicited or is an object of 
the conspiracy.
Section 808.  Possessing Instruments of Crime
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he possesses 
any instrument of crime with intent to employ it criminally.
 (2)  Defi nition.  “Instrument of crime” means:
 (a) anything specially made or specially adapted for criminal use; 
or
 (b) anything commonly used for criminal purposes and possessed 
by the person under circumstances consistent with unlawful intent.
 (3)  Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
Section 809.  Defi nitions
 (1)  “Instrument of crime” has the meaning given in Section 808.
 (2)  “Result element” has the meaning given in Section 202.
 (3)  “Voluntary and complete renunciation” has the meaning given in 
Section 806. 
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ARTICLE 900.  OFFENSE GRADES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
Section 901. Classifi ed Offenses
Section 902. Unclassifi ed Offenses
Section 903. Authorized Terms of Imprisonment
Section 904. Authorized Fines
Section 905. General Adjustments to Offense Grade
Section 906. Authorized Sentence for Multiple Offenses
Section 907. Defi nitions
Section 901.  Classifi ed Offenses
 Each offense in this Code shall be classifi ed as:
 (1) a Class [X plus] felony; or
 (2) a Class X felony; or
 (3) a Class 1 felony; or
 (4) a Class 2 felony; or
 (5) a Class 3 felony; or
 (6) a Class 4 felony; or
 (7) a Class A misdemeanor; or
 (8) a Class B misdemeanor; or
 (9) a Class C misdemeanor; or
 (10) a petty offense or business offense.
Section 902.  Unclassifi ed Offenses
 An offense outside of the Code:
 (1) that declares itself to be a felony, is a Class 4 felony;
 (2) that declares itself to be a misdemeanor, is a misdemeanor of 
the class specifi ed in the offense, or if no class is specifi ed, is a Class B 
misdemeanor;
 (3) that provides a sentence of imprisonment of:
  (a) one year or more is a Class 4 felony;
 (b) less than a year but more than 6 months is a Class A 
misdemeanor;
 (c) 6 months or less but more than 30 days is a Class B 
misdemeanor;
 (d) 30 days or less is a Class C misdemeanor.
 (4) that does not declare itself to be a felony or misdemeanor, or 
provide a sentence of imprisonment, is a petty offense or a business offense.
Section 903.  Authorized Terms of Imprisonment
 Except as otherwise provided, the authorized term of imprisonment 
for:
 (1) a Class [X plus] felony is [life imprisonment and not less than 12 
years];
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 (2) a Class X felony is not more than [30 years and not less than 6 
years];
 (3) a Class 1 felony is not more than [15 years and not less than 4 
years];
 (4) a Class 2 felony is not more than [7 years and not less than 3 
years];
 (5) a Class 3 felony is not more than [5 years and not less than 2 
years];
 (6) a Class 4 felony is not more than [3 years and not less than 1 year];
 (7) a Class A misdemeanor is not more than [1 year];
 (8) a Class B misdemeanor is not more than [6 months];
 (9) a Class C misdemeanor is not more than [30 days].
 (10)  No term of imprisonment is authorized for a petty offense or 
business offense.
Section 904.  Authorized Fines
 Except as otherwise provided, the authorized fi ne for an offense is the 
greater of:
 (1) twice the harm caused or the gain derived, or
 (2) for a:
  (a) Class [X plus] felony, not more than [$250,000];
  (b) Class X felony, not more than [$150,000];
  (c) Class 1 felony, not more than [$80,000];
  (d) Class 2 felony, not more than [$40,000];
  (e) Class 3 felony, not more than [$20,000];
  (f) Class 4 felony, not more than [$10,000];
  (g) Class A misdemeanor, not more than [$5,000];
  (h) Class B misdemeanor, not more than [$3,000];
  (i) Class C misdemeanor, not more than [$2,000];
  (j) petty offense or business offense, not more than [$1,000].
 (3)  Corporate Fines.  The authorized fi ne for a corporation is either 
the amount authorized by Subsection (1) or twice the amount authorized by 
Subsection (2).
Section 905.  General Adjustments to Offense Grade
 If the court fi nds that factor (1) or (2) exists or that both such factors 
exist, or if a trier of fact fi nds beyond a reasonable doubt that one or more 
of factors (3) or (4) exist, and if a relevant specifi c provision of the Code 
has not already taken the factor into account, the authorized sentence for an 
offense shall be that available if the offense were increased by one grade:
 (1) if a defendant is convicted of any offense, after having been 
previously convicted in Illinois or any other jurisdiction of a similar class 
offense or greater class offense, when such conviction has occurred within 
10 years after the previous conviction, excluding time spent in custody, 
and such charges are separately brought and tried and arise out of different 
series of acts; or
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 (2) if a defendant:
 (a) who was at least 17 years of age at the time of the 
commission of the offense, is convicted of a felony, and
 (b) has been previously adjudicated a delinquent minor under 
the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 [705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq.] for an act 
that if committed by an adult would be a Class X or Class 1 felony 
when the conviction has occurred within 10 years after the previous 
adjudication, excluding time spent in custody; or
 (3) if a defendant is convicted of any felony and the offense was 
accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of 
reckless cruelty; or
 (4) if:
 (a) a defendant is convicted of a felony other than conspiracy and 
the felony was committed under an agreement with two or more other 
persons to commit that offense, and    
 (b) the defendant, with respect to the other individuals, occupied 
a position of organizer, supervisor, fi nancier, or any other position of 
management or leadership, and
 (c) the felony committed was related to or in furtherance of the 
criminal activities of a criminal organization or was motivated by the 
defendant’s leadership in a criminal organization.
 (5)  Defi nitions.
 (a)  “Criminal organization” means any confederation, alliance, 
network, or conspiracy of three or more persons that, through its 
membership or through the agency of any member, engages in a 
course or pattern of criminal activity.  A “course or pattern of criminal 
activity” exists when:
 (i) three or more offenses are committed wholly or partly 
within this State, within three years of each other, and
 (ii) at least one such offense was a felony, or an inchoate 
offense toward commission of a felony.
 (b) “Delinquent minor” has the meaning given in 705 ILCS 405/
5-105(3).
Section 906.  Authorized Sentence for Multiple Offenses
 When a defendant is being sentenced for more than one offense, the 
cumulative authorized sentence for all of the offenses of which he has been 
convicted is equal to:
 (1) the sentence for the most serious offense,
 (2) plus one-half the sentence for the next most serious offense,
 (3) plus one-quarter the sentence for the next most serious offense,
 (4) plus one-eighth the sentence for the next most serious offense,
 (5) continuing in like manner for all offenses for which the defendant 
has been convicted, thereby causing each additional offense to increase the 
total authorized cumulative sentence, but by a decreasing increment.
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Section 907.  Defi nitions
 (1)  “Course or pattern of criminal activity” has the meaning given 
Section 905.
 (2)  “Criminal organization” has the meaning given in Section 905.
 (3)  “Delinquent minor” has the meaning given in 705 ILCS 405/5-
105(3).
 (4)  “Offense committed partly within this State” has the meaning 
given in Section 105.
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ARTICLE 1100.  HOMICIDE OFFENSES
Section 1101.   Murder in the First Degree
Section 1102.   Murder in the Second Degree
Section 1103.   Manslaughter in the First Degree
Section 1104.   Manslaughter in the Second Degree
Section 1105.   Negligent Homicide
Section 1106.   Homicide of an Unborn Child
Section 1107.   Causing or Aiding Suicide
Section 1108.   Concealing a Homicide
Section 1109.   Procedures and Standards in Adjudication of Sentence for 
   Capital Offense
Section 1110.   Defi nitions
Section 1101.  Murder in the First Degree
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he knowingly 
causes the death of another person.
 (2)  Grading.  The offense is a Class [X plus] offense for which the 
death penalty may be imposed, subject to the procedures and standards of 
Section 1109.
Section 1102.  Murder in the Second Degree
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he:
 (a) recklessly causes the death of another person under 
circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of 
human life, or
 (b) in fact causes the death of another person while attempting 
or committing a forcible felony other than an assault that causes the 
death.
 (2)  Permissive Inference.  The trier of fact may infer the existence of 
the recklessness and indifference required by Subsection (1)(a) if the person 
unlawfully delivered a controlled substance to the victim and the victim dies 
as a result of injecting, inhaling, or ingesting any amount of that controlled 
substance.
 (3)  Grading.  The offense is a Class X felony.
Section 1103.  Manslaughter in the First Degree
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he causes the 
death of another person, under circumstances that otherwise would be 
murder under Sections 1101 or 1102:
 (a) under the infl uence of extreme mental or emotional 
disturbance
 (b) for which there is areasonable explanation, the 
reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of 
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a person in the defendant’s situation under the circumstances as the 
defendant believes them to be.
 (2)  Burden of Persuasion.  The defendant carries the burden of 
persuasion on the mitigating factors in Subsections (1)(a) and (b) and must 
prove such factors by a preponderance of the evidence.
 (3)  Grading.  The offense is a Class 1 felony.
Section 1104.  Manslaughter in the Second Degree
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he recklessly 
causes the death of another person.
 (2)  Grading.  The offense is a Class 2 felony.
Section 1105.  Negligent Homicide
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he negligently 
causes the death of another person.
 (2)  Grading.  The offense is a Class 4 felony.
Section 1106.  Homicide of an Unborn Child
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he causes the 
death of an unborn child under circumstances that would be an offense 
under Section 1101, 1102(1)(a), 1103, or 1104 if the unborn child had been 
born.
 (2)  Exceptions.  The offense does not include conduct performed:
 (a) by the pregnant woman whose unborn child is killed, or
 (b) during any abortion to which the pregnant woman has 
consented, or
 (c) pursuant to usual and customary standards of medical 
practice during diagnostic testing or therapeutic treatment.
 (3)  Defi nitions.  
 (a)  “Abortion” means the use of any instrument, medicine, 
drug, or any other substance or device to terminate the pregnancy of a 
woman known to be pregnant with an intention other than to increase 
the probability of a live birth, to preserve the life or health of the child 
after live birth, or to remove a dead fetus.
 (b)  An “unborn child” is any individual of the human species 
from fertilization until birth.
 (4)  Grading.  The offense is an offense of one grade less than it would 
be if the unborn child had been born.
Section 1107.  Causing or Aiding Suicide
 (1)  Causing Suicide.  A person may be convicted of an offense under 
this Article for causing another to commit suicide if, and only if, he causes 
such suicide by force, duress or deception.
 (2)  Aiding or Soliciting Suicide:  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits 
an offense if he knowingly aids or solicits another to commit suicide.
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 (3)  Exception.  The offense defi ned in Subsection (2) does not include 
a good-faith attempt at compliance with the Illinois Living Will Act [755 
ILCS 35/1 et seq.], the Health Care Surrogate Act [755 ILCS 40/1 et seq.], 
or the Powers of Attorney for Health Care Law [755 ILCS 45/4-1 et seq.].
 (4)  Defi nition.  “Suicide” means intentionally causing one’s own 
death.
 (5)  Grading.  The offense defi ned in Subsection (2) is:
 (a) a Class 3 felony if his conduct causes such suicide,
 (b) a Class 4 felony if his conduct causes an attempted suicide.
 (c)  Otherwise the offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
Section 1108.  Concealing a Homicide
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he conceals a 
person’s death knowing that the death was caused by a person.
 (2)  Grading.  The offense is a Class 4 felony.
Section 1109.  Procedures and Standards in Adjudication of Sentence 
for Capital Offense
 [Insert provision incorporating recommendations # 28 and 61 of the 
Report of the Governor’s Commission on Capital Punishment.]
Section 1110.  Defi nitions
 (1)  “Abortion” has the meaning given in Section 1106.
 (2)  “Controlled substance” has the meaning given in Section 5309.
 (3)  “Deception” has the meaning given in Section 2103.
 (4)  “Force” has meaning given in Section 108.
 (5)  “Forcible felony” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (6)  “Suicide” has the meaning given in Section 1107.
 (7)  “Unborn child” has the meaning given in Section 1106.
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ARTICLE 1200.  ASSAULT, ENDANGERMENT, AND THREAT OFFENSES
Section 1201.  Assault
Section 1202.  Reckless Injuring; Endangerment
Section 1203.  Terroristic Threats
Section 1204.  Stalking
Section 1205.  Abuse and Gross Neglect
Section 1206.  Defi nitions
Section 1201.  Assault
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he knowingly:
 (a) causes bodily harm to another person, or
 (b) makes physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature 
with another person.
 (2)  Grading.
 (a)  Heinous Assault.  The offense is a Class 2 felony if the 
person knowingly:
 (i) causes great bodily harm, or
 (ii) tortures another person, or
 (iii) circumcises, excises, or infi bulates, in whole or in part, 
the labia majora, labia minora, or clitoris of another person.
 (b)  Aggravated Assault.  The offense is a Class 3 felony if the 
person knowingly:
 (i) causes bodily harm by administering a food or drug to 
the victim without his or her consent, or
 (ii) commits the offense in a public place,*8 or
 (iii) commits the offense against a family member or 
household member, and the defendant has previously been 
convicted of any forcible offense against the victim, or
 (iv) commits the offense in violation of an order of 
protection.
 8Issue:  Should Section 1201(2)(b)(ii) be deleted, thereby eliminating the aggravation 
for assaults committed in public places?
 Yes:  The public-place aggravation appears designed to punish the risk to others, public 
affront, and potential for escalation attendant to a public assault.  Where those dangers or 
harms arise, however, liability for endangerment, disorderly conduct, and/or riot is available. 
Moreover, when coupled with Section 1201(2)(b)(iii)’s aggravation for domestic assault, 
Section 1201(2)(b)(ii) creates a “special” aggravation that seems likely to swallow the basic 
offense. Also, where Section 1201(2)(d)’s grade adjustment for certain victims applies, cases 
of public assault would be graded as seriously as the offense of reckless homicide.   
 No:  The public-place aggravation punishes endangering innocent bystanders and 
generally preserves public order.  Current law similarly grades assault as a Class 3 felony where 
it is committed “on or about a public way, public property or public place of accommodation 
or amusement.”  720 ILCS 5/12-4(b)(8).
 Reporter: No recommendation.
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 (c)  Otherwise the offense:
 (i) under Subsection (1)(a) is a Class 4 felony, and
 (ii) under Subsection (1)(b) is a Class A misdemeanor.
 (d)  Grade Adjustment for Certain Victims.  The grade of the 
offense under Subsection (2)(b) or (2)(c) is one grade higher than it 
would otherwise be if the victim is:
 (i) a peace offi cer, custodial offi cer, or community policing 
volunteer, performing his or her duty, or
 (ii) pregnant, or
   (iii) a physically handicapped or mentally handicapped 
person, or
 (iv) more than 60 years old or less than 13 years old.
(3)  Defi nitions.
 (a)  “Community policing volunteer” means a person who 
is summoned or directed by a peace offi cer or any person actively 
participating in a community policing program and who is engaged in 
lawful conduct intended to assist any unit of government in enforcing 
any criminal or civil law.  For the purpose of this Section, “community 
policing program” means any plan, system, or strategy established 
by and conducted under the auspices of a law enforcement agency in 
which citizens participate with and are guided by the law enforcement 
agency and work with members of that agency to reduce or prevent 
crime within a defi ned geographic area.
 (b)  “Family member” means a spouse, former spouse, parent, 
grandparent, brother, sister, child, or grandchild, whether by whole 
blood, half-blood, or adoption, and includes a step-parent, step-
grandparent, step-brother, step-sister, step-child, or step-grandchild.
(c)  “Household member” means a person who regularly resides 
in a 
person’s household, or who, within the prior 6 months, regularly 
resided in the person’s household.
 (d)  “Torture” means infl iction of, or subjection to, extreme 
physical pain, motivated by an intent to increase or prolong the pain, 
suffering, or agony of the victim.
Section 1202.  Reckless Injuring; Endangerment
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he engages in 
conduct by which he recklessly creates a substantial risk of bodily harm to 
another person.
 (2)  Grading.
 (a)  Reckless Injuring.
 (i)  If great bodily harm is caused, the offense is a Class 3 
felony.
 (ii)  If bodily harm is caused, the offense is a Class A 
misdemeanor.
 (b)  Endangerment.
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 (i)  If the person creates a substantial risk of death or great 
bodily harm, the offense is a Class 4 felony.
 (ii)  Otherwise the offense is a Class B misdemeanor.
Section 1203.  Terroristic Threats
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if:
 (a) being reckless as to terrorizing another person,
 (b) he threatens to commit any offense likely to cause great 
bodily harm, unlawful confi nement or restraint, or substantial property 
damage to another.
 (2)  Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
Section 1204.  Stalking
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he:
 (a) knowingly follows or surveils another person on at least two 
separate occasions, and
 (b) places that person in reasonable apprehension that he, or a 
household member, will receive bodily harm or unlawful confi nement 
or restraint.
 (2)  Grading.
 (a)  The offense is a Class 3 felony if the person violates an order 
of protection.
 (b) Otherwise the offense is a Class 4 felony.
Section 1205.  Abuse and Gross Neglect
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if, having a duty 
to provide  medical or personal care or maintenance, he recklessly causes 
mental injury or substantial emotional distress to, or fails to provide the care 
or maintenance necessary for the safety and welfare of, a victim who:
 (a)  is more than 60 years old, or
 (b)  is less than 18 years old, or
 (c)  is a physically handicapped or mentally handicapped person.
 (2)  Grading.
 (a)  If the offense is committed knowingly, it is a Class 2 felony.
 (b)  Otherwise the offense is a Class 3 felony.
Section 1206.  Defi nitions
 (1)  “Bodily harm” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (2)  “Community policing volunteer” has the meaning given in Section 
1201.
 (3)  “Custodial offi cer” has the meaning given in Section 5302.
 (4)  “Damaging” property has the meaning given in Section 2206.
 (5)  “Family member” has the meaning given in Section 1201.
 (6)  “Forcible offense” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (7)  “Great bodily harm” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (8)  “Household member” has the meaning given in Section 1201.
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 (9)  “Mentally handicapped person” has the meaning given in Section 
108.
 (10)  “Peace offi cer” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (11)  “Physically handicapped person” has the meaning given in 
Section 108.
 (12)  “Property” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (13)  “Public place” has the meaning given in Section 6107.
 (14)  “Torture” has the meaning given in Section 1201.
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ARTICLE 1300.  SEXUAL ASSAULT OFFENSES
Section 1301.  Sexual Assault; Aggravated Sexual Assault
Section 1302.  Sexual Abuse; Aggravated Sexual Abuse
Section 1303.  Sexual Exploitation of a Child
Section 1304.  Custodial Sexual Misconduct
Section 1305.  Prohibited Conduct by Convicted Child Sex Offender
Section 1306.  General Provisions Relating to this Article
Section 1307.  Defi nitions
Section 1301.  Sexual Assault; Aggravated Sexual Assault
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he engages in 
sexual intercourse with another person:
 (a) not his spouse who is less than 17 years old, or
 (b) by force or threat of force, or
 (c) who the defendant knows is unable to:
 (i) understand the nature of the act, or
 (ii) knowingly consent to it.
 (2)  Omission Liability of Parents and Guardians.  It is an offense for 
a parent, step-parent, or legal guardian of a child less than 17 years old to 
knowingly allow another person to engage in the conduct constituting the 
offense under Subsection (1) with the child.
 (3)  Defi nition.  “Sexual intercourse” means:
 (a) any contact, however slight, between the sex organ or anus 
of one person by an object, the sex organ, mouth, or anus of another 
person, or
 (b) any intrusion, however slight, of any part of the body of one 
person or of any animal or object into the sex organ or anus of another 
person, including cunnilingus, fellatio, or anal penetration.
(c) Evidence of emission of semen is not required to prove sexual 
 intercourse.
 (4)  Grading.
 (a)  Aggravated Sexual Assault.  The offense under Subsection 
(1) is a Class X felony if:
 (i) the victim is less than 9 years old and the defendant is at 
least 17 years old; or
 (ii) the defendant causes bodily harm to, or impregnates, 
the victim; or
 (iii) the defendant threatens, or creates a risk of, the 
victim’s death.
 (b)  Sexual Assault.  The offense under Subsection (1) is a Class 
1 felony if:
 (i) the victim is less than 13 years old and the defendant is 
at least 4 years older than the victim, or
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(ii) the victim is less than 17 years old and the defendant:
 (A) is 17 years old or older, and
 (B) holds a position of trust, authority, or supervision 
in relation to the victim, or
 (iii) the offense is committed under Subsections (1)(b) or 
(1)(c).
 (c)  The offense under Subsection (1)(a) is a Class 2 felony if the 
defendant is at least 4 years older than the victim.
 (d)  The offense under Subsection (1)(a) is a Class 4 felony if the 
victim is less than 13 years old and the defendant is less than 4 years 
older than the victim.
 (e)  Otherwise the offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
 (f)  Omission Liability.  The offense under Subsection (2) is an 
offense of one grade less that it would be for the person engaging in 
the intercourse.
Section 1302.  Sexual Abuse; Aggravated Sexual Abuse
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he engages in 
sexual conduct with another person:
 (a) not his spouse who is less than 17 years old, or
 (b) by force or threat of force, or
 (c) who the defendant knows is unable to:
 (i) understand the nature of the act, or
 (ii) knowingly consent to it.
 (2)  Defi nition.  “Sexual conduct” means any knowing touching or 
fondling by the victim or the accused, either directly or through clothing, of:
 (a) the sex organs, anus or breast of the victim or the accused, or
 (b) any part of the body of a child under 13 years of age, or
 (c) any transfer or transmission of semen by the accused upon 
any part of the clothed or unclothed body of the victim, with intent to 
achieve sexual arousal or gratifi cation of the victim or the accused.
 (3)  Grading.
 (a)  Aggravated Sexual Abuse.  The offense is a Class 2 felony if:
 (i) the victim is less than 13 years old and the defendant is 
at least 4 years older than the victim, or
 (ii) the defendant causes bodily harm or pregnancy to the 
victim, or
 (iii) the defendant threatens to cause, or creates a risk of, 
the victim’s death.
 (b)  Sexual Abuse.
 (i)  The offense is a Class 4 felony if:
 (A) the offense is committed under Subsections (1)(b) 
or (1)(c), or
 (B) the victim is less than 17 years old and the 
defendant is at least 4 years older than the victim, or
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 (C) the victim is less than 17 years old and the 
defendant:
 (I) is 17 years old or older and
 (II) holds a position of trust, authority, or 
supervision in relation to the victim.
 (ii)  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor if the victim is 
less than 13 years old and the defendant is less than 4 years older 
than the victim.
 (iii)  Otherwise the offense is a Class B misdemeanor.
 
Section 1303.  Sexual Exploitation of a Child
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if, with intent to 
achieve sexual arousal or gratifi cation of himself or the other person, he 
entices, coerces, or persuades a person less than 17 years old to remove 
clothing.
 (2)  Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
Section 1304.  Custodial Sexual Misconduct
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he engages in 
sexual intercourse or sexual conduct with a person not his spouse who is:
 (a) in the penal custody of the correctional system for which he 
is a correctional employee, or
 (b) a detainee, probationer, parolee, or releasee under his 
supervisory, disciplinary, or custodial authority, including a person he 
is employed as a custodial offi cer to supervise and control.
 (2)  Defi nition.  “Penal custody” means:
  (a) pretrial incarceration or detention following arrest, or
 (b) incarceration or detention under a sentence or commitment to 
a State or local correctional institution, or
(c) parole or mandatory supervised release, or
(d) electronic home detention, or
(e) probation.
 (3)  Grading.  The offense is a Class 3 felony.
Section 1305.  Prohibited Conduct by Convicted Child Sex Offender
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if:
 (a) being a person who:
 (i) has been convicted of any sexual offense for which the 
victim was less than 17 years old, and
 (ii) has been notifi ed that he is a person subject to this 
offense, and
 (b) he knowingly approaches, contacts, or communicates with a 
person less than 17 years old while at or in:
 (i) a public or private pre-school, elementary, or secondary 
school, or
 (ii) a vehicle for the transportation of school children, or
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 (iii) a public park building or grounds, or
 (iv) a facility providing programs or services exclusively 
for persons less than 18 years old.
 (2)  Exception.  A person does not commit the offense if:
 (a) he is a parent or guardian of a person less than 18 years old 
who is present, or
 (b) the superintendent, principal, school board, park manager, 
facility manager, or other person responsible for the operation of the 
facility has given him permission to be present.
 (3)  Defi nition.  “Public park” includes a park, forest preserve, or 
conservation area under the jurisdiction of the State or a unit of local 
government.
 (4)  Grading.  The offense is a Class 4 felony.
Section 1306.  General Provisions Relating to this Article
 (1)  Culpability as to Age.  Unless expressly provided otherwise, 
where an offense in this Article requires that the victim be under a specifi c 
age, it need be proven only that the defendant was negligent as to the victim 
being under that age.
 (2)  Exemption of Medical Treatment.  A medical examination or 
procedure conducted by a physician, licensed medical professional, parent, 
or caretaker for the purpose of providing and in a manner consistent with 
reasonable medical standards is not an offense under this Article.
Section 1307.  Defi nitions
 (1)  “Bodily harm” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (2)  “Correctional employee” has the meaning given in Section 5308.
 (3)  “Correctional institution” has the meaning given in Section 5309.
 (4)  “Custodial offi cer” has the meaning given in Section 5302.
 (5)  “Force” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (6)  “Loiter” has the meaning given in Section 6108.
 (7)  “Penal custody” has the meaning given in Section 1304.
 (8)  “Public park” has the meaning given in Section 1305.
 (9)  “Sexual conduct” has the meaning given in Section 1302.
 (10)  “Sexual intercourse” has the meaning given in Section 1301.
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ARTICLE 1400.  KIDNAPING, COERCION, AND RELATED OFFENSES
Section 1401.  Kidnaping; Aggravated Kidnaping
Section 1402.  Unlawful Restraint; Aggravated Unlawful Restraint
Section 1403.  Interference with Custody
Section 1404.  Criminal Coercion
Section 1405.  Defi nitions
Section 1401.  Kidnaping; Aggravated Kidnaping
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person, other than a parent exercising 
authority over his child, commits an offense if he knowingly:
 (a) confi nes another secretly and against his will, or
 (b) with intent to confi ne him secretly, moves another from one 
place to another against his will:
 (i) by force or threat of force, or
 (ii) by deception or enticement.
 (2)  Child Under 13.  If a child less than 13 years old consents to 
confi nement or movement, such confi nement or movement is nonetheless 
“against his will” if it is done without the consent of the child’s parent or 
legal guardian.
 (3)  Grading.
 (a)  Aggravated Kidnaping.  The offense is a Class X felony if 
the person:
 (i) intends to obtain ransom or the performance of other 
demands, or
 (ii) commits a felony, other than the offense under this 
Section, against the victim.
 (b)  The offense is a Class 1 felony if:
 (i) the victim is a child less than 13 years old or a severely 
or profoundly mentally retarded person, or
 (ii) the confi nement lasts for longer than 24 hours.
 (c)  Kidnaping.  Otherwise the offense is a Class 2 felony.
 (4)  Defi nition.  “Severely or profoundly mentally retarded person” 
means a person:
  (a) whose intelligence quotient does not exceed 40, or
 (b) whose intelligence quotient does not exceed 55 and who 
suffers from signifi cant mental illness to the extent that the person’s 
ability to exercise rational judgment is impaired.
Section 1402.  Unlawful Restraint; Aggravated Unlawful Restraint
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he knowingly 
detains another against his will without authority.
 (2)  Grading.
 (a)  Aggravated Unlawful Restraint.  The offense is a Class 2 
felony if:
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 (i) the person intends to obtain ransom or the performance 
of other demands, and
 (ii) the victim is a peace offi cer, correctional employee, 
or community policing volunteer, and is engaged in the 
performance of his duties.
 (b)  Unlawful Restraint.  Otherwise the offense is a Class 4 
felony.
Section 1403.  Interference with Custody
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he intentionally 
conceals, detains, retains, moves, or otherwise affects the custody of:
 (a) a person less than 18 years old, or
 (b) a severely or profoundly mentally retarded person,
in a way that violates a court order relating to custody of the child or 
retarded person.
 (2)  Grading.
 (a)  The offense is a Class C misdemeanor if it is a violation of 
the visitation provisions of a court order.
 (b)  Otherwise the offense is a Class 4 felony.
Section 1404.  Criminal Coercion
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if, with intent 
to cause another to perform or to omit to perform an act, he threatens to 
unlawfully:
 (a) infl ict bodily harm on any person, subject any person to 
physical confi nement or restraint, or damage property; or
 (b) accuse any person of an offense; or
 (c) expose a secret tending to subject any person to hatred, 
contempt, or ridicule; or
 (d) take or withhold action as a public servant, or cause a public 
servant to take or withhold action; or 
 (e) bring about or continue a strike, boycott, or other collective 
action.
 (2)  Grading.
 (a)  The offense is a Class 2 felony if the person commits the 
offense in furtherance of the activities of a criminal organization.
 (b)  The offense is a Class 3 felony if:
 (i) the victim was a peace offi cer, correctional offi cer, or 
community policing volunteer, and
 (ii) the person intended to interfere with or retaliate for the 
performance of an offi cial duty.
 (c)  Otherwise the offense is a Class 4 felony.
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Section 1405.  Defi nitions
 (1)  “Bodily harm” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (2)  “Community policing volunteer” has the meaning given in 
Section 1201.
 (3)  “Correctional employee” has the meaning given in Section 5308.
 (4)  “Correctional offi cer” has the meaning given in Section 414.
 (5)  “Criminal organization” has the meaning given in Section 905.
 (6)  “Damaging” property has the meaning given in Section 2206.
 (7)  “Deception” has the meaning given in Section 2103.
 (8)  “Force” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (9)  “Peace offi cer” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (10)  “Property” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (11)  “Public servant” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (12)  “Severely or profoundly mentally retarded person” has the 
meaning given in Section 1401.
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ARTICLE 1500.  ROBBERY OFFENSES
       
Section 1501.  Robbery; Aggravated Robbery
Section 1501.  Robbery; Aggravated Robbery
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he takes 
property from the person or presence of another by force or threat of force.
 (2)  Grading.
 (a)  The offense is a Class 1 felony if:
 (i) the amount involved is in excess of $10,000, or
 (ii) the property taken is a fi rearm, automobile, airplane, 
motorcycle, motorboat, or other motor vehicle.
 (b)  The offense is a Class 2 felony if:
 (i) the amount involved is in excess of $1,000; or
 (ii) the victim is:
 (A) a physically handicapped or mentally 
handicapped person, or
 (B) more than 60 years old, or
 (C) less than 17 years old; or
 (iii) the offense is committed in a school or place of 
worship; or
 (iv) the person by his words or actions indicates to the 
victim that he is armed with a dangerous weapon, whether he is 
or not.
 (c)  Otherwise the offense is a Class 3 felony.
 (3)  Valuation.  The “amount involved” in a robbery is governed by 
Section 2109(7).
 (4)  Defi nitions.
 (a)  “Dangerous weapon” means:
 (i) anything readily capable of lethal use and possessed 
under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for any lawful 
use it may have, or
 (ii) any implement for the infl iction of great bodily harm 
that serves no common lawful purpose.
Dangerous weapons include any fi rearm; any gun not ordinarily used 
as a weapon; any stun gun or taser; any sharp-edged or sharply pointed 
knife or razor blade; any axe or hatchet; and any billy, blackjack, 
bludgeon, or metal knuckles.
 (b)  “Firearm” means any device that is designed to expel a 
projectile or projectiles by the action of an explosion, expansion of 
gas, or escape of gas, but excludes any gun not ordinarily used as a 
weapon.
  (c)  “Force” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (d)  “Gun not ordinarily used as a weapon” means: 
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 (i)  any pneumatic gun, spring gun, paint ball gun, or 
B-B gun which either expels a single globular projectile not 
exceeding .18 inch in diameter and which has a maximum 
muzzle velocity of less than 700 feet per second or breakable 
paint balls containing washable marking colors; 
 (ii)  any device used exclusively for signaling or safety and 
required or recommended by the United States Coast Guard or 
the Interstate Commerce Commission; or 
 (iii)  any device used exclusively for the fi ring of stud 
cartridges, explosive rivets, or similar industrial ammunition.
 (e)  “Mentally handicapped person” has the meaning given in 
Section 108.
 (f)  “Physically handicapped person” has the meaning given in 
Section 108.
 (g)  “Place of worship” has the meaning given in Section 108.
  (h)  “Property” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (i)  “School” has the meaning given in Section 108.
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ARTICLE 2100.  THEFT AND RELATED PROVISIONS
Section 2101.   Consolidation of Theft Offenses
Section 2102.   Theft by Unlawful Taking or Disposition
Section 2103.   Theft by Deception
Section 2104.   Theft by Extortion
Section 2105.   Receiving Stolen Property
Section 2106.   Theft of Services
Section 2107.   Theft by Failure to Make Required Disposition of Funds 
   Received
Section 2108.   Theft of Property Lost, Mislaid, or Delivered by Mistake
Section 2109.   Grading of Theft
Section 2110.   Claim of Right
Section 2111.   Unauthorized Use of Automobiles and Other Vehicles
Section 2112.   Defi nitions
Section 2101.  Consolidation of Theft Offenses
 Conduct denominated theft in this Article constitutes a single offense.  
An accusation of theft may be supported by evidence that it was committed 
in any manner that would be theft under this Article.
Section 2102.  Theft by Unlawful Taking or Disposition
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits theft if he knowingly obtains 
or exerts unauthorized control over property of another with intent to 
deprive the owner thereof.
 (2)  Defi nitions.
 (a)  “Deprive” means:
 (i)  to withhold property of another permanently or for 
so extended a period as to appropriate a major portion of its 
economic value, or with intent to restore only upon payment of 
reward or other compensation; or
 (ii) to dispose of the property so as to make it unlikely that 
the owner will recover it.
 (b)  “Obtain” means:
 (i) in relation to property, to bring about a transfer or 
purported transfer of a legal interest in the property, whether to 
the obtainer or another; or
 (ii) in relation to labor or services, to secure performance 
thereof.
 (c)  “Owner” means a person, other than the defendant, who 
has possession of or any other interest in the property involved, even 
though such interest or possession is unlawful, and without whose 
consent the defendant has no authority to exert control over the 
property.
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 (d)  “Property of another” is any property in which a person 
other than the defendant has an interest that the defendant has no 
authority to defeat or impair, even though the defendant may also have 
an interest in the property.
 (3)  Permissive Inferences.  The trier of fact may infer that:
 (a)  a lessee of property has the intent to deprive the owner 
thereof if the lessee:
 (i) fails to return the property to the owner within 10 days 
after receiving written demand from the owner for its return, or
 (ii) fails to return the property to the owner within 24 hours 
after receiving written demand from the owner for its return, 
if the lessee had presented materially fi ctitious identifi cation 
information to the owner.
 (iii) Written demand.  A notice in writing, given after the 
expiration of the leasing agreement, addressed and mailed by 
registered mail to the lessee, at the address given by him and 
shown on the leasing agreement, shall constitute proper demand 
for purposes of this provision; or
 (b)  a person who intentionally conceals unpurchased 
merchandise of any mercantile establishment on the premises of such 
establishment has the intent to deprive the owner of his property 
without paying the purchase price for it.
Section 2103.  Theft by Deception
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits theft if he knowingly obtains 
property of another by deception.
 (2)  Deception Defi ned.  A person deceives if he knowingly:
 (a) creates or confi rms another’s false impression, including a 
false impression as to law, value, or intention or other state of mind; 
but deception as to a person’s intention to perform a promise shall not 
be inferred from the fact alone that he did not subsequently perform 
the promise; or
 (b) fails to correct a false impression that the deceiver previously 
created or confi rmed, or that the deceiver knows to be infl uencing 
another to whom he stands in a fi duciary or confi dential relationship; 
or
 (c) prevents another from acquiring information that would affect 
his judgment of a transaction; or
 (d) fails to disclose a known lien, adverse claim, or other 
legal impediment to the enjoyment of property that he transfers or 
encumbers in consideration for the property obtained, whether such 
impediment is or is not valid, or is or is not a matter of offi cial record.
 (3)  Exception.  This offense is not committed if the deception 
concerns only matters having no pecuniary signifi cance, or is puffi ng by 
statements unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed.
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 (4)  Permissive Inference.  The trier of fact may infer that the elements 
of this offense are satisfi ed if a person:
 (a) promises to perform services for the owner for consideration 
of $10,000 or more; and
 (b) accepts a down payment of 10% or more of the agreed 
consideration; and
 (c) intentionally, and without cause, fails to substantially perform 
the promise, unless the owner initiated the suspension of performance; 
and
 (d) fails, within 45 days of receiving written demand from the 
owner, to respond to the demand or to return all payments he accepted 
under the promise, including the down payment.
 (e) Written demand.  A notice in writing, addressed and mailed 
by registered mail to the promisor at the promisor’s last known 
address, shall constitute proper demand for purposes of this provision. 
Section 2104.  Theft by Extortion
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits theft if he knowingly obtains 
property of another by threatening to:
 (a) infl ict bodily harm on any person, subject any person to 
physical confi nement or restraint, or commit any other offense; or
 (b) accuse any person of an offense; or
 (c) expose a secret tending to subject any person to hatred, 
contempt, or ridicule, or to harm his credit or business repute; or
 (d) take or withhold action as a public servant, or cause a public 
servant to take or withhold action; or
 (e) bring about or continue a strike, boycott, or other collective 
action, if the property is not demanded or received for the benefi t of 
the group the person purports to represent; or
 (f) testify or provide information or withhold testimony or 
information with respect to another’s legal claim or defense; or
 (g) infl ict any other harm that would not benefi t the defendant.
 (2)  Defense.  It is a defense to prosecution under Subsections (1)(b) 
to (1)(g) of this Section that the property obtained by threat of accusation, 
exposure, lawsuit, or other invocation of offi cial action or inaction was 
honestly claimed as restitution or indemnifi cation for harm done in the 
circumstances to which such action or inaction relates, or as compensation 
for property or lawful services.
Section 2105.  Receiving Stolen Property
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits theft if he knowingly 
receives, retains, or disposes of stolen property, while reckless as to whether 
the property has been stolen.
 (2)  Exception.  It is not an offense if the person received, retained, or 
disposed of the property with the intent to restore it to the owner.
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 (3)  Defi nitions.
 (a)  “Receiving” means acquiring possession, control, or title, or 
lending on the security of the property.
 (b)  “Stolen” property means property over which control has 
been obtained by theft.
 (4)  Permissive Inference.  The trier of fact may infer the requisite 
recklessness in the case of a person who:
 (a) is found in possession or control of property:
 (i) that has been stolen from more than one person on 
separate occasions, or
 (ii) for which he knows the serial number or other 
identifi cation number or mark has been removed, covered, 
altered, or obscured; or
 (b) has received stolen property in another transaction within the 
year preceding the transaction charged; or
 (c) being a dealer in property of the sort received, acquires it for 
a consideration that he knows is far below its reasonable value.
 (d)  Defi nition.  “Dealer” means a person in the business of 
buying or selling goods, including a pawnbroker.*9
Section 2106.  Theft of Services
(1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits theft if:
 (a) by deception or threat, by false monetary instrument, 
token, or note, or by other means to avoid payment for the service, 
he knowingly obtains services that he knows are available only for 
compensation; or
 (b) having control over the disposition of services of others 
to which he is not entitled, he knowingly uses or appropriates such 
services to his own benefi t or to the benefi t of another not entitled 
thereto.
 9Issue:  Should the permissive inferences established in Section 2105(4) be deleted?
 Yes:  The evidence that would be required to establish these inferences would be overly 
prejudicial, amounting to “other crimes” evidence used to support an improper  “propensity” 
inference.
 No:  The facts supporting these inferences are highly probative, as they strongly support 
the conclusion that the defendant is knowingly traffi cking in stolen goods.  Several states 
have adopted these specifi c presumptions; at least ten additional states have adopted similar 
presumptions; New York, California, New Jersey, and some other states have adopted even 
stronger presumptions (e.g.,  presuming knowledge absent a reasonable inquiry by the buyer 
into the seller’s rights in the property).  Although current law does not explicitly provide 
such inferences, the current provision (720 ILCS 5/16(a)(4)) also has a lesser culpability 
requirement — knowledge or reason to know, rather than actual knowledge — as to whether 
the property is stolen.
 Reporter:  No recommendation.
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 (2)  Defi nition.  “Services” includes labor; professional service; 
advertising services; transportation, telephone, or other public service; 
accommodation in hotels, restaurants, or elsewhere; admission to 
exhibitions; use of vehicles, copyrighted or patented material or other 
intellectual property, or other property; or access to cable television, the 
internet, or any other electronic service.
 (3)  Permissive Inference.  Where compensation for service is 
ordinarily paid immediately upon the rendering of such service, as in 
the case of hotels and restaurants, the trier of fact may infer an intention 
to obtain the services without paying from a person’s refusal to pay or 
absconding without payment or offer to pay.
Section 2107.  Theft by Failure to Make Required Disposition of 
 Funds Received
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person who knowingly obtains property 
upon agreement, or subject to a known legal obligation, to make a specifi ed 
payment or other disposition, whether from such property or its proceeds 
or from his own property to be reserved in equivalent amount, commits 
theft if he deals with the property obtained as his own and fails to make the 
required payment or disposition.
 (2)  Mixed Property.  Subsection (1) applies notwithstanding that 
it may be impossible to identify particular property as belonging to the 
victim at the time of the person’s failure to make the required payment or 
disposition.
 (3)  Permissive Inference.  The trier of fact may infer from the fact that 
a person is a public servant, an offi cer or employee of a fi nancial institution, 
a lawyer, or an accountant or other fi nancial professional that the person:
 (a) has the requisite knowledge of any legal obligation relevant to 
his criminal liability under this Section, and
 (b) has dealt with the property as his own if he fails to pay or 
account upon lawful demand, or if an audit reveals a shortage or 
falsifi cation of accounts.
 (4)  Defi nition.  “Financial institution” means a bank, insurance 
company, credit union, building and loan association, investment trust, or 
other organization held out to the public as a place of deposit of funds or 
medium of savings or collective investment.
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Section 2108.  Theft of Property Lost, Mislaid, or Delivered by Mistake
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits theft if, having come into 
control of property of another that he knows to have been lost, mislaid, 
or delivered under a mistake as to the nature or amount of the property or 
the identity of the recipient, and with intent to deprive the owner thereof, 
he fails to take reasonable measures*10 to restore the property to a person 
entitled to have it.
 (2)  Grading.  The grade of this offense is one grade lower than it 
would be under Section 2109.
Section 2109.  Grading of Theft
 (1)  Theft constitutes a Class 1 felony if the amount involved is in 
excess of $100,000.
 (2)  Theft constitutes a Class 2 felony if:
 (a) the amount involved is in excess of $10,000, or
 (b) the stolen property is a fi rearm, automobile, airplane, 
motorcycle, motorboat, or other motor vehicle, or
 (c) in the case of theft by receiving stolen property, if the receiver 
is in the business of buying or selling stolen property.
 (3)  Theft constitutes a Class 3 felony if the amount involved is in 
excess of $1,000.
 (4)  Theft constitutes a Class 4 felony if:
 (a) the amount involved is in excess of $300, or
 (b) the stolen property is a credit or debit card.
 (5)  Theft constitutes a Class A misdemeanor if the amount involved is 
$300 or less,
 10Issue:  Should the phrase “reasonable measures” be replaced with some more specifi c 
requirement?
 Yes:  The phrase “reasonable measures” reaches too far and does not provide suffi cient 
notice of what conduct is required.  Cf. People v. Maness, 732 N.E.2d 545, 550-51 (Ill. 2000) 
(invalidating as vague 720 ILCS 150/5.1, requiring parent or guardian to “take reasonable 
steps to prevent . . . commission or future occurrences of” acts of criminal sexual abuse or 
assault).
 No:  It is diffi cult to be any more specifi c here, because the intuitive sense of what is 
a “reasonable measure” is proportional to the value (and perhaps uniqueness) of the thing 
in question.  That is, the person who fi nds a $5 bill on the street is not expected to do much 
about it, while the person who accidentally receives a valuable painting in the mail would 
be expected to do quite a lot.  The corresponding current Illinois provision uses the phrase 
“reasonable measures.”  See 720 ILCS 5/16-2(b).
 Reporter:  Mild recommendation to retain the draft language.
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 (6) except that, if the property was not taken from the person or by 
threat, or in breach of a fi duciary obligation, and the amount involved was 
less than $50, the offense constitutes a Class C misdemeanor.*11
 (7)  Valuation.  The “amount involved” in a theft is the highest value, 
by any reasonable standard, of the property or services acquired by theft.  
Amounts involved in thefts committed pursuant to one scheme or course 
of conduct, whether from the same person or several persons, may be 
aggregated in determining the grade of the offense.
 (8)  Theft committed in a school or place of worship, or committed 
upon a victim who is more than 60 years old, has the grade provided by this 
Section based upon double the value of the property.*12
Section 2110.  Claim of Right
 It is a defense to prosecution for theft that the person reasonably 
believed that the owner, if present, would have consented to the person’s 
obtaining or using the property.
Section 2111.  Unauthorized Use of Automobiles and Other Vehicles
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if:
 (a) he operates another’s automobile, airplane, motorcycle, 
motorboat, or other motor vehicle without consent of the owner; or
 11Issue:  Should the Code include the grading category recognized in Section 2109(6), 
which reduces theft of less than $300 from a Class A to a Class C misdemeanor where the 
amount stolen was less than $50 and was not taken from the person, by threat, or by a breach 
of fi duciary obligation?
 Yes:  Section 2109(6)’s grading category applies to cases that involve less harm than 
other cases within the general category of thefts involving amounts under $300.  Although any 
theft certainly merits liability, there is a meaningful difference between stealing a candy bar, a 
compact disc, or a $5 bill, and stealing a television.  Grading theft of a trivial amount as a Class 
A misdemeanor would be disproportionate to its relative seriousness.
 No:  Theft involving any amount of property is more serious offense than other Class 
C misdemeanors in the Proposed Code, such as criminal trespass (Section 2303), refusing to 
aid an offi cer (Section 5305), and disrupting meetings and processions (Section 6110).  The 
offense would also do little to deter shoplifting if the base-level offense were graded as a mere 
Class C misdemeanor.  Current law does not recognize such a grading category.  See 720 ILCS 
5/16-1(b). 
 Reporter: No recommendation.
 12Issue:  Should Section 2109(8), providing special aggravations for theft, be deleted?
 Yes:  The distinctions this provision creates are arbitrary.  Although it may be true 
that offenses against these specifi c victims or in these places seem particularly undesirable, 
numerous other factors might be equally relevant (such as the nature or uniqueness of the 
item stolen, or the wealth of the victim) yet would not be recognized.  For the grading system 
to be completely evenhanded, it would have to recognize so many distinctions as to become 
unwieldy.  Singling out specifi c factors, while ignoring others, is haphazard.
 No:  Offenders who steal from churches, schools, and the elderly are especially 
blameworthy and should be subject to enhanced punishment, as current law provides in 720 
ILCS 5/16-1(b).
 Reporter:  No recommendation.
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 (b) having custody of another’s motor vehicle pursuant to an 
agreement that it is to be returned to the owner at a specifi ed time or 
on request, he knowingly retains possession without consent of the 
owner for so lengthy a period beyond the specifi ed time or the request 
for return as to be a gross deviation from the agreement; or
 (c) having custody of another’s motor vehicle pursuant to 
an agreement that he will provide maintenance or repairs for 
compensation, the person operates the vehicle without consent of the 
owner for his own purpose in a manner constituting a gross deviation 
from the agreed purpose of his custody.
 (2)  Defense.  It is a defense to prosecution under this Section that 
the person reasonably believed that the owner would have consented to the 
operation had he known of it.
 (3)  Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
Section 2112.  Defi nitions
 (1)  “Bodily harm” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (2)  “Credit card” has the meaning given in Section 3108.
   (3)  “Dealer” has the meaning given in Section 2105.
 (4)  “Debit card” has the meaning given in Section 3108.
 (5)  “Deception” has the meaning given in Section 2103.
 (6)  “Deprive” has the meaning given in Section 2102.
 (7)  “Financial institution” has the meaning given in Section 2107.
 (8)  “Firearm” has the meaning given in Section 1501.
 (9)  “Obtain” has the meaning given in Section 2102.
 (10)  “Owner” has the meaning given in Section 2102.
 (11)  “Place of worship” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (12)  “Property” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (13)  “Property of another” has the meaning given in Section 2102.
 (14)  “Public servant” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (15)  “Reasonably believes” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (16)  “Receiving” has the meaning given in Section 2105.
 (17)  “School” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (18)  “Services” has the meaning given in Section 2106.
 (19)  “Stolen” has the meaning given in Section 2105.
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ARTICLE 2200.  PROPERTY DAMAGE AND DESTRUCTION PROVISIONS
Section 2201.  Arson
Section 2202.  Endangering by Fire or Explosion
Section 2203.  Failure to Control or Report a Dangerous Fire
Section 2204.  Causing or Risking Catastrophe
Section 2205.  Possession of a Device or Substance for Catastrophic Effect
Section 2206.  Criminal Damage
Section 2207.  Tampering With or Damaging a Public Service
Section 2208.  Defi nitions
Section 2201.  Arson
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if, by means of 
fi re or explosive, he knowingly:
 (a) damages a building or habitable structure of another or a vital 
public facility; or  
 (b) damages any property, whether his own or another’s, with the 
intention that insurance be collected for such loss.
 (2)  Defi nitions.
 (a)  “Habitable structure” means a structure or vehicle:
 (i) where any person lives or carries on business or other 
calling; or
 (ii) where people assemble for purposes of business, 
government, education, religion, entertainment, or public 
transportation; or
 (iii) that is used for overnight accommodation of persons.
 (iv)  Any such structure or vehicle is deemed to be 
“habitable” regardless of whether a person is actually present. 
If a building or structure is divided into separately habitable 
units, any unit that is property of another constitutes a habitable 
structure of another.
 (b)  “Vital public facility” means a facility that is necessary to 
ensure or protect the public health, safety, or welfare.  Vital public 
facilities include bridges (whether over land or water), dams, tunnels, 
wharves, communications or radar installations, and power stations.
 (3)  Grading.  The offense is a Class 2 felony.*13
 13Issue:  Should there be an increased penalty — i.e., to a Class 1 felony — for arson 
where the offender damages a person’s residence, or knows a person or persons are present, or 
causes serious bodily injury?
 Yes:  The instances of arson described above differ meaningfully from arson cases that 
do not involve the same degree of jeopardy or actual harm.  Such an enhanced punishment is 
currently provided in 720 ILCS 5/20-1.1 and 5/21-1.2.
(continued…)
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Section 2202.  Endangering by Fire or Explosion
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he knowingly 
starts a fi re or causes an explosion, whether on his own property or 
another’s, and thereby recklessly:  
 (a) creates a risk of death or bodily harm to another; or  
 (b) creates a risk of damaging another’s building or habitable 
structure or a vital public facility.  
 (2)  Grading.
 (a)  The offense is a Class 3 felony if the person creates a 
substantial risk of death under circumstances manifesting an extreme 
indifference to the value of human life.
 (b)  Otherwise the offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
Section 2203.  Failure to Control or Report a Dangerous Fire
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if:
 (a) he knows that a fi re creates a risk of death to, or damage to a 
substantial amount of property of, another; and
(b) (i) he knows that he is under an offi cial, contractual, or 
other legal duty to prevent or combat the fi re, or  
 (ii) the fi re was started, even if lawfully, by him or with his 
assent, or on property in his custody or control; and
 (c) he fails:
 (i) to give a prompt fi re alarm, or
 (ii) to take reasonable measures to put out or control the 
fi re, when he can do so without substantial risk to himself.
 (2)  Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.*14
 13(…continued)
 No:  As to residential arson, it is not a special case of arson needing special treatment, 
as the underlying basis for any arson offense is the element of endangerment it creates.  For 
the instances of arson described above other than residential arson, the offender would already 
be subject to additional liability for aggravated assault or other similar offenses.  Cf. proposed 
Sections 254, 906 (allowing multiple liability and non-concurrent sentencing in this situation). 
Where fi ve or more persons are injured, the offender would be subject to liability for causing a 
catastrophe, which is punished as a Class X felony.  Arson is already a specialized offense that 
punishes a combination of property destruction and endangerment.  Attempts to combine even 
more offenses, such as assault, within the arson offense’s scope are likely only to create more 
problems.
 Reporter:  No recommendation.
 14Issue:  Should proposed Section 2203, imposing an affi rmative duty on certain 
specifi ed persons to control or report a dangerous fi re, be deleted?
 Yes:  Omission liability should be avoided for all but very rare and serious 
circumstances. This provision is not clear in specifying the situations to which it applies, 
which is a particularly serious failing in a criminal provision imposing a duty to act.  Current 
law does not include such a provision.
 No:  This provision addresses rare and serious circumstances for which omission 
liability is appropriate.  The provision applies only to those who are already under a legal duty 
to take action, or who started the fi re.  Several state codes, and the Model Penal Code, include 
similar provisions.
 Reporter:  Mild recommendation to retain the draft provision.
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Section 2204.  Causing or Risking Catastrophe
 (1)  Causing Catastrophe.
 (a)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he causes 
a catastrophe by fi re, fl ood, avalanche, collapse of building, bridge, or 
tunnel, use of a catastrophic agent, or by any other means of causing 
potentially widespread injury or damage.
 (b)  Defi nition.  A “catastrophic agent” means an explosive, an 
explosive or incendiary device, a timing or detonating mechanism for 
such device, poison or poisonous gas, a deadly biological or chemical 
contaminant or agent, or a radioactive substance.
 (c)  Grading.  The offense is:
 (i) a Class X felony if committed knowingly, and
 (ii) a Class 1 felony if committed recklessly.
 (2)  Risking Catastrophe.
 (a)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he 
recklessly creates a risk of catastrophe in the employment of fi re, 
explosives, or other dangerous means, as described in Subsection 
(1)(a).
 (b)  Grading.  The offense is a Class 3 felony.
 (3)  Threatening to Cause Catastrophe.
 (a)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he 
threatens to cause a catastrophe in the employment of fi re, explosives, 
or other dangerous means, as described in Subsection (1)(a).
 (b)  Grading.  The offense is a Class 4 felony.
 (4)  Failure to Prevent Catastrophe.
 (a)  Offense Defi ned.  A person who recklessly fails to take 
reasonable measures to prevent or mitigate a catastrophe commits an 
offense if:
 (i) he knows that he is under an offi cial, contractual, or 
other legal duty to take such measures; or
 (ii) he did or assented to the act causing or threatening the 
catastrophe.
 (b)  Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
 (5)  Catastrophe Defi ned.  “Catastrophe” means:
 (a)  great bodily harm to fi ve or more persons, or
 (b)  substantial damage to fi ve or more buildings or habitable 
structures, or
 (c)  substantial damage to a vital public facility that seriously 
impairs its usefulness or operation.
Section 2205.  Possession of a Device or Substance for Catastrophic 
 Effect
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he possesses a 
catastrophic agent with the intent to use it to commit a felony or with the 
knowledge that another will use it to commit a felony.
 (2)  Grading.  The offense is a Class 3 felony.
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Section 2206.  Criminal Damage
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he:
 (a) damages property of another; or
 (b) negligently damages property of another in the employment 
of fi re, explosives, or other dangerous means, as described in Section 
2204(1)(a);*15 or
 (c) tampers with property of another and thereby creates a risk of 
bodily harm to another or damage to property; or
 (d) causes another to suffer pecuniary loss by deception or threat.
 (2)  Defi nition.  “Damaging” property means impairing its usefulness 
or value by any means, and includes deleting or altering computer programs 
or other electronically recorded data.
 (3)  Grading.  Where damage or loss is knowingly caused, the offense 
is:
 (a) a Class 1 felony if the pecuniary loss is in excess of 
$100,000;
 (b) a Class 2 felony if the pecuniary loss is in excess of $10,000;
 (c) a Class 3 felony if the pecuniary loss is in excess of $1,000;
 (d) a Class 4 felony if the pecuniary loss is in excess of $300;
 (e) a Class A misdemeanor if the pecuniary loss is in excess of 
$50.
 (f)  Other violations.  Otherwise the offense is a Class B 
misdemeanor.
 (g)  Recklessly Causing Damage.  Where damage or loss is 
caused recklessly, the offense is one grade lower than it would be if 
caused knowingly.
 (h)  Institutional Vandalism.  Damage to the property of a place 
of worship, burial or memorializing the dead, or school, has the grade 
 15Issue:  Should Section 2206(1)(b), imposing negligence liability in criminal damage 
cases that involve fi re, explosion or other dangerous means, be deleted?
 Yes:  Negligence is generally to be avoided as a basis for criminal liability.  The offense 
already provides liability for those acting recklessly, thus guaranteeing the truly blameworthy 
will be punished.  Current law (720 ILCS 5/21-1) does not provide for negligence liability for 
property damage, and imposes a recklessness requirement for damage caused through fi re or 
explosives.
 No:  The offense is limited to cases involving fi re, explosives, and other dangerous 
means.  In cases involving such inherently dangerous activities, negligent behavior will nearly 
always be objectively reckless.  Reducing the culpability requirement to negligence, however, 
ensures that a defendant cannot avoid liability merely by saying that he was not consciously 
aware of the dangerousness of his activity.  Such ignorance should not entirely exonerate a 
person who engages in conduct that is objectively dangerous.
 Reporter:  Mild recommendation to retain the draft provision.
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provided by this Section based upon double the value of the damage 
done.*16
Section 2207.  Tampering With or Damaging a Public Service
 (1)  Offense Defi ned. A person commits an offense if he causes a 
substantial interruption or impairment of a public service by:
 (a) damaging or tampering with the property of another; or
 (b) negligently damaging the property of another by fi re, 
explosive, or other dangerous means, as described in Section 
2204(1)(a); or
 (c) incapacitating an operator of such service.
 (2)  Defi nition.  “Public service” includes any public water, gas, or 
power supply; any telecommunications service; any transportation service, 
facility, or road; any service furnished by a public utility owned by this 
State or any of its political subdivisions; any service subject to regulation by 
the Illinois Commerce Commission; or any service furnished by an electric 
cooperative. 
 (3)  Grading. The offense is:
 (a) a Class 3 felony if the person causes the interruption or 
impairment intentionally; or
 (b) a Class 4 felony if the person causes the interruption or 
impairment knowingly.
 (c) Otherwise the offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
 16Issue:  Should 2206(2)(h) be deleted, thereby omitting the aggravation for vandalism 
to certain institutions?
 Yes:  The distinctions this provision creates are arbitrary.  Although it may be true that 
offenses against these specifi c types of property seem particularly undesirable, numerous other 
factors might be equally relevant (such as the antiquity or rarity of the damaged object, or the 
identity of its owner) yet would not be recognized.  For the grading system to be completely 
evenhanded, it would have to recognize so many distinctions as to become unwieldy; singling 
out specifi c factors, while ignoring others, is haphazard.  Further, this section may authorize 
serious liability for students who recklessly damage school property.
 No:  Offenders who damage churches, schools, and burial grounds are especially 
blameworthy and should be subject to enhanced punishment, as current law provides in 720 
ILCS 5/21-1(2).
 Reporter:  No recommendation.
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Section 2208.  Defi nitions
 (1)  “Bodily harm” has the meaning given in Section 108. 
 (2)  “Catastrophe” has the meaning given in Section 2204.
 (3)  “Catastrophic agent” has the meaning given in Section 2204.
 (4)  “Damaging” property has the meaning given in Section 2206.
 (5)  “Great bodily harm” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (6)  “Habitable structure” has the meaning given in Section 2201.
 (7)  “Owner” has the meaning given in Section 2102.
 (8)  “Place of worship” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (9)  “Property” has the meaning given in Section 108. 
 (10)  “Property of another” has the meaning given in Section 2102.
 (11)  “Public service” has the meaning given in Section 2207.
 (12)  “School” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (13)  “Vital public facility” has the meaning given in Section 2201.
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ARTICLE 2300.  BURGLARY AND OTHER CRIMINAL INTRUSION PROVISIONS
Section 2301.  Home or Car Invasion
Section 2302.  Burglary
Section 2303.  Criminal Trespass
Section 2304.  Residential Picketing
Section 2305.  Defi nitions
Section 2301.  Home or Car Invasion
 (1)  Home Invasion Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if, during 
commission of or fl ight from burglary of the dwelling of another, he uses or 
threatens force on any person within such dwelling.
 (2)  Vehicle Invasion Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if, while 
or after entering or reaching into a vehicle with intent to commit a felony*17 
therein, he uses or threatens force against an occupant of the vehicle.
 (3)  Defi nitions.
 (a)  “Dwelling” means any building or structure, though movable 
or temporary, or a portion thereof, that is at the time of an alleged 
offense used as a human habitation, home, or residence.
 (b)  “Dwelling of another” includes a dwelling where the 
defendant maintains a tenancy interest but from which the defendant 
has been barred by a divorce decree, judgment of dissolution of 
marriage, order of protection, or other court order.
 (4)  Grading.  The offense is a Class 1 felony.
 17Issue:  Should “commit a felony therein” be changed to “commit an offense therein” 
in proposed Section 2301(2)?
 Yes:  One who invades a vehicle and threatens or uses force against an occupant 
is intrusive and dangerous, regardless of the seriousness of the crime he originally intended to 
commit when he entered or reached into the vehicle.  (Current law requires intent to commit a 
felony or theft.  See 720 ILCS 5/12-11.1.)
 No:  Entering or reaching into a vehicle is less intrusive than entering a dwelling, 
and may also be consistent with a lawful purpose.  Requiring an intent to commit a felony 
ensures that the defendant’s conduct is suffi ciently serious to warrant punishment on a par 
with that for home invasion, and parallels Section 2301(1)’s incorporation of the felony of 
burglary.
 Reporter:  No recommendation.
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Section 2302.  Burglary
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if, without license 
or authority, he enters or surreptitiously*18 remains in a building or habitable 
structure at a time when the premises are not open to the public,*19 with 
intent to commit an offense*20 therein.
 18Issue:  Should the word “surreptitiously” in proposed Section 2302(1) be deleted?
 Yes:  Remaining in a building with the intent to commit a crime therein should be 
punishable as burglary whether it has the element of covertness or not, as current law provides 
in 720 ILCS 5/19-1.
 No:  The modifi er “surreptitiously” ensures that the burglary offense captures only 
conduct that specifi cally creates the elements of invasion and fear that this distinct offense 
aims to punish.  Without those elements of invasion and fear, there is little reason to give the 
conduct special treatment as burglary, rather than just punishing it as trespass and an attempt 
to commit the intended crime.
 Reporter:  Mild recommendation to retain the draft language.
 19Issue:  Should the phrase “at a time when the premises are not open to the public” be 
deleted from proposed Section 2302(1)?
 Yes:  This language eliminates the Illinois courts’ “limited authority” doctrine, which 
holds that one who enters a building or vehicle with the intent to commit a crime does so 
“without authority.”  The “limited authority” doctrine is desirable, as it properly recognizes 
that one who opens his door to the public does not thereby give visitors permission to commit 
crimes on his property.
 No:  The “limited authority” doctrine is undesirable, and also contradicts the language 
and goals of the existing intrusion statutes.  Under the doctrine, one offense element (intent to 
commit a crime) automatically establishes another (the separate statutory “without authority” 
element), making the second totally irrelevant and ultimately meaning that any entry into any 
building will translate the attempted crime (usually theft) into burglary.  This eliminates any 
distinction between burglary and theft, and often ends up punishing an attempt, or even less 
than an attempt, to commit theft more severely than the completed theft would be punished. 
For example, under the “limited authority” rule, a teenager who enters a supermarket planning 
to shoplift a candy bar, but who is caught, is currently guilty of burglary (a Class 2 felony) 
instead of attempted theft (a Class A misdemeanor).  Such a result violates any sense of 
proportional punishment.
 Reporter:  Mild recommendation to retain the draft language.
 20Issue:  Should the phrase “commit an offense therein” be changed to “commit a 
felony therein” in proposed Section 2302(1)?
 Yes:  Intent to commit a misdemeanor is not serious enough to warrant punishment 
as burglary.  (Current law requires intent to commit a felony or theft.  See 720 ILCS 5/19-1, 
19-3.)
 No:  The arousal of fear and the invasion of one’s sense of security that the burglary 
offense is meant to punish exist irrespective of the precise crime the burglar intends to commit 
— which, after all, need not occur for burglary liability to exist.  The codes of about half the 
states, and the Model Penal Code, contain similar language.
 Reporter:  No recommendation.
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 (2)  Grading.
 (a)  If committed in the dwelling of another, the offense is a 
Class 2 felony.
 (b)  Otherwise the offense is a Class 4 felony.
Section 2303.  Criminal Trespass
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he enters or 
remains in a place where he knows he has no license or authority to be.
 (2)  Grading.  Committing the offense in:
 (a) a dwelling or in highly secured premises is a Class 4 felony;
 (b) any building, habitable structure, storage structure, separately 
secured or occupied portion thereof, or in any place so enclosed as 
manifestly to exclude intruders is a Class A misdemeanor.
 (c)  Otherwise the offense is a Class C misdemeanor.
 (3)  Defi nitions.
 (a)  “Highly secured premises” means any place that is 
continuously guarded and where display of visible identifi cation is 
required of persons while they are on the premises.
 (b)  “Storage structure” means any structure, truck, railway 
car, vessel, or aircraft that is used primarily for the storage or 
transportation of property.
 (4)  Defenses.  It is a defense to prosecution under this Section that:
 (a) the premises were at the time of entry open to members of the 
public and the person complied with all lawful conditions imposed on 
access to or remaining in the premises; or
 (b) the person reasonably believed that the owner of the 
premises, or other person empowered to license access thereto, would 
have licensed him to enter or remain.
Section 2304.  Residential Picketing
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he pickets 
before or about the dwelling of another that is not used as a place of 
business or of public assembly.
 (2)  Grading.  The offense is a Class B misdemeanor.
Section 2305.  Defi nitions
 (1)  “Dwelling” has the meaning given in Section 2301.
 (2)  “Dwelling of another” has the meaning given in Section 2301.
 (3)  “Force” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (4)  “Habitable structure” has the meaning given in Section 2201.
 (5)  “Highly secured premises” has the meaning given in Section 2303.
 (6)  “Reasonably believes” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (7)  “Storage structure” has the meaning given in Section 2303.
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ARTICLE 2400.  INVASION OF PRIVACY PROVISIONS
Section 2401.  Interception of Electronic or Oral Communications
Section 2402.  Interception of Private Written Correspondence
Section 2403.  Unlawful Eavesdropping or Surveillance
Section 2404.  Unlawful Access to Information
Section 2405.  Unlawful Disclosure of Information
Section 2406.  Defi nitions
Section 2401.  Interception of Electronic or Oral Communications
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he knowingly 
intercepts any private electronic or oral communication by means of any 
intercepting device other than equipment being used by a communications 
common carrier in the ordinary course of its business.
 (2)  Defi nitions.
 (a)  “Contents,” when used with respect to any electronic or oral 
communication, includes any information concerning the identity 
of the parties to such communication or the existence, substance, or 
meaning of that communication.
 (b)  “Electronic communication” means any communication 
made in whole or in part through the use of facilities for the 
transmission of communications by the aid of electronic, microwave, 
radio, cable, satellite, or other connection between the point of 
origin and the point of reception furnished or operated by any person 
engaged as a common carrier in providing or operating such facilities 
for the transmission of communications.
 (c)  “Intercepting device” means any electronic, mechanical, or 
other device or apparatus that can be used to intercept an electronic or 
oral communication, but does not include:
 (i) equipment that a communications common carrier, in 
the ordinary course of its business, furnished to a subscriber or 
user, or specifi cally authorized a subscriber or user to use, and 
that was being used by the subscriber or user in the ordinary 
course of business; or
 (ii) a hearing aid or similar device being used to correct 
subnormal hearing.
 (d)  “Interception” of an electronic or oral communication means 
the visual or aural acquisition, or the recording by any means, of all or 
part of the contents of the communication.
 (e)  “Private electronic communication” means an electronic 
communication sent by a person with an expectation that such 
communication is not subject to interception under circumstances 
justifying such expectation.
 (f)  “Private oral communication” means any oral communication 
uttered by a person with an expectation that such communication 
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is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such 
expectation.
 (3)  Defenses.*21 It is a defense to prosecution under this Section or 
Section 2405 that:
 (a) the parties*22 to the communication consented to the 
interception, disclosure, or use in question; or
 (b) the person was authorized by law to engage in the 
interception, disclosure, or use in question; or
(c) (i)  the interception in question was made by or at the 
request of a party to the communication who reasonably believed 
that the communication would provide evidence of an offense 
that another party to the communication had committed, or 
would commit, against him or a household member; or 
   (ii) the disclosure or use in question involved an 
interception described in Subsection (3)(c)(i) and was for the 
purpose of prosecuting an offense.
 (d)  Acquiescence is Consent.  A party to a communication 
who continues the communication after receiving a disclosure that 
the communication is subject to interception thereby consents to any 
subsequent interception, or disclosure or use of the interception, that 
falls within the scope of the disclosure.
 21Issue:  Should proposed Section 2401(3) include an explicit exemption for employers 
who monitor employees’ computer activities?
 Yes:  Employers increasingly seek to oversee and limit worker use of the Internet and 
e-mail for legitimate, business-related reasons.
 No:  Under the proposed provision, the employer who wishes to surveil an employee’s 
computer use need only set the employee’s consent as a condition of employment, thus falling 
within the consent defense in proposed Section 2401(3)(a).  Requiring consent would give the 
employee notice that his computer use will be surveilled, so he would have no expectation of 
privacy.  (Current law has no such special exemption for employers.)
 Reporter:  No recommendation.
 22Issue:  Should “the parties” in proposed Section 2401(3)(a) be changed to “a party,” 
thereby requiring only one-party consent?
 Yes:  A person who feels he is being improperly intimidated, harassed, threatened, or 
the like, should be able to lawfully record any conversation to support his claim — or, to put 
it differently, the threat-maker should not be able to escape responsibility simply by being 
a convincing liar.  Allowing one-party consent empowers victims to protect themselves, 
and empowers citizens to marshal evidence of others’ improper behavior.  Further, the non-
consenting party has a limited expectation of privacy because he is, after all, speaking to the 
recording party, who presumably may repeat the conversation if he does not record it.  Thus, 
the primary effect of the two-party-consent rule is to give the speaker a right to falsely deny 
what he said.
 No:  One-party consent allows some people to invade other people’s privacy without 
notifi cation.  Current Illinois law requires all-party consent.  See 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(1)(A).
 Reporter:  No recommendation.
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 (4)  Grading.  The offense is a Class 3 felony.*23
Section 2402.  Interception of Private Written Correspondence
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if, knowing that 
a letter or other written private correspondence has not yet been delivered 
to the person to whom it is directed, and knowing that he does not have the 
consent of the sender or receiver of the correspondence, he:
 (a) damages or destroys the correspondence; or
 (b) opens or reads sealed correspondence, with intent to discover 
its contents.
 (2)  Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
Section 2403.  Unlawful Eavesdropping or Surveillance
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if, except as 
authorized by law, he:
 (a) trespasses on property with intent to subject anyone in a 
private place to eavesdropping or other surveillance; or
 (b) installs or uses in any private place, without the consent 
of the person or persons entitled to privacy there, any device for 
observing, photographing, recording, amplifying, or broadcasting 
sounds or events in such place; or  
 (c) installs or uses outside a private place any device for hearing, 
recording, amplifying, or broadcasting sounds originating in such 
private place that would not ordinarily be audible or comprehensible 
outside the private place, without the consent of the person or persons 
entitled to privacy there.
 (2)  Defi nition.  “Private place” means a place where a person 
reasonably would expect to be safe from casual or hostile intrusion or 
surveillance.  A private place does not include an area to which the public or 
a substantial group thereof has access, but does include areas within public 
places where people reasonably expect to be safe from casual or hostile 
intrusion or surveillance.
 (3)  Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
 23Issue:  Should the offense in proposed Section 2401 (interception of communications) 
be graded higher for offenses involving communications of a law-enforcement offi cial?
 Yes:  Such communications are especially sensitive, and must be accorded greater 
weight in the punishment provisions.  Such an aggravation is currently provided in 720 ILCS 
5/14-4(b), which aggravates the offense from a Class 4 felony to a Class 1 felony.
 No:  The provision as drafted increases the general grade of the offense from a Class 4 
felony to a Class 3 felony.  No further increase is warranted.  Moreover, although it may be true 
that offenses involving these communications seem particularly undesirable, numerous other 
intrusions might be equally harmful (such as those involving confi dential communications 
between attorney and client, doctor and patient, or other government offi cials such as military 
personnel) yet would not be recognized.  
 Reporter:  No recommendation.
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Section 2404.  Unlawful Access to Information
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if, knowing he 
is not privileged to do so, he knowingly gains access to information or*24 
electronic programs or data.
 (2)  Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
 24Issue:  Should proposed Section 2404(1)’s prohibition on gaining access to 
“information” be deleted, thus limiting the offense to those who access computer programs 
and data?
 Yes:  Limiting liability to accessing computer programs or data better assures that only 
blameworthy persons are within the offense’s reach.  Current law only prohibits access to “a 
computer or any part thereof, or a program or data.”  See 720 ILCS 5/16D-3(a)(1).
 No:  Accessing information without privilege causes harm regardless of whether one 
uses a computer or some other means to invade another’s privacy.  There seems little reason 
to distinguish between one who steals information from a computer fi le and one who steals 
from a paper fi le.  In fact, current law includes a separate offense criminalizing obtaining 
private insurance information by deception.  See 215 ILCS 5/1023.  It seems reasonable to 
think that current law’s special prohibition should apply more broadly.  Requiring that the 
defendant know he has no privilege to access the information ensures that the offense does not 
criminalize innocent conduct.
 Reporter:  No recommendation.
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Section 2405.  Unlawful Disclosure of Information
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he discloses or 
uses information that he knows*25 was obtained in a manner prohibited by 
Section 2401, 2402, 2403, or 2404.*26
 (2)  Defenses.  The defenses defi ned in Subsection 2401(3) are 
available as defenses to this offense.
 (3)  Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
 25Issue:  Should the culpability requirement in proposed Section 2405(1) be lowered 
to allow liability for one who is reckless as to whether the information was unlawfully 
obtained? 
 Yes:  Requiring knowledge as to the unlawfulness of initially acquiring the information 
would preclude liability in many cases.  Moreover, disclosing or using private information is 
often much more harmful — and may involve a greater invasion of privacy — than initially 
acquiring it.  The current eavesdropping offense imposes liability on one who discloses or uses 
information that he “knows or reasonably should know” was unlawfully obtained.  See 720 
ILCS 5/14-2(a)(3).
 No:  Requiring knowledge as to the unlawfulness of initially acquiring the information 
ensures that only the truly blameworthy — and not mere gossipmongers — are within the 
offense’s reach.
 Reporter:  No recommendation.
 26Issue:  Should Section 2405’s offense (unlawful disclosure of information) be 
expanded to criminalize improperly using or disclosing private information that was lawfully 
obtained in the fi rst instance?
 Yes:  Disclosing or using sensitive information often invades privacy regardless of 
whether it was lawfully obtained.  People often willingly share very sensitive information 
— such as information in medical records, insurance records, and records relating to sexual 
abuse — under an understanding that the person receiving the information will not share it, or 
will share it only in specifi c contexts.  A person, such as a doctor or accountant, who violates 
that trust and unlawfully shares confi dential information merits criminal punishment.  Several 
current offenses outside Chapter 720 criminalize disclosing information that was lawfully 
obtained.  See, e.g., 20 ILCS 301/30-5 (contents of medical records); 210 ILCS 85/6.17 
(hospital or medical record information); 325 ILCS 5/11 & 5/11.2 (records relating to sexual 
abuse).
 No:  Although disclosing or using private information that was lawfully acquired 
may  invade privacy, a Code offense that generally criminalizes such conduct risks punishing 
the blameless.  Prohibition of the disclosure or use of specifi c kinds of information is better 
handled through the particular regulatory schemes governing the persons who oversee that 
information.
 Reporter:  No recommendation.
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Section 2406.  Defi nitions
 (1)  “Contents” has the meaning provided in Section 2401.
 (2)  “Electronic communication” has the meaning given in Section 
2401.
 (3)  “Household member” has the meaning given in Section 1201.
 (4)  “Intercepting device” has the meaning given in Section 2401.
 (5)  “Interception” has the meaning given in Section 2401.
 (6)  “Private electronic communication” has the meaning given in 
Section 2401.
 (7)  “Private oral communication” has the meaning given in Section 
2401.
 (8)  “Private place” has the meaning given in Section 2403.
 (9)  “Reasonably believes” has the meaning given in Section 108.
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ARTICLE 3100.  FORGERY AND FRAUDULENT PRACTICES
Section 3101.  Forgery and Counterfeiting
Section 3102.  Tampering with Writing, Record, or Device
Section 3103.  Securing Execution of Documents by Deception
Section 3104.  Simulating Objects of Special Value
Section 3105.  Unauthorized Impersonation
Section 3106.  Deceptive Practices
Section 3107.  Bad Checks
Section 3108.  Fraudulent Use of Credit or Debit Card
Section 3109.  Commercial Bribery and Breach of Duty to Act 
         Disinterestedly
Section 3110.  Bid Rigging
Section 3111.  Rigging Publicly Exhibited Contest
Section 3112.  Defrauding Secured Creditors
Section 3113.  Fraud in Insolvency
Section 3114.  Receiving Deposits in a Failing Financial Institution
Section 3115.  Selling Participation in a Pyramid Sales Scheme
Section 3116.  Defi nitions
Section 3101.  Forgery and Counterfeiting
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if, with intent to 
defraud or injure*27 anyone, he:
 (a)  alters any writing of another without his authority; or
 (b)  makes, completes, executes, authenticates, issues, or 
transfers any writing so that it purports:
 (i) to be the act of another who did not authorize that act, or
 (ii) to have been executed at a time or place other than was 
in fact the case, or
 (iii) to be a copy of an original when no such original 
existed; or
 (c)  puts forward any writing that he knows to be forged in a 
manner specifi ed in Subsections (1)(a) or (1)(b).
 27Issue:  Should the references to “injuring” another in Sections 3101(1) (forgery) and 
3102(1) (tampering with writing, record, or device) be deleted? 
 Yes:  Culpability with respect to “injuring” another is vague and is not suffi ciently 
serious to warrant liability for these offenses.  The current forgery provision does not include 
“intent to injure,” but refers only to an intent to defraud.  See 720 ILCS 5/17-3(a).
 No:  Imposing liability where one acts with an intent to injure covers persons who 
intend to infl ict harm (such as harming another’s reputation) that may not be pecuniary in 
nature, and serves more generally to guard against the undermining of confi dence in the 
legitimacy of writings, records, and devices.
 Reporter:  No recommendation.
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 (2)  Defi nitions.
 (a)  “Defraud” means to obtain anything of value through 
deception.
 (b)  “Writing” includes printing, electronically recorded 
data, or any other method of recording information, money, coins, 
tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, digital 
signatures or other encrypted electronic identifi ers, electronic mail 
routing information, and other symbols of value, right, privilege, or 
identifi cation.
 (3)  Grading.  The offense is:
 (a) a Class 2 felony if the writing is or purports to be part of 
an issue of money, securities, postage, or revenue stamps, or other 
instruments issued by the government, or part of an issue of stock, 
bonds, or other instruments representing interests in or claims against 
any property or enterprise;
 (b) a Class 3 felony if the writing is or purports to be a will, 
deed, contract, release, commercial instrument, or other document 
evidencing, creating, transferring, altering, terminating, or otherwise 
affecting legal relations.
 (c)  Otherwise the offense is a Class A misdemeanor. 
Section 3102.  Tampering with Writing, Record, or Device
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if, with intent to 
deceive or injure*28 anyone or to conceal any wrongdoing:
 (a) knowing that he has no privilege to do so, he tampers with, 
falsifi es, destroys, removes, or conceals any writing, record, or device, 
or
 (b) he puts forward a writing, record, or device, knowing that it 
has been altered in a manner prohibited by Subsection (1)(a).
 (2)  Defi nition.  To “put forward” a writing, record, device, or object 
means to issue, authenticate, transfer, publish, circulate, present, display, or 
otherwise give currency to such writing, record, device, or object.
 (3)  Grading.
 (a)  The offense is a Class 3 felony if the writing is a will, deed, 
mortgage, security instrument, or other writing for which the law 
provides public recording.
 (b)  Otherwise the offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
Section 3103.  Securing Execution of Documents by Deception
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if by deception he 
causes another to execute any instrument affecting or purporting to affect or 
likely to affect the pecuniary interest of any person.
 (2)  Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
 28[See footnote 27 on page 90.]
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Section 3104.  Simulating Objects of Special Value
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if, with intent 
to defraud anyone, he makes, alters, or puts forward any object so that it 
appears to have value because of antiquity, rarity, source, or authorship that 
it does not possess.
 (2)  Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
Section 3105.  Unauthorized Impersonation
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he:
 (a) represents himself to be another person, being reckless as 
to whether his misrepresentation will deprive the other person of 
anything of value or injure the other person’s reputation; or
 (b) represents himself to be another person or to have a 
characteristic of legal signifi cance that he knows he does not have, 
with intent to obtain service or property to which he is not entitled.
 (2)  Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
Section 3106.  Deceptive Practices
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he:
 (a)  makes a false or misleading written statement with intent to 
obtain property or credit; or
 (b)  makes a false or misleading statement in any advertisement 
addressed to the public or to a substantial segment thereof with intent 
to promote the purchase or sale of property or services; or
 (c)  makes a false or misleading written statement with intent to 
promote the sale of securities, or omits information required by law to 
be disclosed in written documents relating to securities; or
 (d)  uses or possesses for use a false weight or measure, or 
any other device for falsely determining or recording any quality or 
quantity of a commodity to be sold; or
 (e)  sells, offers, or exposes for sale, or delivers less than the 
represented quantity of any commodity or service; or
 (f)  takes more than the represented quantity of any commodity 
or service when as buyer he furnishes the weight or measure; or
 (g)  sells, offers, or exposes for sale adulterated or mislabeled 
commodities.
 (2)  Defi nitions.
 (a)  “Adulterated” means varying from the standard of 
composition or quality prescribed by or pursuant to any statute 
providing criminal penalties for such variance, or set by established 
commercial usage.
 (b)  “Mislabeled” means varying from the standard of truth 
or disclosure in labeling prescribed by or pursuant to any statute 
providing criminal penalties for such variance, or set by established 
commercial usage.
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 (c)  “Securities” has the meaning given in Section 2.1 of the 
Illinois Securities Law of 1953 [815 ILCS 5/2.1].
 (3)  Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
Section 3107.  Bad Checks
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he issues or 
passes a check or similar sight order for the payment of money, knowing 
that it will not be honored by the drawee.
 (2)  Permissive Inference.  The trier of fact may infer that an issuer 
knew that the check or order (other than a postdated check or order) would 
not be paid, if:
 (a)  the issuer had no account with the drawee at the time the 
check or order was issued; or  
 (b)  payment was refused by the drawee for lack of funds, upon 
presentation within 30 days after issue, and the issuer failed to make 
good within 10 days after receiving notice of that refusal. 
 (3)  Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
Section 3108.  Fraudulent Use of Credit or Debit Card
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he uses a credit 
or debit card with the intent of obtaining property or services knowing that:
 (a)  the card is stolen or forged; or  
 (b)  the card has been revoked or cancelled; or  
 (c)  for any other reason his use of the card is unauthorized by 
the issuer or cardholder.
 (2)  Defi nitions.
 (a)  “Credit card” means a writing or other evidence of an 
undertaking to pay for property or services delivered or rendered to or 
upon the order of a designated person or bearer.
 (b)  “Debit card” means any instrument or device for the use of 
the cardholder in obtaining money, goods, services, and anything else 
of value, payment of which is made against funds previously deposited 
by the cardholder.
 (3)  Defense.
 (a)  It is a defense to prosecution under Subsection (1)(c) that the 
person had the intent and ability to meet all obligations to the issuer 
arising out of his use of the card.
 (b)  The defendant carries the burden of persuasion on the 
defense in Subsection (3)(a) and must prove such defense by a 
preponderance of the evidence.
 (4)  Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor. 
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Section 3109.  Commercial Bribery and Breach of Duty to Act 
 Disinterestedly
 (1)  Commercial Bribery.  A person commits an offense if he 
knowingly solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefi t as consideration 
for violating or agreeing to violate a duty of fi delity to which he is subject 
as:
 (a)  partner, agent, or employee of another;
 (b)  trustee, guardian, or other fi duciary;
 (c)  lawyer, physician, accountant, appraiser, or other 
professional adviser or informant;
 (d)  offi cer, director, manager, or other participant in the direction 
of the affairs of an incorporated or unincorporated association; or
 (e)  arbitrator or other purportedly disinterested adjudicator or 
referee.
 (2)  Breach of Duty to Act Disinterestedly.  A person who holds himself 
out to the public as being engaged in the business of making disinterested 
selection, appraisal, or criticism of commodities or services commits an 
offense if he knowingly solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefi t to 
infl uence his selection, appraisal, or criticism.*29
 (3)  Offering Bribes.  A person commits an offense if he knowingly 
confers, offers, or agrees to confer any benefi t the acceptance of which 
would be an offense under Subsections (1) or (2).
 (4)  Grading.  Each of the offenses defi ned in this Section is a Class 4 
felony.*30
 29Issue:  Should the offense in proposed Section 3109(2) (breach of duty to act 
disinterestedly) be deleted? 
 Yes:  The prohibited conduct is not suffi ciently serious to warrant criminal liability. 
Current law does not criminalize such conduct.
 No:  The sort of dishonesty covered by the offense — such as surreptitiously accepting 
money to overestimate the value of an antique or to write a favorable movie review — deceives 
the public and undermines its confi dence in honest recommendations, appraisals, and 
criticisms.  
 Reporter:  No recommendation.
 30Issue:  Should the grade for the offenses defi ned in proposed Section 3109 
(commercial bribery) be lowered?
 Yes:  The prohibited conduct is not serious enough to warrant felony status.  Civil 
remedies suffi ciently address any serious harm caused by these offenses.  Current law grades 
commercial bribery as a business offense.  See 720 ILCS 5/29A-3.
 No:  Grading these offenses at this level refl ects their close relation to bribery of public 
offi cials, which both current law (see 720 ILCS 5/33-1) and proposed Section 5101 grade 
as a Class 2 felony.  Although not as harmful as the bribery of public offi cials, the conduct 
prohibited by these offenses is suffi ciently serious to warrant status as a Class 4 felony.
 Reporter:  No recommendation.
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Section 3110.  Bid Rigging
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he knowingly 
engages in conduct that violates the laws governing the bidding process for 
a public contract, as set out in [current 30 ILCS 500/50-25 and 720 ILCS 
5/33E-3, -4, -11, -14, and -18].
 (2)  Grading.  The offense is a Class 3 felony.
Section 3111.  Rigging Publicly Exhibited Contest*31
 (1)  Rigging Publicly Exhibited Contest.  A person commits an offense 
if, with intent to prevent a publicly exhibited contest from being conducted 
in accordance with the rules and usages purporting to govern it, he:
 (a)  confers, offers, or agrees to confer any benefi t upon, or 
threatens bodily harm to a participant, offi cial, or other person 
associated with the contest or exhibition; or
 (b)  tampers with any person, animal, or thing.
 (2)  Soliciting or Accepting Benefi t for Rigging.  A person commits an 
offense if he knowingly solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefi t the 
giving of which would be an offense under Subsection (1).
 (3)  Participation in Rigged Contest.  A person commits an offense 
if he knowingly engages in, sponsors, produces, judges, or otherwise 
participates in a publicly exhibited contest knowing that the contest is not 
being conducted in compliance with the rules and usages purporting to 
govern it, by reason of conduct that would be an offense under this Section.
 (4)  Grading.
 (a)  An offense under Subsection (1) or (2) is a Class 4 felony.
 (b)  An offense under Subsection (3) is a Class A misdemeanor.
Section 3112.  Defrauding Secured Creditors
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he destroys, 
removes, conceals, encumbers, transfers, or otherwise deals with property 
subject to a security interest with intent to hinder enforcement of that 
interest. 
 (2)  Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
 31Issue:  Should proposed Section 3111 (rigging publicly exhibited contest) be 
expanded to cover bribes designed to infl uence amateur athletes’ decisions to attend particular 
schools, participate in competitions, or retain agents for professional sports contracts?
 Yes:  Amateur athletics are a major source of revenue for schools.  A bribe to an amateur 
athlete can result in the player’s ineligibility to compete and in athletic-association violations 
carrying serious consequences for the school involved.  Current law also criminalizes such 
conduct.  See 720 ILCS 5/29-1(b) & (c); 5/29-3.
 No:  Such conduct is not suffi ciently serious to warrant criminal liability, and is already 
controlled with greater specifi city by athletic associations’ rules, regulations, and penalties.  
 Reporter:  No recommendation.
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Section 3113.  Fraud in Insolvency
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if, knowing that 
proceedings have been or are about to be instituted for the appointment 
of a receiver or other person entitled to administer property for the benefi t 
of creditors, or that any other composition or liquidation for the benefi t of 
creditors has been or is about to made, he:  
 (a)  destroys, removes, conceals, encumbers, transfers, or 
otherwise deals with any property with intent to defeat or obstruct the 
claim of any creditor, or otherwise to obstruct the operation of any law 
relating to administration of property for the benefi t of creditors; or  
 (b)  knowingly falsifi es any writing relating to the property; or  
 (c)  knowingly misrepresents or refuses to disclose to a receiver 
or other person entitled to administer property for the benefi t of 
creditors, the existence, amount, or location of the property, or any 
other information that the person could be legally required to furnish 
in relation to such administration. 
  (2)  Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
Section 3114.  Receiving Deposits in a Failing Financial Institution
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if:
 (a) being an offi cer, manager, or other person directing or 
participating in the direction of a fi nancial institution,
 (b) he knowingly receives or permits the receipt of a deposit, 
premium payment, or other investment in the institution,
 (c) knowing that:
 (i)  due to fi nancial diffi culties the institution is about to 
suspend operations or go into receivership or reorganization; and 
 (ii)  the person making the deposit or other payment is 
unaware of the precarious situation of the institution. 
 (2)  Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
Section 3115.  Selling Participation in a Pyramid Sales Scheme
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he knowingly 
sells the right to participate in a pyramid sales scheme.
 (2)  Defi nition.  “Pyramid sales scheme” means any plan or operation 
whereby a person, in exchange for anything of value, acquires the 
opportunity to receive anything of value, which is primarily based upon 
the inducement of additional persons to participate in the same plan or 
operation and is not primarily contingent on the quantity of property to be 
sold or distributed for purposes of resale to customers.  For purposes of this 
subsection, “anything of value” does not include payments made for sales 
demonstration equipment and materials furnished on a nonprofi t basis for 
use in making sales and not for resale.
 (3)  Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
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Section 3116.  Defi nitions
 (1)  “Adulterated” has the meaning given in Section 3106.
 (2)  “Association” has the meaning given in Section 701.
 (3)  “Bodily harm” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (4)  “Credit card” has the meaning given in Section 3108.
 (5)  “Debit card” has the meaning given in Section 3108.
 (6)  “Deception” has the meaning given in Section 2103.
 (7)  “Defraud” has the meaning given in Section 3101.
 (8)  “Mislabeled” has the meaning given in Section 3106.
 (9)  “Property” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (10)  “Put forward” has the meaning given in Section 3102. 
 (11)  “Pyramid sales scheme” has the meaning given in Section 3115.
 (12) “Securities” has the meaning given in 815 ILCS 5/2.1.
 (13)  “Services” has the meaning given in Section 2106.
 (14)  “Stolen” has the meaning given in Section 2105.
 (15)  “Writing” has the meaning given in Section 3101.
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ARTICLE 4100.  OFFENSES AGAINST THE FAMILY
Section 4101.  Incest
Section 4102.  Bigamy
Section 4103.  Child Abandonment
Section 4104.  Harboring or Assisting a Runaway
Section 4105.  Contributing to the Delinquency of a Minor
Section 4106.  Persistent Non-Support
Section 4107.  Abortion
Section 4108.  Charging Unlawful Fee for Adoption
Section 4109.  Defi nitions
Section 4101.  Incest
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he engages in 
sexual intercourse or sexual conduct with a person to whom he knows he is 
related as:
 (a) brother or sister, either of the whole blood or the half blood; 
or
 (b) father or mother, regardless of whether the child is legitimate, 
is of the whole blood or half blood, or is adopted; or
 (c) stepfather or stepmother.
 (2)  Grading.  The offense is a Class 3 felony.
Section 4102.  Bigamy
 (1)  Bigamy.  A person commits an offense if, having a spouse, the 
person subsequently marries another or resides in the State after such 
marriage.
 (2)  Marrying a Bigamist.  An unmarried person commits an offense 
if the person marries another under circumstances known to him that would 
render the other guilty of an offense under Subsection (1), or resides in the 
State after such marriage.
 (3)  Defense:  Absent Spouse.  It is a defense to prosecution under this 
Section that the prior spouse had been continually absent for a period of 5 
years during which time the defendant did not know the prior spouse to be 
alive.
 (4)  Grading.  The offenses defi ned are each a Class A misdemeanor.
Section 4103.  Child Abandonment
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if:
 (a) being a parent, guardian, or other person having physical 
custody or control of a child,
 (b) without regard for the mental or physical health, safety, or 
welfare of the child,
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 (c) he knowingly leaves a child under the age of 13 without 
supervision by a responsible person over the age of 14 for a period of 
24 hours or more.
 (2)  Factors to Consider.  For the purposes of determining whether the 
child was left without regard for the mental or physical health, safety, or 
welfare of that child, under Subsection (1)(b), the trier of fact shall consider 
the following factors:
 (a) the age of the child;
 (b) the number of children left at the location;
 (c) special needs of the child, including whether the child is a 
physically handicapped person or a mentally handicapped person, or 
otherwise in need of ongoing prescribed medical treatment such as 
periodic doses of medications;
 (d) the duration of time in which the child was left without 
supervision;
 (e) the condition and location of the place where the child was 
left without supervision;
 (f) the time of day or night when the child was left without 
supervision;
 (g) the weather conditions, including whether the child was left 
in a location with adequate protection from the natural elements such 
as adequate heat or light;
 (h) the location of the parent, guardian, or other person having 
physical custody or control of the child, and the physical distance of 
the child from the person;
 (i) whether the child’s movement was restricted, or the child was 
otherwise locked within a room or other structure;
 (j) whether the child was given a phone number of a person or 
location to call in the event of an emergency and whether the child 
was capable of making an emergency call;
 (k) whether there was food and other provision left for the child;
 (l) whether any of the conduct is attributable to economic 
hardship or illness and whether the parent, guardian or other person 
having physical custody or control of the child made a good faith 
effort to provide for the health and safety of the child;
 (m) whether the child was left under the supervision of another 
person, and the age and physical and mental capabilities of such 
person;
 (n) any other factor that would endanger the health or safety of 
the child.
 (3)  Grading.  The offense is a Class 4 felony.
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Section 4104.  Harboring or Assisting a Runaway
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if:
 (a) without the consent of the unemancipated minor’s parents 
or legal guardians and without notifying local law enforcement 
authorities,
 (b) he knowingly shelters an unemancipated minor for more than 
48 hours, and
 (c) is not an agency or association providing crisis intervention 
services, as authorized by Section 3-5 of the Juvenile Court Act of 
1987 [705 ILCS 405/3-5], or an operator of a youth emergency shelter.
 (2)  Defi nitions.  
 (a)  “Unemancipated minor” means a person less than 18 years 
old, other than a mature minor who has been emancipated under the 
Emancipation of Mature Minors Act [750 ILCS 30/1 et seq.].
 (b)  “Youth emergency shelter” has the meaning given in Section 
2.21 of the Child Care Act of 1969 [225 ILCS 10/2.21].
 (3)  Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
Section 4105.  Contributing to the Delinquency of a Minor
 (1)  Soliciting Minor to Commit an Offense.  A person more than 21 
years old commits an offense if, with the intent to promote or facilitate the 
commission of an offense, he solicits, compels, or directs any person less 
than 18 years old to commit an offense.
 (2)  Improper Supervision.  A person commits an offense if he:
 (a) is a parent, guardian, or other person having custody or 
control of a person less than 18 years old, and
 (b) knowingly permits the person to associate with persons 
engaged in criminal activity, to commit lewd acts, or to violate a 
municipal curfew ordinance.
 (3)  Grading.  The offense:
 (a) under Subsection (1) is a Class A misdemeanor;
 (b) under Subsection (2) is a petty offense.
Section 4106.  Persistent Non-Support
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he:
 (a) refuses to provide for the support of his or her spouse, or his 
or her child less than 18 years old; and
 (b) knows that the spouse or child is in need of such support, 
or that a support payment is required under a court or administrative 
order for support, and the required support payment:
 (i) has remained unpaid for longer than 6 months, or
 (ii) is more than $5,000 in arrears; and
 (c) has the ability to provide the support.
 (2)  Permissive Inference.  The trier of fact may infer that the person 
has the ability to provide the support, as required by Subsection (1)(c), if:
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 (a) there exists a court or administrative order of support that was 
not based on a default judgment, and
 (b) the support order required the payment for which the failure 
to pay constitutes the offense.
 (3)  Grading.
(a)  The offense is a Class 4 felony if, being subject to a support 
obligation under a court or administrative order for support:
 (i) the person leaves the State with the intent to evade the 
obligation, or
 (ii) the obligation has remained unpaid for longer than 6 
months, or
 (iii) the obligation is more than $10,000 in arrears.
 (b)  Otherwise the offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
Section 4107.  Abortion
 A person violating the requirements of the Illinois Abortion Law 
of 1975 (720 ILCS 510/1 to 510/15) is subject to the penalties provided 
therein.
Section 4108.  Charging Unlawful Fee for Adoption
 A person violating the requirements of the Adoption Compensation 
Prohibition Act (720 ILCS 525/0.01 to 525/5) is subject to the penalties 
provided therein.
Section 4109.  Defi nitions
 (1)  “Abortion” has the meaning given in Section 1106. 
 (2)  “Law enforcement authorities” has the meaning given in Section 
108.
 (3)  “Mentally handicapped person” has the meaning given in Section 
108.
 (4)  “Physically handicapped” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (5)  “Reasonably believes” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (6)  “Sexual conduct” has the meaning given in Section 1302.
 (7)  “Sexual intercourse” has the meaning given in Section 1301.
 (8)  “Unemancipated minor” has the meaning given in Section 4104.
 (9)  “Youth emergency shelter” has the meaning given in 225 ILCS 
10/2.21.
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ARTICLE 5100.  BRIBERY AND OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT OFFENSES
Section 5101.  Bribery
Section 5102.  Failure to Report a Bribe Offer
Section 5103.  Offi cial Misconduct
Section 5104.  Defi nitions
Section 5101.  Bribery
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if:
 (a) he knowingly solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any 
benefi t as consideration for infl uencing or agreeing to infl uence the 
performance of any act related to the employment or function of any:
 (i) public servant,
 (ii) independent contractor working on a public project,
 (iii) juror, 
 (iv) witness, or
 (v) voter, and
 (b) he is not authorized by law to accept such benefi t.
 (2)  Offering Bribes.  A person commits an offense if he knowingly 
confers, offers, or agrees to confer any benefi t the acceptance of which 
would be an offense under Subsection (1).
 (3)  Grading.
 (a)  The offense under Subsections (1)(a)(i) to (1)(a)(iv) is a 
Class 2 felony.
 (b)  The offense under Subsection (1)(a)(v) is a Class 4 felony.
Section 5102.  Failure to Report a Bribe Offer
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he fails to 
promptly report to law enforcement authorities any offer made to him in 
violation of Section 5101.
 (2)  Grading.
 (a) If the defendant is a public servant, independent contractor 
working on a public project, juror, or witness, the offense is a Class 4 
felony.
 (b)  Otherwise, the offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
Section 5103.  Offi cial Misconduct
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if, being a public 
servant acting in his offi cial capacity, he knowingly:
 (a) fails to perform any mandatory duty as required by law, or
 (b) performs an act that is forbidden by law to perform, or
 (c) performs an act in excess of his authority believing it will 
advantage himself or another, or
 (d) solicits or accepts for the performance of any act a fee or 
reward that is not authorized by law.
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 (2)  Grading.  The offense is a Class 3 felony.  A public servant of this 
State or any of its political subdivisions who is convicted of violating any 
provision of this Section forfeits his offi ce or employment.
Section 5104.  Defi nitions
 (1)  “Law enforcement authorities” has the meaning given in Section 
108.  
 (2)  “Property” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (3)  “Public servant” has the meaning given in Section 108.
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ARTICLE 5200.  PERJURY AND OTHER OFFICIAL FALSIFICATION OFFENSES
Section 5201.  Perjury
Section 5202.  Unsworn Falsifi cation to Authorities
Section 5203.  Tampering with Public Record or Notice
Section 5204.  False Reports to Law Enforcement Authorities
Section 5205.  False Personation
Section 5206.  Exercising False Authority
Section 5207.  Simulating Legal Process
Section 5208.  False Alarms to Agencies of Public Safety
Section 5209.  Defi nitions
Section 5201.  Perjury
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if:
 (a) under oath or affi rmation in a proceeding or in any other 
matter,
 (b) he makes a false statement of fact that he does not believe to 
be true.
 (2)  Exception:  Admission of Falsity.  It is not an offense under 
Subsection (1) if:
 (a) a person makes contradictory statements in a proceeding, and
 (b) the person admits the falsity of a contradictory statement in 
that same proceeding, and
 (c) the admission is made:
 (i) before the false statement substantially affects the 
proceeding, and
 (ii) before it becomes manifest that the statement’s falsity 
has been or will be exposed.
 (3)  Defense:  Statement Not Material.
 (a)  It is a defense to prosecution under this Section that the 
defendant’s false statement was not material to the issue or point in 
question.
 (b)  The defendant carries the burden of persuasion on the 
defense in Subsection (3)(a) and must prove such defense by a 
preponderance of the evidence.
 (4)  Defense:  Oath Not Authorized.
 (a)  It is a defense to prosecution under this Section that the oath 
or affi rmation was not authorized by law.
 (b) The defense in Subsection (4)(a) is to be determined by the 
court.
 (5)  Evidentiary Rules.
 (a)  Proof of Falsity.  Where contradictory material statements 
are made under oath or affi rmation in the same or in different 
proceedings, the prosecution need not specify which statement is false.
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 (b)  Corroboration Required.  No person shall be convicted of 
an offense under this Section where proof of falsity rests solely upon 
contradiction by testimony of a single person other than the defendant.
 (6)  Grading.  The offense is a Class 3 felony.
Section 5202.  Unsworn Falsifi cation to Authorities
 (1)  Offense Defi ned:  Unsworn Falsifi cation.  A person commits an 
offense if, with intent to mislead a public servant in performing his offi cial 
function, he:
 (a) makes any written false statement that he does not believe to 
be true, or
 (b) intentionally omits information necessary to prevent a written 
statement from being misleading, or
 (c) submits or invites reliance on any writing or object that he 
knows to be forged, altered, lacking in authenticity, or otherwise false.
 (2)  Offense Defi ned:  Statements “Under Penalty.”  A person commits 
an offense if he makes a written false statement that he does not believe to 
be true, on or pursuant to a form bearing notice, authorized by law, to the 
effect that false statements made therein are punishable.
 (3)  Proof of Falsity.  Where two unsworn written statements are 
contradictory, in a prosecution under Subsections (1)(a) or (2), the 
prosecution need not specify which statement is false.
 (4)  Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
Section 5203.  Tampering with Public Record or Notice
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he:
 (a) knowingly makes a false entry in, or false alteration of, any 
writing:
 (i) belonging to, or received or kept by, the government for 
information or record, or
 (ii) required by law to be kept by others for information of 
the government; or
 (b) knowingly alters, destroys, defaces, removes, or conceals:
 (i) any public record or device, or
 (ii) any public notice, posted according to law, during the 
time for which the notice was to remain posted.
 (2)  Grading.
 (a)  The offense under Subsection (1)(b)(ii) is a Class C 
misdemeanor.
 (b)  Otherwise the offense is a Class 4 felony.
Section 5204.  False Reports to Law Enforcement Authorities
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he:
 (a) knowingly gives false information to law enforcement 
authorities relating to an offense or incident within their concern, or
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 (b) reports to law enforcement authorities a past, present, or 
imminent offense or other incident within their concern knowing that 
it did not or will not occur.
 (2)  Grading.
 (a)  The offense is a Class 4 felony if committed with the intent 
to implicate another in an offense.
 (b)  Otherwise the offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
Section 5205.  False Personation
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he falsely 
represents himself to be:
 (a) an attorney authorized to practice law, with intent to receive 
compensation or consideration, or
 (b) a peace offi cer, or
 (c) the parent, legal guardian, or other relation of a person less 
than 18 years old to any public servant, or elementary or secondary 
school employee or administrator, or
 (d) a public servant.
 (2)  Grading.  The offense:
 (a)  under Subsection (1)(a) or (1)(b) is a Class 4 felony; and
 (b)  Otherwise the offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
Section 5206.  Exercising False Authority
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if, knowing that 
his performance is not authorized by law, he:
 (a) conducts a marriage ceremony; or
 (b) acknowledges the execution of any document that by law 
may be recorded; or
 (c) becomes a surety for any party in any civil or criminal 
proceeding, before any court or public servant authorized to accept 
such surety.
 (2)  Grading.  The offense is a Class 4 felony.
Section 5207.  Simulating Legal Process
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he issues or 
delivers any document that he knows falsely purports to be any civil or 
criminal process.
 (2)  Grading.  The offense is a Class B misdemeanor.
Section 5208.  False Alarms to Agencies of Public Safety
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he knowingly 
causes a false alarm of fi re or other emergency to be transmitted to or 
within any organization, offi cial or volunteer, for dealing with emergencies 
involving danger to life or property.
 (2)  Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
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Section 5209.  Defi nitions
 (1)  “Law enforcement authorities” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (2)  “Peace offi cer” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (3)  “Public servant” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (4)  “Writing” has the meaning given in Section 3101.
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ARTICLE 5300.  INTERFERENCE WITH GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS; ESCAPE
Section 5301.   Obstructing Justice
Section 5302.   Resisting or Obstructing a Peace Offi cer or 
   Custodial Offi cer
Section 5303.   Obstructing Administration of Law or Other Government 
   Function
Section 5304.   Obstructing Service of Process
Section 5305.   Refusing to Aid an Offi cer
Section 5306.   Concealing or Aiding a Fugitive
Section 5307.   Escape; Failure to Report to a Correctional Institution or 
  to Report for Periodic Imprisonment
Section 5308.   Permitting Escape
Section 5309.   Bringing or Allowing Contraband into a Correctional 
  Institution; Possessing Contraband in a Correctional 
  Institution
Section 5310.   Improperly Infl uencing a Witness or Juror
Section 5311.   Failure to Appear
Section 5312.   Defi nitions
Section 5301.  Obstructing Justice
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if, with intent to 
prevent the apprehension of or to obstruct the prosecution or defense of any 
person, he knowingly:
 (a) destroys, alters, conceals, or disguises physical evidence, 
plants false evidence, furnishes false information; or
 (b) induces a witness having knowledge material to the subject at 
issue to leave the State or conceal himself; or
 (c) possessing knowledge material to the subject at issue, he 
leaves the State or conceals himself.
(2)  Grading.
 (a)  If committed in furtherance of the activities of a criminal 
organization, the offense is a Class 3 felony.
 (b)  Otherwise the offense is a Class 4 felony.
Section 5302.  Resisting or Obstructing a Peace Offi cer or Custodial 
 Offi cer
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if:
 (a) he knowingly resists, obstructs, or interferes with the 
performance of any authorized act within the offi cial capacity
 (b) of one known to the person to be a peace offi cer or custodial 
offi cer.
 (2) Defi nition.  “Custodial offi cer” means:
 (a)  a correctional offi cer; or
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 (b)  any person employed to supervise and control persons who 
have been civilly committed, or are being detained awaiting civil 
commitment.
 (3)  Grading.
 (a)  If the offense conduct includes disarming a peace offi cer of 
his fi rearm while he is engaged in his offi cial duties, the offense is a 
Class 2 felony.
 (b)  Otherwise the offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
Section 5303.  Obstructing Administration of Law or Other 
 Government Function
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he intentionally 
obstructs, impairs, or perverts the administration of law or other 
governmental function by physical interference or obstacle, breach of 
offi cial duty, or any unlawful act.
 (2)  Grade.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
Section 5304.  Obstructing Service of Process
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he knowingly 
resists or obstructs the authorized service or execution of any civil or 
criminal process or order of any court.
 (2)  Grading.  The offense is a Class B misdemeanor.
Section 5305.  Refusing to Aid an Offi cer
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if, when requested 
to do so, he knowingly fails to provide reasonable aid to a person known by 
him to be a peace offi cer in:
 (a) apprehending a person whom the offi cer is authorized to 
apprehend; or
 (b) preventing the commission of any offense by another.
 (2)  Grading.  The offense is a Class C misdemeanor.
Section 5306.  Concealing or Aiding a Fugitive
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if:
 (a) not standing in the relation of husband, wife, parent, child, 
brother, or sister to an offender, and
 (b) with intent to prevent the apprehension of the offender,
he harbors, aids, or conceals the offender.
 (2)  Grading.  The offense is a Class 3 felony.
Section 5307.  Escape; Failure to Report to a Correctional Institution 
 or to Report for Periodic Imprisonment
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if:
 (a) he is:
 (i) in penal custody pursuant to a conviction or charge for 
an offense, or
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 (ii) in the lawful penal custody of a peace offi cer, or
 (iii) civilly committed, or detained awaiting civil 
commitment, and
 (b) he knowingly:
 (i) escapes from the place of detention or from the penal 
custody of an employee of that institution, or
 (ii) fails to report to the place of detention or to report for 
periodic detention at the time required, or
 (iii) fails to return from furlough or from work or day 
release, or
 (iv) fails to abide by the terms of home confi nement.
 (2)  Grading.
 (a)  The offense under Section (1)(b)(i) is a Class 2 felony if the 
underlying offense is a felony.
 (b)  The offense under Section (1)(b)(ii)-(iv) is a Class 3 felony if 
the underlying offense is a felony.
  (c)  Otherwise the offense is a Class 4 felony.*32
Section 5308.  Permitting Escape
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if:
 (a) being a correctional employee,
 (b) he recklessly permits any prisoner in his custody to escape.
 (2)  Defi nition.  “Correctional employee” means any elected or 
appointed offi cer, trustee, or employee of a correctional institution or of 
the governing authority of the correctional institution, or any person who 
performs services for the correctional institution pursuant to contract 
with the correctional institution or its governing authority, and includes a 
correctional offi cer.  
 (3)  Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
Section 5309.  Bringing or Allowing Contraband into a Correctional 
 Institution; Possessing Contraband in a Correctional Institution
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if, knowingly and 
without authority, he:
 32Issue:  Should proposed Section 5307(2)(c) (grading the escape offense) be amended 
to lower the offense grade where the underlying offense is a misdemeanor, or to track (2)(a) 
and (b)’s grading distinction  between different means of committing the offense?
 Yes:  One should not be subject to greater liability for escaping from custody for a 
misdemeanor than he would be for the misdemeanor itself.  It is inconsistent to recognize 
a distinction between different means of committing the offense for felons, but not for 
misdemeanants.  (Current law grades this offense as a Class A or Class B misdemeanor, 
depending on the means by which it is committed.  See 720 ILCS 5/31-6(b), (c), & (c-6).)
 No:  Regardless of how it is committed, this offense constitutes a seriously wrongful 
act that refl ects (and promotes) disrespect for lawful authority and which must be strongly 
deterred.  Accordingly, Class 4 felony liability is appropriate as a minimum sanction.
 Reporter:  No recommendation.
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 (a) brings into a correctional institution, or
 (b) places in such proximity to a correctional institution as to 
give an inmate access to, or
 (c) knowingly possesses in a correctional institution,
an item of contraband.
 (2)  Defi nitions.
 (a)  “Correctional institution” means any penitentiary, State 
farm, reformatory, prison, jail, house of correction, police detention 
area, half-way house, or other institution or place for the incarceration 
or custody of persons under sentence for offenses or awaiting trial 
or sentence for offenses, under arrest for an offense, a violation of 
probation, a violation of parole, or a violation of mandatory supervised 
release, or awaiting a bail setting hearing or preliminary hearing.
 (b)  “Item of contraband” includes any of the following items in 
or being brought into a correctional institution:
 (i)  a fi rearm, stun gun, or taser;
 (ii) “fi rearm ammunition,” meaning any self-contained 
cartridge or shotgun shell that is designed to be used or adaptable 
to use in a fi rearm;
 (iii) a catastrophic agent;
 (iv) a “controlled substance,” meaning a drug, substance, or 
immediate precursor in the Schedules of Article II of the Illinois 
Controlled Substances Act [currently codifi ed at 720 ILCS 570/
201 et seq.];
 (v) a hypodermic syringe or hypodermic needle, or any 
instrument adapted for use of controlled substances or cannabis 
by subcutaneous injection;
 (vi) a dangerous weapon, or a broken bottle or other piece 
of glass that could be used as a dangerous weapon, or any other 
instrument of like character.
 (vii) a “tool to defeat security mechanisms,” including a 
handcuff or security restraint key, tool designed to pick locks, or 
device or instrument capable of unlocking handcuff or security 
restraints, doors to cells, rooms, gates, or other areas of the 
correctional institution;
 (viii) a “cutting tool,” including a hacksaw blade, 
wirecutter, or device, instrument or fi le capable of cutting 
through metal;
 (ix) “electronic contraband,” including any electronic, 
video recording device, computer, or cellular communications 
equipment, including cellular telephones, cellular telephone 
batteries, videotape recorders, pagers, computers, and computer 
peripheral equipment;
 (x) “cannabis,” as that term is defi ned in the Cannabis 
Control Act [currently codifi ed at 720 ILCS 550/3(a)] including 
marijuana, hashish and other substances which are identifi ed 
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as including any parts of the plant Cannabis Sativa, whether 
growing or not; the seeds thereof, the resin extracted from 
any part of such plant; and any compound, manufacture, salt, 
derivative, mixture, or preparation of such plant, its seeds, 
or resin, including tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) and all other 
cannabinol derivatives, including its naturally occurring or 
synthetically produced ingredients, whether produced directly or 
indirectly by extraction, or independently by means of chemical 
synthesis or by a combination of extraction and chemical 
synthesis; but shall not include the mature stalks of such plant, 
fi ber produced from such stalks, oil or cake made from the seeds 
of such plant, any other compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, 
mixture, or preparation of such mature stalks (except the resin 
extracted therefrom), fi ber, oil or cake, or the sterilized seed of 
such plant which is incapable of germination;
 (xi) “alcoholic liquor,” as such term is defi ned in Section 1-
3.05 of The Liquor Control Act of 1934 [235 ILCS 5/1-3.05].
 (3)  Grading.
 (a)  The offense is:
 (i) a Class 2 felony if the contraband is defi ned in 
Subsections (2)(b)(i)-(iii);
 (ii) a Class 3 felony if the contraband is defi ned in 
Subsections (2)(b)(iv)-(ix);
 (iii) a Class 4 felony if the contraband is defi ned in 
Subsection (2)(b)(x).
  (iv)  Otherwise it is a Class A misdemeanor.*33
 (b)  If committed by a correctional employee, the offense is one 
grade higher than it would otherwise be.
 33Issue:  Should the grades for the offense defi ned in proposed Section 5309 (bringing, 
allowing, possessing contraband in correctional institution) be increased?
 Yes:  Higher grading is needed for this offense to maintain order and security in prisons. 
Because the offense usually applies to people who are already in prison, it must impose 
signifi cant additional liability to have a deterrent effect.  (Current law grades the offense as 
anything from a Class 4 felony to a Class X felony, depending on the nature of the contraband 
involved.  See 720 ILCS 5/31A-1.1, -1.2.)
 No:  More serious grading for this offense would be disproportionate to its relative 
seriousness.  Under the proposed grading scheme, the offense may be graded up to a Class 1 
felony based on Section 5309(3)(b)’s aggravation for employees of correctional institutions. 
This is a fairly high “ceiling” for contraband offenses, and a higher ceiling is inappropriate 
because, although having contraband in prisons is harmful and dangerous, bringing even a 
fi rearm into a prison is inherently less serious than other Class X felonies, such as murder and 
causing a catastrophe.  There is also no clear indication that increasing the grade will have 
any added deterrent effect on prisoners, who (a) have already shown that they do not take the 
criminal law’s commands seriously, and (b) may be unlikely to consider the possibility of 
continued incarceration as a serious cost, especially if they are already serving a long prison 
sentence.
 Reporter:  No recommendation.
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Section 5310.  Intimidating, Improperly Infl uencing, or Retaliating 
Against a Public Servant, Witness, Juror, or Voter
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if:
 (a)  with intent to:
 (i) infl uence a juror or public servant in the performance of 
his duties, or
 (ii) deter a party or witness from testifying freely, fully, or 
truthfully in any legal proceeding, or
 (iii) annoy, harass, intimidate, or victimize a current or 
former public servant, witness, juror, or voter because of that 
person’s past, present, or potential future testimony, vote, or 
other act or omission related to performance of his duties, 
(b) he:
 (i) commits, or threatens to commit, any offense likely to 
cause great bodily harm, unlawful confi nement or restraint, or 
substantial property damage to another; or
 (ii) commits or threatens any other offense; or
 (iii) communicates, directly or indirectly, with such other 
person otherwise than as authorized by law.
 (2)  Grading.  The offense is:
 (a) a Class 2 felony under Subsection (1)(b)(i);
 (b) a Class 3 felony under Subsection (1)(b)(ii);
 (c) a Class 4 felony under Subsection (1)(b)(iii).
Section 5311.  Failure to Appear
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if, having been 
admitted to bail for appearance before any court of this State or released on 
personal recognizance, he:
 (a) fails to appear on the date directed, or
 (b) violates a condition of release.
 (2)  Grading.  The offense is one grade lower than the grade of his 
underlying offense, but not higher than a Class A misdemeanor.
Section 5312.  Defi nitions
 (1)  “Alcoholic liquor” has the meaning given in 235 ILCS 5/1-3.05.
 (2)  “Bodily harm” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (3)  “Cannabis” has the meaning given in Section 5309.
 (4)  “Catastrophic agent” has the meaning given in Section 2204. 
 (5)  “Controlled substance” has the meaning given in Section 5309. 
 (6)  “Correctional employee” has the meaning given in Section 5308.
 (7)  “Correctional institution” has the meaning given in Section 5309.
 (8)  “Correctional offi cer” has the meaning given in Section 414.
 (9)  “Criminal organization” has the meaning given in Section 905.
 (10)  “Custodial offi cer” has the meaning given in Section 5302.
 (11)  “Cutting tool” has the meaning given in Section 5309.
 (12)  “Dangerous weapon” has the meaning given in Section 1501.
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 (13)  “Electronic contraband” has the meaning given in Section 5309.
 (14)  “Firearm” has the meaning given in Section 1501.
 (15)  “Firearm ammunition” has the meaning given in Section 5309.
 (16)  “Hypodermic syringe” has the meaning given in Section 5309.
 (17)  “Item of contraband” has the meaning given in Section 5309.
 (18)  “Peace offi cer” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (19)  “Penal custody” has the meaning given in Section 1304.
 (20)  “Property” has the meaning given in Section 2102.
 (21)  “Tool to defeat security mechanisms” has the meaning given in 
Section 5309.
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ARTICLE 6100.  PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY OFFENSES
Section 6101.  Riot
Section 6102.  Failure to Disperse
Section 6103.  Disorderly Conduct
Section 6104.  False Public Alarms
Section 6105.  Harassment
Section 6106.  Hate Crime Aggravation
Section 6107.  Public Drunkenness; Drug Incapacitation
Section 6108.  Loitering or Prowling
Section 6109.  Obstructing Highways and Other Public Passages
Section 6110.  Disrupting Meetings and Processions
Section 6111.  Desecration of Venerated Objects
Section 6112.  Defi nitions
Section 6101.  Riot
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he participates 
with two or more other persons in a course of disorderly conduct:
 (a)  with intent to commit or facilitate the commission of a felony 
or misdemeanor, or
 (b)  with intent to prevent or coerce offi cial action.
 (2)  Grading.  The offense is a Class 4 felony.*34
Section 6102.  Failure to Disperse
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if:
 (a) he and two or more other persons are participating in a course 
of disorderly conduct likely to cause substantial harm or serious 
inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, and
 (b) law enforcement authorities engaged in executing or 
enforcing the law order the participants and others in the immediate 
vicinity to disperse, and
 34Issue:  Should the grade for the offense in proposed Section 6101 (riot) be lowered?
 Yes:  This offense is aimed at conduct that often is also covered by other offenses, 
such as disorderly conduct, criminal damage, theft, or assault, or attempt offenses.  Under 
the proposed rules for charging and sentencing multiple offenses, such serious cases will 
be subject to increased penalties.  See proposed Sections 254 and 906 and corresponding 
commentaries.  Cases not involving those other offenses will be less serious and therefore will 
not merit felony punishment.  For example, current law grades the corresponding offense as a 
Class 4 felony only in cases where the person uses force or violence; otherwise the offense is 
a Class C misdemeanor.  See 720 ILCS 5/25-1.
 No:  The conduct this offense prohibits presents a serious risk of group lawlessness and 
disorder that, regardless of whether other offenses are committed, deserves felony punishment. 
Morever, in many riot cases it will be diffi cult to prove individual instances of theft, assault, or 
damage.
 Reporter:  No recommendation.
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 (c) the person refuses or knowingly fails to obey such an order.
 (2)  Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
Section 6103.  Disorderly Conduct
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if, while 
recklessly creating a risk of public inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, he:
 (a) engages in fi ghting or threatening, or in violent or tumultuous 
behavior; or
 (b) makes unreasonable noise or offensively coarse utterance, 
gesture, or display, or addresses abusive language to any person 
present; or
 (c) creates a hazardous or physically offensive condition by any 
act that serves no legitimate purpose of the actor.
 (2)  Defi nition.  “Public” means affecting or likely to affect persons 
in a place to which the general populace or a substantial group has access; 
among the places included are highways, transport facilities, schools, 
prisons, apartment houses, places of business or amusement, or any 
neighborhood.
 (3)  Grading.
 (a)  The offense is a Class B misdemeanor if:
 (i) the actor intends to cause substantial harm or serious 
inconvenience, or
 (ii) he persists in disorderly conduct after reasonable 
warning or request to desist.
 (b)  Otherwise the offense is a petty offense.
Section 6104.  False Public Alarms
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he:
 (a) knowingly initiates or circulates a false or baseless report or 
warning of an impending bombing or other offense or catastrophe,
 (b) being reckless as to whether such report or warning will 
cause evacuation of a building, place of assembly, or facility of public 
transport, or cause public inconvenience or alarm.
(2)  Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.*35
 35Issue:  Should the penalty for the offense defi ned in proposed Section 6104 (false 
public alarms) be increased to a Class 4 felony?
 Yes:  False alarms of this nature are likely to cause major public inconvenience or alarm 
such that felony punishment is appropriate.  Current law recognizes this by grading false 
reports of a fi re as a Class 4 felony and false reports of a bomb or deadly substance as a Class 
3 felony.  See 720 ILCS 5/26-1(a)(2), (a)(3), (b)(1).
 No:  This offense is generally not serious enough to merit felony punishment.  Where 
serious harm, inconvenience, or damage results, the offender may already be subject to 
increased punishment for a variety of other offenses, such as endangerment (Section 1202), 
criminal damage (Section 2206), false report to law enforcement authorities (Section 5204), 
or false alarm to an agency of public safety (Section 5208).
 Reporter:  No recommendation.
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Section 6105.  Harassment
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if, with intent to 
harass another, he:
 (a) makes or sends an electronic communication without the 
intent to engage in legitimate communication; or
 (b) insults, taunts, or challenges another in a manner likely to 
provoke violent or disorderly response; or
 (c) makes repeated communications anonymously or at 
extremely inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language; or
 (d) engages in any other course of alarming conduct serving no 
legitimate purpose of the actor.
 (2)  Grading.
 (a) The offense is a Class A misdemeanor if it is in violation of 
an order of protection.
 (b) Otherwise the offense is a Class B misdemeanor.
Section 6106.  Hate Crime Aggravation*36
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an additional offense if he:
 (a) commits an offense against a victim,
 (b) believing it may intimidate or terrorize a group of persons 
who identify with the victim through race, national origin, ethnicity, 
religion, gender, or sexual preference.
 (2)  Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
Section 6107.  Public Drunkenness; Drug Incapacitation
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if:
 (a) he appears in any public place manifestly under the infl uence 
of alcohol, narcotics, or other drug, not therapeutically administered,
 (b) to the degree that he may endanger himself or other persons 
or property, or annoy persons in his vicinity.
 (2)  Defi nition.  “Public place” means a place to which the general 
populace or a substantial group has access; among the places included are 
 36Issue:  Should Section 6106 (hate crime aggravation) be formulated differently, to 
focus on the offender’s motivation in committing the offense, rather than the resulting harm to 
the affected group?
 Yes:  The proper focus of the hate-crime inquiry is on the offender’s bias against 
his victim, not on his willingness or intent to harm the group to which the victim belongs. 
Current Illinois law (720 ILCS 5/12-7.1) and many other jurisdictions refl ect these concerns 
by punishing offenders based upon such improper motives.  
 No:  The proper concern of hate-crime statutes is the harm the offense causes, not the 
underlying psychological motivation of the offender.  Focusing on the person’s particular 
motive for committing an offense is problematic.  It will often be diffi cult, if not impossible, 
to prove that an offender acted based on a particular motive.  Moreover, proving such an 
improper motive will often involve the introduction of prejudicial character evidence, or 
worse, an encroachment upon the defendant’s First Amendment rights.  Such an approach 
may lead to arbitrary application of the offense against disfavored groups, even groups whom 
the statutes were originally intended to protect.
 Reporter:  No recommendation.
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highways, transport facilities, schools, prisons, apartment houses, places of 
business or amusement, or any neighborhood.
 (3)  Grading.  The offense is a petty offense.*37
Section 6108.  Loitering or Prowling
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he loiters or 
prowls in a place, at a time, or in a manner not usual for law-abiding 
individuals under circumstances that warrant alarm for the safety of 
persons or property in the vicinity.
 (2)  Defi nition.  “Loiter” means to stand or sit idly.
 (3)  Factors to be Considered.  Among the circumstances that may be 
considered in determining whether such alarm is warranted is the fact that 
the actor takes fl ight upon appearance of a peace offi cer, refuses to identify 
himself, or manifestly endeavors to conceal himself or any object.
 (4)  Request to Identify and Explain Required.  Unless fl ight by the 
actor or other circumstance makes it impracticable, a peace offi cer shall 
prior to any arrest for an offense under this section afford the actor an 
opportunity to dispel any alarm that would otherwise be warranted, by 
requesting him to identify himself and explain his presence and conduct.
 (5)  Exception.  No person shall be convicted of an offense under 
this Section if the peace offi cer did not comply with Subsection (4), or if 
it appears at trial that the explanation given by the actor was true and, if 
believed by the peace offi cer at the time, would have dispelled the alarm.
 (6)  Grading.  The offense is a petty offense.*38
 37Issue:  Should proposed Section 6107, creating an offense to prohibit public 
drunkenness, be deleted?
 Yes:  Truly disruptive behavior will already be covered by another offense, such as 
disorderly conduct or harassment.  Where a person has committed no such offense, he will 
not be suffi ciently blameworthy to merit punishment because he will have no culpability as to 
disturbing the peace.  Current law does not include such an offense. 
 No:  Persons who appear in public in a clearly intoxicated state may present an inherent 
risk of danger or inconvenience to themselves, property, or others.  Other offenses, such as 
disorderly conduct, often will not cover such persons, precisely because such persons may 
lack the requisite intent to cause public disorder.
 Reporter:  No recommendation.
 38Issue:  Should proposed Section 6108, defi ning an offense for persons who loiter 
under circumstances that warrant alarm for the safety and welfare of others, be eliminated?
 Yes:  The offense infringes on, and invites abuse of, citizens’ civil rights.  The offense 
may not provide suffi cient notice to citizens of what conduct is prohibited.  The offense is 
unnecessary because truly improper behavior will likely be subject to liability under another 
provision.  Moreover, the offense is subject to abuse by law enforcement offi cials who may use 
it to harass disfavored persons or groups.  Current law does not include such an offense.
 No:  The offense is necessary to prevent the fear and intimidation caused by the 
presence of persons or groups, such as street gangs, who remain in an area without any 
legitimate purpose.  In such situations, other offenses do not address the conduct, because law 
enforcement offi cials often will be unable to prove that a particular offense was contemplated 
or attempted.  Moreover, Section 6108 avoids arbitrary enforcement by requiring that peace 
offi cers inquire as to the person’s identity and presence. 
 Reporter:  No recommendation.
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Section 6109.  Obstructing Highways and Other Public Passages
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if:
 (a) having no legal privilege to do so, he recklessly obstructs any 
highway or other public passage, whether alone or with others; or
 (b) being a person in a gathering, he refuses to obey a reasonable 
offi cial request or order to move:
 (i) to prevent obstruction of a highway or other public 
passage, or
 (ii) to maintain public safety by dispersing those gathered 
in dangerous proximity to a fi re or other hazard.
 (2)  Defi nition.  “Obstructing” a highway or public passage means 
rendering it impassable without unreasonable inconvenience or hazard.
 (3)  Exception.  No person shall be deemed guilty of recklessly 
obstructing in violation of Subsection (1)(a) solely because of a gathering of 
persons to hear him speak or otherwise communicate, or solely because of 
being a member of such a gathering.
 (4)  Reasonableness of Order to Move.  An order to move, addressed 
to a person whose speech or other lawful behavior attracts an obstructing 
audience, shall not be deemed reasonable if the obstruction can be readily 
remedied by police control of the size or location of the gathering.
 (5)  Grading.
 (a)  If the person persists after warning by law enforcement 
authorities, the offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
 (b)  Otherwise the offense is a petty offense.
Section 6110.  Disrupting Meetings and Processions
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if:
 (a) with intent to prevent or disrupt a lawful meeting, procession, 
or gathering,
 (b) he does any act tending to obstruct or interfere with it 
physically, or 
 (c) makes any utterance, gesture, or display designed to outrage 
the sensibilities of the group.
 (2)  Grading.  The offense is a Class C misdemeanor.
Section 6111.  Desecration of Venerated Objects
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if:
 (a) knowing it will outrage the sensibilities of persons likely to 
observe or discover his action,
 (b) he intentionally desecrates:
 (i) any public monument or structure, or place of worship 
or burial, or
 (ii) any other object of veneration by the public or a 
substantial segment thereof in any public place.
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 (2)  Defi nition.  “Desecrate” includes defacing, damaging, polluting, 
or otherwise physically mistreating.
 (3)  Grading.  The offense is a Class C misdemeanor.
Section 6112.  Defi nitions
 (1)  “Catastrophe” has the meaning given in Section 2204.
 (2)  “Desecrate”  has the meaning given in Section 6111.
 (3)  “Electronic communication” has the meaning given in 
Section 2401.
 (4)  “Law enforcement authorities” has the meaning given in 
Section 108.
 (5)  “Loiter” has the meaning given in Section 6108. 
 (6)  “Obstructing” has the meaning given in Section 6109.
 (7)  “Peace offi cer” has the meaning given in Section 108.
 (8)  “Public” has the meaning given in Section 6103.
 (9)  “Public place” has the meaning given in Section 6107.
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ARTICLE 6200.  PUBLIC INDECENCY OFFENSES
Section 6201.   Public Indecency
[Section 6202.   Prostitution; Patronizing a Prostitute]
[Section 6202.   Solicitation of a Sexual Act]
Section 6203.   Promoting, Supporting, or Living Off the Proceeds of 
   Prostitution
Section 6204.   Disseminating Obscene Material
Section 6205.   Abuse of Corpse
Section 6206.   Sale of Human Body Parts
Section 6207.   Cruelty to Animals
Section 6208.   Defi nitions
Section 6201.  Indecent Exposure
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if:
 (a)  he is more than 17 years old; and
 (b)  he is in:
 (i) a place open to public view, or
 (ii) the presence of a person less than 17 years old; and
 (c)  he performs:
 (i) an act of sexual intercourse or sexual conduct, or
 (ii) an exposure of the sex organs, anus, or breast, done 
with intent to arouse or to satisfy the sexual desire of himself or 
another person.
 (2) Defi nition.  “Place open to public view” means any place where 
the conduct may reasonably be expected to be viewed by others without 
their prior knowledge or consent.
 (3)  Exception.  Breast-feeding of infants is not an offense under this 
Section.
 (4)  Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
[Section 6202.  Prostitution; Patronizing a Prostitute]
 [(1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he or she offers 
or accepts anything of value to perform any act of sexual conduct or sexual 
intercourse.
 (2)  Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.]*39
 39Issue:  Should the Code adopt the fi rst formulation of Section 6202 (prostitution), 
which criminalizes the prostitution transaction of sex for money, or the second, which 
criminalizes only the offer or solicitation of a sexual act, and not the “trade” itself?
 First Version:  In the vast majority of cases, there will be little danger of prosecution 
where conduct involves innocent sexual relations as opposed to an overt monetary transaction 
between a prostitute and a client.  Current Illinois law employs a formulation like the second 
one.  See 720 ILCS 5/11-14.
(continued…)
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[Section 6202.  Solicitation of a Sexual Act]
 [(1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he or she 
offers or solicits a person not his or her spouse to perform an act of sexual 
intercourse or sexual conduct for anything of value.
 (2)  Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.]
Section 6203.  Promoting, Supporting, or Living Off the Proceeds of 
 Prostitution
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if, to obtain 
anything of value, he:
 (a) compels a person to become a prostitute; or
 (b) arranges a situation in which a person may commit 
prostitution; or
 (c) allows the use of a place, over which he exercises control, 
while negligent as to its being used for prostitution; or
 (d) being a parent, step-parent, or legal guardian of a child less 
than 16 years old, allows the child to engage in prostitution; or
 (e)  receives anything of value from a prostitute, not for a lawful 
consideration, knowing it was earned in whole or in part from the 
practice of prostitution.
 (2)  Grading.
 (a)  Juvenile Prostitution.  The offense is a Class 2 felony if the 
person is negligent as to the prostitute being:
 (i) less than 16 years old, or
 (ii) a severely or profoundly mentally retarded person.
 (b)  Except as provided in Subsection (2)(a), a violation under 
Subsections (1)(a) to (1)(d) is a Class 4 felony.
 (c)  Except as provided in Subsection (2)(a), a violation under 
Subsection (1)(e) is a Class A misdemeanor.
Section 6204.  Disseminating Obscene Material
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if, with knowledge 
of its obscene nature or content, or recklessly failing to exercise reasonable 
inspection that would have disclosed the obscene nature or content, he:
 (a) sells, delivers, or provides any obscene writing, picture, 
record, or other representation or embodiment of the obscene; or
 39(…continued)
 Second Version:  Most modern codes employ the second formulation of the 
prostitution offense.  They take this view in part for fear of extending criminalization to 
common interactions regarding sexual relations:  partners, even spouses, may engage in tacit 
agreements to “trade” sex for other things under a variety of circumstances.  Instead, most 
modern codes defi ne the offense as “making one’s living as a prostitute” or “soliciting a 
prostitute,” focusing on the explicit offer or acceptance of a direct trade of sex for money.
Reporter:  No recommendation.
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 (b) presents or directs an obscene play, dance, or other 
performance or participates directly in the portion that makes it 
obscene; or
 (c) publishes, exhibits, or otherwise makes available anything 
obscene; or
 (d) performs an obscene act or otherwise presents an obscene 
exhibition of his body for gain; or
 (e) advertises or otherwise promotes the sale of material 
represented or held out by him to be obscene, whether or not it is 
obscene; or
 (f) creates, buys, procures or possesses obscene matter or 
material with intent to disseminate it in violation of this Section, or of 
the penal laws or regulations of any other jurisdiction.
 (2)  Obscene Defi ned.  Any material or performance is “obscene” if 
the average person, applying contemporary adult community standards of 
this State, would fi nd that:
 (a) taken as a whole, it appeals to the prurient interest; and
 (b) it depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, ultimate 
sexual acts or sadomasochistic sexual acts, whether normal or 
perverted, actual or simulated, or masturbation, excretory functions, or 
lewd exhibition of the genitals; and
 (c) taken as a whole, it lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or 
scientifi c value.
 (3)  Permissive Inference.  The trier of fact may infer an intent to 
disseminate from the creation, purchase, procurement, or possession of a 
mold, engraved plate, or other embodiment of obscenity specially adapted 
for reproducing multiple copies, or the possession of more than 3 copies of 
the obscene material.
 (4)  Defenses.  It is a defense to prosecution under this Section that the 
dissemination:
 (a) was not for gain and was made to personal associates other 
than persons less than 18 years old; or
 (b) was to institutions or individuals having scientifi c or other 
special justifi cation for possession of such material.
 (5)  Grading.
 (a)  Child Pornography.  The offense is a Class 2 felony if 
the person is negligent as to the obscene material or performance 
including a victim who is:
 (i) less than 16 years old, or
 (ii) a severely or profoundly mentally retarded person.
 (b)  Otherwise the offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
Section 6205.  Abuse of Corpse
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if, except as 
authorized by law, he treats a corpse in a way that he knows would outrage 
ordinary family sensibilities.
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 (2)  Grading.  The offense is a Class B misdemeanor.
Section 6206.  Sale of Human Body Parts
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he knowingly 
buys or sells any part of a human body.
 (2)  Exceptions.  The offense does not include:
 (a) an anatomical gift made in accordance with the Uniform 
Anatomical Gift Act [755 ILCS 50/1 et seq.]; or
 (b) the removal and use of a human cornea in accordance with 
the Illinois  Corneal Transplant Act [755 ILCS 55/1 et seq.]; or
 (c) reimbursement of actual expenses, including medical costs, 
loss of income, and travel expenses, incurred by a living person in 
donating any body part or fl uid for medical or scientifi c use; or
 (d) payments provided under a plan of insurance or other health 
care coverage; or
 (e) reimbursement of reasonable costs associated with the 
removal, storage, or transportation of a human body or part thereof 
donated for medical or scientifi c purposes; or
 (f) purchase or sale of blood, plasma, blood products, or 
derivatives, other body fl uids, or human hair; or
 (g) purchase or sale of drugs, reagents, or other substances made 
from human  bodies or body parts, for use in medical or scientifi c 
research, treatment, or diagnosis.
 (3)  Grading.  The offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
Section 6207.  Cruelty to Animals
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an offense if he:  
 (a)  subjects any animal to cruel mistreatment, or
 (b)  subjects any animal in his custody to cruel neglect, or
 (c)  kills or injures any animal belonging to another without legal 
privilege or consent of the owner.
 (2)  Exception.  Subsections (1)(a) and (1)(b) are inapplicable to 
accepted veterinary practices and activities carried on for scientifi c research.
 (3)  Grading.  The offense is:
 (a)  a Class A misdemeanor if committed intentionally, and
 (b)  a Class C misdemeanor if committed recklessly.
Section 6208.  Defi nitions
 (1)  “Obscene” has the meaning given in Section 6204.
 (2)  “Place open to public view” has the meaning given in Section 6201.
 (3)  “Severely or profoundly mentally retarded person” has the 
meaning given in Section 1201.
 (4)  “Sexual conduct” has the meaning given in Section 1302.
 (5)  “Sexual intercourse” has the meaning given in Section 1301.
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ARTICLE 7100.  WEAPONS OFFENSES
Section 7101.  Possession or Use of a Dangerous Weapon During a Felony
Section 7101.  Possession or Use of a Dangerous Weapon During a 
 Felony
 (1)  Offense Defi ned.  A person commits an additional offense if he 
possesses or uses a dangerous weapon in the course of committing a felony.
 (2)  Grading.
 (a)  If the person discharges a fi rearm, the offense is a Class 3 
felony.
 (b)  If the person displays or threatens to use a fi rearm, the 
offense is a Class 4 felony.
 (c)  Otherwise the offense is a Class A misdemeanor.
 (3)  Defi nitions.
 (a)  “Dangerous weapon” has the meaning given in Section 1501.
 (b)  “Firearm” has the meaning given in Section 1501.
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[N.B.  It should not be assumed that current sentencing ranges apply to the proposed grades. 
The grades are intended only to assess the relative seriousness of offenses, and not the 
sentencing consequences of a conviction for any offense.]
Offense Description Section
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Offense Description Section
[N.B.  It should not be assumed that current sentencing ranges apply to the proposed grades. 
The grades are intended only to assess the relative seriousness of offenses, and not the 
sentencing consequences of a conviction for any offense.]
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Grading Summary
[N.B.  It should not be assumed that current sentencing ranges apply to the proposed grades. 
The grades are intended only to assess the relative seriousness of offenses, and not the 
sentencing consequences of a conviction for any offense.]
Offense Description Section
recklessly causing death of another person under 
circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to 
value of human life (second-degree murder)
1102(1)(a)
causing, in fact, the death of another person in course 
of attempting or committing forcible felony (felony 
murder)
1102(1)(b)
sexual assault, where victim is under 9 and offender is 
over 17, or victim suffers harm, pregnancy, or threat 
to life
1301(4)(a)
kidnaping (secret confinement against one’s will) for 
ransom or where kidnaper commits felony against 
victim
1401(3)(a)
knowingly causing a catastrophe (great bodily harm 
to 5+ people, or substantial damage to 5+ buildings or 
vital public facility)
2204(1)(c)(i)
knowingly causing death of another person (first-
degree murder)
1101
Class X-plus Felony
Class X Felonies
Offense Description Section
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Offense Description Section
[N.B.  It should not be assumed that current sentencing ranges apply to the proposed grades. 
The grades are intended only to assess the relative seriousness of offenses, and not the 
sentencing consequences of a conviction for any offense.]
knowingly causing death of another while under 
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance 
(first-degree manslaughter)
1103
parent knowingly allowing sexual intercourse with 
child under 9
1301(4)(a), (f)
engaging in sexual intercourse with child aged 9-13, or 
with child under 17 where offender holds position of 
authority
1301(4)(b)(i), (ii)
engaging in sexual intercourse by force or threat, or 
with person unable to consent
1301(4)(b)(iii)
kidnaping (secret confinement against one’s will) 
where confinement lasts for 1 day or more, or victim is 
under 13 or mentally retarded
1401(3)(b)
robbery (taking property from another by use or threat 
of force), where (1) amount involved exceeds $10,000, 
or (2) property taken is firearm or motor vehicle
1501(2)(a)
theft of over $100,000 2109(1)
theft of over $50,000 from school, place of worship, 
victim age 60 or older
2109(1), (8)
recklessly causing a catastrophe (great bodily harm to 
5+ people, or substantial damage to 5+ buildings or 
vital public facility)
2204(1)(c)(ii)
knowingly causing damage resulting in loss of over 
$100,000
2206(3)(a)
knowingly damaging religious or educational building, 
or place of burial, resulting in loss of over $50,000
2206(3)(a), (h)
using or threatening force during a dwelling burglary or 
vehicle invasion
2301(4)
employee bringing, possessing, or giving inmate access 
to firearm, ammunition, or catastrophic agent in penal 
institution
5309(3)(a)(i), (3)(b)
Class 1 Felonies
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[N.B.  It should not be assumed that current sentencing ranges apply to the proposed grades. 
The grades are intended only to assess the relative seriousness of offenses, and not the 
sentencing consequences of a conviction for any offense.]
Offense Description Section
recklessly causing death of another person 
(second-degree manslaughter)
1104
knowingly causing great bodily harm (heinous assault) 1201(2)(a)(i)
knowingly causing bodily harm, where assailant 
tortures another person (heinous assault)
1201(2)(a)(ii)
knowingly causing bodily harm (assault), where 
assailant mutilates female genitalia
1201(2)(a)(iii)
knowingly causing bodily harm (assault), where 
caused by administration of food or drug to victim, and 
where victim is peace officer, correctional employee, 
community policing volunteer performing duty, 
pregnant, physically or mentally handicapped, over 60, 
or under 13
1201(2)(b)(i), (2)(d)
knowingly causing bodily harm or making physical 
contact of insulting or provoking nature (assault), 
where (1) assailant knowingly commits offense in 
public place, and (2) victim is peace officer, correctional 
employee, community policing volunteer performing 
duty, pregnant, physically or mentally handicapped, 
over 60, or under 13
1201(2)(b)(ii), (2)(d)
knowingly causing bodily harm or making physical 
contact of insulting or provoking nature (assault), 
where (1) in violation of protective order or second 
or subsequent assault against family or household 
member, and (2) victim is peace officer, correctional 
employee, community policing volunteer performing 
duty, pregnant, physically or mentally handicapped, 
over 60, or under 13
1201(2)(b)(iii)-(iv), 
(2)(d)
knowingly causing mental injury or emotional distress, 
or failing to provide needed care, for elderly or 
handicapped person or minor
1205(2)(a)
parent knowingly allowing sexual intercourse with 
child aged 9-13, or with child under 17 where offender 
holds position of authority
1301(4)(b)(i) & (ii), 
(4)(f)
Class 2 Felonies
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Offense Description Section
[N.B.  It should not be assumed that current sentencing ranges apply to the proposed grades. 
The grades are intended only to assess the relative seriousness of offenses, and not the 
sentencing consequences of a conviction for any offense.]
engaging in sexual intercourse with child aged 13-17, 
where offender is at least 4 years older than victim
1301(4)(c)
engaging in sexual conduct (short of intercourse) with 
minor, or by force or threat, or with person unable to 
consent, where victim is under 13 and offender is at 
least 4 years older, or victim suffers harm, pregnancy, 
or threat to life
1302(3)(a)
secret confinement against one’s will, or coerced 
transportation with intent to confine (kidnaping)
1401(3)(c)
knowingly detaining another for ransom or demand, 
where victim is peace officer, correctional employee, or 
community policing volunteer
1402(2)(a)
threatening bodily harm, restraint, accusation of 
offense, etc., with intent to influence another’s behavior 
(criminal coercion), if in furtherance of criminal 
organization
1404(2)(a)
robbery (taking property from another by use or threat 
of force), where (1) amount involved exceeds $1,000, 
(2) victim is under 17, over 60, or handicapped, 
(3) committed in school or place of worship, or (4) 
offender suggests he is armed
1501(2)(b)
theft of over $100,000 of property that was lost, 
mislaid, or delivered by mistake
2108(2), 2109(1)
theft of firearm, vehicle, or $10,000-100,000 2109(2)(a)
receiver of stolen property is in the business of same 2109(2)(c)
theft of $5,000-50,000 from school, place of worship, 
victim age 60 or older
2109(2), (8)
knowingly causing fire or explosion that damages 
building, habitable structure, or vital public facility
2201(1)(a)
knowingly causing fire or explosion that damages 
property for insurance
2201(1)(b)
recklessly causing damage resulting in loss of over 
$100,000
2206(3)(a), (g)
Class 2 Felonies (continued)
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Offense Description Section
recklessly damaging religious or educational building, 
or place of burial, resulting in loss of over $50,000
2206(3)(a), (g), (h)
knowingly causing damage resulting in loss of 
$10,000-100,000
2206(3)(b)
knowingly damaging religious or educational building, 
or place of burial, resulting in loss of $5,000-50,000
2206(3)(b), (h)
entering a building to commit a crime (burglary), in 
dwelling
2302(2)(a)
counterfeiting money, securities, postage, stock, etc. 3101(3)(a)
offering or accepting property with intent to influence 
performance of public duties (bribery)
5101(3)(a)
disarming police officer of firearm while engaged in 
official duties
5302(3)(a)
felon knowingly escaping from detention 5307(2)(a)
non-employee bringing, possessing, or giving inmate 
access to firearm, ammunition, or catastrophic agent in 
penal institution
5309(3)(a)(i)
employee bringing, possessing, or giving inmate access 
to controlled substance, syringe, weapon, lockpicking 
implement, saw, electronic contraband in penal 
institution
5309(3)(a)(ii), (3)(b)
causing or threatening bodily harm, confinement or 
restraint, substantial property damage against public 
servant, witness, juror, or voter
5310(2)(a)
compelling, promoting, supporting, or living off 
the proceeds of prostitution while negligent as to 
prostitute’s minority or mental retardation
6203(2)(a)
disseminating pornographic material that contains 
victim who is under 16 or severely and profoundly 
mentally retarded
6204(5)(a)
Class 2 Felonies (continued)
ILL Code Vol I Grading Table   133 6/30/03, 3:51:52 PM
134
Proposed Illinois Criminal Code — Volume I
Offense Description Section
[N.B.  It should not be assumed that current sentencing ranges apply to the proposed grades. 
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sentencing consequences of a conviction for any offense.]
knowingly aiding or soliciting another to commit 
suicide (if death results)
1107(5)(a)
knowingly causing bodily harm (assault), where caused 
by administration of food or drug to victim
1201(2)(b)(i)
knowingly causing bodily harm (assault), where 
assailant knowingly commits offense in public place
1201(2)(b)(ii)
knowingly causing bodily harm (assault), if in violation 
of protective order or if second or subsequent assault 
against family or household member
1201(2)(b)(iii)-(iv)
recklessly causing great bodily harm 1202(2)(a)(i)
knowingly following or surveilling another on at least 
two occasions, thus placing person in apprehension of 
harm or restraint (stalking), where offender violates 
protection order
1204(2)(a)
recklessly causing mental injury or emotional distress 
to, or failing to provide needed care for, elderly or 
handicapped person or minor
1205(2)(b)
parent knowingly allowing sexual intercourse with 
child aged 13-17, where offender is at least 4 years 
older than victim
1301(4)(c), (f)
engaging in sexual intercourse or conduct with person 
under offender’s custodial supervision
1304
threatening bodily harm, restraint, accusation of 
offense, etc., with intent to influence another’s 
behavior (criminal coercion), knowing victim is peace 
officer, correctional employee, or community policing 
volunteer, and intending to interfere with or retaliate for 
exercise of official duty
1404(2)(b)
robbery (taking property from another by use or threat 
of force)
1501(2)(c)
theft of firearm, vehicle, or $10,000-100,000 of property, 
that was lost, mislaid, or delivered by mistake
2108(2), 2109(2)
theft of $1,000-10,000 2109(3)
Class 3 Felonies
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Offense Description Section
theft of $500-5,000 from school, place of worship, 
victim age 60 or older
2109(3), (8)
knowingly causing fire or explosion, while recklessly 
endangering another, and manifesting extreme 
indifference to value of human life
2202(2)(a)
recklessly creating risk of catastrophe (great bodily 
harm to 5+ people, or substantial damage to 5+ 
buildings or vital public facility)
2204(2)
possession of a device or substance for catastrophic 
effect
2205
recklessly damaging religious or educational building, 
or place of burial, resulting in loss of $5,000-50,000
2206(3)(b), (g), (h)
recklessly causing damage of $10,000-100,000 2206(3)(b), (g)
knowingly causing damage resulting in loss of 
$1,000-10,000
2206(3)(c)
knowingly damaging religious or educational building, 
or place of burial, resulting in loss of  $500-5,000
2206(3)(c), (h)
intentionally causing interruption of public service 2207(3)(a)
knowing interception of communication using 
intercepting device
2401
forgery (altering another’s writing or creating, 
executing, etc., unauthorized writing) of will, deed, 
contract, commercial instrument, etc.
3101(3)(b)
tampering with publicly recorded document (will, 
deed, mortgage, security)
3102(3)(a)
violating bidding process for public contract (bid 
rigging)
3110
incest (sexual intercourse or conduct with one’s sibling 
or child)
4101
public employee knowingly failing to perform 
mandatory public duty
5103(1)(a)
Class 3 Felonies (continued)
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public employee knowingly performing forbidden act 5103(1)(b)
public employee performing act in excess of lawful 
authority
5103(1)(c)
public employee soliciting or accepting unauthorized 
fee
5103(1)(d)
making false statement of fact under oath (perjury) 5201
obstructing justice (destroying, altering, concealing 
evidence; leaving state or hiding, or inducing 
another witness to do so) in furtherance of criminal 
organization
5301(2)(a)
harboring, aiding, or concealing a known criminal or 
fugitive
5306
felon knowingly failing to report or return to place 
of detention, or failing to abide by terms of home 
confinement
5307(2)(b)
non-employee bringing, possessing, or giving inmate 
access to controlled substance, syringe, weapon, 
lockpicking implement, saw, electronic contraband in 
penal institution
5309(3)(a)(ii)
employee bringing, possessing, or giving inmate access 
to cannabis in penal institution
5309(3)(a)(iii), (3)(b)
causing or threatening offense against public servant, 
witness, juror, or voter
5310(2)(b)
discharging a firearm in course of committing felony 7101(2)(a)
Class 3 Felonies (continued)
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Offense Description Section
negligently causing the death of another person 1105
knowingly aiding or soliciting another to attempt 
suicide (if no death results)
1107(5)(b)
concealing a homicide 1108
knowingly causing bodily harm (assault), where victim 
is peace officer performing duty, pregnant, mentally 
retarded, over 60, or under 13
1201(2)(c)(i), (d)
recklessly creating substantial risk of death or great 
bodily harm
1202(2)(b)(i)
knowingly following or surveilling another on at least 
two occasions, placing person in apprehension of harm 
or restraint (stalking), generally
1204(2)(b)
engaging in sexual intercourse with victim under 13, 
where offender is less than 4 years older
1301(4)(d)
engaging in sexual conduct (short of intercourse) by 
force or threat, or with person unable to consent, or 
where victim is under 17 and offender is at least 4 years 
older or in position of authority
1302(3)(b)(i)
approaching, making contact, or communicating with 
minor in certain public places by convicted child sex 
offender
1305
knowingly detaining another 1402(2)(b)
interfering with custody of minor or mentally retarded 
person in violation of court order
1403(2)(b)
threatening bodily harm, restraint, accusation of 
offense, etc., with intent to influence another’s behavior 
(criminal coercion)
1404(2)(c)
theft of $1,000-10,000 of property that was lost, 
mislaid, or delivered by mistake
2108(2), 2109(3)
theft of $300-1,000 or credit or debit card 2109(4)
theft of $150-500 from school, place of worship, victim 
age 60 or older
2109(4), (8)
Class 4 Felonies
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threatening to cause a catastrophe (great bodily harm 
to 5+ people, or substantial damage to 5+ buildings or 
vital public facility)
2204(3)
recklessly causing damage resulting in loss of 
$1,000-10,000
2206(3)(c), (g)
recklessly damaging religious or educational building, 
or place of burial, resulting in loss of $500-5,000
2206(3)(c), (g), (h)
knowingly causing damage resulting in loss of 
$300-1,000
2206(3)(d)
knowingly damaging religious or educational building, 
or place of burial, resulting in loss of  $150-500
2206(3)(d), (h)
knowingly causing interruption of public service 2207(3)(b)
entering a building, other than a dwelling, to commit a 
crime (burglary)
2302(2)(b)
trespass of dwelling or highly secured premises 2303(2)(a)
accepting bribe to breach duty of fidelity or duty to act 
disinterestedly (commercial bribery)
3109(1), (2)
offering commercial bribe 3109(3)
rigging publicly exhibited contest through bribery or 
tampering
3111(1)
accepting bribe to rig publicly exhibited contest 3111(2)
parent or guardian knowingly leaving child under 13 
without supervision for 24 hours or more
4103
failure to provide child support of more than $10,000, 
or for more than 6 months, or by fleeing the state
4106(3)(a)
offering or accepting property with intent to influence 
performance of voter (bribery of voter)
5101(3)(b)
public servant, independent contractor, juror, or 
witness failing to report bribe offer to law enforcement 
officials
5102(2)(a)
Class 4 Felonies (continued)
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Offense Description Section
Class 4 Felonies (continued)
knowingly making false entry in government record 5203(1)(a), (2)(b)
knowingly altering, destroying, removing public 
record
5203(1)(b)(i), (2)(b)
knowingly giving false information, or reporting offense 
or other incident that did not occur, to law enforcement 
authorities with intent to implicate another
5204(2)(a)
falsely representing oneself to be attorney or police 
officer
5205(2)(a)
performing unauthorized marriage ceremony, execution 
of recorded document, surety for party to litigation
5206
obstructing justice (destroying, altering, concealing 
evidence; leaving state or hiding, or inducing another 
witness to do so)
5301(2)(b)
misdemeanant knowingly escaping from detention, 
failing to report or return to place of detention, or 
failing to abide by terms of home confinement
5307(2)(c)
non-employee bringing, possessing, or giving inmate 
access to cannabis in penal institution
5309(3)(a)(iii)
employee bringing, possessing, or giving inmate access 
to liquor in penal institution
5309(3)(a)(iv), (3)(b)
communicating with juror without authority 5310(2)(c)
participating in course of disorderly conduct with intent 
to facilitate crime or affect official action (riot)
6101
compelling, promoting, or supporting prostitution 
(pimping)
6203(2)(b)
displaying, or threatening use of, firearm in course of 
committing felony
7101(2)(b)
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possessing instrument of crime with intent to employ 
it criminally
808
knowingly aiding or soliciting another to commit 
suicide if no suicide or attempt results
1107(5)(c)
knowingly causing bodily harm (assault) 1201(2)(c)(i)
knowingly making physical contact of insulting or 
provoking nature (assault), where victim is peace 
officer, correctional employee, or community policing 
volunteer performing duty, pregnant, physically or 
mentally handicapped, over 60, or under 13
1201(2)(c)(ii), (2)(d)
recklessly causing bodily harm 1202(2)(a)(ii)
threatening to commit crime likely to cause great bodily 
harm, unlawful confinement or restraint, or substantial 
property damage, while reckless as to risk of terrorizing 
another
1203
parent knowingly allowing sexual intercourse with victim 
under 13, where offender is less than 4 years older
1301(4)(d), (f)
engaging in sexual intercourse with child aged 13-17, 
where offender is less than 4 years older than victim
1301(4)(e)
engaging in sexual conduct (short of intercourse), 
where victim is under 13 and offender is less than 4 
years older
1302(3)(b)(ii)
inducing minor to remove clothing 1303
theft of credit or debit card or $300-1,000 of property 
that was lost, mislaid, or delivered by mistake
2108(2), 2109(4)
theft of $300 or less 2109(5)
theft of $150 or less from school, place of worship, 
victim age 60 or older
2109(5), (8)
unauthorized use of vehicle 2111
knowingly causing fire or explosion, while recklessly 
endangering another, a building, or a vital public facility
2202(2)(b)
Class A Misdemeanors
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Offense Description Section
Class A Misdemeanors (continued)
failure to control or report dangerous fire 2203
failure, by one with duty to do so, to prevent a catastrophe 
(great bodily harm to 5+ people, or substantial damage 
to 5+ buildings or vital public facility)
2204(4)
recklessly causing damage resulting in loss of 
$300-1,000
2206(3)(d), (g)
recklessly damaging religious or educational building, 
or place of burial, causing loss of $150-500
2206(3)(d), (g), (h)
knowingly causing damage resulting in loss of 
$50-300
2206(3)(e)
knowingly damaging religious or educational building, 
or place of burial, causing loss of $25-150
2206(3)(e), (h)
recklessly or negligently causing interruption of public 
service
2207(3)(c)
trespass of enclosed space 2303(2)(b)
damaging, opening, or reading contents of 
correspondence
2402
trespass for purposes of surveillance or eavesdropping 2403(1)(a)
installing or using recording device to surveil or 
eavesdrop on private place
2403(1)(b), (c)
knowingly gaining access to privileged information 2404
disclosure of improperly obtained information 2405
altering writing of another; making, executing, issuing 
writing so that it purports to be writing of another or 
executed at false time or place (forgery)
3101(3)(c)
tampering with writing or record with intent to deceive 3102(3)(b)
securing execution of document by deception 3103
simulating object of special value with intent to 
defraud
3104
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unauthorized impersonation 3105
deceptive practices:  false or misleading written 
statement to obtain credit, advertise, sell securities; 
using false weight or measure or selling less than 
represented quantity; selling adulterated or mislabeled 
goods
3106
issuing or passing bad check 3107
using stolen, forged, revoked, cancelled credit card 3108
knowingly participating in rigged contest 3111(3)
defrauding secured creditors by destroying, transferring, 
etc., secured property
3112
destroying, transferring, etc., property to avoid 
creditors’ claims in insolvency
3113(1)(a)
knowingly falsifying records, or misrepresenting status 
of property, to avoid creditors’ claims in insolvency
3113(1)(b), (c)
receiving deposit in failing financial institution 3114
knowingly selling right to participate in pyramid 
scheme
3115
bigamy (marrying another when one is already 
married); knowingly marrying a bigamist
4102
knowingly sheltering runaway for more than 48 hours 4104(3)
separate offense where person over 21 solicits or directs 
person under 18 to commit offense
4105(3)(a)
failure to provide child support of more than $5,000 4106(3)(b)
failing to report bribe offer to law enforcement 
officials
5102(2)(b)
making false or misleading written statement, or 
inducing reliance on false document, with intent to 
mislead public servant
5202(1), (4)
Class A Misdemeanors (continued)
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Offense Description Section
Class A Misdemeanors (continued)
making false written statement on form authorizing 
punishment for doing so
5202(2), (4)
knowingly reporting crime that did not occur, or 
furnishing false information relating to crime
5204(2)(b)
falsely representing oneself to be public servant, or 
parent or guardian of a child
5205(2)(b)
knowingly causing false alarm of fire or emergency 5208
resisting, obstructing, interfering with police or 
correctional officer
5302(3)(b)
intentionally obstructing, impairing, perverting 
administration of law or other governmental function
5303
employee of penal institution recklessly permits 
prisoner to escape
5308
non-employee bringing, possessing, or giving inmate 
access to liquor in penal institution
5309(3)(a)(iv)
participating in course of disorderly conduct and 
knowingly failing to obey order to disperse by law 
enforcement authorities
6102
knowingly initiating or circulating false report or 
warning of catastrophe (great bodily harm to 5+ people, 
or substantial damage to 5+ buildings or vital public 
facility) or other offense while being reckless as to 
causing public inconvenience or alarm
6104
harassment in violation of order of protection 6105(2)(a)
separate offense for committing offense believing it 
will intimidate group based on race, religion, etc. (hate 
crime)
6106
persisting in recklessly obstructing highway or public 
passage after warning by law enforcement authorities
6109(5)(a)
performing lewd act or exposure in public 6201
prostitution, patronizing prostitute, or soliciting sex act 6202(2)
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living off proceeds of prostitution 6203(2)(c)
disseminating pornography 6204(5)(b)
buying or selling human body parts 6206
intentionally subjecting animal to cruel mistreatment 
or neglect
6207(3)(a)
possessing firearm in course of committing felony 7101(2)(c)
Class A Misdemeanor [or, if lower, 1 below underlying offense]
person released on bail or own recognizance fails to 
appear or violates condition of release
5311(2)
Class A Misdemeanors (continued)
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Offense Description Section
recklessly creating substantial risk of bodily harm 1202(2)(b)(ii)
knowingly making physical contact of insulting or 
provoking nature (assault)
1201(2)(c)(ii)
parent knowingly allowing sexual intercourse with 
child aged 13-17, where offender is less than 4 years 
older than victim
1301(4)(e), (f)
engaging in sexual conduct (short of intercourse) with 
person aged 13-17, where offender is less than 4 years 
older than victim
1302(3)(b)(iii)
theft of credit or debit card, or less than $300 of property, 
that was lost, mislaid, or delivered by mistake
2108(2), 2109(5)
recklessly causing damage resulting in loss of $50-300 2206(3)(e), (g)
recklessly damaging religious or educational building, 
or place of burial, resulting in loss of  $25-150
2206(3)(e), (g), (h)
knowingly causing damage resulting in loss of $50 or 
less
2206(3)(f)
knowingly damaging religious or educational building, 
or place of burial, resulting in loss of $25 or less
2206(3)(f), (h)
unlawful residential picketing 2304
issuing false service of legal process 5207
knowingly resisting or obstructing service of process 5304
engaging in fighting, threatening, noisy, coarse, 
offensive, or hazardous behavior, intending to cause 
substantial harm or inconvenience
6103(3)(a)(i)
engaging in fighting, threatening, noisy, coarse, 
offensive, or hazardous behavior, and persisting after 
request to desist
6103(3)(a)(ii)
harassment by offensive or irritating communication; 
insults or taunts in manner likely to provoke; offensive 
touching
6105(2)(b)
abusing corpse 6205
Class B Misdemeanors
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interfering with custody of minor or mentally retarded 
person in violation of visitation provisions of court 
order
1403(2)(a)
theft of less than $50, not from person, no threat, and no 
breach of fiduciary duty
2109(6)
recklessly causing damage resulting in loss of $50 or 
less
2206(3)(f), (g)
trespass generally 2303(2)(c)
knowingly altering, destroying, removing public notice 5203(1)(b)(ii), (2)(a)
knowingly failing to provide requested aid to police 
officer
5305
obstructing, interfering with, or provoking public 
meeting or gathering
6110
intentionally desecrating public monument, place of 
worship or burial, or other object of public veneration
6111
recklessly subjecting animal to cruel mistreatment or 
neglect
6207(3)(b)
Class C Misdemeanors
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Offense Description Section
parent or guardian knowingly permits child to associate 
with criminals or violate curfew
4105(3)(b)
engaging in fighting, threatening, noisy, coarse, 
offensive, or hazardous behavior
6103(3)(b)
appearing in public under influence of drugs or alcohol 
and creating likelihood of danger or annoyance
6107
loitering or prowling under circumstances warranting 
alarm
6108
recklessly obstructing highway or public passage 6109(5)(b)
Petty Offenses
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[1 grade below completed offense]
[1 grade below applicable standard offense]
attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to commit an 
offense
807
homicide of unborn child 1106
Offense Description Section
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Part I: General Provisions
Article 100. Preliminary Provisions
Section 101. Short Title and Effective Date
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/1-1; 5/34-4
Comment:
 Generally. This provision gives a name for the Code and specifies the 
date on which it becomes legally effective.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 101(1) is similar to current 5/1-1. 
 Section 101(2) is similar to current 5/34-4.
 
Section 102. Principle of Construction; General Purposes
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/1-2; 5/34-1 to -3
Comment:
 Generally. This provision articulates the general legislative purposes 
of the Code and sets forth the principles of construction to be used in its 
interpretation.  
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 102 states principles of 
construction that appear in four separate provisions under Chapter 720.
 Section 102(1) is similar to current 5/1-2, but imposes a new default 
rule of construction requiring that Code provisions must first “be construed 
according to the fair import of their terms.” Section 102(1)’s default rule of 
construction codifies the rule recognized by Illinois courts that “the language 
of a statute is the best indication of the legislative drafter’s intent.” People 
v. Brooks, 633 N.E.2d 692, 694 (Ill. 1994). The proposed provision makes 
clear, however, that when the language of a statute is subject to differing 
constructions, the courts should first “resort to general principles of statutory 
interpretation and available indicia of legislative intent.”1 Only if, after using 
such rules in an effort to determine the intent behind a specific provision, the 
language remains ambiguous, should a court employ the general principles 
listed in Section 102(1)(a) to (d). Such a construction ensures that these 
 1 Illinois courts use various rules of statutory construction to aid in determining 
legislative intent. See, e.g., People v. Beam, 384 N.E.2d 1315, 1316 (Ill. 1979) (finding 
State’s right to exercise preemptory challenges omitted from a revised version of statute by 
legislative oversight and was not intentionally deleted); People v. Wallace, 312 N.E.2d 263, 
290 (Ill. 1974) (finding it proper to rely on Committee Comments in ascertaining legislative 
intent); People v. Hairston, 263 N.E.2d 840, 846 (Ill. 1970) (holding entire Code should be 
considered in determining legislative intent of a particular section). The proposed provision 
is not intended to affect the use of any of these rules, or to endorse or criticize any rule. The 
provision merely makes clear that such methods should be applied before a court resorts to the 
general principles stated in Section 102.
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general principles do not “trump” a more specific legislative intent with 
respect to a particular provision.
 The proposed provision expands on the rule of construction in current 
5/1-2, which simply states that Code provisions should be “construed in 
accordance with the general purposes hereof,” but does not specify when, 
or how, courts should resort to those general purposes. Moreover, Section 
102(1) eliminates the common-law rule of “strict construction,” which 
mandated that penal statutes “be strictly construed in favor of an accused 
without, however, defeating the legislative intent.” People v. Brooks, 633 
N.E.2d 692, 694 (Ill. 1994); see also Faheem-El v. Klincar, 527 N.E.2d 307, 
310 (Ill. 1988); People v. Haywood, 515 N.E.2d 45, 49 (Ill. 1987). Section 
102(1)’s rule is more flexible than the strict construction principle, which 
effectively creates a presumption in the defendant’s favor. The “fair import” 
language is designed to allow consideration, and balancing, of the twin goals 
that citizens have reasonable notice of criminal prohibitions and that the 
courts have the discretion to interpret the Code without frustrating legislative 
intent.
 Section 102(1)(a) to (d) are substantively similar to 5/1-2(a) to (d), 
with two alterations. First, Section 102(1)(b) omits as redundant 5/1-2(b)’s 
reference to “adequately” defining the act and mental state that constitute 
each offense. Second, Section 102(1)(c) does not list as a general purpose 
the development of penalties that “permit recognition of differences in 
rehabilitation possibilities among individual offenders.” Although useful in 
identifying the most appropriate method of sanction, potential rehabilitation 
is not useful in determining the existence and extent of an offender’s liability. 
Rehabilitative goals are more properly addressed after liability has been 
found and the appropriate grade of penalty has been imposed. 
 Section 102(2) provides that this commentary “may be used as an aid 
in construing” the Code. The provision does not specify how much weight 
courts are to give the commentary in interpreting the Code, but merely points 
out that they may use the commentary as a guide.
 Section 102(3) is similar to current 5/34-1, but generally refers to 
“heading[s]” or “provision[s]” rather than specifying “Section, Article, and 
Title headings” and “[t]he provisions of any Section, Article, or Title.”
 Section 102(4) and (5) are identical to current 5/34-2 and 5/34-3, 
respectively.
Section 103. Applicability
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/1-3
Comment:
 Generally. This provision prohibits common-law offenses by requiring 
that offenses be defined in the Code or another statute. At the same time, 
the provision recognizes and preserves the courts’ inherent powers to punish 
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for contempt and to enforce orders and civil judgments. Section 103 also 
provides that the Code’s General Part applies to offenses defined by statutes 
other than the Code, unless the Code otherwise provides.  
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 103(1) and (3) are identical to 
current 5/1-3. 
 Section 103(2) — which ensures that the Code’s culpability terms, 
defenses, and other general provisions apply to any offense, whether defined 
in the Code or elsewhere — is consistent with Illinois Supreme Court 
decisions finding that the culpability provisions of 5/4-3 to 5/4-9 apply “to 
all criminal penalty provisions, including those outside the Criminal Code 
of 1961.” In re K.C., 714 N.E.2d 491, 493-94 (Ill. 1999); see also People v. 
Gean, 573 N.E.2d 818, 820-21 (Ill. 1991); People v. Valley Steel Prods. Co., 
375 N.E.2d 1297, 1304-05 (Ill. 1978). 
 
Section 104. Civil Remedies Preserved
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/1-4
Comment:
 Generally. This provision makes clear that the Code does not affect 
rights or liabilities in civil actions related to conduct made punishable by the 
Code. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 104 is identical to current 5/1-4.
Section 105. State Criminal Jurisdiction
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/1-5
Comment:
 Generally. This provision provides the rules for determining whether a 
person is subject to prosecution in the State for an offense.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 105(1) is identical to current 
5/1-5(a), with one alteration. Section 105(1)(d), unlike 5/1-5(a)(4), provides 
for jurisdiction where a person’s conduct in Illinois provides “aid” for an 
offense in another jurisdiction, thus subjecting the person providing the 
aid to complicity liability in Illinois for the offense committed elsewhere. 
See proposed Section 301 (providing for complicity liability where one 
“intentionally aids” another in committing an offense). For example, a person 
based in Illinois who provides material support to a terrorist group committing 
crimes in another jurisdiction, whether or not he enters a “conspiracy” to 
commit any particular offense, would be subject to complicity liability in 
Illinois for the offenses committed elsewhere.
 Section 105(2) clarifies when an offense is “committed partly within 
this State” for purposes of establishing jurisdiction under Section 105(1)(a). 
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Subsection (2) restates the first sentence of current 5/1-5(b), but uses 
“conduct” and “a result” instead of “the conduct” and “the result,” as an 
offense may have more than one conduct or result element. Cf. infra note 2 
and corresponding text (discussing felony murder).
 Section 105(3) is substantively similar to the second clause of the last 
sentence of current 5/1-5(b), but uses “the trier of fact may infer” rather 
than “is presumed” to make clear that a permissive inference rather than a 
categorical presumption is being established. (For discussion of the rules 
regarding permissive inferences, see infra commentary for proposed Section 
107(4).)
 Section 105(4) is identical to current 5/1-5(c), allowing jurisdiction over 
offenses based on an omission to perform a duty within Illinois, regardless of 
whether the defendant is in Illinois at the time of the omission.
 Section 105 does not incorporate current 5/1-5(b)’s two special rules 
related to homicide offenses. First, the proposed provision eliminates the 
special rule that in cases of felony murder, jurisdiction is proper if the attempt 
or commission of an underlying felony other than second-degree murder 
occurs in Illinois. Such a specific rule is unnecessary given the general rule 
in Section 105(1)(a) that the State has jurisdiction over offenses committed 
partly within this State. Under proposed Section 105(2), the commission or 
attempt of an underlying felony in Illinois would be sufficient to find that 
the felony murder was committed partly within this State, as the underlying 
felony would constitute a conduct element of the felony murder.2 (See 
proposed Section 1102 and corresponding commentary.)
 The proposed provision also eliminates current 5/1-5(b)’s special rule 
for homicide cases that the result element may either be the physical contact 
which causes the death or the death itself. The current rule appears to be aimed 
at the extremely rare case where the offender’s conduct and the victim’s death 
occur outside Illinois, but the physical contact causing death occurs in Illinois 
— for example, where a person standing in Wisconsin shoots a victim who is 
in Illinois, but who crosses into Wisconsin (or Indiana) before dying. In such 
cases, neither the result nor the conduct element3 of the murder occurred in 
 2 It appears that the General Assembly adopted this special felony-murder rule in 
response to the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Holt, 440 N.E.2d 102, 107 (Ill. 
1982). In Holt, the court held the State did not have jurisdiction over a murder that occurred 
in Wisconsin, even though the victim was initially kidnaped in Illinois. Id. The Holt court 
reasoned that the conduct of kidnaping the victim was not the conduct which was an element 
of the offense of felony murder as required by 5/1-5(b). Holt, 440 N.E.2d at 105. Under the 
proposed provision, conduct constituting the predicate felony in a charge of felony murder 
would be “conduct that is an element of the offense” and thus be subject to jurisdiction in this 
State. See supra commentary for Section 105(2). 
 3 The proposed Code makes clear that, in this example, the conduct element of the 
murder occurs in Wisconsin and not Illinois. Under proposed Section 202, a “conduct element” 
is the part of the offense that requires an offender’s act. Section 204 defines an “act” as bodily 
movement. Thus the offender’s act of pulling the trigger, and not the bullet hitting the victim, 
is the conduct element of the murder. Note, however, that Illinois would have jurisdiction for 
an assault under Section 1201, as the result element of bodily harm did occur in Illinois. See 
proposed Section 1201 and corresponding commentary.
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Illinois, and the case would not be covered under the general rule in Section 
105(1)(a). Because the rule would be of extremely limited applicability and 
does not serve any significant policy interest, there is no reason to carve out 
a specific exception to the generally applicable rules of jurisdiction to cover 
this one situation.
Section 106. Place of Trial
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/1-6
Comment:
 Generally. This provision provides the rules for determining where a 
criminal action may be tried.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 106 maintains most of the 
substantive venue rules of current 5/1-6, but eliminates 5/1-6’s specific 
formulations for particular offenses and factual situations. Section 106 also 
adds a venue rule for offenses based on omission liability.
  Section 106(1) sets forth a permissive venue rule: criminal offenses 
“may be tried in any county in which the requirements of criminal 
jurisdiction under Section 105 have been satisfied” (emphasis added). 
Under the mandatory general venue rule articulated in current 5/1-6(a), in 
contrast, “[c]riminal actions shall be tried in the county where the offense 
was committed, except as otherwise provided by law” (emphasis added). 
But Illinois courts have read 5/1-6(a)’s rule to be similar to that in proposed 
Section 106, finding that “[v]enue is proper in any county where any element 
of the offense was committed.” People v. Eggerman, 685 N.E.2d 948, 952 
(Ill. App. 1997); see also People v. Lambert, 552 N.E.2d 300, 303 (Ill. App. 
1990).
 Section 106(1) also achieves the same results as all but a few of the 
special permissive venue rules contained in current 5/1-6(b) to (r) and in case 
law. Section 106(1) allows venue where any conduct or result element of the 
offense has occurred; this avoids the problem of having to determine a single 
county in which the offense was committed. For offenses committed while 
in transit, for which “it cannot be readily determined in which county the 
offense was committed,” current 5/1-6(f) provides that venue is proper in any 
county through which the defendant passed. In most cases, Section 106(1) 
would achieve the same result as current 5/1-6(f), as it would permit venue in 
any county through which the defendant passed while an ongoing conduct or 
result element was occurring. With respect to the offense of treason,4 Section 
106(1) dictates that venue is proper in any county in which the defendant 
committed the offense conduct, whereas current 5/1-6(k) provides that venue 
is proper in any county. Similarly, Section 106(1) would permit venue for 
 4 720 ILCS 5/30-1.
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the offenses of cannabis trafficking5 and controlled substance trafficking6 
in the counties where the conduct or result element occurred, rather than 
in any county, as prescribed by current 5/1-6(r). For inchoate offenses, 
Section 106(1) achieves venue results that are substantively similar to those 
achieved by current 5/1-6(m), but would also permit prosecution for attempt 
in the county in which the substantive crime would have been completed, in 
addition to any counties in which offense elements occurred. Finally, Section 
106(1) would permit the offense of official misconduct7 to be tried in any 
county in which the misconduct occurred, whereas an Illinois appellate court 
has also permitted prosecution in the county of the official’s office. See 
People v. Clark, 389 N.E.2d 911, 922-23 (Ill. App. 1979).
 Section 106(1) also omits, as redundant, the second and third sentences 
of current 5/1-6(a), which provide that “[t]he State is not required to prove 
during trial that an alleged offense occurred in any particular county” and 
that all proceedings concerning the propriety of venue shall be conducted 
under Section 114-1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 
5/114-1). The deletion of these provisions is not intended to reintroduce the 
State’s burden of proving venue beyond a reasonable doubt at trial. Rather, 
under Section 107(2)(c), the State is only required to prove proper venue 
by a preponderance of the evidence. See proposed Section 107(2)(c) and 
corresponding commentary. The procedures for contesting and proving 
venue would still be governed by current 725 ILCS 5/114-1.
 Section 106(2), which introduces a supplementary venue rule for 
offenses imposing omission liability — allowing trial where a victim8 or 
defendant resides — has no corresponding provision under Chapter 720. 
Section 106(2) provides a default rule to clarify venue given that the locus of 
an omission is conceptually difficult to identify. This approach differs from 
the offense-specific holdings of some Illinois courts. See People v. Choura, 
405 N.E.2d 493, 495 (5th Dist. 1980) (venue proper for offense of failure 
to report a bribe9 only in county where bribe offer occurred); cf. People v. 
Hennefent, 42 N.E.2d 633 (Ill. App. 1942) (venue for offense of “neglect and 
refusal to support minor child” proper only in the county where wife and the 
neglected child lived, and not in county where defendant lived).
 Section 106(3) is substantively similar to the last sentence of current 
5/1-6(a).
 5 720 ILCS 550/1.
 6 720 ILCS 470/401.
 7 720 ILCS 5/33-3.
 8 Note that not every offense to which Section 106(2) applies will necessarily have a 
“victim.” For example, there is no easily identifiable victim for the current offense of failing to 
report a bribe. See 720 ILCS 5/33-2. In cases where the defendant resides outside Illinois and 
the victim is difficult to identify, or is an entity without a particular residence (such as the State 
where the offense is failure to file a tax return), venue would be appropriate in any county of 
the State. 
 9 720 ILCS 5/33-2.
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 Section 106(4) is substantively similar to current 5/1-6(e), but makes 
two minor amendments. The current law provides that if “an offense is 
committed” on a bordering navigable water, venue is proper in “any county 
adjacent to such navigable water.” Section 106(4) provides that the special 
venue rule is triggered if “an element of the offense occurs” on a bordering 
navigable water, ensuring that the rule applies when either a conduct or result 
element occurs on such water. Section 106(4) also clarifies that, under such 
circumstances, venue is proper in “any county adjacent to any portion of 
such navigable water.” Hence, if an element of an offense occurs on Lake 
Michigan, Section 106(4) clarifies that the offense may be tried in any county 
bordering Lake Michigan, rather than only in the nearest county.
 
Section 107. Burdens of Proof; Affirmative Defenses; Permissive 
 Inferences
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/3-1; 5/3-2
Comment:
 Generally. This provision sets forth the presumption that a defendant 
is innocent until proven guilty, establishes two distinct burdens of proof, and 
provides rules for the consequences of permissive inferences established 
elsewhere in the proposed Code.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 107(1) is the same as the first 
sentence of current 5/3-1, but says that “[a] defendant,” rather than “[e]very 
person,” is presumed innocent until proven guilty.
 Section 107(2) and (3) establish two distinct evidentiary burdens 
for different stages of a criminal proceeding. Section 107(2) sets forth the 
ultimate burden of persuasion. Section 107(2) provides that the State must 
prove: (1) the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) unless 
the Code provides otherwise, the absence of any exception, exemption, 
defense, or mitigation beyond a reasonable doubt; and (3) unless there is an 
express exception, all other facts required for liability by a preponderance 
of the evidence.10 The scope of the State’s burden of persuasion remains the 
same with respect to elements of the offense and defenses as under current 
5/3-2(b), but Section 107(2) provides a default rule that all other facts need 
only be proven by a preponderance.
 Section 107(3) sets forth the burdens of production for the State and the 
defendant. The burdens of production define the requisite threshold amount 
of evidence the burdened party must present to have an issue sent to the “trier 
 10 Illinois courts have sometimes said that the State must prove jurisdiction beyond a 
reasonable doubt. See People v. Holt, 440 N.E.2d 102, 108 (Ill. 1988); People v. Young, 727 
N.E.2d 386, 388 (Ill. App. 2000). Yet Chapter 720 provides that the State need not prove venue 
at trial. See 720 ILCS 5/1-6(a). Under proposed Section 107(2)(c), neither jurisdiction nor 
venue would have to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. It is also anticipated that, under 
proposed Section 106(3), the issue of venue (and thus also the issue of jurisdiction) will be 
resolved by the court prior to trial. See 725 ILCS 5/114-1.
ILL Code  V II Gen Part   9 7/2/03, 1:18:21 PM
10
Proposed Criminal Code Offi cial Commentary — Volume 2
of fact” (the jury in a jury trial, or the court in a bench trial). Section 107(3)(a) 
imposes the same burden of production on the State as exists under current 
Illinois law. See People v. McLaurin, 703 N.E.2d 11, 21 (Ill. 1998); see also 
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316-20 (1979).
 Section 107(3)(b) clarifies the defendant’s burden of production with 
respect to affirmative defenses and mitigations. Under the current statutory 
provision, a defendant properly raises an affirmative defense by presenting 
“some evidence” supporting the defense. See 720 ILCS 5/3-2(a); People v. 
Jones, 676 N.E.2d 646, 649 (Ill. 1997); People v. Everett, 565 N.E.2d 1295, 
1298-99 (Ill. 1990). The Illinois Supreme Court has stated, though, that even 
if the defendant presents some evidence on an affirmative defense, the court 
may refuse to instruct the jury on the defense if “the evidence before the trial 
court is so clear and convincing as to permit the court to find as a matter of 
law that there is no affirmative defense.” Jones, 676 N.E.2d at 649; see also 
People v. Larry, 494 N.E.2d 1212 (Ill. App. 1986) (affirming refusal to give 
instruction on defense).
 Like the restriction in Jones, Section 107(3)(b) provides that a defendant 
is entitled to an instruction on an affirmative defense only if “there exists11 
sufficient evidence, considered in the light most favorable to the defendant 
and all reasonable inferences therefrom, to allow a rational factfinder to find 
that all requirements of the defense . . . are proven by a preponderance of the 
evidence.” Section 107(3)(b)’s burden of production follows the constitutional 
requirement that a conviction must be reversed “if it is found that upon the 
record evidence adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found 
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at 324. Section 
107(3)(b) prevents defendants from being able to obtain an instruction for 
any frivolous defense, no matter how weak the supporting evidence.
 Section 107(3)(c) defines “affirmative defense or mitigation.” Current 
Chapter 720 discusses and designates certain defenses as “affirmative 
defenses,” but does not define the term. See, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/3-2; 5/4-
8; 5/6-4; 5/7-14. Section 107(3)(c) defines the term as any defense or 
mitigation that does not operate by negating an offense element. Affirmative 
defenses receive the same evidentiary treatment under Section 107(3)(b), 
coupled with Section 107(2)(b), that they receive under current 5/3-2. (The 
burden of persuasion for the insanity defense and other excuses, and for 
nonexculpatory defenses, is addressed elsewhere. See proposed Sections 501 
and 601 and corresponding commentary.) Section 107(3) explicitly mentions 
“mitigations” as well as defenses to make clear that it may apply to rules that 
reduce liability as well as to rules that exonerate the defendant entirely. See, 
e.g., proposed Section 1103 (defining statutory mitigation to reduce liability 
from murder to manslaughter).
 11 The “there exists” language is meant to make clear that, as under current law, the 
defendant need not present the necessary evidence himself if it is provided by the State’s case. 
See, e.g., People v. Bailey, 439 N.E.2d 4, 9 (Ill. App. 1982); People v. Rorer, 358 N.E.2d 681, 
684 (Ill. App. 1976).
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 Section 107(4) explains the significance of permissive inferences 
established elsewhere in the proposed Code. Section 107(4)(a), which sets 
forth the circumstances under which courts are obligated to submit the issue 
of the existence of an inferred fact to the trier of fact, has no corresponding 
provision under current law. Section 107(4)(b) reflects the current rule 
that permissive inferences leave the trier of fact “free to reject or accept 
the suggested presumption,” People v. Hester, 544 N.E.2d 797, 801 (Ill. 
1989) (citing County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979)), but are not 
permitted to “undermine the fact finder’s responsibility at trial, based on 
evidence adduced by the State, to find the ultimate facts beyond a reasonable 
doubt.” People v. Ferguson, 561 N.E.2d 1118, 1124 (Ill. App. 1990) (citing 
Allen, 442 U.S. at 156).
 Although Chapter 720 does not contain a provision similar to Section 
107(4), the Illinois Supreme Court has addressed the constitutionality 
of permissive inferences. Under current Illinois law, “when there is 
some corroborating evidence of the defendant’s guilt, . . . the permissive 
presumption will satisfy due process concerns if the presumed fact is more 
likely than not to flow from the predicate fact.” People v. Watts, 692 N.E.2d 
315, 321 (Ill. 1998) (citing Allen, 442 U.S. at 167). Where the permissive 
inference is the “‘sole and sufficient basis for a finding of guilt,’ the presumed 
fact must flow beyond a reasonable doubt from the proven, predicate fact” 
to satisfy due process concerns. Watts, 692 N.E.2d at 321 (quoting Allen, 
442 U.S. at 166-67). As long as there is a sufficiently close nexus between 
the proven predicate fact and the presumed fact, a permissive inference is 
not unconstitutional per se under Illinois law. See Watts, 692 N.E.2d at 321; 
Hester, 544 N.E.2d at 801-02; People v. Housby, 420 N.E.2d 151, 153-54 (Ill. 
1981).
Section 108. Definitions
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/2-3; -4; -8; -10; -13; 
  -15; -15a; -15b; -17 to -19.5; -22;
  5/15-1; see also 5/12-12(b),(d)
Comment:
 Generally. Section 108 catalogues every defined term used in the 
proposed Code. Terms that are used regularly throughout the Code are 
defined directly in Section 108. Terms that are used in only one or a few 
sections are defined where appropriate, and that section of the Code is 
referenced in Section 108. For every defined term used in the Code, whether 
defined in Section 108 or elsewhere, a reference to the section defining the 
term is provided at the end of each article in which the term is used. Terms 
that are defined outside of this provision are discussed in the commentary for 
the referenced provision.
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 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 108’s initial statement that the 
terms defined therein have the designated meanings “[u]nless a particular 
context clearly requires a different meaning” is substantively similar to 
current 5/2-.5.
 The definition of “another” is defined as a person other than the 
defendant and is identical to that in current 5/2-3.
 The term “bodily harm” is defined as “substantial physical pain, illness, 
or any impairment of physical condition, and includes great bodily harm.” 
Chapter 720 uses this term often, but does not provide a general definition. 
In requiring “substantial physical pain,” however, the proposed definition 
seems to be somewhat more strict than the current standard for “bodily 
harm.” Cf. People v. Mays, 437 N.E.2d 633, 635-36 (Ill. 1982) (finding 
that bodily harm in the context of battery requires “some sort of physical 
pain or damage to the body, like lacerations, bruises or abrasions, whether 
temporary or permanent”). The proposed definition is not meant to include 
minor physical discomfort or pain, but only a “substantial” injury. Current 
5/12-12(b) provides that, in the context of sexual offenses, the term means 
“physical harm” and includes “sexually transmitted disease, pregnancy and 
impotence.” The proposed provision expands on that definition and removes 
the references to STDs, pregnancy, and impotence so that the definition 
may be used throughout the Code.12 In addition, the proposed definition 
specifically includes great bodily harm to ensure that the showing of great 
bodily harm will always satisfy an offense requirement of bodily harm.
 The definition of “conduct” is substantively similar to that in current 
5/2-4, but omits that provision’s inappropriate reference to “the accompanying 
mental state” as a component of conduct. See proposed Section 202 and 
corresponding commentary. The proposed definition also adds that conduct 
includes “a failure to act when bound by a legal duty to act.” This language is 
necessary as every offense contains a conduct element, but not every offense 
requires an act. See proposed Sections 202 and 204 and their corresponding 
commentaries.
 “Force” is defined in a limited fashion, to make clear that “confinement 
or restraint” will satisfy an offense’s requirement of “force.” The current 
Code uses, but does not generally define, the term “force.” Like the term 
“bodily harm,” current Illinois law provides a narrow definition of “force 
or threat of force” in the context of sexual offenses, but that provision is not 
particularly helpful in explaining the phrase’s meaning, as it merely repeats 
the terms “force” and “threat” within the definition. See 720 ILCS 5/12-
12(d) (defining “force or threat of force” as “the use of force or violence, 
 12 The proposed definition covers STDs and impotence, as such conditions constitute 
illness and an impairment of a physical condition, respectively. Although the proposed 
definition is likely broad enough to include pregnancy, the proposed offenses of sexual assault 
and sexual abuse both contain an aggravation in cases where the offender causes bodily harm 
or pregnancy. See proposed Sections 1301 and 1302 and their respective commentaries.
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or the threat of force or violence”). The current definition also provides two 
examples, but the first is similarly unhelpful, as it merely refers to “when 
the accused threatens to use force or violence” and the victim reasonably 
believes the threat will be executed. Id. The other example, which discusses 
“overcom[ing] the victim by use of superior strength or size, physical restraint 
or physical confinement,” id., is similar to the proposed explicit inclusion of 
“confinement or restraint.”
 The definition of “forcible offense” is similar to the definition of 
“forcible felony” in current 5/2-8, but with three important differences. First, 
the term has been changed to forcible “offense” to include misdemeanors that 
involve the use or threat of force or create a risk of bodily harm. See, e.g., 
proposed Section 1203 (terroristic threats). 
 Second, the proposed definition omits the current provision’s list of 
specific offenses that qualify as “forcible felonies.” The current list approach 
appears to promote clarity and precision, but, in fact, has lead to irrational 
results. See People v. Johnson, 711 N.E.2d 787, 788 (Ill. App. 1999) (holding 
residential burglary not a forcible felony because previous version of current 
5/2-8, which specifically included the less serious offense of burglary, did not 
specifically include residential burglary) (emphasis added); see also People 
v. McCarty, 769 N.E.2d 985, 993-94 (Ill. App. 2002) (holding aggravated 
possession of a stolen motor vehicle a forcible felony even though not 
specifically listed in 5/2-8, in part because the offense was inherently more 
dangerous than burglary, a crime that is listed as a forcible felony) (emphasis 
added); cf. People v. Berg, 660 N.E.2d 1003, 1004 (Ill. App. 1996) (refusing 
to apply 5/3-5(a)’s rule allowing prosecutions for “arson” to be commenced 
at any time in case involving aggravated arson, because that crime was not 
specifically listed in 5/3-5(a)). To avoid such results, the proposed provision 
employs only a general definition of what offenses are forcible.
 Third, the determination of whether an offense is “forcible” looks to the 
statutory elements, rather than to the facts of a particular case.13 This method 
parallels the current method of listing specific offenses that count as “forcible 
felonies” in the abstract, though it differs from the rule reflected in current 
 13 Although the proposed definition looks to the elements of the charged offense, it is 
not always necessary that the offense explicitly require the use or threat of force or the creation 
of a risk of great bodily harm so long as the offense in some way contemplates or implies the 
use of force or the creation of a risk. For example, the offense of arson does not explicitly 
require the creation of a risk of great bodily harm, but the offense is clearly designed to punish 
the risk to both people and property inherent in starting fires. See proposed Section 2201 and 
corresponding commentary. Thus arson would be a forcible offense, while a crime like theft 
(Section 2102), which is only concerned with harm to a person’s property, would not. 
 Note, however, that proposed Section 7101 creates a separate felony offense any time 
a person uses, displays, or threatens to use a firearm during the commission of a felony. See 
proposed Section 7101 and corresponding commentary. In such cases, the offense in Section 
7101 would be a forcible offense. Thus, the use or threatened use of a firearm during the 
commission of a non-forcible offense such as theft could serve as a predicate felony in the 
felony-murder context, even though the underlying theft would not. See proposed Section 
1102 and corresponding commentary.
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case law. See People v. Golson, 207 N.E.2d 68, 73 (Ill. 1965) (allowing 
conspiracy to steal from mails to serve as forcible felony; relevant inquiry is 
“whether, under the facts of a particular case, it is contemplated that violence 
might be necessary to enable the conspirators to carry out their common 
purpose”). In using an offense-elements analysis, rather than the current 
facts-of-the-case approach, the proposed rule promotes clarity regarding the 
question of whether an offense is forcible or not, and authorizes the courts to 
resolve that issue as a legal matter rather than leaving it to the determination 
of the jury in each individual case. Cf. People v. Banks, 678 N.E.2d 348, 353 
(Ill. App. 1997) (affirming trial court’s finding that mob action was a forcible 
felony and rejecting defendant’s requested jury instruction on the definition 
of forcible felony).
 The term “great bodily harm” is defined as “bodily harm that creates 
a substantial risk of death, or causes serious, permanent disfigurement, 
or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or 
organ.” The term “great bodily harm” is often used, but is not defined, in 
Chapter 720.14 The proposed definition significantly expands on the definition 
adopted by the Illinois courts. See People v. Edwards, 770 N.E.2d 507, 509 
(Ill. App. 1999) (holding that great bodily harm requires “an injury of graver 
and more serious character” than bodily harm). The proposed definition 
specifically includes death to ensure that proof of death will always satisfy an 
offense requirement of bodily harm. The definition also specifically includes 
life-threatening diseases to cover serious illnesses such as AIDS.
 The term “he” is defined to equate with person to make clear that both 
sexes, and nonhuman entities, may be included within that pronoun where it 
is used.
 The definitions of “includes” and “including” are identical to those in 
current 5/2-10.
 The term “law enforcement authorities” is meant to cover all the 
governmental personnel and agencies that engage in law enforcement 
activities. The term includes prosecutors and peace officers, as well as other 
government employees who investigate or prevent offenses in more specific 
contexts, such as workers at the Department of Children and Family Services 
who investigate child abuse, or members of the Department of Public Health 
who investigate abuses at nursing homes. Cf. commentary for Section 5204. 
Chapter 720 uses, but does not define, this term. See, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/33E-7.
 The term “mentally handicapped person” is used, but not defined, in 
current Chapter 720. See, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/12-21.5. The proposed definition 
parallels the proposed definition for “physically handicapped person,” see 
infra, and is meant to cover people who suffer disabling mental impairments. 
The proposed definition requires the mental impairment be “long-term,” but 
 14 See, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/2-8 (defining “forcible felony”); 5/7-1 to 5/7-6, 5/7-9, 5/7-11 
(justifications for use of force and “compulsion”); 5/9-1(a) (first-degree murder based on 
intent to cause great bodily harm); 5/10-2(a)(3), (8) (aggravated kidnapping based on causing 
great bodily harm); 5/12-4 (aggravated battery based on causing great bodily harm).
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not permanent. This formulation ensures that people who suffer severe and 
potentially long-lasting conditions, such as schizophrenia or bipolar disorder, 
are covered, regardless of whether they may be “cured” at some later point 
in time, but people suffering from some form of “temporary insanity” are 
excluded.
 The definition of “peace officer” is substantively similar to that in current 
5/2-12, but omits the language in the second paragraph thereof regarding 
federal officers, agents, and employees also qualifying as “peace officers” 
for the purposes of certain provisions. Nevertheless, such persons may still 
qualify as “peace officers” under the proposed definition — provided that, by 
virtue of their offices or employment, they are “vested by law with a duty to 
maintain public order or to make arrests for offenses.”
 The definition of “person” is the same is that in current 5/2-15, except 
that the word “individual” has been replaced with “human being who has 
been born alive” to make the definition conform to the legislative declaration 
in 720 ILCS 510/6(3). Cf., e.g., 720 ILCS 5/9-1, 5/9-1.2 (distinguishing, for 
homicide purposes, between “individual” and “unborn child”); proposed 
Sections 1101, 1106 (same, but using “person” instead of “individual”).
 The definition of “physically handicapped person” is similar to that 
in current 5/2-15a, with one substantive change. The proposed definition 
requires that the disability be long-term rather than permanent. The proposed 
change covers people who suffer a long-lasting impairment, even though the 
defect may be “cured” at some point in the future, but excludes a person 
whose condition, such as a broken leg, is merely temporary. See supra 
discussion of “mentally handicapped person.”
 The definition of “place of worship” is identical to that in current 5/2-
15b. 
 The general definition of “property” as “anything of value” is the same 
as current 5/15-1. However, the proposed definition is not limited, as the 
current definition is, to the property offense sections. Moreover, the proposed 
definition provides a less comprehensive list of items that are included in 
the definition of property in recognition that all the items specifically listed 
in current 5/15-1 are already covered by the general definition of property 
as “anything of value.” The list of items that constitute property is meant to 
be illustrative and not exhaustive. Cf. proposed Section 108’s definition of 
“including.”
 The term “public servant” replaces the current law terms “public 
employee” and “public officer.”15 The proposed definition combines the 
current terms into one definition in recognition that the two current terms are 
interrelated and often used together. See, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/3-6. The proposed 
definition is nearly identical to the current definitions, except that the new 
definition specifically includes peace officers and persons who perform 
official functions on behalf of the United States government.
 15 See 720 ILCS 5/2-17 and 5/2-18.
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 The definitions of “reasonable belief” and “reasonably believes” are 
substantively similar to those in current 5/2-19, but are generalized to apply 
to all beliefs, rather than beliefs concerning the existence of “described facts.” 
Also, the proposed Code explicitly defines “reasonable belief” by reference 
to negligence to make clear that the term fits within the general culpability 
scheme set out in Article 200. Without such an explicit reference, the 
relation between “reasonable belief” and the “standard” defined culpability 
requirements is unclear. The proposed definition makes clear that a person 
with a “reasonable belief” is a person who lacks the culpability level of 
negligence.
 The definition of “school” is identical to that in current 5/2-19.5.
 The definitions of “State,” “this State” and “other state” are identical to 
those in current 5/2-21.
 The definition of “statute” is identical to that in current 5/2-22.
 The following terms that appear in Article 2 and elsewhere in current 
Chapter 720 are omitted from the proposed Code: “armed with a firearm” 
(5/2-3.6); “emergency medical technician” (5/2-6.5); “felony” (5/2-7); 
“laser” or “laser device” (5/2-10.2); “laser gunsight” (5/2-10.3); “laser 
pointer” (5/24.6-5); “laser sight” (5/24.6-5); “misdemeanor” (5/2-11); 
“offense” (5/2-12 and 5/8-6); “personally discharged a firearm” (5/2-15.5); 
and “solicit” (5/2-20).
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 ARTICLE 200. BASIC REQUIREMENTS OF OFFENSE LIABILITY
Section 201. Basis of Liability
Corresponding Current Provision(s): None
Comment:
 Generally. This provision establishes the bases of liability for an offense 
under the proposed Code. Section 201 makes clear the relevance and function 
of the other Articles of the Code in relation to the determination of criminal 
liability for both Code and non-Code offenses. Section 201(1) provides that 
an actor may be liable for an offense only if he or she satisfies all its elements, 
except where a provision in Article 300 operates to impute a missing element. 
Section 201(1)(a) also clarifies that liability may not be imposed where the 
defendant satisfies the requirements of a “bar to liability” (whether defined 
as a defense, exception, or other rule) set out in Article 800,16 in the Code’s 
Special Part,17 or outside the Code.18 Section 201(2) provides that the defenses 
set forth in Articles 250, 400, 500, and 600 will preclude liability even though 
all of an offense’s elements are satisfied or imputed. Such provisions differ 
from the “bars to liability” covered by Section 201(1)(a) in that they present 
general, rather than special, defenses (and thus apply to any offense, rather 
than to a particular offense or group of offenses). 
 Relation to current Illinois law. The principles expressed in Section 
201 reflect the current understanding of the basis of criminal liability. No 
current Chapter 720 provision contains an explicit statement of the material 
in Section 201. 
Section 202. Offense Elements
Corresponding Current Provision(s): None
 Comment:
 Generally. This provision categorizes and defines offense elements 
in terms of conduct, circumstances, results, and culpability requirements. 
Defining offense elements in this manner enables a systematic and clear 
 16 See proposed Section 805 (providing defense to solicitation and conspiracy for 
victims and conduct inevitably incident to offense’s commission); proposed Section 806 
(providing renunciation defense for inchoate offenses).
 17 See, e.g., proposed Section 2104(2) (providing defense to theft by extortion); 
proposed Section 2110 (providing claim-of-right defense for theft offenses); proposed Section 
2303(4) (providing defense to criminal trespass); proposed Section 3108(3) (providing 
defense to fraudulent use of credit or debit card).
 18 Cf., e.g., 625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(5), 5/4-103.2(a)(4) (providing affirmative defenses 
to offenses related to receiving stolen motor vehicles); 625 ILCS 5/5-401.3(c) (providing 
affirmative defense to regulatory offense applying to scrap processors); 810 ILCS 5/9-
315.02(5) (providing affirmative defense to offense of unlawful disposal of collateral by 
debtor).
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approach to offense definition. Specifically, the offense element definitions 
aid in defining culpability requirements, which can be more precisely 
elaborated by reference to their application to each type of offense element.
 As Section 202(1) makes explicit, offense elements may appear not 
only in the offense definition itself, but also in the provisions that define 
the offense grade or otherwise specify a specific level of liability that will 
attach to the offense. Cf. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) 
(establishing constitutional rule that facts affecting defendant’s potential 
maximum punishment are offense elements and must be proved to jury 
beyond reasonable doubt).
 Section 202(2) defines the terms “conduct element,” “result element,” 
“circumstance element,” and “objective elements.” Section 202(2)(a) defines 
a “conduct element” as any element of an offense that requires an offender’s 
“act” (as defined in Section 204(4)) or “failure to perform a legal duty.” For 
example, the offense of arson requires that a person “damage[]” property; 
any physical act or failure to perform a legal duty leading to such damage will 
satisfy the conduct element. See proposed Section 2201. (The causation and 
culpability requirements, however, will operate to limit the range of conduct 
for which a person will be criminally liable.)
 Section 202(2)(b) defines a “result element” as any change of 
circumstances caused by a person’s conduct. For example, the offense of 
arson requires the result of damage. See proposed Section 2201.
 Section 202(2)(c) defines a “circumstance element” as any objective 
element of an offense that is not a conduct or result element. Most offenses 
will have one or more circumstance elements that define the requisite 
conditions for a given act and result to generate criminal liability. For example, 
the offense of arson requires damage “by means of fire or explosive” to “a 
building or habitable structure of another.” See proposed Section 2201.
 Section 202(2)(d) defines an offense’s “objective elements.” This 
term distinguishes an offense’s conduct, circumstance, and result elements 
from its culpability requirements. The distinction makes it clear that the 
culpability requirements set out in proposed Section 205 apply only to an 
offense’s objective elements and not its specified culpability requirements 
themselves.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Current Illinois law discusses conduct, 
circumstance, and result elements. See 720 ILCS 5/1-5; 5/4-4 to 5/4-7. Of 
these terms, however, current law defines only “conduct.” Section 202(2)(a)’s 
definition of “conduct element” is substantively similar to current 5/2-4’s 
definition of “conduct,” but omits that definition’s improper reference to 
mental state. See 720 ILCS 5/2-4 (conduct is “an act or series of acts, and the 
accompanying mental state”). Culpability terms define relevant mental states 
that must accompany a person’s conduct; it is misleading and inaccurate to 
include mental state within the definition of conduct itself.
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Section 203. Causal Relationship Between Conduct and Result
Corresponding Current Provision(s): None
Comment:
 Generally. This provision specifically defines the minimum causal 
nexus between given conduct and its attendant results that will allow 
imposition of criminal liability for the conduct.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Current Chapter 720 includes no 
provision dealing with a causation requirement. Section 203 is in keeping, 
however, with decisions of the Illinois courts recognizing that causation is 
an implied requirement of offenses, such as homicide, that require a certain 
result.19 See, e.g., People v. Lara, 683 N.E.2d 480, 483 (Ill. App. 1997) (“The 
evidence must show ‘that the defendant’s act was, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, a contributing cause to a death such that the death did not result from 
a source unconnected with the defendant’s act.’”) (quoting People v. Brown, 
373 N.E.2d 459, 461 (Ill. App. 1978)); People v. Kent, 444 N.E.2d 570, 574 
(Ill. App. 1982) (“In every murder prosecution, proof of death and proof 
of criminal agency are elements the state must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”).
 Section 203(1)(a) establishes that the conduct must be the factual 
or “but-for” cause of the result an offense prohibits. Section 203(1)(b) 
imposes an additional “proximate cause” requirement, holding that the 
prohibited result must not be so far removed from the defendant’s conduct 
that imposing liability would be unjust. These requirements are in keeping 
with the holdings of Illinois courts, which require both but-for causation and 
proximate causation for criminal liability to be imposed. See, e.g., People v. 
Hall, 652 N.E.2d 1266, 1269 (Ill. App. 1996) (requiring defendant’s act to be 
the actual or “but for” cause and the legal or “proximate” cause of victim’s 
injury); cf. IPI (CRIMINAL) 23.28A (4th ed. 2000) (defining proximate cause 
as “any cause which, in the natural or probable sequence, produced the 
[harm]”).
 Section 203(1)(b) also explicitly points out that a defendant’s act will 
not satisfy the proximate cause requirement where the result in question was 
 19 As under current Illinois law, the State must prove causation beyond a reasonable 
doubt whenever an offense contains a result element. See proposed Section 107(2)(a) (State 
bears burden of persuasion to prove offense elements beyond reasonable doubt); cf. proposed 
Section 202(1)(a) (defining “elements” to include conduct and “such result of conduct” 
contained in offense definition or grading provisions).
 Also as under current law, causation is generally an issue for the trier of fact. See People 
v. Brackett, 510 N.E.2d 877, 881 (Ill. 1987); People v. McCarty, 769 N.E.2d 985, 995 (Ill. App. 
2002). Section 203’s language is intended to provide guidance to the courts, but causation 
is ultimately a factual or mixed determination for the jury, rather than a legal issue for the 
court.
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“too dependent upon another’s volitional act.” Such independent “intervening 
acts” are typically held to frustrate the proximate-cause requirement.20 See 
People v. Brackett, 510 N.E.2d 877, 880 (Ill. 1987) (“The courts in Illinois 
have repeatedly held that an intervening cause completely unrelated to the 
acts of the defendant does relieve a defendant of criminal liability.”); People 
v. Dordies, 377 N.E.2d 245, 249 (Ill. App. 1978) (holding non-IPI instruction 
erroneous because it “may have mistakenly led the jury to believe that … 
defendant was guilty of murder, even if unconnected, intervening factors 
caused the death”).
 Section 203(1)(c) requires satisfaction of any additional causation 
requirements imposed elsewhere (including the offense definition itself). 
Section 203(1)(c) makes it clear that the legislature would be free to require, 
for example, that a particular offense’s result element occur within a certain 
amount of time.
 Section 203(2) provides that in cases where more than one person 
contributes to a prohibited result and each person’s conduct alone would have 
caused the result, each person is considered to have caused the result. This 
provision prevents equally blameworthy persons from escaping liability due 
to the fortuity that someone else independently caused the prohibited result. 
Section 203(2) is consistent with Illinois courts’ holdings that a person’s 
conduct need only be a contributing cause of a prohibited result. See, e.g., 
People v. Brackett, 510 N.E.2d 877, 880 (Ill. 1987) (finding that defendant’s 
conduct need not be sole and immediate cause of victim’s injury; defendant 
may be found guilty if he contributed to the injury); see also IPI (CRIMINAL) 
7.15 (4th ed. 2000) (for homicide, “it is not necessary that . . . the acts of 
the defendant were the sole and immediate cause of death”). Section 203(2) 
clarifies, however, that an offense’s causation requirement is satisfied only 
if the defendant’s conduct “alone would have been sufficient to cause the 
result.” Cf. IPI (CRIMINAL) 23.28A (4th ed. 2000) (stating that, for offense of 
aggravated driving under the influence, defendant’s contribution to result “is 
sufficient if it concurs with some other cause acting at the same time, which 
in combination with it, causes the [harm].”).
 20 Some authority, however, suggests that Section 203(1)(b) may vary in some respects 
from the current law of causation as developed by the Illinois courts. Cf. People v. McCarty, 
769 N.E.2d 985, 997 (Ill. App. 2002) (stating that, in felony-murder prosecution, fact that 
third party caused death “is irrelevant”); People v. Gulliford, 407 N.E.2d 1094, 1098 (Ill. 
App. 1980) (“It is generally held that a defendant who inflicts a dangerous wound upon his 
victim . . . is responsible for the victim’s death despite unskillful or even improper medical 
treatment which aggravates the wound or contributes to cause the death because the unskillful 
medical treatment is reasonably foreseeable.”). Section 203 supersedes the current common 
law concerning causation to the extent that it is inconsistent with the proposed provision as to 
this issue. At the same time, as noted above, whether a result was “too dependent on another’s 
volitional act” would generally be a factual question, and the factfinder would be free to 
resolve that question in either direction except in extreme cases.
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Section 204. Requirement of an Act; Omission Liability; 
 Possession Liability
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/2-2; 5/4-1; 5/4-2
Comment:
 Generally. Section 204 sets the minimum conduct requirements for 
criminal liability. Section 204(1) prohibits liability absent an overt act or the 
failure to perform a legal duty.21 A fundamental principle of criminal law 
holds that it is inappropriate to punish “mere thoughts” unaccompanied by 
a physical act or failure to discharge a specified legal duty. Section 204(2) 
provides that, in the absence of clear language to the contrary, an offense’s 
conduct element may be satisfied by either an affirmative act or a failure to 
perform a legal duty. Section 204(3) defines the circumstances under which 
possession is considered an “act” for purposes of criminal liability. Section 
204(4) defines “act.”
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 204(1) is substantively 
similar to current 5/4-1. Section 502 covers current 5/4-1’s requirement 
that the act must be voluntary. See proposed Section 502 and corresponding 
commentary.
 Section 204(2) is substantively similar to current 5/2-2 and 5/4-1, but 
clarifies the relationship between omission liability and the elements of 
an offense. Current 5/2-2 and 5/4-1, respectively, define “act” to include a 
failure to act and provide that an omission to perform a legal duty may satisfy 
the act requirement. Section 204(2) explicitly recognizes that, in the absence 
of clear language stating otherwise, an offense definition will not preclude 
omission liability even if it uses terms (such as active verbs) that may appear 
to require an affirmative act. 
 Section 204(3) is substantively the same as current 5/4-2, but divides 
certain clauses into subparts to enhance clarity. Cf. IPI (CRIMINAL) 4.15 (4th 
ed. 2000).
 Section 204(4) corresponds to current 5/2-2, but provides an affirmative 
definition for “act,” whereas 5/2-2 states only that a “failure or omission to 
take action” also counts as an act. That definition fails to say what an act is, 
 21 Section 204(1) authorizes omission liability based on a failure to perform any “legal 
duty.” Such duties may arise, for example, from statutes imposing criminal liability for 
omitting to act, from civil statutes requiring certain conduct, from contractual obligations, or 
from case law (including civil decisions). The Illinois courts have similarly allowed omission 
liability to be premised on the failure to perform civil duties. See People v. Stanciel, 606 
N.E.2d 1201, 1211 (Ill. 1992) (citing civil case as basis for parent’s duty to care for child); 
People v. Haycraft, 278 N.E.2d 877, 882 (Ill. App. 1972) (affirming theft conviction based 
on omission to perform regulatory duty now appearing at 35 ILCS 200/20-55). Although 
an offense’s conduct element may be satisfied, under Section 204, by the failure to perform 
various sorts of legal duties, omission liability may only be imposed if the defendant also 
satisfies the offense’s remaining elements — including its culpability requirements.
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and also explicitly includes things that fall outside any intuitive definition 
of “act.” Additionally, defining “act” to include omissions effectively 
eviscerates the general requirement of an affirmative act. As Section 204(1) 
specifies, omission liability is appropriate only in certain specific situations 
— namely, where one is bound by a legal duty to act.
Section 205. Culpability Requirements
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/4-3, 5/4-9
Comment:
 Generally. Section 205 establishes rules governing the application of 
culpability requirements to objective elements. Section 205(1) specifies that 
some level of culpability is normally required as to each objective element of 
an offense. (Note that this and Section 205’s other requirements apply to those 
elements defined in the grading provisions as well as to elements appearing in 
the offense definition itself. Cf. proposed Section 202(1) (defining “element” 
to include issues appearing in grading provisions).) Section 205(2) provides 
a general rule that a stated culpability requirement for one objective element 
governs subsequently elaborated objective elements as well, in order to 
avoid unnecessary repetition. Section 205(3) provides a “read-in” culpability 
requirement of recklessness where no culpability level is specified (either 
through direct statement or through application of the rule of Section 205(2)), 
to avoid excess verbiage and ensure that offenses, or offense elements, do 
not allow absolute liability for want of an explicit culpability term for 
each element. Section 205(4) sets prerequisites for imposition of absolute 
liability. Section 205(5) establishes that culpability as to the criminality of 
one’s conduct is not required unless the offense definition so provides. For 
example, one need not know specifically that one is committing a crime, or 
intend to commit “a crime” per se, to be subject to liability. Section 205(6) 
points out that the requirement of a given culpability level is satisfied by 
proof of a more serious culpability level.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 205(1) is substantively similar 
to current 5/4-3(a), with two differences. First, Section 205(1) makes clear 
that culpability requirements apply only to “objective” elements, and not to 
stated culpability elements themselves: for example, a person need not be 
consciously aware that he is acting “recklessly,” or know that he is acting 
“knowingly.”
 Second, Section 205(1) explicitly requires culpability as to “every 
objective element” of an offense (except where Section 205(4) would allow 
absolute liability), whereas current 5/4-3(a)’s rule is limited to elements 
contained in the “statute defining the offense.” The Illinois courts have 
construed 5/4-3(a)’s language (which also appears in current 5/4-3(b)) very 
narrowly, and hold that the ordinary rules governing culpability requirements 
do not apply to provisions that impose “enhancing factors” that aggravate 
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punishment for certain offenses.22 The proposed Code rejects such a narrow 
application. Section 205(1) requires some level of culpability as to each 
objective element of the offense, regardless of whether it appears in an 
offense definition, grading provision, or other provision establishing the 
extent of liability.23 See proposed Section 202(1) (defining “elements” of 
an offense to include its grading provisions); cf. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
530 U.S. 466 (2000) (establishing constitutional rule that facts affecting 
defendant’s potential maximum punishment are offense elements and must 
be proved to jury beyond reasonable doubt).
 Section 205(2) clarifies the application of a stated culpability 
requirement within an offense. Under current 5/4-3(b)’s first sentence, a 
stated culpability requirement applies to every element in an offense if it 
is “prescribed . . . with respect to the offense as a whole.” This language 
is confusing, as it is difficult to determine when a requirement is meant to 
apply to the entire offense as opposed to a specific objective element. Section 
205(2) makes clear that sentence structure will govern application; a stated 
culpability requirement applies to all subsequent objective elements in the 
same grammatical clause, and any other subsequent objective elements where 
the legislature has suggested an intent to apply the same requirement.
 Section 205(3), like current 5/4-3(b)’s second sentence, establishes 
recklessness as the “read-in” culpability requirement for offense elements 
that otherwise have no specified culpability requirement. This “read-in” 
rule would apply to elements appearing in the grading provision as well 
as to elements in the offense definition itself. Cf. proposed Section 202(1) 
(defining “element” to include issues appearing in grading provisions). 
Generally, setting a default culpability level keeps offense definitions readable 
and ensures that absolute liability is avoided. Specifically, recklessness is set 
as the default level because it is the minimum level of culpability normally 
considered appropriate for criminal liability. This default rule tracks current 
5/4-3(b), which similarly states that if an offense does not prescribe a 
particular mental state, “any mental state defined in Sections 4-4, 4-5 or 4-6 
[i.e., intent, knowledge, and recklessness] is applicable.” This clearly means 
 22 See People v. Brooks, 648 N.E.2d 626, 629 (Ill. App. 1995) (“Section 4-3(a) speaks 
of scienter being necessary for each element ‘described by the statute defining the offense.’ . . . 
For the same reason, the provision of section 4-3(b) of the Criminal Code, which speaks of the 
mental state set forth in the ‘statute defining an offense’ as prevailing as to ‘each such element,’ 
refers to elements of the offense described in the defining statute. Thus, these provisions have 
no relevance to the elements of the enhancing statute.”); see also People v. Daniels, 718 N.E.2d 
1064, 1070-72 (Ill. App. 1999); People v. Pacheco, 666 N.E.2d 370, 375-76 (Ill. App. 1996). 
 23 Section 205(1)’s rule applies, for example, to grading provisions in the proposed 
Code that enhance punishment based on the existence of certain objective elements. With 
Section 205(3), Section 205(1) requires that a culpability requirement of recklessness be “read 
in” as to all objective elements in grading provisions for which a culpability requirement is not 
otherwise specified. See, e.g., proposed Section 1201(2)(d) (authorizing grade adjustment for 
assault based on victim’s status); proposed Section 1202(2)(a)(i) (aggravating offense grade 
where “great bodily harm is caused”); proposed Section 1301(4)(a) (grading sexual assault as 
Class X felony where “victim is less than 9 years old” or other factors are satisfied).
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that a person may be found liable based on a showing of any of those three 
mental states.
 However, the Illinois Supreme Court has interpreted 5/4-3 as requiring 
the court to choose which one of the three mental states should apply to a given 
offense — or has imposed a different culpability requirement altogether.24 
This judicial gloss distorts the statutory meaning and inappropriately restricts 
the culpability requirements for various offenses. The current Code’s failure 
to point out that lesser culpability requirements include stricter ones may 
have contributed to this fundamental misreading of a central Code provision. 
That failure tacitly reinforces the misunderstanding that the culpability 
requirements are meant to be mutually exclusive, so that each objective 
element must have one, and only one, corresponding culpability requirement. 
See infra commentary for proposed Section 205(6).
 Moreover, as a general matter, Illinois courts have sometimes failed to 
follow 5/4-3(a)’s rule that a person must have culpability “with respect to each 
element” of an offense — a rule which is reinforced by 5/4-9’s prohibition of 
absolute liability unless an offense “clearly indicates a legislative purpose to 
impose” such liability. This failure has taken three forms. First, courts have 
failed to apply 5/4-3(b)’s rule that a culpability requirement prescribed for 
an offense as a whole “applies to each . . . element” of the offense.25 Second, 
 24 See, e.g., People v. Gean, 573 N.E.2d 818, 822 (Ill. 1991) (“[W]hen a statute neither 
prescribes a particular mental state nor creates an absolute liability offense, then either intent, 
knowledge or recklessness applies. In the case at bar, we believe knowledge is the appropriate 
mental element.”); People v. Terrell, 547 N.E.2d 145, 158 (Ill. 1989) (“[T]he legislature 
clearly did not intend the aggravated criminal sexual assault statute to define a strict liability 
or public welfare offense. Accordingly, a mental state of either intent or knowledge implicitly 
is required[.]”); People v. Sevilla, 547 N.E.2d 117, 122 (Ill. 1989) (“Where a statute neither 
prescribes a particular mental state nor creates an absolute liability offense, then either intent, 
knowledge or recklessness applies. . . . [K]nowledge is the mental state element implied under 
the [Retailers’ Occupation Tax] Act.”); People v. Whitlow, 433 N.E.2d 629, 633, 634 (Ill. 
1982) (stating that “it is necessary to determine which of the[] mental states [referenced in 5/4-
3(b)] should apply to securities law violations,” and requiring “scienter . . . [which] embraces 
intentional or knowing misconduct”); People v. Banks, 388 N.E.2d 1244 (Ill. 1979) (finding 
robbery to be a “general intent” crime).
 25 See People v. Jones, 495 N.E.2d 1371, 1372-73 (Ill. App. 1986) (requiring no 
culpability as to fact that another person owned property in prosecution under 5/21-1(a) for 
“knowingly damaging . . . property of another”); People v. Ivy, 479 N.E.2d 399, 403-04 (Ill. 
App. 1985) (requiring no culpability as to fact of firearm’s type in prosecution under 5/24-
1(a)(7)(ii) and (b) for “knowingly . . . possess[ing] . . . a shotgun having one or more barrels 
less than 18 inches in length”); People v. Rickman, 391 N.E.2d 1114, 1117-18 (Ill. App. 1979) 
(requiring no culpability as to extent of resulting harm in prosecution under 5/12-4(a) for 
“intentionally or knowingly caus[ing] great bodily harm”).
 In some instances, interpretive problems have been caused by offense drafting that 
ignores current 5/4-3(b)’s rule of construction. See, e.g., People v. White, 608 N.E.2d 
1220, 1229 (Ill. App. 1993) (requiring no culpability as to victim’s age in prosecution under 
5/12-4(b)(10) for “knowingly . . . caus[ing] bodily harm to an individual of 60 years of age 
or older”) (citing People v. Jordan, 430 N.E.2d 389 (Ill. App. 1981) (finding that General 
Assembly indicated requirement of knowledge as to victim’s status in other provisions in 5/12-
4(b) by using the phrase “knows the individual harmed to be”)).
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where no culpability requirement is specified for an entire offense, courts 
have failed to “read in” the culpability requirement of recklessness that 5/4-
3(b) requires. This failure has most commonly related to two facts: the fact 
of a victim’s age in prosecutions under 5/12-14(b)(1) (now 5/12-14.1(a)(1)) 
for aggravated criminal sexual assault;26 and the fact of the proximity of 
certain types of property in prosecutions under 570/407(b) for delivery of a 
controlled substance.27 Third, where the courts acknowledge that the “read-
in” culpability requirement of 5/4-3(b) applies, they nonetheless hold that the 
jury need not be instructed about the culpability requirement.28 
 Section 205(4) is substantively similar to current 5/4-9, with a few 
minor modifications. First, Section 205(4) makes clear that it applies only 
to those objective elements for which a culpability requirement is not stated, 
rather than to entire offenses. Otherwise, any offense satisfying the criteria 
for absolute liability might be read to impose absolute liability as to all 
elements, even those for which a culpability requirement is stated. Second, 
Section 205(4) uses the term “culpability” in place of the phrase “one of the 
mental states described in Sections 4-4 through 4-7.” Third, as makes logical 
sense, Section 205(4)(a) extends current 5/4-9’s rule covering misdemeanors 
to petty and business offenses. (Note that Section 205(4)(b)’s requirement 
of a clear indication of legislative purpose to impose absolute liability is 
typically satisfied by employing the phrase “in fact” in place of a culpability 
requirement for a specific element of an offense. See, e.g., proposed Section 
 26 See People v. Barfield, 543 N.E.2d 157, 161 (Ill. App. 1989); cf. People v. Griffin, 
616 N.E.2d 1242, 1251 (Ill. App. 1993) (prosecution based on complicity theory; noting that 
strict liability is mens rea for aggravated criminal sexual assault against victim under 13 years 
old).
 27 See People v. Daniels, 718 N.E.2d 1064, 1070-72 (Ill. App. 1999) (church); People 
v. Pacheco, 666 N.E.2d 370, 375-76 (Ill. App. 1996) (school); People v. Brooks, 648 N.E.2d 
626 (Ill. App. 1995) (public housing property). As noted above, the courts’ holdings in these 
cases are based, in part, on a narrow interpretation of current 5/4-3’s use of the phrase “statute 
defining the offense.” See supra  commentary for proposed Section 205(1).
 28 See People v. Simms, 736 N.E.2d 1092, 1113-15 (Ill. 2000) (aggravated criminal 
sexual assault and armed robbery); People v. Adams, 638 N.E.2d 254, 258 (Ill. App. 1994) 
(armed violence); People v. Garland, 627 N.E.2d 377, 380-82 (Ill. App. 1993) (armed 
robbery); People v. Franzen, 622 N.E.2d 877, 891-92 (Ill. App. 1993) (aggravated criminal 
sexual assault); People v. DeBusk, 595 N.E.2d 1156, 1163-64 (Ill. App. 1992) (robbery); 
People v. Coleman, 560 N.E.2d 991, 1001-02 (Ill. App. 1990) (armed robbery); People v. 
Burton, 558 N.E.2d 1369, 1371-74 (Ill. App. 1990) (aggravated criminal sexual assault); 
People v. Podhrasky, 554 N.E.2d 578, 581-82 (Ill. App. 1990) (aggravated assault); People 
v. Avant, 532 N.E.2d 1141, 1145-47 (Ill. App. 1989) (robbery); People v. Talley, 531 N.E.2d 
1139 (Ill. App. 1988) (armed robbery); People v. Ortiz, 508 N.E.2d 490, 494 (Ill. App. 1987) 
(any offense involving sexual penetration); People v. Anderson, 417 N.E.2d 663, 668-69 (Ill. 
App. 1981) (armed robbery, rape, deviate sexual assault).
 Illinois law generally holds, however, that “certain instructions, such as the burden of 
proof and elements of the offense, are essential to a fair trial and that the failure to give such 
instructions constitutes grave error when, viewing the record as a whole, it appears that the 
jury was not apprised of the People’s burden of proof.” People v. Reddick , 526 N.E.2d 141, 
147 (Ill. 1988) (emphasis added).
26
Proposed Criminal Code Offi cial Commentary — Volume 2
1102(1)(b) (imposing felony-murder liability where one “in fact causes the 
death of another person” while committing forcible felony).)
 Section 205(5) is substantively similar to current 5/4-3(c). The word 
“knowledge” in 5/4-3(c) has been generalized to “culpability.”
 Section 205(6), which specifies that proof of a more culpable mental 
state will satisfy an offense’s requirement of a less serious one, has no 
corresponding provision in Chapter 720. The absence of such a provision 
has led Illinois courts to maintain a rigid distinction between culpable mental 
states, so that satisfaction of a higher level of culpability may preclude 
liability for an offense requiring a lower level of culpability. For example, 
the Illinois Supreme Court has found that “recklessness and knowledge 
are mutually inconsistent culpable mental states.” People v. Fornear, 680 
N.E.2d 1383, 1387 (Ill. 1997) (reversing, as legally inconsistent, convictions 
for multiple offenses where one required knowledge and another required 
recklessness) (relying on People v. Spears, 493 N.E.2d 1030 (Ill. 1986)). 
Failure to define criminal mental states as constituting a hierarchy — so that 
proof of deliberate intent will satisfy an objective element requiring only 
recklessness — will either lead to absurd results, or force the criminal code 
to define multiple culpability requirements for each objective element (thus 
becoming awkward and unwieldy),29 or both.
Section 206. Culpability Requirements Defined
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/4-4 to 5/4-7
Comment:
 Generally. Section 206 defines four culpability requirements — intent, 
knowledge, recklessness, and negligence — as they relate to each type of 
offense element: conduct, circumstance, and result. The proposed Code 
uses these four culpability levels, which are the norm for modern criminal 
 29 Perhaps because the Illinois Criminal Code currently lacks a provision similar to 
Section 205(6), numerous offenses in current Chapter 720 provide alternative culpability 
requirements for the same objective element or group of objective elements. See, e.g., 720 
ILCS 5/9-2.1(b) (“intentionally or knowingly”); 5/11-9.1(a) (“with intent or knowledge”); 
5/12-3(a) (“intentionally or knowingly”); 5/12-3.1(a) (“intentionally or knowingly”); 
5/12-3.2(a) (“intentionally or knowingly”); 5/12-3.3(a) (“intentionally or knowingly”); 
5/12-4(a) (“intentionally or knowingly”); 5/12-4.3(a) (“intentionally or knowingly”); 5/
12-4.4(a) (“intentionally or knowingly”); 5/12-4.6(a) (“intentionally or knowingly”); 5/14-
2(a)(2) (“knowing or having reason to know”); 5/16-1(a)(4) (“knowing . . . or under such 
circumstances as would reasonably induce him to believe”); 5/16-7(a)(1)-(4) (“Intentionally, 
knowingly or recklessly”); 5/16-8(a) (“intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or negligently”); 
5/16D-3(a)(4) (“knowing or having reason to believe”); 5/16F-4(a)(2)(i) (“knowing or having 
reason to believe”); 5/24-3.2(a),(b) (“knowingly or recklessly”); 5/24.6-20(a) (“intentionally 
or knowingly”); 5/33-3 (“intentionally or recklessly”). Section 205(6) eliminates any need to 
mention more than a single culpability level as to a particular objective element.
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codes, exclusively. Numerous current Illinois provisions, in contrast, employ 
other culpability requirements — such as “specific intent,”30 “having reason 
to know,”31 “reasonably should know,”32 “wil[l]fully,”33 “maliciously,”34 
“fraudulently,”35 “designedly,”36 or a combination of the foregoing and 
others.37 The proposed Code rejects the use of such outmoded, and 
undefined,38 culpability terms in defining offenses.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 206 is generally similar to 
current 5/4-4 through 5/4-7. Cf. IPI (CRIMINAL) 5.01 to 5.02 (4th ed. 2000). 
However, for each of the defined culpability levels, Section 206 breaks the 
definition down into subsections for each of the three element types: conduct, 
circumstance, and result. (The current definitions are structurally inconsistent, 
and incomplete, in this respect: whereas current 5/4-5 defines “knowledge” 
with respect to conduct, results, and the “attendant circumstances of . . . 
conduct,” current 5/4-4 fails to define “intent” as to circumstance elements, 
and 5/4-6 and 5/4-7 fail to define “recklessness” and “negligence,” 
 30 See 720 ILCS 5/6-3(a).
 31 See 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(2),(3); 5/12-11; 690/2; see also 20 ILCS 1805/94a(b)(1); 625 
ILCS 5/18c-7502(a)(iii).
 32 See 720 ILCS 5/11-20.1; 5/12-21; 5/20-1.1; 5/24-1.2; 5/24.6-20; 5/29B-1; 510/11.
 33 See 720 ILCS 5/12-4.8; 5/12-9(a); 5/12-21.6; 5/16-1.2; 5/16-3(b); 5/16B-2(d); 5/17-
15; 5/17-22; 5/17B-10(b); 5/21-.2-2; 5/32-10; 5/33C-2; 5/33C-3; 5/33E-16; 130/2; 130/2a; 
150/4.1; 660/2; see also, e.g., 15 ILCS 520/23; 30 ILCS 230/2b; 35 ILCS 5/1301; 35 ILCS 
130/22, /23; 55 ILCS 5/3-11019; 205 ILCS 5/49; 205 ILCS 620/8-1; 205 ILCS 635/4-4; 205 
ILCS 690/36; 215 ILCS 5/1023; 410 ILCS 535/27; 625 ILCS 5/4-103.2(a)(7).
 34 See 720 ILCS 5/16B-2.1; see also, e.g., 20 ILCS 2305/2.
 35 See 720 ILCS 5/16G-15(a); 5/17-13; 5/17-16; 5/33C-1; 5/33C-4; see also, e.g., 20 
ILCS 4020/22; 35 ILCS 130/22; 35 ILCS 200/21-306(a)(2); 310 ILCS 10/25.04; 320 ILCS 
25/9.
 36 See 720 ILCS 5/17-17.
 37 See 720 ILCS 5/17-1(A)(iii) (“wilfully, and with . . . specific intent”); 5/17-18 
(“wilfully and designedly”); 5/21-1.1 (“wilfully and maliciously”); 5/32-11 (“wickedly 
and willfully”); 125/2 (“[w]ilfully obstructs or interferes with . . . specific intent”); 300/1 
(“willfully and maliciously”); 360/1 (“wilfully and maliciously”); 540/1 (“wilfully, corruptly 
and falsely”); see also, e.g., 55 ILCS 5/3-14043 (“wilfully, corruptly and falsely”); 105 ILCS 
10/9 (“wilfully and maliciously”); 210 ILCS 85/65.17 (“wilfully or wantonly”); 605 ILCS 
10/28 (“wilfully, maliciously and forcibly”); 610 ILCS 95/1 (“willfully and maliciously”); 625 
ILCS 5/11-503 (“willful or wanton disregard”).
 38 Currently, there are no pattern jury instructions defining culpability levels other 
than intent, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence. See IPI (CRIMINAL) 5.01 et seq. (4th ed. 
2000). The pattern jury instructions, like current 5/4-5 and 5/4-6, contain language equating 
“knowingly” with “willfully,” and “recklessly” with “wantonly.” See IPI (CRIMINAL) 5.01, 
5.01B (4th ed. 2000). Current 5/4-5 and 5/4-6 provide, however, that such equivalence does 
not exist where a statute “clearly requires a different meaning.” See 720 ILCS 5/4-5; 5/4-6. It 
is unclear, therefore, whether “willfully” should be considered synonymous with “knowingly” 
for the numerous current offenses specifying both culpability levels with respect to a single 
element or set of elements. Cf., e.g., 720 ILCS 5/12-4.8 (“knowingly and willfully”); 5/12-
9(a) (“knowingly and willfully”); 5/17B-10(b) (“willfully facilitates, aids, abets, assists, or 
knowingly participates in a known violation”); 130/2 (“knowingly or wilfully”); 130/2a 
(“knowingly or wilfully”). 
ILL Code  V II Gen Part   27 7/2/03, 1:18:32 PM
28
Proposed Criminal Code Offi cial Commentary — Volume 2
respectively, with respect to conduct elements.) Section 206’s formulation 
provides a consistent and precise structure for defining the culpability 
requirements for each offense. Moreover, with respect to the conduct element 
of each culpability level definition, Section 206 adds language to cover 
situations, like conspiracy, where the actor enlists another to engage in the 
prohibited conduct. The modifier “consciously” has generally been removed 
from the term “aware” as redundant.
 Other than the differences explained above, Section 206(1)’s definition 
of “intent” is similar to current 5/4-4. However, Section 206(1)(d) adds 
language to clarify that conditional intent satisfies the requirement of intention 
required by an offense, “unless the condition eliminates the harm or wrong 
sought to be prevented by . . . the offense.” This conditional-intent provision 
makes clear that a person whose intent is predicated on some factual situation 
(e.g., the burglar who intends to steal from the premises, but only if he finds 
something valuable therein) will satisfy a culpability requirement of intent.
 Section 206(2) is substantively similar to current 5/4-5, but makes 
three modifications to the definition of knowledge. First, Section 206(2) 
eliminates the current language equating “knowingly” with “wilfully” in 
order to keep the culpability terms limited and consistent. Second, Section 
206(2)(b)’s definition of knowledge with respect to circumstances replaces 
“is consciously aware” with “believes.” Although an offense definition may 
require the actual existence of a circumstance for liability for the completed 
offense, the proposed provision’s language allows for inchoate liability 
where one’s subjective belief is not objectively true. Third, Section 206(2)(b) 
requires belief of a “high,” rather than a “substantial,” probability that a 
circumstance exists to more clearly distinguish knowledge from the less 
culpable mental state of recklessness. 
 Section 206(3) is substantively similar to current 5/4-6, but eliminates 
the language equating “recklessly” with “wantonly” in order to keep the 
culpability terms limited and consistent.
 Section 206(4) is substantively similar to current 5/4-7’s definition of 
“negligence,” but requires that the departure from the standard of care must 
be “gross” rather than “substantial.” This modification distinguishes criminal 
negligence from mere tort negligence and ensures that an actor’s failure to be 
aware of something is sufficiently blameworthy to warrant the criminal law’s 
condemnation.
Section 207. Ignorance or Mistake Negating Required Culpability
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/4-8(a)
Comment:
 Generally. Section 207 makes it explicit that an offense definition’s 
requirements are not satisfied if a person’s ignorance or mistake as to a fact 
or law negates a required culpability level.
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 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 207(1) is substantively similar 
to current 5/4-8(a), with three minor modifications. First, Section 207(1) 
provides that “a required culpable mental state is not satisfied” if it is 
negatived by ignorance or a mistake, whereas current 5/4-8(a) states that 
ignorance or mistake provides a “defense” in such a situation. Section 207(1) 
avoids the current “defense” formulation to make clear that the provision does 
not remove or reduce the prosecution’s burdens of production and persuasion 
as to all elements of the offense, including culpability requirements. See 
proposed Section 107 and corresponding commentary.
 Second, Section 207(1) explicitly recognizes that in some cases — such 
as where one mistakenly believes that he is committing a more serious 
offense — proposed Sections 303 and 304 will permit imputation of an 
offense’s culpability requirement in spite of the actor’s ignorance or mistake 
as to an objective element.
 Third, Section 207(1) omits as unnecessary current 5/4-8(a)’s reference 
to 5/4-3(c)’s rule that knowledge as to criminality is not required unless the 
relevant statute clearly so provides. This omission does not limit or otherwise 
affect the operation of Section 205(5)’s similar rule regarding culpability as 
to criminality.
 Section 207(2) refines current law by explaining the conditions under 
which a mistake “negatives” an offense’s culpability requirement. Section 
207(2) categorizes mistakes as reckless, negligent, or reasonable.39 Just as 
there are different levels of culpability as to conduct, there are different 
categories of mistakes — some innocent, some not — and a mistake at 
which a person arrives through culpability equal to, or greater than, the 
requirement of the offense itself should not exonerate the person. In other 
words, a person’s recklessness as to forming or holding a mistaken belief 
should not preclude liability where the offense definition itself requires only 
recklessness as to the subject of the belief. Accordingly, Section 207(2) states 
that a reckless mistake may negate only intention or knowledge; a negligent 
mistake negates intention, knowledge, and recklessness; and a reasonable 
mistake negates any of the four culpability levels.
 Section 207(3) defines the terms “reckless mistake,” “negligent 
mistake,” and “reasonable mistake.” Section 207(3)(a) and (3)(b)’s definitions 
of “reckless mistake” and “negligent mistake” require, respectively that the 
actor be “reckless” or “negligent” in forming or holding an erroneous belief. 
Section 207(3)(c)’s definition of “reasonable mistake” applies to erroneous 
beliefs that an actor forms or holds neither recklessly nor negligently. Section 
207(3)’s definitions are intended to incorporate by reference Section 206’s 
definitions of the culpability levels of recklessness and negligence; whether 
a mistake is reckless, negligent, or reasonable is to be determined with 
reference to the standards set forth in Section 206(3) and (4).
 39 Under Section 207, a mistake can be, at most, reckless. One cannot make an 
intentional or knowing mistake.
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Section 208. Mental Disease or Defect Negating Required Culpability
Corresponding Current Provision(s): None
Comment:
 Generally. Section 208 recognizes that a mental disease or defect, like 
ignorance or mistake, may negate an offense’s culpability requirement. Section 
208 makes clear that evidence of mental disease or defect may be relevant in 
contexts other than those covered by the proposed Code’s excuse defense for 
insanity and nonexculpatory defense for incompetent persons. See proposed 
Sections 504 and 604 and corresponding commentary. For example, the 
insanity defense provides a freestanding excuse when a person satisfies all 
culpability requirements of the offense itself, but merits exoneration because 
he could not control his conduct or understand the criminal nature of his 
act. Section 208, on the other hand, would apply in cases where the person’s 
mental incapacity prevented him from satisfying the offense’s elements in the 
first place, as where an offense requires knowledge and the person’s mental 
incapacity prevented him from “knowing” something another person might 
know. For example, where, due to a mental disease or defect, a defendant 
enters another’s home believing it to be his own, he would not satisfy all 
the elements of trespass, in that he would lack the requisite knowledge that 
he entered a place where he had no license or authority to be. See proposed 
Section 2303. In such a case, the admissibility of evidence related to the 
defendant’s mental disease or defect should not rest on his ability to present 
sufficient evidence to properly raise an insanity excuse under Section 504.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Although Section 208 has no 
corresponding provision in current Chapter 720, Illinois courts have 
implicitly recognized that mental disease or defect may negate the culpability 
requirement for an offense element. See, e.g., People v. Leppert, 434 N.E.2d 
21, 23 (Ill. App. 1982) (considering defendant’s claim that, due to mental 
defect, he lacked the requisite intent to attempt murder).
Section 209. Definitions
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/2-2; 5/4-4; 5/4-5; 
  5/4-6; 5/4-7; 5/6-2(b)
 Generally. This provision collects defined terms used in Article 200 and 
provides cross-references to the provisions in which they are defined. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. For discussion of the relationship 
between Article 200’s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary 
for the provision in which each term is initially defined.
ILL Code  V II Gen Part   30 7/2/03, 1:18:34 PM
31
Part I: General Provisions
ARTICLE 250. DEFENSES RELATED TO THE OFFENSE
HARM OR WRONG
Section 251. Consent
Corresponding Current Provision(s): Various; see, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/9-
  1.2(c); 5/10-1(b); 5/11-23(a); 
  5/12-13(a)(2); 5/12-15(a)(2); 
  5/12-16.2(d); 5/12-17(a); 5/12- 
  32(a); 5/14-2(a)(1), 5/16-3(a), 
  5/20-1(a); 5/21-1(1); 5/21-1.2(a); 
  5/21-1.3(a); 5/21-4(1). 
Comment:
 Generally. Section 251 establishes rules governing when the consent of 
one who would otherwise be the victim of an offense will preclude criminal 
liability. Section 251(1) defines the general rule; Section 251(2) provides 
special rules for offenses involving bodily harm; and Section 251(3) defines 
the circumstances under which a person’s agreement will not constitute valid 
legal consent.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 251 has no directly 
corresponding provision in current Chapter 720, which instead defines 
consent as a defense, or its absence as an offense element, for several specific 
offenses.40 Current Illinois law’s repeated use of the phrase “without consent” 
fails to clearly articulate the rules required to properly determine liability. 
Section 251 recognizes that a person’s agreement will not always constitute 
valid legal consent (for example, where the person is incompetent or the 
“consent” is coerced), and ensures that the proposed Code is both clear in 
explaining when consent precludes liability and consistent in its treatment of 
consent from one offense to another.
 Section 251(1) provides that a victim’s consent will preclude liability, 
as a general matter, if it negatives either an offense element or the harm or 
wrong at which the offense is aimed. For example, several offense definitions 
in the proposed Code41 explicitly include the absence of a person’s “consent” 
 40 See, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/9-1.2(c); 5/10-1(b); 5/11-23(a); 5/12-13(a)(2); 5/12-15(a)(2); 
5/12-16.2(d); 5/12-17(a); 5/12-32(a); 5/14-2(a)(1), 5/16-3(a), 5/20-1(a); 5/21-1(1); 5/21-1.2(a); 
5/21-1.3(a); 5/21-4(1).
 41 See, e.g., proposed Sections 1301(1)(c)(ii) and 1302(1)(c)(ii) (requiring knowledge 
as to victim’s inability to consent); proposed Section 2111(1)(a)-(c) (requiring conduct be 
performed “without consent of the owner”); proposed Section 2402(1) (requiring knowledge 
as to absence of victim’s consent); proposed Section 4104(1) (requiring conduct be performed 
“without the consent” of parent or guardian).
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as an offense element.42 Less obviously, Section 251(1) would also apply 
to offenses requiring that the defendant accomplish something by “force or 
threat of force,”43 against another’s “will,” or without “authority.”44
 Section 251(1) also provides a defense for situations where consent 
does not negative an explicit offense element, but nevertheless “precludes the 
infliction of the harm or wrong sought to be prohibited” by an offense. For 
example, proposed Article 2200 includes several offenses that criminalize 
damaging or endangering the property of “another.” See, e.g., proposed 
Sections 2201(1)(a), 2202(1)(b), 2203, 2206. Although a victim’s consent 
does not negative such offenses’ requirement that the property involved belong 
to “another,” it does negative the harm at which the offenses are aimed.
 Section 251(2) creates special rules for consent to bodily harm in 
recognition that, in limited circumstances, consent to such harm should 
preclude criminal liability even though it does not negative either an offense 
element or the harm the offense seeks to punish. Section 251(2)’s rules 
operate independently of Section 251(1)’s general rules regarding consent 
— that is, a consent defense exists if either Section 251(1) or Section 251(2) 
is satisfied; both are not required.
 Section 251(2)(a) provides that consent to bodily harm is a defense where 
the bodily harm is not “serious.” Current Illinois law also typically denies a 
consent defense for offenses involving severe harm, although it provides 
that consent may preclude liability for such serious conduct as mutilating 
another or exposing another to HIV. See 720 ILCS 5/12-16.2(d) (consent 
 42 Under current law, there is disagreement between the Illinois courts and the pattern 
jury instructions as to whether “without consent” is an offense element or an affirmative 
defense for property-damage offenses. Compare, e.g., People v. May, 262 N.E.2d 908, 910 
(Ill. 1970) (consent is affirmative defense for which defendant bears burden of production), 
with IPI (CRIMINAL) 16.01 (absence of consent is offense element for which State bears burden 
of production). The proposed Code treats an offense definition’s requirement of the absence of 
consent as a circumstance element for which the prosecution bears the burdens of production 
and persuasion. See proposed Section 107(2) and (3) (State bears burden of proof as to offense 
“elements”); proposed Section 202(1) (defining “elements” to include requirements “contained 
in the offense definition or the provisions establishing the offense grade or the severity of the 
punishment”). Because the absence of consent is an element, the proposed Code’s culpability 
rules apply to that issue. See proposed Section 205 and corresponding commentary.
 43 Section 251(1)’s rule is in keeping with current 5/12-17(a)’s first sentence, which 
provides that a victim’s consent precludes liability for sexual assault and abuse offenses 
requiring the use or threat of force. Section 251(1) is broader than 5/12-17(a), however, and 
would allow consent to serve as a defense for other sorts of offenses (such as proposed Section 
1501(1)’s robbery offense) that involve “force or threat of force.”
 44 See, e.g., proposed Section 1301(1)(b) (sexual assault committed where one has sexual 
intercourse by “force or threat of force”); proposed Section 1401(1) (kidnaping committed 
where one secretly confines or moves another “against his will”); proposed Section 1501(1) 
(robbery committed where one takes property “by force or threat of force”); proposed Section 
2102(1) (theft by taking committed where one obtains “unauthorized control” of property of 
another); proposed Section 2302(1) (burglary committed where one enters or remains in place 
“without license or authority”); proposed Section 3101(1)(a) (forgery committed where one 
alters another’s writing “without his authority”).
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to HIV exposure presents defense to offense of “criminal transmission of 
HIV”); 5/12-32(a) (absence of victim’s consent element of offense of “ritual 
mutilation”). Section 251(2)(a), by contrast, uniformly provides that consent 
does not preclude liability for offenses involving serious bodily harm.45
 Section 251(2)(b), consistent with current law, recognizes consent as 
a defense where the bodily harm caused or threatened occurs in a lawful 
sport or athletic contest. Cf. People v. Hussey, 279 N.E.2d 732, 734 (Ill. App. 
1972) (“Consent . . . justifies a battery, or rather, excuses it, as in a boxing 
match, football game, or being jostled on a crowded bus.”); 2 JOHN F. DECKER, 
ILLINOIS CRIMINAL LAW: A SURVEY OF CRIMES AND DEFENSES § 19.57, at 396 (3d 
ed. 2000) (“Since societal values accept some forms of infliction of physical 
attacks, most notably in legitimate athletic contests such as boxing and 
football, the willingness of the participants will prevail.”).
 Section 251(3) recognizes four sets of circumstances under which a 
victim’s assent will not constitute effective consent. Section 251(3)’s rules 
are generally consistent with the understanding that consent “implies a 
willingness, voluntariness, free will, reasoned or intelligent choice, physical 
or moral power of acting, or an active act of concurrence (as opposed to a 
passive assent) unclouded by fraud, duress, or mistake.” People v. Whitten, 
647 N.E.2d 1062, 1067 (Ill. App. 1995). Section 251(3)(a) provides that a 
person’s agreement will not provide a defense where he is legally incompetent 
to authorize the conduct constituting the offense. Section 251(3)(a) makes 
clear, for example, that permission to operate a motor vehicle by one 
who merely pretends to be the owner will not itself preclude liability for 
joyriding.46 Cf. proposed Section 2111(1)(a).
 Section 251(3)(b) makes clear that consent will not preclude liability 
where the victim lacks the mental capacity to consent. Current Chapter 
720 sometimes defines offenses to require that the actor know the victim 
is “unable to give knowing consent.” See, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/12-13(a)(2) 
(criminal sexual assault); 5/12-15(a)(2) (criminal sexual abuse); cf. 5/12-
32(a) (ritual mutilation; offense occurs if victim does not consent or is “under 
such circumstances that the defendant knew or should have known that the 
 45 Section 251(2)(a) is not intended, however, to impair the rights to sexual intimacy that 
seem to motivate current 5/12-16.2(d)’s consent defense for HIV exposure. Although liability 
for reckless endangerment might be appropriate where an infected person has consensual, but 
unprotected, sex with another, Section 1202’s requirement of creating a “substantial” risk of 
harm would seem to preclude liability for consent cases involving “safe” sex.
 46 An actor’s mistake as to consent will ordinarily be immaterial where consent operates 
strictly as an affirmative defense. Where the absence of consent is an offense element as to 
which culpability is required, however, a mistake as to consent may negative that requirement. 
For example, although the assent of a person merely pretending to be a car’s owner would not 
constitute effective consent, a defendant’s reasonable or negligent mistake as to the assent’s 
effectiveness would negative the joyriding offense’s requirement of recklessness as to the 
absence of consent. See proposed Section 207 and corresponding commentary; proposed 
Section 2111(1)(a) and corresponding commentary. A mistake as to consent may similarly 
negative offense elements other than the absence of “consent” per se, such as whether the actor 
had “authority” or was acting “against another’s will.” See supra note 44.
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victim was unable to render effective consent”). In the absence of a provision 
similar to Section 251(3)(b), however, such language does not provide 
guidance concerning what sorts of people might lack the capacity to consent, 
or the extent to which their judgment must be impaired. Moreover, by using 
such language in some places but not others, current Illinois law suggests that 
the risk of ineffective consent is a concern only for certain offenses.
 Section 251(3)(c) provides that assent does not constitute effective 
consent where it is given by one whose imprudent consent the law seeks to 
protect against. For example, a minor’s consent to sexual intercourse will not 
preclude liability for “statutory rape,” precisely because that offense aims 
to prevent such improvident consent. See proposed Section 1301(1)(a) and 
corresponding commentary. 
 Finally, Section 251(3)(d) provides that consent is not a defense where 
it is induced by force, duress, or deception. Section 251(3)(d) is similar 
to current 5/12-17(a)’s rule that “consent” includes only “freely given 
agreement,” but is not limited to only sexual assault and abuse offenses.
Section 252. Customary License; De Minimis Infraction; and Conduct
 Not Envisaged by Legislature as Prohibited by the Offense
Corresponding Current Provision(s): None
Comment:
 Generally. This provision sets out “defenses” — actually modifications 
of the meaning of the underlying offense definitions — for persons whose 
conduct was within a customary license, was too insignificant to merit 
criminal punishment, or did not cause the harm contemplated by the offense’s 
existence. These provisions enable the court to dismiss prosecutions on 
these bases, creating an additional safeguard beyond the usual reliance on 
prosecutorial discretion. These “defenses” are to be presented to, and ruled 
on by, the court prior to trial, rather than to the jury at trial.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 252 has no corresponding 
provision in current Chapter 720. Section 252’s defenses are consistent, 
however, with the well-accepted rule of construction that a statute should not 
be interpreted to produce an absurd result.47
 47 See, e.g., People v. Murphy, 752 N.E.2d 19, 27 (Ill. 2001) (noting that courts have a 
“duty to avoid construing a statute to defeat the purpose of the legislation or yield an absurd or 
unjust result”); People v. Love, 687 N.E.2d 32, 35 (Ill. 1997) (noting that courts have a “duty 
to interpret statutes so as to avoid absurd consequences”); People v. Haywood, 515 N.E.2d 
45, 48 (Ill. 1987) (“It cannot be presumed that the General Assembly, in legislating, intended 
obscurity, or ‘to override common sense.’”) (quoting United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25 
(1948)); People v. Beam, 384 N.E.2d 1315, 1316 (Ill. 1979) (“Courts are not bound . . . by 
a literal reading of a statute if that reading was clearly not intended.”); cf. People v. Bailey, 
657 N.E.2d 953, 960 (Ill. 1995) (“While the stalking and aggravated stalking statutes do not 
contain the phrase ‘without lawful authority,’ we interpret the statutes as proscribing only 
conduct performed ‘without lawful authority.’”).
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 Section 252(1) provides that conduct may be exempt from liability 
if it is within a “customary license.” For example, where a landowner had 
previously allowed his neighbors to use his yard as a shortcut, even though 
the yard was posted against trespassing, Section 252(1) would provide a 
defense to the neighbors if the landowner unexpectedly decided to accuse 
them of trespassing. Section 252(1)’s defense is not available, however, 
where a license has been “expressly negatived by the person whose interest 
was infringed” or is inconsistent with the relevant offense.
 Section 252(2) recognizes a defense for conduct that, although 
technically constituting an offense, is too trivial to fairly to warrant a criminal 
conviction. For example, one might technically commit an offense by being 
less than a minute late in reporting for periodic detention. See proposed 
Section 5307(1)(b)(ii).
 Section 252(3) provides a defense where one did not actually cause 
the harm or wrong at which the offense is aimed. For example, the current 
public indecency offense would appear to reach private, consensual sex 
between spouses. See 720 ILCS 5/11-9 (public indecency involves exposure 
in “any place where the conduct may reasonably be expected to be viewed by 
others”). Section 252(3) would allow the court to dismiss a prosecution based 
on such conduct, because it would not involve the sort of harm the offense 
aims to prohibit.
 Section 252(4) and (5) place important limitations on the defenses to 
ensure that they are not abused. Section 252(4) provides that the court may 
not dismiss a charge on the basis of a defense set forth in Section 252 without 
filing a written statement of its reasons for doing so. Section 252(5) provides 
that the defendant bears the burden of persuasion and must prove the defenses 
by a preponderance of the evidence.
Section 253. Prosecution When the Defendant Satisfies the
 Requirements of More than One Offense
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/3-3
Comment:
 Generally. This provision sets out the rules for prosecuting persons 
whose conduct may violate two or more offenses at the same time.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 253(1), which provides that a 
defendant whose conduct satisfies the requirements of multiple offenses may 
be prosecuted for each such offense, is identical to current 5/3-3(a).48
 48 Section 253(1), like current 5/3-3(a), clearly states that a defendant who commits 
multiple offenses by the same conduct “may be prosecuted for each . . . offense.” Thus “where 
conduct violates two criminal statutes possessing different elements or defenses . . . the State is 
free to prosecute under whichever carries the greater penalty.” People v. Simmons, 430 N.E.2d 
1032, 1035 (Ill. 1981); see also People v. Brooks, 357 N.E.2d 1169, 1172 (Ill. 1976); People 
v. Gordon, 355 N.E.2d 3, 6 (Ill. 1976).  (continued…)
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 Section 253(2) provides that multiple offenses based on the same 
conduct should, as a general rule, be prosecuted together. Section 253(2) is 
the same as current 5/3-3(b), except that the phrase “based on the same act” 
has been moved to enhance clarity.
 Section 253(3) allows for separate trials for offenses based on the same 
conduct. Section 253(3) is nearly identical to current 5/3-3(c), but omits the 
word “shall” as superfluous and replaces the current phrase “in the interest 
of justice” with an explicit reference to 725 ILCS 5/114-8, which governs 
severance of trials, to avoid arguments that this provision grants the court 
residual authority beyond that provided in the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
Section 254. Conviction When the Defendant Satisfies the Requirements
 of More than One Offense or Grade
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/2-9; 5/8-5
Comment:
 Generally. Section 254 defines the circumstances under which the court 
may enter multiple convictions when a person’s criminal conduct satisfies 
the requirements of more than one offense. Significantly, this provision 
does not restate (or even directly relate to) the constitutional prohibition 
on double jeopardy, but is more comprehensive, addressing broad general 
issues regarding the appropriateness of multiple liability that go beyond 
the Constitution’s minimum requirements. Moreover, this provision does 
not address any procedural issues relating to how, or when, a jury is to be 
instructed regarding various offenses, such as “included offenses” of charged 
offenses. Section 254 speaks only to the issue of when multiple liability is 
appropriate and allowed under the proposed Code.
 48 (…continued)
 In the context of drug conspiracies, however, Illinois courts have stated that the more 
specific conspiracy offenses appearing in the Cannabis Control Act and the Controlled 
Substances Act may “preempt” current 5/8-2’s general conspiracy offense. See People v. 
Robinson, 614 N.E.2d 531, 532 (Ill. App. 1993) (“[W]here more than two conspirators are 
involved, the more specific conspiracy provision of the Cannabis Control Act pre-empts 
prosecution under the general conspiracy statute.”); People v. Caballero, 604 N.E.2d 1028, 
1036 (Ill. App. 1992) (“[A] specific statute, such as the calculated criminal drug conspiracy 
statute at issue here, preempts a prosecution under the general conspiracy statute . . . to the 
extent that the specific statute is applicable.”); People v. Urban, 553 N.E.2d 740, 742 (Ill. 
App. 1990) (“[W]here the defendant has been charged with conspiracy to deliver more than 
30 grams but no more than 500 grams of . . . cannabis, the Cannabis Control Act preempts 
section 8-2.”); People v. Taylor, 309 N.E.2d 595, 596 (Ill. App. 1974) (“Did the legislature by 
the passage of the Cannabis Control Act preempt in toto a possible prosecution for conspiracy 
to violate that Act? We conclude that it did.”).
 The proposed Code does not provide for such “preemption.” Although Section 254 may 
limit the entry of multiple convictions based on the same conduct, Section 253 does not limit 
multiple prosecutions (i.e., multiple counts or charges) based on the same conduct.
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 Relation to current Illinois law. Current Chapter 720 provides little 
guidance regarding when multiple convictions are allowed or appropriate. 
Rather, the current Code merely defines the term “included offense,” see 
720 ILCS 5/2-9, and provides that “[n]o person shall be convicted of both 
the inchoate and the principal offense.” See 720 ILCS 5/8-5. The current 
Code’s failure to deal comprehensively with this critical issue has left the 
Illinois courts to fall back on the so-called “one-act, one-crime” rule, which 
has two components: (1) multiple convictions may not be “carved from the 
same physical act,” and (2) liability may not be imposed for one offense that 
is included in another.49 See, e.g., People v. McLaurin, 703 N.E.2d 11, 32-34 
(Ill. 1998); People v. Rodriguez, 661 N.E.2d 305 (Ill. 1996); People v. King, 
363 N.E.2d 838, 844-45 (Ill. 1977).
 The first aspect of this rule is problematic. Sometimes a single act merits 
liability as more than one offense, for it may cause several independent harms 
at once. For example, an offender who commits murder by setting his victim 
on fire also, by the same act, creates the risk of property damage and further 
jeopardy to life that the arson offense seeks to punish. In People v. McLaurin, 
however, the Illinois Supreme Court vacated the defendant’s arson conviction 
under those facts because it ran afoul of the “one-act, one-crime” rule. See 
703 N.E.2d at 34.
 In apparent recognition of its shortcomings, the Illinois courts have 
placed three important limitations on the “one-act, one-crime” rule that 
enable multiple convictions where a defendant causes multiple harms. First, 
 49 The basis of the “one-act, one-crime” rule is unclear. Federal precedent makes clear 
that the U.S. Constitution does not require such a rule. See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 N.E.2d 
359, 368-69 (1983) (“Where . . . a legislature specifically authorizes cumulative punishment 
under two statutes, regardless of whether those two statutes proscribe the ‘same’ conduct . . 
. , a court’s task of statutory construction is at an end and the prosecutor may seek and the 
trial court or jury may impose cumulative punishment under such statutes in a single trial.”); 
Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 340 (1981) (“[T]he question of what punishments 
are constitutionally permissible is not different from the question of what punishment the 
Legislative Branch intended to be imposed. Where Congress intended . . . to impose multiple 
punishments, imposition of such sentences does not violate the Constitution.”).
 The current Criminal Code also does not establish any such rule. Indeed, the General 
Assembly may have intended to abolish the rule for many cases in which it is applied. See 
730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(a) (mandating consecutive sentences in certain circumstances “for offenses 
which were committed as part of a single course of conduct during which there was no 
substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective”); cf. People v. Rodriguez, 661 
N.E.2d 305, 310 (Ill. 1996) (Heiple, J., concurring) (noting that 5/5-8-4(a) “overrules” the 
“one-act, one-crime” rule).
 Further, the Illinois courts have not explained, or even addressed, whether some other 
source such as the Illinois Constitution mandates the rule. In fact, People v. King, the leading 
case on the “one-act, one-crime” rule, explicitly recognized that “[m]ultiple convictions and 
consecutive sentences have been permitted against claims of double jeopardy for offenses 
based on a single act but requiring proof of different facts.” 363 N.E.2d 838, 844 (Ill. 1977) 
(citing Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 
299 (1931)).
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the courts have created a “multiple victim” exception to the rule.50 Second, 
the Illinois Supreme Court has held that, even where there are not multiple 
victims, the “one-act, one-crime” rule does not necessarily prevent liability 
for multiple offenses that share a common act.51 Finally, the scope of what 
counts as “one act” has been drawn narrowly, so that defendants are frequently 
found to have performed “multiple acts” allowing multiple convictions.52
 50 See, e.g., People v. Shum, 512 N.E.2d 1183, 1202 (Ill. 1987) (upholding murder and 
feticide convictions for “single physical act” of killing mother because “[i]n Illinois it is well 
settled that separate victims require separate convictions and sentences”); People v. Hanks, 
528 N.E.2d 1044, 1047-48 (Ill. App. 1988) (“We conclude defendant was properly convicted 
of two offenses of aggravated arson against two victims resulting from defendant’s single act 
of arson.”); People v. Mercado, 456 N.E.2d 331 (Ill. App. 1983) (upholding three convictions 
for reckless homicide arising from single automobile accident).
 Section 254 similarly would not preclude multiple convictions in the multiple-victim 
situation. For example, Section 254(1)(a)(i)(A) would not bar liability for killing one victim 
and endangering another by the same conduct; in such a case, the offense of homicide would 
not account for the harm of endangerment, precisely because the latter offense involves a 
different victim.
 51 See People v. Rodriguez, 661 N.E.2d 305, 307-08 (Ill. 1996) (“Applying King to the 
present case, we conclude that the aggravated criminal sexual assault offense and the home 
invasion offense were based on separate acts. Although both offenses shared the common act 
of defendant threatening the victim with a gun, ‘[a] person can be guilty of two offenses when 
a common act is part of both offenses.’”) (quoting People v. Lobdell, 459 N.E.2d 260, 263 (Ill. 
App. 1983)); People v. Tate, 436 N.E.2d 272, 276 (Ill. App. 1982) (“one-act, one-crime” rule 
does not preclude multiple liability “when a common act is part of both offenses or part of one 
offense and the only act of another”).
 Not surprisingly, this second exception to the “one-act, one-crime” rule appears to be 
the source of some confusion in the lower courts. Compare, e.g., People v. White, 724 N.E.2d 
572, 582 (Ill. App. 2000) (“Although both offenses shared the common act of possession of a 
weapon, armed violence required the additional act of possession of the drugs, and unlawful 
possession of a weapon by a felon required the additional element of status as a felon. 
Accordingly, the two offenses did not result from precisely the same physical act.”), with 
People v. Williams, 707 N.E.2d 980, 982 (Ill. App. 1999) (“In the case decided herein, the 
common act is a felon possessing a gun and drugs simultaneously. There is no separate act. In 
one instance the gun is combined with possession of a controlled substance to constitute armed 
violence, and in the other it is combined with the act of a convicted felon status to create a 
separate offense [of unlawful possession by a felon]. We hold that the one-act, one-crime rule 
does apply to these
 52 See, e.g., People v. Green, 557 N.E.2d 939, 942 (Ill. App. 1990) (affirming consecutive 
sentences for two offenses premised on defendant’s possession of cocaine because “the armed-
violence conviction could be based upon the contents of the right-hand pocket, while the 
possession with intent to deliver could be based upon the six tested bags of the nine bags 
subsequently found in the left-hand pocket”). Rather than providing meaningful guidance as 
to what constitutes an “act” for purposes of the “one-act, one-crime” rule, the Illinois Supreme 
Court has approached tautology in stating that an act is “any overt or outward manifestation 
which will support a different offense.” People v. King, 363 N.E.2d 838, 844-45 (Ill. 1977); 
see also People v. Rodriguez, 661 N.E.2d 305, 307 (Ill. 1996). The Illinois Supreme Court’s 
failure to definitively state what constitutes an “act” for purposes of the “one-act, one-crime” 
rule has resulted in considerable confusion at the appellate level. See, e.g., People v. Bowens, 
718 N.E.2d 602, 607-08 (Ill. App. 1999) (citing several cases holding that multiple gunshots 
and blows constitute separate acts and several cases holding that they constitute a single act).
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 The second aspect of current law’s “one-act, one-crime” rule, which 
bars convictions for both a greater offense and an included offense, also 
fails to satisfactorily resolve multiple-liability issues. Current Illinois law 
uses the “charging instrument” approach to determine whether one offense 
is “included” in another. The approach focuses on the particular facts of 
each case, rather than referring to abstract offense definitions, to determine 
when multiple convictions are appropriate. See People v. Novak, 643 N.E.2d 
762, 769 (Ill. 1994) (adopting charging instrument approach). Under this 
approach, one offense includes another if its charging instrument establishes 
the “main outline” of the lesser offense, and the lesser offense’s elements “can 
be inferred from the language of the charging instrument.”53 This approach 
has led to problematic or undesirable results, such as disallowing multiple 
convictions where a burglar commits his intended crime upon entering a 
place. Illinois courts currently vacate the conviction for the subsequent 
offense, under the theory that it is “necessarily implied” by an indictment 
alleging the mere intent to commit that crime.54 Disallowing multiple liability 
in these cases, however, trivializes the significance role of the additional 
harm that occurs when a burglar commits his intended crime — which may 
be as serious as, or more serious than, the burglary itself.
 Section 254 replaces the “one-act, one-crime” rule with a comprehensive 
statutory provision governing the acceptability of multiple convictions for 
separate offenses. Importantly, Section 254 does not alter current Illinois law 
regarding when a jury may be instructed on, or find a defendant guilty of, 
multiple offenses or included offenses.55 Section 254 imposes limitations on 
multiple judgments of conviction by the court, as opposed to multiple guilty 
verdicts by the jury, where an offender satisfies the requirements of more 
than one offense.
 53 People v. Baldwin, 764 N.E.2d 1126, 1130 (Ill. 2002). The vagueness of this test 
appears to be one cause of inconsistency in current law’s resolution of included-offense issues. 
Compare, e.g., People v. Novak, 643 N.E.2d at 773 (finding sexual abuse was not included 
offense of sexual assault where charging instrument alleged sexual penetration rather than 
sexual conduct), with People v. Jones, 595 N.E.2d 1071, 1075-76 (Ill. 1992) (finding that 
theft’s requirement of intent to permanently deprive another’s property was implicit in robbery 
charge of taking victim’s property by force). 
 54 See, e.g., People v. Oparah, 742 N.E.2d 1272, 1277 (Ill. App. 2001) (vacating arson 
conviction because burglary conviction was premised on intent to commit arson); People v. 
Milton, 723 N.E.2d 863, 868 (Ill. App. 1999) (vacating theft conviction because burglary 
conviction was premised on intent to commit theft).
 55 As to the jury’s ability to return multiple guilty verdicts, see, for example, People v. 
Burnridge, 687 N.E.2d 813, 815 (Ill. 1997) (noting that trial judge instructed jury on battery 
as included offense of aggravated criminal sexual abuse, then vacated battery conviction 
when jury returned guilty verdicts for both offenses); People v. Kettler, 446 N.E.2d 550, 553 
(Ill. App. 1983) (“[A] jury may, and frequently does, return verdicts of guilty upon both the 
charged offense and its lesser included offense.”).
 As to when the jury may receive an instruction on an included offense, see People v. 
Hamilton, 688 N.E.2d 1166, 1169 (Ill. 1997); People v. Landwer, 655 N.E.2d 848, 854 (Ill. 
1995); People v. Novak, 643 N.E.2d 762, 769-70 (Ill. 1994).
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 Section 254(1) does not employ the concept of an “included offense,” 
which is significant in the context of jury instructions, but is conceptually 
distinct from the question of when multiple liability should be allowed. 
Unlike current Illinois law, the rules established in Section 254 do not 
depend on consideration of the particular facts of specific cases. Rather, 
they present issues of law56 regarding how defined offenses relate to each 
other — specifically, whether their relation is such that multiple liability is 
appropriate, or whether imposing liability for one offense would needlessly 
and improperly duplicate liability already imposed by a conviction for 
another offense. Accordingly, a court’s finding regarding the appropriateness 
of multiple convictions for two separate offenses would be binding on all 
future cases involving those same offenses,57 enhancing predictability, 
stability, and evenhandedness in the imposition of multiple liability.
 Section 254(1)(a) provides rules governing liability for multiple 
offenses that are “based on the same conduct.” Importantly, Section 254(1)(a) 
does not in any way limit convictions for related offenses arising out of 
different conduct. For example, Section 254(1)(a)(i)(A) would preclude 
assault liability where the bodily harm involved consists solely of sexual 
penetration that is accounted for by a sexual assault conviction. Multiple 
liability would be appropriate, however, where the bodily harm involved is 
independent of the sexual penetration, such as where the defendant beats the 
victim to facilitate, or in the course of, a sexual assault. Similarly, Section 
254(1)(a)(i)(B) would preclude convictions for both homicide and assault 
where the defendant shot the victim with a single bullet, but would not bar 
convictions for both offenses where the defendant caused bodily harm with 
one shot and death with another.
 Section 254(1)(a) imposes additional requirements, however, so 
that multiple convictions are not barred for all situations where the same 
conduct constitutes multiple offenses. (In practice, the “one-act” rule has 
similarly been narrowed to allow multiple liability in situations of the kind 
that would fall outside Section 254(1)(a)’s strictures. See supra note 50.) 
Section 254(1)(a)(i)(A) precludes liability for two offenses arising out of 
the same conduct where one offense is concerned with a harm or wrong 
that is “entirely accounted for by” the other offense. Rather than considering 
the theoretical possibility of committing one offense without committing 
 56 Whether Section 254 allows multiple convictions is a question of law for the court, 
rather than a question of fact for the jury. In some instances, the court may be able to withhold 
jury instructions for an offense because Section 254 would preclude a conviction. To avoid the 
risk of a reversal requiring a new trial, however, the court would probably prefer in the usual 
case to postpone such determinations until after the jury has returned its verdicts.
 57 Because Section 254(1)(a) applies only when two offenses are “based on the same 
conduct,” a ruling that Section 254(1)(a) prohibits multiple convictions would govern only 
subsequent cases where those two offenses were again based on the same conduct. Multiple 
convictions for the two offenses would remain acceptable where they are not both based on the 
same conduct.
ILL Code  V II Gen Part   40 7/2/03, 1:18:40 PM
41
Part I: General Provisions
another, the proposed standard calls for a consideration of the relevant 
offenses’ purposes. Consider the following examples: 
 
 • Section 254(1)(a)(i)(A) would bar convictions for both felony 
murder and another homicide offense based on a single death. Cf. 
proposed Section 1102(1)(b) (defining felony murder). As Illinois 
courts have noted, an “included offense” approach to multiple 
liability does not adequately deal with this situation, as each 
offense includes an element that the other does not. See People v. 
Sandy, 544 N.E.2d 1248, 1254 (Ill. App. 1989) (“Conviction for 
felony murder does not require proof of an independent mental 
state. Technically, therefore, involuntary manslaughter, which 
involves a reckless mental state, cannot be an included offense of 
felony murder.”) (citations omitted). The proposed provision, by 
contrast, prevents multiple liability because each homicide offense 
accounts for the same harm: causing another person’s death.
 • Section 254(1)(a)(i)(A) would not bar convictions for both felony 
murder and the predicate forcible felony (or attempted forcible 
felony). The proposed Code’s felony-murder provision punishes 
only the harm of causing another person’s death, and does not 
account for the harm of the predicate offense. Current Illinois law, 
by contrast, bars conviction for both offenses, under the theory 
that the underlying forcible felony is an “included offense” of 
felony murder. See People v. Smith, 701 N.E.2d 1097, 1100 (Ill. 
1998) (“Because the armed robbery . . . is a lesser included offense 
of felony murder in this case, the included offense of armed 
robbery will not support a separate conviction and sentence.”). 
The proposed approach avoids trivializing the underlying offense 
— which will, by virtue of being a “forcible felony,” itself be a 
serious offense. 
 • Section 254(1)(a)(i)(A) would bar convictions, based on the same 
conduct, for both forcible sexual assault and unlawful restraint. 
Cf. proposed Section 1301(1)(b) (defining sexual assault by 
force); proposed Section 1402 (defining unlawful restraint). As 
Illinois courts have recognized, the harm of restricting movement 
in such a situation is incidental to, and accounted for by, the sexual 
assault offense. See People v. Bowen, 609 N.E.2d 346, 362 (Ill. 
App. 1993) (“The unlawful restraint charged in the indictment was 
that which the legislature addressed in the criminal sexual assault 
statute and is conduct inherent in every case of criminal sexual 
assault by force. As the restraint charged was not independent of 
the sexual assault, it cannot be punished as such.”). Yet multiple 
liability would be appropriate where the sexual assault and 
unlawful restraint are based on different conduct. For example, an 
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unlawful restraint conviction could be based on a detention that 
was independent of, and occurred before or after, a sexual assault, 
as where the offender forces the victim into a locked room or dark 
alleyway before committing the assault.
 • Section 254(1)(a)(i)(A) would bar convictions, based on the 
same conduct, for both sexual assault and assault by contact 
of an “insulting or provoking nature.” Cf. proposed Section 
1201(1)(b) (defining assault); proposed Section 1301 (defining 
sexual assault); People v. Margiolas, 453 N.E.2d 842, 845 (Ill. 
App. 1983) (noting the “undeniable verity that inherent in every 
crime of rape is an intentional physical contact of an outrageously 
insulting, as well as provoking, character”).
 • Section 254(1)(a)(i)(A) would bar convictions, based on the 
same conduct, for both aggravated sexual assault under proposed 
Section 1301(4)(a)(ii) and assault under proposed Section 
1201(1)(a). Section 1301(4)(a)(ii)’s aggravation fully accounts 
for the bodily harm, which is the only harm the assault provision 
addresses. A conviction for assault would be permitted, however, 
where a factor other than bodily harm (such as the victim’s age) 
aggravates the sexual assault offense, or where the sexual-assault 
aggravation is based on different conduct.
 • Section 254(1)(a)(i)(A) would not bar convictions for both sexual 
assault and incest based on a single act of sexual penetration, 
insofar as sexual assault does not in any way account for the harm 
to families at which the incest offense is aimed. Cf. proposed 
Section 1301 (defining sexual assault); proposed Section 4101 
(defining incest). 
 • Section 254(1)(a)(i)(A) would not bar convictions for both 
criminal coercion and sexual exploitation of a child where the 
defendant coerced a victim to remove clothing. Cf. proposed 
Section 1303 (defining sexual exploitation of a child); proposed 
Section 1404 (defining criminal coercion). The coercion offense 
punishes the harm of wrongfully interfering with another’s 
freedom of action, but does not account for the exploitation 
offense’s harm of sexually victimizing a child. 
 • Section 254(1)(a)(i)(A) would bar convictions for both criminal 
coercion and terroristic threats based on the same threat to 
commit an offense, insofar as the coercion offense accounts for 
the same harm (causing fear) as the threat offense. Cf. proposed 
Section 1203 (defining terroristic threats); proposed Section 1404 
(defining criminal coercion).
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 • Section 254(1)(a)(i)(A) would bar convictions for both robbery 
and theft based on a single taking of property. Cf. proposed 
Section 1501 (defining robbery); proposed Section 2102 (defining 
theft by taking). The offense of robbery is essentially a compound 
offense comprised of theft and an assault offense, and thus fully 
accounts for the harm of wrongfully taking another’s property. 
 • Where a defendant obtains property by conduct that is itself 
criminal, Section 254(1)(a)(i)(A) typically would not bar 
convictions for both theft and the other offense. For example, 
liability for both theft by deception and forgery would be 
appropriate where one acquires property by passing a counterfeit 
bill, insofar as the offense of theft does not account for the 
forgery offense’s harm of undermining public confidence in paper 
currency and the monetary system. See proposed Section 2103 
(defining theft by deception); proposed Section 3101 (defining 
forgery). 
 
 • Section 254(1)(a)(i)(A) would not bar convictions for both assault 
and home invasion where the offender physically injures another 
during the home invasion. Cf. proposed Section 1201 (defining 
assault); proposed Section 2301(1) (defining home invasion). 
Home invasion’s requirement of using or threatening “force” does 
not account for any bodily harm resulting from such force. The 
provision would, however, bar convictions for both home invasion 
and terroristic threats based on a single threat of force, insofar as 
home invasion fully accounts for the fear for personal safety and 
security that the threat offense addresses. Cf. proposed Section 
1203 (defining terroristic threats).
 • Section 254(1)(a)(i)(A) would bar convictions for both burglary 
and trespassing based on the same entry into a building. Cf. 
proposed Section 2302 (defining burglary); proposed Section 
2303 (defining criminal trespass). The harm addressed by the 
offense of trespassing (interfering with property, and perhaps 
privacy, interests by physical intrusion) is fully accounted for by 
the offense of burglary, which is essentially a compound offense 
consisting of trespassing and an attempt to commit another 
offense. The Illinois courts similarly recognize that trespassing 
is an “included offense” of burglary. See People v. Austin, 576 
N.E.2d 505, 507 (Ill. App. 1991) (“[B]ecause the elements 
of criminal trespass to residence are subsumed in the offense 
of residential burglary, we conclude that criminal trespass to 
residence is a lesser-included offense of residential burglary.”).
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 • Section 254(1)(a)(i)(A) would also bar convictions for both 
burglary and attempted theft where the burglary charge is premised 
on the defendant’s intention to steal property upon entering a 
building. Section 254(1)(a)(i)(A) would not bar convictions for 
both burglary and attempted theft, however, where a burglary 
conviction is based on the defendant’s intention to commit a 
second offense. Liability for both burglary and theft would also 
be appropriate where a burglar actually steals property, given that 
the offense of burglary does not account for the completed theft 
offense’s harm of actually taking another’s property.
 
 • Section 254(1)(a)(i)(A) would not bar convictions for both 
contributing to the delinquency of a minor and the inchoate 
offense of solicitation based on the same solicitation to commit 
an offense. Cf. proposed Section 4105(1) (defining offense of 
contributing to delinquency of minor). In such a case, the inchoate 
offense does not account for the harm of corrupting a juvenile, 
while the promoting-delinquency offense does not account for 
the harm of the underlying offense. The promoting-delinquency 
offense operates, rather, as an “add-on” offense that provides 
additional punishment so that soliciting a child is punished more 
severely than soliciting an adult to commit an offense.
 • Section 254(1)(a)(i)(A) would not bar convictions for both official 
misconduct and any other crime the misconduct constitutes. 
Liability for official misconduct may, but need not, arise from 
conduct that is itself criminal. Cf. proposed Section 5103 (defining 
official misconduct). The proposed misconduct offense punishes 
the harms of abusing authority, violating the public’s trust, and 
disrupting the proper functioning of government, but does not 
account for any independent harm caused by the misconduct. For 
example, an official-misconduct conviction based on embezzling 
public funds would not account for the wrongful taking of 
property, which would support a separate theft conviction.
 • Section 254(1)(a)(i)(A) would not bar convictions for both escape 
and the offense for which the offender was originally in custody. 
Cf. proposed Section 5307 (defining escape). The offense of 
escape punishes the harm of interfering with governmental 
operations, but does not account for the harm of the underlying 
offense — for which, in a great number of escape cases, the 
offender will already be under sentence.
 • Section 254(1)(a)(i)(A) would not bar convictions for both a hate-
crime or weapons offense and the underlying predicate offense. 
The provisions defining the hate-crime and weapons offenses 
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explicitly state that they constitute “additional” offenses. See 
proposed Section 6106(1) (defining hate crime aggravation); 
proposed Section 7101 (defining offense for possession of 
dangerous weapon during felony). 
 Section 254(1)(a)(i)(B) bars convictions for two offenses based on the 
same conduct where the harm or wrong of one offense is “of the same kind, 
but lesser degree, than” the harm or wrong of the other offense. This provision 
would bar convictions for both sexual assault and sexual abuse based on the 
same conduct. Cf. proposed Section 1301 (defining sexual assault); proposed 
Section 1302 (defining sexual abuse). Section 254(1)(a)(i)(B) also makes 
clear that convictions for both homicide and assault may not be based on 
the same conduct. Cf. proposed Section 1101 (defining first-degree murder); 
proposed Section 1201 (defining assault).
 Section 254(1)(a)(ii) and (iii) bar multiple convictions for specific and 
general offenses punishing the same conduct, or offenses that differ only in 
their culpability requirements, or offenses defined as a continuing course of 
conduct. These rules embody specific aspects of the current “one-act, one-
crime” rule (and its numerous exceptions), but are narrower, thus avoiding its 
drawbacks.
 Section 254(1)(a)(ii)(A) bars multiple convictions where two offenses 
differ only in that one prohibits a kind of conduct generally and the other 
criminalizes a specific subset of the same conduct. The proposed Code has 
been drafted to avoid such overlap, but current Illinois law has offenses 
illustrating the desirability of such a provision. For example, current 5/21-
1.3’s “criminal defacement” offense differs from 5/21-1(1)(a)’s general 
property-damage offense only in requiring that property be damaged “by the 
use of paint or any similar substance, or by the use of a writing instrument, 
etching tool, or any other similar device.” Section 254(1)(a)(ii)(A) makes 
clear that convictions for both property damage and criminal defacement 
based on the same conduct (such as a particular instance of “tagging” a 
subway car with one’s name) would be inappropriate.
 Section 254(1)(a)(ii)(B) provides that multiple liability may not be 
imposed where two offenses differ only in that “one requires a lesser kind 
of culpability than the other.” Where an offender causes the death of a single 
person, for example, convictions would not be permitted for both first-
degree murder (which requires knowingly causing death) and second-degree 
manslaughter (which requires recklessly causing death). The Illinois courts 
have similarly held that a single death cannot support multiple homicide 
convictions. See, e.g., People v. Fuller, 2002 WL 254030, at *21 (Ill. 2002) 
(“If only one person has been murdered, there can be but one conviction for 
murder.”) (citing People v. Kuntu, 752 N.E.2d 380, 385 (Ill. 2001)).
 Section 254(1)(a)(iii) bars multiple liability where an offense is defined 
as a continuing course of conduct and the offender’s conduct is uninterrupted. 
For example, the proposed offense definition for bigamy prohibits “resid[ing] 
in the State” after a second marriage. Section 254(1)(a)(iii)’s rule makes 
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clear that multiple bigamy convictions would not be appropriate based on 
a defendant’s single, uninterrupted residence in Illinois. Cf. Brown v. Ohio, 
432 U.S. 161, 169 (1977) (“The Double Jeopardy Clause is not such a fragile 
guarantee that prosecutors can avoid its limitations by the simple expedient 
of dividing a single crime into a series of temporal or spatial units.”). Section 
254(1)(a)(iii) allows the General Assembly to override this general rule 
against multiple convictions, however, by expressly providing that specific 
periods of continuing conduct constitute separate offenses.
 Section 254(1)(b)(i) adopts the rule of current 5/8-5 barring convictions 
for both an inchoate offense and the completed target offense. Section 
254(1)(b)(ii) expands on this rule to bar convictions for both (1) an inchoate 
offense, and (2) any offense that relates to the inchoate offense’s target offense 
in such a way that Section 254(1)(a) would bar convictions for both of them. 
For example, 254(1)(b)(ii) would preclude convictions (based on the same 
conduct) for both battery and attempted aggravated battery, or for attempted 
battery and aggravated battery. Illinois’ current “one-act, one-crime” rule 
would reach the same result in these cases. See, e.g., People v. Thomas, 531 
N.E.2d 84, 88 (Ill. App. 1988) (vacating aggravated battery conviction where 
same stabbing was basis for attempted murder conviction).
 Section 254(1)(c), barring convictions for multiple inchoate offenses 
toward a single substantive offense, has no corresponding provision in current 
Chapter 720. Because Chapter 720 lacks such a provision, Illinois courts 
have held that convictions for multiple inchoate offenses are permissible as 
a matter of law, provided that one inchoate offense does not include another 
as charged. See People v. Stroner, 449 N.E.2d 1326 (Ill. 1983) (affirming 
defendant’s convictions for solicitation to commit murder, conspiracy to 
commit murder, and attempted murder on theory of accountability for 
single, unconsummated offense). As a matter of policy, however, there is 
little justification for permitting convictions of multiple inchoate offenses 
toward the same substantive offense. A conviction of a single inchoate 
offense sufficiently punishes an offender for his incomplete efforts toward an 
offense. Moreover, because proposed Section 906 dispenses with concurrent 
sentences for multiple offenses, Section 254(1)(c) is necessary to prevent the 
possibility of punishing an offender who does not complete an offense more 
severely than one who does. (See proposed Section 906 and corresponding 
commentary.) For example, a person convicted of both attempt and conspiracy 
to commit a Class 2 felony would be liable for two Class 3 felonies, with a 
corresponding sentence of 3 to 7½ years, whereas a person who actually 
committed the Class 2 felony would be subject to a possible sentence of 
only 3 to 7 years. (Under Section 254(1)(b)(i), completing the Class 2 felony 
would bar conviction for the inchoate efforts toward it.)
 Section 254(1)(d) codifies the current Illinois rule that a person cannot 
be convicted of the same offense twice where one conviction is based on 
his own conduct and one is based on his complicity for another’s conduct 
toward the same offense. Thus, where two people jointly commit the offense 
of home invasion, each may be convicted on one count of home invasion, but 
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not for another count based solely on each one’s accountability for the other’s 
conduct. See People v. Hicks, 693 N.E.2d 373, 376 (Ill. 1998) (“In essence, 
accountability provides an alternative basis of liability, not an additional 
basis for liability. Once a defendant’s guilt as a principal has been established 
through his own conduct or behavior, there is no longer any need to base a 
conviction for the same crime on the doctrine of accountability.”) (emphasis 
in original).
 Section 254(1)(e) tracks current Illinois law in prohibiting legally 
inconsistent simultaneous convictions. See, e.g., People v. Fornear, 680 
N.E.2d 1383, 1388-89 (Ill. 1997); People v. Becker, 734 N.E.2d 987, 996-99 
(Ill. App. 2000).
 Section 254(2) makes clear that where multiple convictions conflict and 
only one may be entered into judgment, the court must enter a conviction for 
the most serious of those offenses (or the more serious of two grades of the 
same offense). This rule is consistent with current Illinois law.58
 Section 254(3) defines “inchoate offense” and “substantive offense.” 
Current Chapter 720 uses, but does not define, the terms “inchoate offense” 
and “principal offense.”
Section 255. Definitions
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/6-2(b); 5/15-1; 
  5/15-4
 Generally. This provision collects defined terms used in Article 250 and 
provides cross-references to the provisions in which they are defined. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. For discussion of the relationship 
between Article 250’s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary 
for the provision in which each term is initially defined. 
 58 See People v. Lego, 507 N.E.2d 800, 808 (Ill. 1987) (“When multiple convictions are 
obtained for offenses arising out of a single act, sentence may be imposed only for the most 
serious offense.”); People v. Donaldson, 435 N.E.2d 477, 479-80 (Ill. 1982) (where defendant 
found guilty of both armed violence and aggravated battery, “[j]udgment should have been 
entered and sentence imposed only on the more serious offense”); People v. Cosby, 711 
N.E.2d 1174, 1186 (Ill. App. 1999) (“Where a defendant stands convicted of multiple offenses 
arising from the same physical act, it is the more serious offense upon which judgment should 
be entered and sentence imposed.”).
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 ARTICLE 300. IMPUTATION OF OFFENSE ELEMENTS
 
Section 301. Accountability for the Conduct of Another
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/5-1 to -359
Comment:
 Generally. This provision sets out the circumstances according to which 
one person may be held accountable for the conduct of another person.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 301(1)(a) and (b) are similar 
to current 5/5-2(a) and (c),60 defining two standards for liability: the first 
applies where the defendant’s assistance is a “but-for” cause of the crime; 
the second applies where the defendant’s objective contribution to the crime 
is less substantial, but the accomplice has culpability of “intent” as to his 
assistance. In addition to minor alterations for clarity (changing “conduct” to 
“conduct constituting the offense” in (a), and replacing “another” with “such 
other person” in (a) and (b) to make the reference clear),61 three changes have 
been made to current 5/5-2(a) and (c):
 (1) The mental state elements of the current provisions have been 
rephrased. The phrase “having the culpability required by the 
offense” replaces “having a mental state described by the statute 
defining the offense” in 5/5-2(a), and has been added to 5/5-2(c). 
The imputation of one person’s conduct to another person should 
not alter the culpability level required by the offense. Rather, the 
person held accountable for another’s conduct should satisfy the 
standard culpability level for the underlying offense — no more, 
no less. Replacing 5/5-2(a)’s “mental state” with “culpability” 
tracks the use of the word “culpability” elsewhere in the Code, 
and may help avoid problems in interpreting the phrase “mental 
state,” as have arisen previously. See, e.g., commentary for 
proposed Section 302.
 59 Some other specific provisions include prohibitions on “aiding and abetting” the 
offenses they define. See, e.g., 5 ILCS 312/3-103(d); 20 ILCS 1605/15; 50 ILCS 105/4.5(3); 
625 ILCS 5/18b-108(c); 720 ILCS 5/10-7(a)(i); 5/11-6.5(a); 5/16-10(a)(3),(4); 5/16-12(a); 
5/16D-3(a-5); 5/16F-4(a); 5/17-9(b); 5/17-10(b); 5/17-15; 5/31-7(a) to (e); 5/31-7(f-5),(f-6); 
5/32-3; 250/9; 250/10; 365/1(e),(f).
 60 Section 301 also incorporates the substance of current 5/5-1 in defining when a 
person is accountable for the conduct of another. Other sections make clear when a person is 
accountable for his own conduct.
 61 In addition, 5/5-2(c)’s phrase “before or during the commission of an offense” has 
been deleted as redundant. Aiding “in the planning or commission” of an offense may only 
occur “before or during” the offense. As under current law, there can be no accountability 
liability after all elements of the offense are complete — that is, proposed Section 301 does 
not allow for liability as an “accessory after the fact.” See, e.g., People v. Dennis, 692 N.E.2d 
325 (Ill. 1998).
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          The phrase “with the intent to promote or facilitate such 
commission” in 5/5-2(c) has been changed to “intentionally” 
in Section 301(1)(b). The current phrasing is confusing, as it 
is unclear whether the requisite “intent” relates to the person’s 
conduct in helping the confederate, or to the desired result of that 
help (commission of the offense). (Current Illinois pattern jury 
instructions retain the “intent to promote or facilitate” language, 
but also add “knowingly” before “solicits, aids, [etc.],” indicating 
that the former requirement applies to the result. See IPI (CRIMINAL) 
5.03 (4th ed. 2000).) The new wording makes clear that only the 
conduct must be intentional. The culpability level with respect to 
the completed offense, on the other hand, is the same as it would 
be if the “helper” committed the offense himself.62
 (2) The purpose of the phrase “and the other person in fact or by 
reason of legal incapacity lacks such a mental state” in 5/5-2(a) 
— namely, ensuring that an accomplice may be held liable even 
where the principal himself may not — is now addressed in 
Section 301(4) (see infra). The phrase in 5/5-2(a) is misleading, 
as the principal actor’s mental state should not be relevant if the 
defendant’s assistance satisfies the requirement of causing the 
actor’s conduct.63
 62 Illinois cases recognize that “[a]ccountability, tied as it is to the crime charged, must 
comport with the requirements of that crime,” but use the now-defunct common-law notions 
of “specific intent” and “general intent” to define the culpability requirements of offenses 
for accountability purposes. See, e.g., People v. Stanciel, 606 N.E.2d 1201, 1210 (Ill. 1992) 
(“Thus, for example, the charge of assault with intent to rape, a specific intent crime, must 
require a specific intent for one who is accountable as well. Under this analysis, then, one 
whose guilt of murder, a general intent crime, is established through accountability, need 
only possess a general intent, with all the requirements that state of mind entails.”). This 
understanding of culpability is inconsistent with the scheme defined in current 5/4-3. See also 
commentary for proposed Section 302.
 Adding to the confusion, Illinois courts have also interpreted current 5/5-2(c) as 
incorporating the “common design” rule, which abandons the requirement of the culpability 
level defined in the underlying offense to provide that “[w]here two or more persons engage 
in a common criminal design or agreement, any acts in furtherance of that common design 
committed by one party are considered to be the acts of all parties to the design or agreement 
and all are equally responsible for the consequences of the further acts.” In re W.C., 657 N.E.2d 
908, 923-24 (Ill. 1995); see also People v. Terry, 460 N.E.2d 746, 749 (Ill. 1984); People v. 
Kessler, 315 N.E.2d 29, 32 (Ill. 1974). Section 301(1)(b) rejects the “common design” rule, 
which has no statutory authority and inappropriately allows imposition of liability without 
regard to a defendant’s lack of criminal culpability.
 63 The scope of this provision is limited by two other provisions. First, under Section 
203(1)(b), the resulting offense must not be “too remote or accidental” from the defendant’s 
actions in causing the offense, nor may the result be “too dependent upon another’s volitional 
act.” Second, under Section 205(3)’s “read-in” provision, the defendant must be at least 
reckless as to causing another to commit the crime. Current law is similar in this regard. Cf. 
People v. Cooper, 743 N.E.2d 32, 38 (Ill. 2000) (finding defendants were not accountable for 
killing of fellow gang member by rival gang because they neither “intended” to have the rival 
gang shoot their fellow member, “nor sought the caused result”).
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 (3) The phrase “solicits, aids, abets, agrees or attempts to aid” has 
been replaced with “aids, solicits, or conspires with” in 301(1)(b). 
The term “abet” is redundant of “aid.” “Conspires with” is a 
legal term of art that is defined elsewhere in the Code, whereas 
the meaning of “agrees” is nebulous. “Attempts” to aid are now 
addressed in Section 301(5) and (6) (see infra).
 Section 301(1)(c) is the same as 5/5-2(b).
 Section 301(2) is the same as the second sentence of 5/5-2(c), but has 
been placed into a separate subsection as an exception to the general rules 
regarding accountability. A few minor changes have been made to enhance 
clarity: adding the phrase “for the conduct of another” after “so accountable”; 
rephrasing “the offense is so defined that his conduct was inevitably incident” 
as “his conduct is inevitably incident to . . . the offense”; dividing the “does 
one of the following” clauses into discrete subsections; and deleting “in such 
commission” in Section 301(2)(c)(i) (current 5/5-2(c)(3)) as superfluous. Cf. 
IPI (CRIMINAL) 5.04 (4th ed. 2000).
 Section 301(3) has no corresponding provision in Chapter 720. The 
proposed provision provides that a person who may have been legally 
incapable of committing an offense himself may still be convicted of the 
offense based on his accountability for the conduct of another who commits 
the offense.64 Many offenses require that the defendant occupy a special 
position before he may be liable for certain conduct. This provision precludes 
a defense for defendants who, though they do not occupy the required position, 
aid, solicit, or encourage another who does in fact occupy such a position. 
For example, proposed Section 1301(4)(b)(i) requires that the defendant be 
at least four years older than the victim for the offense to be liable for Class 
1 sexual assault. One who is only three years older than the victim, but 
aids or encourages a person ten years older than the victim to commit the 
sexual assault, causes the same degree of harm, and is as blameworthy, as 
the accomplice who is more than four years older than the victim. In other 
words, the accomplice should not escape liability simply because he does not 
occupy the same position as the person for whose conduct he is accountable. 
But see People v. Anderson, 604 N.E.2d 424, 430 (Ill. App. 1992) (holding 
defendant could not be held accountable for sexual assault of her sister by her 
boyfriend because she was not at least five years older than victim as required 
by the statute). 
 Section 301(4) is largely the same as current 5/5-3. The title has been 
changed from “Separate conviction of person accountable” to “Unconvicted 
 64 Section 301(1) requires the accomplice have the culpability required by the 
underlying offense. Thus, the accomplice would still be able to assert any defense which 
negated his culpability as to the offense, as well as any general defense for which he qualifies 
under Articles 400, 500, and 600. Lastly, Section 301(3) specifically precludes accomplice 
liability in cases where such liability would be inconsistent with the purpose of the provision 
establishing their incapacity, e.g., where the accomplice is also a victim of the offense. See 
supra proposed Section 301(2) and corresponding commentary.
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Principal or Confederate No Defense” to clarify the section’s relevance. 
The phrase “upon proof that the offense was committed and that he was so 
accountable” has been replaced with “upon proof that the objective elements 
of the offense are satisfied.” This change makes clear that the accomplice 
may be liable even if the principal lacks the requisite mental state or has an 
excusing condition; in such a situation, an offense has not technically been 
committed, even though all objective elements are satisfied. The phrase “or is 
not amenable to justice” has been removed as unnecessary. Cf. IPI (CRIMINAL) 
5.05, 5.06 (4th ed. 2000).
 Section 301(5) has no corresponding provision in Chapter 720. Section 
301(5) makes clear that liability (for an inchoate offense) is appropriate 
where one satisfies the requirements of Section 301(1), but the person for 
whose conduct he would have been accountable does not commit the offense. 
Section 301(5) imposes reduced liability in recognition of the fact that the 
harm of the substantive offense does not occur in such situations. (The same 
result should follow from proper application of Sections 301(1) and 801. This 
subsection, and Section 301(6), have been added mainly to clarify the Code’s 
position as to a confusing issue of law.) 
 Section 301(6) is similar to current 5/5-2(c) in imposing liability 
for an “attempt to aid,” with a few modifications. Section 301(6) applies 
“whether or not the offense is attempted or committed by the other person,” 
thus clarifying that one is subject to liability for an unsuccessful attempt to 
aid, solicit, or conspire with another. Section 301(6) also imposes liability 
for attempts to solicit or conspire as well as attempts to aid. Finally, Section 
301(6) recognizes — as current Illinois law generally does — that inchoate 
efforts toward an offense should not be sanctioned as severely as completed 
offenses. Section 301(6) therefore reduces the liability for attempted 
complicity relative to actual complicity. 
Section 302. Voluntary Intoxication
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/6-3(a)
Comment:
 Generally. This provision governs the imputation of culpability 
to a person who engages in offense conduct after voluntarily becoming 
intoxicated. (For conduct performed under the influence of involuntary 
intoxication, see proposed Section 506 and corresponding commentary.) 
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 302 takes a different approach 
from current law with respect to the significance of voluntary intoxication. 
Illinois recently eliminated its voluntary intoxication “defense,” which 
applied in cases where the intoxication was “so extreme as to suspend the 
power of reason and render [the defendant] incapable of forming a specific 
intent which is an element of the offense.” See 720 ILCS 5/6-3(a) (West 
2000); cf. IPI (CRIMINAL) 24-25.02, 24-25.02A (4th ed. 2000). By eliminating 
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the specific defense, the General Assembly apparently intended to make it 
more difficult for defendants to successfully assert a voluntary intoxication 
defense by shifting the burden of proof on the issue to the defendant.65
 It is not clear, however, that elimination of the 5/6-3(a) defense 
has affected defendants’ ability to obtain an acquittal based on voluntary 
intoxication. Defendants are generally allowed to introduce evidence 
indicating that they lacked an offense definition’s required culpability, 
whether the offense requires “specific intent” or something else. Although 
5/6-3, as amended, now has no defense categorically stating that certain 
voluntarily intoxicated persons are not “criminally responsible” (a phrase 
whose meaning is unclear), it is not clear that the provision creates a per se rule 
prohibiting the introduction of evidence of intoxication to negate an offense’s 
culpability requirement. Cf. Mont. Code Ann. § 45-2-203 (explicitly stating 
that a person’s “intoxicated condition . . . may not be taken into account 
in determining the existence of a mental state which is an element of [an] 
offense,” unless intoxication is involuntary). Thus it seems that defendants 
may still be able to introduce evidence of intoxication to support a claim that 
the State has failed to prove culpability beyond a reasonable doubt.
 Proposed Section 302 takes a sounder approach to the issue of voluntary 
intoxication by treating it as a basis for imputation, and not as a special 
defense — its special relevance is that it will inculpate, rather than exculpate, 
defendants in certain cases. Under Section 302(2), intoxication may be used 
to hold a defendant accountable as if he were culpably reckless, whether or 
not it can be proved that he had a mental state of recklessness. Where the 
imputation rule does not apply, and where the person does not otherwise 
satisfy the culpability requirements of the offense, there would be no liability 
— as would be true in any case where the defendant lacked the culpability 
required by the offense.66 Section 302(1), requiring that intoxication must 
“negative[] a required culpability element,” expresses this more clearly than 
prior 5/6-3(a), which applied if the defendant’s intoxication “suspend[ed] the 
 65 According to Sen. Dennis J. Jacobs (D-Moline), the change was designed to shift the 
burden of proof on the issue of voluntary intoxication to the defendant. See Daniel C. Vock, 
Panel Votes to End Defense of Intoxication, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Mar. 7, 2001, at 1. The 
impetus for the change appears to have come from a high-profile case in which the trial court 
found a man not guilty of aggravated sexual assault on the basis of his voluntary intoxication. 
See id.
 66 Note, however, that a person could be liable for an offense, regardless of his 
intoxication, if he possessed the culpability required by the offense when he became 
intoxicated. Consider, for example, a person who intentionally becomes intoxicated knowing 
that he will assault his spouse when drunk. Although the person may ultimately become 
so intoxicated that he may not be contemporaneously aware of, or intend, his actions in 
beating his spouse, the person’s earlier culpability at the time he became intoxicated could 
support liability for the assault. In such a case, the State could argue that the person had the 
requisite culpability for the assault at the time he became intoxicated, and that his conduct in 
becoming intoxicated caused the prohibited result of bodily harm. See proposed Section 1201 
(assault) and corresponding commentary; see also proposed Section 203 and corresponding 
commentary for a discussion of the rules of causation.
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power of reason and render[ed] him incapable of forming a specific intent 
which is an element of the offense.”67
 Section 302(2) creates a rule imputing recklessness to acts performed 
while intoxicated. Current law has no general imputation rule, but intoxication 
creates a statutory presumption of recklessness for vehicular homicide. 720 
ILCS 5/9-3(b); see also People v. Spencer, 709 N.E.2d 687, 693 (Ill. App. 
1999). Illinois courts have found intoxication to bear on recklessness for 
other offenses as well. See, e.g., People v. Roberts, 345 N.E.2d 132, 137-38 
(Ill. App. 1973) (involuntary manslaughter).
 Section 302(3) defines “intoxication” and “voluntary intoxication.” 
Current law defines neither term, although 5/9-3(c) defines “under the 
influence of alcohol or other drugs.”
Section 303. Divergence Between Consequences Intended or
 Risked and Actual Consequences
Corresponding Current Provision(s): None
Comment:
 Generally. Section 303 addresses the “transferred intent” situation 
where a person intends, foresees, or risks one result that would be an offense 
and ends up causing or risking another result that is also an offense. In such a 
case, liability may be imposed for the unintended offense that actually results. 
(Where a person causes both the intended result and another result that is also 
an offense, he may be held liable for both offenses. Where the intended result 
does not occur, the person may be held liable for attempting to commit the 
intended offense as well as for committing the unintended offense.)
 67 Prior 5/6-3(a) was flawed in that it used the term “specific intent,” a common-law 
mental state that Chapter 720 does not otherwise recognize. The original 1961 Code rejected 
the notions of “general intent” and “specific intent” in favor of the culpability requirements 
defined in 5/4-3 (“Mental state”) et seq. Accordingly, the 1961 version of 5/6-3(a) provided 
that intoxication must “negative[] the existence of a mental state which is an element of the 
offense.”
 However, subsequent judicial decisions, instead of reading “mental state” to refer to the 
culpability terms defined in the Code, read it to refer to the concepts of general and specific 
intent. See, e.g., People v. Harkey, 386 N.E.2d 1151, 1153 (Ill. App. 1979) (“It is a well 
established rule in Illinois that the defense of voluntary intoxication may be used only in cases 
in which the crime involves specific intent (i.e. a mental state which is an element of the crime) 
and that it is not available where the offense charged is a general intent crime.”) (emphasis 
added); People v. Saunders, 461 N.E.2d 1006, 1016 (Ill. App. 1984) (denying defense, as 
“[d]eviate sexual assault and rape are general intent crimes, in that no specific mental state 
is required to be alleged”); People v. Berlin, 270 N.E.2d 461, 463 (Ill. App. 1971) (denying 
defense for “robbery, an offense for which no specific intent is required”).
 The courts’ continued use of the concept of “specific intent” — which later made its 
way into an amendment to 5/6-3(a) — disregarded the 1961 Code’s deliberate rejection of this 
concept.
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 Section 303(1) uses the term “consequence” instead of “result” because 
in some cases, it may not be immediately clear whether an offense element 
is a circumstance element or a result element, as those terms are defined 
in proposed Section 202. For example, if an offense prohibits “sexual 
intercourse with a minor,” it is unclear whether the result requirement is 
“sexual intercourse” and the person’s age is merely an attendant specific 
circumstance, or whether the result requirement is “sex with a minor” 
specifically. Section 303(2) avoids this ambiguity by including attendant 
circumstances within the definition of “consequence.”
 Relation to current Illinois law. There is no statutory section on 
transferred intent generally. However, the statutory offense of first-degree 
murder imposes liability on one who kills another person if he “intends to 
kill or do great bodily harm to that individual or another.” 720 ILCS 5/9-
1(a)(1) (emphasis added); see also People v. Shelton, 688 N.E.2d 831, 833 
(Ill. App. 1997). Illinois courts have also applied the doctrine of transferred 
intent to offenses lacking such express statutory language. See, e.g., People 
v. Psichalinos, 594 N.E.2d 1374, 1381 (Ill. App. 1992) (aggravated battery 
of a child).
 Although Section 303 would permit imputation in cases such as 
Psichalinos, it would not allow the level of liability permitted in that case, 
where the defendant’s attempt to hit an adult was used to ground liability for 
aggravated battery of a child, an offense requiring that one “intentionally or 
knowingly . . . cause great bodily harm . . . to any child under the age of 13.” 
720 ILCS 5/12-4.3(a). A person who tries to hit an adult, but accidentally hits 
a child, would lack the required culpability of knowledge or intent as to the 
victim’s being under 13 years of age, so it would be impossible to impute his 
culpability as to that requirement. It would be possible, however, to sustain 
a conviction for the “standard” aggravated battery offense by imputing the 
person’s culpability to the result. (In the opposite situation, where a person 
swings at a child but hits an adult, there also could not be liability for 
aggravated battery of a child, because that offense’s required result would 
not have occurred. The person could, however, be found liable for aggravated 
battery or for attempted aggravated battery of a child.)
Section 304. Mistaken Belief Consistent with a Different Offense
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 4-8(c)
Comment:
 Generally. This provision addresses situations where a person has a 
mistaken belief, but is not entitled to a defense under proposed Section 207 
because even under his mistaken view, he was committing an offense. In such 
cases, culpability as to the committed offense will be imputed based on the 
person’s culpability as to the intended offense.
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 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 304 is substantively similar to 
current 5/4-8(c), but has been rephrased for clarity. Current 5/4-8(c) provides 
that a defendant’s mistake or ignorance does not preclude conviction for “an 
included offense of which he would be guilty.” This language is confusing 
— if, indeed, it makes conceptual sense — for if the defendant’s conduct 
has in fact caused the greater offense, it has in fact also caused any result 
necessary for an included offense, so that imputation of either conduct or 
culpability would be unnecessary for that offense. Section 304 more clearly 
provides that mistake or ignorance is not a defense if the defendant who did 
commit the lesser offense mistakenly thought he was committing a similar or 
more serious offense.68 In other words, the defendant’s culpability as to the 
greater offense will be imputed to make him liable for the lesser offense.
Section 305. Definitions
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/15-1 
Comment:
 Generally. This provision collects defined terms used elsewhere in 
Article 300.
 Relation to current Illinois law. For a discussion of the relationship 
between Article 300’s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary 
for the provision in which the term in question is defined.
 68 Where the defendant would be guilty of another offense of a lower grade had the 
situation been as he supposed, in contrast, attempt liability for the less serious offense may 
be appropriate under proposed Section 801. See proposed Section 801 and corresponding 
commentary.
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ARTICLE 400. JUSTIFICATION DEFENSES
Section 400. General Defenses
Corresponding Current Provision(s): None
Comment:
 Generally. This provision explains the implications of the existence 
of a defense for a person’s possible criminal liability. Section 400 states a 
principle implicit in the notion of a “defense”: it applies even if one has done 
something that would otherwise constitute an offense. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 400’s rule reflects current 
law, under which defenses similarly preclude conviction even if all offense 
elements are satisfied. Indeed, raising an affirmative defense sometimes 
requires the defendant tacitly or explicitly to admit that he has committed 
the offense elements. See, e.g., People v. Landwer, 655 N.E.2d 848, 855 (Ill. 
1995) (“[I]n order to rely on the defense of entrapment, a defendant must 
admit to committing all the elements of the charged offense.”).
 Section 400 also obviates the need for language in numerous current 
homicide and assault offenses requiring that defendants act “without lawful 
justification” or “without legal justification.”69 Current Illinois law’s use 
of those phrases suggests, inconsistently with the actual governing legal 
rules, that the absence of a justification is an offense element for which the 
prosecution bears the burden of production.70 Section 400 makes clear that 
justifications — as well as excuses and nonexculpatory defenses — may bar 
criminal liability, but does so without undermining the rule that the defendant 
bears the burden of production for affirmative defenses. See proposed Section 
107 and corresponding commentary. 
 69 See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a); 5/9-1.2(a); 5/9-2.1(a); 5/9-3(a); 5/9-3.2(a); 5/12-2(a)(11),(12); 
5/12-2(a-5); 5/12-3(a); 5/12-3.1(a); 5/12-3.2(a); 5/12-4(a)(10),(15); 5/12-4(d-3); 5/12-4.3(a); 
5/12-7.3(a); 5/12-11.1(a); 5/26-2(a).
 70 Chapter 720 otherwise treats justifications as affirmative defenses for which the 
defendant bears the burden of production. See 720 ILCS 5/3-2(a) (defendant bears burden 
of production for affirmative defenses); 5/7-14 (denominating defenses in current Article 
7 “affirmative defenses”). Illinois case law and the current pattern jury instructions have 
concluded that the phrases “without lawful justification” and “without legal justification” 
describe an affirmative defense, rather than an offense element, so that instructions for murder, 
attempted murder, or battery need not include the phrase “without lawful justification” or 
“without legal justification” unless the defendant has properly raised a justification defense. 
As to battery, see People v. Sambo, 554 N.E.2d 1080, 1085 (Ill. App. 1990); People v. Voda, 
388 N.E.2d 206, 212 (Ill. App. 1979); People v. Mills, 374 N.E.2d 233, 235 (Ill. App. 1978); 
People v. Looney, 361 N.E.2d 18, 22 (Ill. App. 1977); People v. Worsham, 326 N.E.2d 134, 
137 (Ill. App. 1975); IPI (CRIMINAL) 11.05 (4th ed. 2000). As to murder and attempted murder, 
see People v. Smith, 500 N.E.2d 605, 611 (Ill. App. 1986); People v. McNutt, 496 N.E.2d 
1089, 1096 (Ill. App. 1986); IPI (CRIMINAL) 6.05X (attempted first-degree murder), 7.01 (first-
degree murder) (4th ed. 2000). 
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General Comment Regarding Justifications:
 Justifications differ from excuses in that they relate to specific conduct, 
not specific persons — although sometimes, only particular persons are 
authorized to perform the justified conduct. In other words, an act is (or is 
not) justified, whereas an actor is (or is not) excused. Justifications exist 
independently of an actor’s state of mind: in common-law legal terms, a 
justification negates the existence of an actus reus, not the existence of a 
mens rea. 
 This distinction is important because a defense’s status as a justification, 
an excuse, or a nonexculpatory defense has significant legal implications. 
For example, a person acting in self-defense may be assisted by others, 
and may not legally be interfered with. On the other hand, an aggressor 
is entitled to resist a person who mistakenly believes himself to be acting 
in self-defense; such a person, even if excused, is not justified. Moreover, 
because justifications recognize conduct that is socially acceptable, and often 
desirable, it is sensible to require the prosecution to prove that conduct was 
not justified. Excuses and nonexculpatory defenses, by contrast, operate 
to prevent liability for harmful conduct that would ordinarily constitute 
an offense. Accordingly, and because the state-of-mind or other evidence 
relevant to an excuse or nonexculpatory defense is frequently within the 
control of the defendant, it is sensible to shift the burden of persuasion to the 
defendant for those defenses. (See proposed Sections 411, 501, and 601 and 
corresponding commentary.) 
 Proposed Article 400 alters the language of current Chapter 720 to 
reflect this understanding of justification defenses: instead of saying “a person 
is justified” or “a peace officer is justified,” it says “conduct is justified” or 
“conduct of a peace officer is justified.” (In corresponding fashion, Section 
502 and the other provisions in Article 500 use the language “a person is 
excused . . .” rather than Chapter 720’s “a person is not criminally responsible 
. . .” This language better reflects the distinction between justified conduct and 
excused persons — a distinction of considerable practical importance. See 
proposed Sections 411(4), 501(2) and (5), and corresponding commentary.)
Section 411. General Provisions Governing Justification Defenses
Corresponding Current Provision(s): Various; see 720 ILCS 5/7-4; 
  5/7-5; 5/7-13
Comment:
 Generally. This provision sets out several general rules applying 
to justification defenses. Section 411(1) defines the term “justification 
defense.” Section 411(2) creates a rule mandating the supremacy of more 
specific justifications over more general ones. This is because the more 
specific justifications set out in full the legislative determinations that have 
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been made regarding liability for specific forms of conduct. To allow a more 
general provision to supersede or complement the more specific one would 
enable circumvention of the particular determinations the legislature has 
made regarding such conduct. At the same time, Section 411(3) makes clear 
that conduct may relate to several justification rules at once — for example, 
an aggressor’s conduct may threaten both a person’s life and his property. 
Where this is the case, the actor may act according to the allowances of 
any relevant justification — for example, in the above situation, if the self-
defense provision authorizes deadly force, the person may employ such force 
even though the defense-of-property provision standing alone would not 
allow it. Section 411(4) notes that justified conduct, beyond merely being 
non-criminal, merits heightened legal status: one person may lawfully assist, 
and may not lawfully seek to impede, another’s justified conduct. Section 
411(5) and (6) cover situations where an actor causes the circumstances that 
give rise to the justification for his conduct.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 411(1) through 411(4) have 
no directly corresponding provisions in current Chapter 720. Section 411(1) 
defines a justification defense as any defense described in Article 400. 
 Section 411(2) corresponds to the basic principle of statutory 
construction that “the specific controls the general.” See, e.g., People v. 
Alejos, 455 N.E.2d 48, 53 (Ill. 1983). Based on this principle, Section 411(2) 
denies any justification where the legislature has made a more nuanced 
decision that specific types of conduct are or are not justified, regardless 
of whether they satisfy the requirements of the more generalized “lesser 
evils” and public-duty justifications. See proposed Section 412 (lesser-evils 
justification); proposed Section 413 (justification for execution of public 
duty). For example, Article 400’s provisions governing the defense of 
property and the use of deadly force together provide that using deadly force 
to protect only property is never justified. See proposed Section 417 (failing 
to expressly authorize use of deadly force in defense of property); proposed 
Section 419 (authorizing use of deadly force only to prevent serious bodily 
injury or commission of forcible felony). Section 411(2) makes clear that 
— regardless of the monetary value or rarity of the property involved — the 
lesser-evils justification can never be used to circumvent that rule. Illinois 
courts have allowed multiple instructions on such asserted justifications, 
which may inappropriately allow the general justification to “trump” the 
more narrowly drawn one. See, e.g., People v. Veatch, 495 N.E.2d 674, 678 
(Ill. App. 1986) (allowing instructions on both “necessity” and “defense-of-
another” justifications). Section 411(2) would, however, allow instructions 
as to both the lesser-evils justification and an asserted excuse defense. See, 
e.g., People v. Blake, 522 N.E.2d 822 (Ill. App. 1988) (allowing instruction 
regarding both “necessity” justification and “compulsion” excuse). 
 Section 411(3), which provides that multiple justification defenses are 
available in situations not governed by Section 411(2), is in keeping with the 
ILL Code  V II Gen Part   58 7/2/03, 1:18:51 PM
59
Part I: General Provisions
Illinois courts’ general practice, mentioned above, of allowing instructions 
for more than one justification defense. See Veatch, 495 N.E.2d at 678.
 Section 411(4)’s rule that one may not interfere with justified conduct 
is consistent with current Illinois law. For example, a police officer may use 
force against one who mistakenly thinks himself to be justified, whereas an 
aggressor may not use force against one who is in fact justified. See 720 
ILCS 5/7-4; 5/7-5. Unjustified conduct also may not be assisted — although 
the assisting person may be excused based on his own reasonable mistake 
as to whether his conduct is justified. See People v. Smith, 312 N.E.2d 355, 
357 (Ill. App. 1974) (giving defense to person who tried to protect third party 
from plainclothes police officer based on reasonable belief that third party 
needed protection from unlawful force). 
 Section 411(5) and (6) have no directly corresponding provisions in 
current Chapter 720, but three current provisions discuss the availability of 
justifications where the actor himself has caused the justifying conditions. 
See 720 ILCS 5/7-4(b) (use of force not justified where defendant “[i]nitially 
provokes the use of force . . . with the intent to use such force as an excuse 
to inflict bodily harm”); 5/7-4(c) (use of force not justified where defendant 
“[o]therwise initially provokes the use of force against himself”); 5/7-13 
(“necessity” defense only available if defendant “was without blame in 
occasioning or developing the situation”). Section 411(5) and (6) follow 
the same general rule as those current provisions: where the actor was not 
culpable in causing the justifying circumstances, he is justified, but where he 
was culpable, he is not justified. Cf. proposed Section 418 and corresponding 
commentary; IPI (CRIMINAL) 24-25.11 (4th ed. 2000) (denying justification 
for use of force where defendant provokes assailant with intent to use 
provoked force as excuse to inflict harm). 
 Section 411(5) and (6) differ from the current rules governing causing 
the conditions of one’s own justification, however, in three respects. First, 
the proposed provisions set forth rules applying to justification defenses 
generally, whereas the current provisions apply only to the self-defense and 
necessity justifications. This broader scope enables consistent treatment of 
similar issues. For example, current 5/7-4(b) ostensibly applies to defense of 
another, but denies a justification defense only where the defendant provokes 
the use of force “against himself.” Proposed Section 411(6)(a) also clearly 
denies the defense-of-person justification where the defendant provokes the 
use of force against another — by, for example, accusing that person of a 
misdeed — as an expedient for justifying his own use of force.
 Second, Section 411(5) and (6) provide that the availability of a 
justification defense uniformly depends on whether the defendant caused the 
justifying conditions with the culpability required by the charged offense. 
The current provisions, by contrast, prescribe standards that are inconsistent 
and problematic. While current 5/7-4(b) narrowly precludes the self-defense 
justification only where the defendant “provokes” the victim with the 
“intent” to cause the justifying conditions, current 5/7-13 more broadly 
bars the necessity defense whenever the defendant is to “blame” in causing 
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the situation.71 Section 411(6)(a)’s formulation provides that the culpability 
required as to causing the justifying conditions should be the same as the 
culpability requirement(s) of the charged offense.
 Finally, Section 411(6)(b) introduces a new rule recognizing the 
availability of general defenses in cases where the defendant causes the 
conditions of his own justification defense. Just as a person may have a 
justification, excuse, or nonexculpatory defense as to the offense itself, it 
seems appropriate to allow such a defense as to an actor’s conduct in causing 
the conditions of a justification. For example, Section 411(6)(b) might allow 
a duress defense in a case where one is coerced at gunpoint to cause the 
conditions of a lesser-evils justification.
Section 412. Lesser Evils
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/7-13
Comment:
 Generally. This provision ensures that conduct will not give rise to 
criminal liability where the conduct is objectively necessary to avoid a 
threatened harm even greater than that caused by the conduct itself. For 
example, an ambulance may exceed the speed limit or pass through a traffic 
light, or property may be destroyed to prevent the spread of a fire.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 412(1) and (2) are substantively 
similar to current 5/7-13, except that Section 412(1) requires that the actor’s 
conduct be immediately necessary to avoid the threatened harm. This shifts 
the requirement of immediacy from the threat, see People v. Kite, 605 N.E.2d 
563, 566 (Ill. 1992) (requiring proof of “specific and immediate” threat as 
threshold requirement), to the need to respond to the threat. Some threats, 
although foreseeable, may not become “imminent” for some time — at 
which point it may be too late to respond and prevent the threat. For example, 
the crew on a ship that is leaking or has low rations, but whose captain refuses 
to return to port, may not face the imminent threat of capsizing or starvation 
for some time, at which point the ship may be too far out to return to shore. 
At the same time, forbidding the crew to mutiny until such action becomes 
immediately necessary — until they have reached the “point of no return” 
— gives the captain time to relent.
 71 Section 418(1), like current 5/7-4(c), precludes justification defenses for one 
who “initially provokes” the use of force against himself, except under certain limited 
circumstances. Section 418(1) does not itself justify any conduct, but rather serves as a 
limitation on justification defenses described elsewhere in Article 400. Although Section 
411(5) and (6) may overlap with Section 418(1) to some extent, they do not preempt Section 
418(1).
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 Section 412(3) has no corresponding provision in current Chapter 720. 
Like Section 411(2) (q.v.), Section 412(3) follows the principle of statutory 
construction, generally recognized by Illinois courts, that “the specific 
controls the general.” See, e.g., People v. Alejos, 455 N.E.2d 48, 53 (Ill. 
1983). Based on this principle, Section 412(3) denies the general lesser-
evils justification where the legislature has already made a more particular 
determination regarding the interests involved. For example, Section 412(3) 
would deny the lesser-evils defense where an inmate has escaped from a 
correctional institution to avoid poor prison conditions. The legislature’s 
decision to criminalize escape reflects a determination that the harms of 
that offense — public fear and institutional disorder — outweigh the harms 
associated with poor prison conditions.72 The proposed limitation ensures that 
such a legislative determination is not defeated by the actor’s own balancing 
of the interests involved.
 Section 412 omits current 5/7-13’s requirement that defendant must 
be “without blame in occasioning or developing the situation,” which is 
instead addressed by proposed Section 411(5) and (6) (q.v.). Current 5/7-13’s 
“reasonable belief” language is addressed by proposed Section 511’s excuse 
defense for mistakes as to justifications (q.v.).
Section 413. Execution of Public Duty
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/7-10; see also 720 
  5/10-5.5(g); 5/11-20.1(b)(3); 
  5/12-7.2(b); 5/21-1.4(c); 
  5/24-1.5(d); 5/32-2(d); 125/2; 
  15 ILCS 335/14(c); 625 ILCS 
  5/4-103(a)(5); 625 ILCS 
  5/6-301.2(d) 
Comment:
 Generally. This provision creates a justification for conduct explicitly 
allowed by a governmental institution with the lawful power to authorize the 
conduct. Section 413 incorporates, rather than reiterating, the law governing 
public duties. Section 413(1) justifies conduct authorized by laws defining 
the powers and duties of public servants. Section 413(2) provides a defense 
for conduct authorized by laws governing the execution of legal process. 
Section 413(3) immunizes conduct sanctioned by a court or tribunal. Finally, 
 72 Section 412(3) would not preclude a lesser-evils defense, however, where a prisoner 
escapes prison to avoid a more particularized harm not contemplated by the legislature. Cf. 
People v. Unger, 362 N.E.2d 319 (Ill. 1977) (holding “necessity” defense was properly raised 
where defendant was told he was going to be killed just prior to escaping). 
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Section 413(4) is a catchall provision justifying conduct authorized by other 
laws imposing public duties.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 413 expands the justification 
provided by current 5/7-10, which justifies execution of a death sentence, 
to offer a justification for any conduct undertaken pursuant to an official 
public duty or with explicit legal authorization. Section 413 also renders 
unnecessary numerous offenses’ exemptions, exceptions, and affirmative 
defenses for conduct authorized by laws imposing public duties. See, e.g., 
720 ILCS 5/10-5.5(g); 5/11-20.1(b)(3); 5/12-7.2(b); 5/21-1.4(c); 5/24-1.5(d); 
5/32-2(d); 125/2; see also 15 ILCS 335/14(c); 625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(5); 625 
ILCS 5/6-301.2(d).
Section 414. Law Enforcement Authority
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/7-5; 5/7-6; 5/7-8; 
  5/7-9
Comment:
 Generally. This provision creates a justification for conduct — 
specifically, the use of force — necessary to bring a person into lawful 
custody, or prevent a person’s escape from custody.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 414(1) provides a justification 
for the conduct of a peace officer, or one assisting a peace officer, in making 
a lawful arrest or detention. Section 414(1)(a) is substantively similar to 
the first two sentences of current 5/7-5(a), but makes three modifications 
to the current provision. First, Section 414(1)(a) applies to any “conduct” 
necessary to effect a lawful arrest or “lawful . . . detention,” whereas current 
5/7-5(a) much more narrowly justifies only the “use of . . . force” to make 
lawful arrests. The proposed provision’s broader language makes clear that 
the justification applies to conduct other than force — so that a peace officer 
is also justified in, for example, trespassing or speeding to effect an arrest 
— and that the justification applies to such non-arrest detentions as Terry 
stops.
 Second, Section 414(1)(a) omits as unnecessary the “need not retreat 
. . .” language of current 5/7-5(a)’s first sentence, which merely makes a 
general statement without elaborating an actual justification; it is 5/7-5(a)’s 
second sentence that defines the scope of the justification.
 Third, Section 414(1)(a) omits current 5/7-5’s requirement of 
a “reasonable belief” that an arrest is necessary in recognition of the 
applicability of proposed Section 511’s excuse defense for mistakes as to 
justifications (q.v.). 
 Section 414(1)(b), governing the use of severe force in connection with 
arrests, is substantively the same as current 5/7-5(a)(1) and (2), but uses 
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the phrase “create a risk” rather than “endanger.”73 The defense-of-person 
language in 5/7-5(a)’s second and third sentences is addressed by proposed 
Section 416 and 419 (q.v.). 
 Section 414(1)(c)’s rule governing arrests pursuant to invalid warrants 
is nearly identical to current 5/7-5(b), but reaches all conduct rather than only 
the use of force. Section 414(1) generally omits current 5/7-5’s “reasonable 
belief” aspects, as those are addressed by proposed Section 511 (q.v.).
 Section 414(2) provides a justification for the conduct of a private 
person making a lawful arrest74 when not summoned or directed by a peace 
officer. Section 414(2)(a) is substantively similar to current 5/7-6(a)’s rules 
governing lawful arrests by citizens, with three differences. First, Section 
414(2)(a) justifies the use of deadly force only if it is “immediately” 
necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm to oneself or another; this 
modification brings 414(2)(a)’s language into conformity with Section 419’s 
general rules governing the use of severe force. Cf. commentary for proposed 
Section 412(1). 
 Second, Section 414(2)(a) justifies any conduct, whereas current 5/7-
6(a) immunizes only the “use of force.” Section 414(2)(a)’s broader language 
makes clear that conduct such as trespassing may also be justified even 
though it does not amount to “force.”
 Finally, as with Article 400’s other provisions, Section 414(2)(a) omits 
5/7-6(a)’s “reasonable belief” language in recognition of Section 511 (q.v.).
 Section 414(2)(b) is substantively the same as current 5/7-6(b), but 
more broadly applies to “conduct” rather than the “use of force.”
 Section 414(3) provides a justification defense for conduct necessary 
to prevent escape. Section 414(3)(a) is substantively similar to current 5/7-9, 
but explicitly covers lawful detentions, clarifies that the justification applies 
where an offender escapes from an officer’s “presence” — that is, before 
 73 Like current Illinois law, Article 400 may appear to impose more stringent 
requirements for a peace officer’s use of severe force to prevent an offense than for a private 
citizen’s use of such force for the same purpose. Whereas Section 419(2), current 5/7-1, and 
current 5/7-3 allow a private citizen to use deadly force to prevent the commission of any 
forcible felony, Section 414(1)(b)(ii)(A) and current 5/7-5(a)(2) justify the use of severe 
force only where the arrestee has attempted or committed a forcible felony that “involves 
the infliction or threatened infliction of great bodily harm.” The latter standard is based on 
the United States Supreme Court’s pronouncements concerning the constitutionality of the 
use of severe force under the Search and Seizure Clause. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 
1, 11-12 (1985) (“Where the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a 
threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others, it is not constitutionally 
unreasonable to prevent escape by using deadly force. Thus, if the suspect threatens the officer 
with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime involving 
the infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force may be used if 
necessary to prevent escape . . . .”). 
 74 As under current law, whether an arrest is “lawful” for purposes of Section 414(2) is 
governed by 725 ILCS 5/107-3, which provides that a private person “may arrest another when 
he has reasonable grounds to believe that an offense other than an ordinance violation is being 
committed.” See People v. Perry, 327 N.E.2d 167, 170 n. 3 (Ill. App. 1975) (stating that current 
5/7-6 only applies to arrests that are lawful under 725 ILCS 5/107-3).
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formal “custody” has been established — and covers “conduct” that may not 
constitute the use of force.
 Section 414(3)(b) is substantively similar to current 5/7-9(b), but 
requires that the use of deadly force be “immediately” necessary to prevent 
escape, uses “conduct” rather than “use of force,” omits the current provision’s 
“reasonable belief” elements in light of proposed Section 511, and uses the 
defined term “correctional officer” rather than the undefined term “guard.”
 Section 414(4)(a) defines “correctional officer” in a manner similar 
to current 5/31-1(b)’s definition of “correctional institution employee,” but 
uses the term “correctional institution” rather than reiterating the particular 
kinds of correctional institutions that are included in Section 5309(2)(a)’s 
definition of that term.
 Section 414(4)(b)’s definition of “force likely to cause death or great 
bodily harm” is substantively the same as current 5/7-8.
 
Section 415. Use of Force by Persons with Special Responsibility for 
 Care, Discipline, or Safety of Others
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 730 ILCS 5/3-6-4(b); see also 
720 ILCS 5/12-4(c); 5/12-4.9; 
5/12-10.1; 5/12-18(b); 5/12-19(a); 
5/12-21(d); 5/12-33(b); 5/12-34
Comment:
 Generally. This provision creates a justification for the use of force 
by those charged with a special responsibility for others. This conduct 
— including parents’ or teachers’ authority to protect or discipline children, 
wardens’ authority to impose order on a prison population, and medical 
professionals’ need to administer care or restrain those posing a danger to 
others or themselves — might not otherwise fall within the scope of the 
justifications set out in this article.75 Each part of the provision specifies the 
categories of person to whom it applies and the range of conduct allowed. 
For example, Section 415(1) applies to any of the persons specified in 
subsections (a) and (b), but imposes in subsection (c) a general limitation on 
the acceptable use of force by such persons.76
 75 Section 415 does not justify the use of force against a justified actor; the provision 
may not be used to circumvent Section 416’s rule that the use of force in defense of another is 
justified only to the extent that it is immediately necessary to defend against an aggressor’s use 
of “unjustified” force. For example, Section 415(1)(a) does not justify a father’s use of force 
against a police officer who is using justified force against his son. 
 76 Note that, as with Article 400’s other defenses, an excuse defense may be available 
for one who makes a mistake as to a justification set forth in Section 415. One who makes a 
reasonable mistake as to the necessity of his force, for example, may be excused under Section 
511. See proposed Section 511 and corresponding commentary.
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 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 415(1) provides a justification 
defense for persons responsible for the care and supervision of children 
and mentally handicapped persons.77 Section 415(1) has no corresponding 
statutory provision, but, with respect to children, is in keeping with Illinois 
cases stating that a parent or teacher is subject to criminal liability for 
discipline or punishment only if it is “unreasonable.” See People v. Ball, 317 
N.E.2d 54, 57 (Ill. 1974) (“[S]ince teachers by statute stand In loco parentis 
in matters of discipline of students within their charge in the schools, we 
think it follows that teachers should be subject to the same standard of 
reasonableness which has long been applicable to parents in disciplining 
their children.”); People v. Walker, 473 N.E.2d 995, 997 (Ill. App. 1985) (“A 
parent’s right to exercise authority over a child is broad, but it is not absolute. 
In matters of discipline or punishment a standard of reasonableness has been 
applied to determine whether a parent’s conduct . . . was legally justified and 
authorized by law.”). 
 Section 415(2)’s justification defense applies to medical treatment by 
doctors and other licensed medical professionals. Although Section 415(2) 
has no directly corresponding provision in current Chapter 720, current 
Illinois law recognizes medical exceptions for several specific offenses that 
are similar to the proposed provision. See 720 ILCS 5/12-4(c); 5/12-4.9; 
5/12-10.1; 5/12-18(b); 5/12-19(a); 5/12-21(d); 5/12-33(b); 5/12-34.
 Section 415(3) immunizes the use of force by a correctional officer to 
enforce the rules or procedures of a correctional institution. Section 415(3) 
is substantively similar to current 730 ILCS 5/3-6-4(b)’s rule authorizing 
correctional employees to use “all suitable means to . . . enforce the 
observance of discipline” in correctional institutions, but omits the current 
provision’s language regarding “attempts to injure in a violent manner,” 
property damage, and escape. Those rules are instead covered by Article 
400’s defense-of-person, defense-of-property, and law-enforcement-authority 
justifications. See proposed Sections 414, 416, and 417 and corresponding 
commentary.
 Section 415(4) and (5) provide justification defenses for persons who are 
responsible for the safety of, or required to maintain order in, public vehicles 
and common carriers. Section 415(4) and (5) have no corresponding provisions 
in current Chapter 720, but Illinois cases have recognized defenses for such 
persons. See, e.g., People v. Ibom, 185 N.E.2d 690, 695 (Ill. 1962) (“That a 
passenger upon a public vehicle or common carrier may not remain thereon 
without payment of the established fare, and that the employee of the carrier 
in charge of the vehicle may request the nonpaying passenger to leave and 
insist that he do so, even to the point of using such force as may be reasonably 
necessary to accomplish the eviction, is the settled law of this State.”).
 77 Section 415(1)(b) applies to those responsible for the care of mentally handicapped 
persons of any age, but is not intended to preclude the concurrent availability of Section 
415(1)(a) where one is responsible for a person who is both mentally handicapped and a 
minor. 
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Section 416. Defense of Person
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/7-1
Comment:
 Generally. This provision entitles a person to use force to protect 
himself or another from physical attack.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 416(1) is substantively similar 
to the first sentence of current 5/7-1,78 with three differences. First, Section 
416(1) replaces the current provision’s requirement that the other person’s 
use of force be “imminent” with the requirement that the use of force be 
“immediately necessary.” The proposed language recognizes that response 
to some threats may be appropriate, and even necessary, before they become 
“imminent.” For example, a kidnaping victim whose kidnaper threatens to 
kill him after a week does not face an imminent threat until the moment 
the kidnaper advances to kill him, but at that point, he may not have an 
opportunity to defend himself or escape. (See also commentary for proposed 
Section 412.)  
 Second, Section 416(1) differs from current 5/7-1 in justifying the 
use of force to defend oneself or another from “unjustified,” rather than 
“unlawful,” force. Current Chapter 720 does not define “unlawful,” but the 
commentary for the original 1961 Code states that the drafters intended 
a very broad understanding of the term that would include conduct that 
“constitutes either a tort or an offense (or an element thereof) or both.” 720 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7-1 Committee Comments at 293 (West 1993). The 
current provision’s language improperly suggests that even justified conduct 
may be lawfully resisted if it is “unlawful” in some respect. Yet this is not the 
case: for example, under both current 5/7-7 and proposed Section 418(2), an 
unlawful arrest (which might sometimes even amount to a tort) would still 
be justified and could not ordinarily be resisted lawfully. Section 416’s use 
of the term “unjustified” as defined in Section 416(2) more clearly defines 
the defense-of-person justification without the need to resort to tort-law 
concepts.
 Third, Section 416(1) omits current 5/7-1’s “reasonable belief” element, 
which is instead addressed by proposed Section 511’s excuse defense for 
mistakes as to justifications. See proposed Section 511 and corresponding 
commentary.
 Section 416(2), defining “unjustified” conduct, has no corresponding 
provision in current Chapter 720. Section 416(2)’s definition makes clear 
that conduct is “unjustified” where it satisfies the objective elements of an 
offense (i.e., those elements that relate strictly to objective facts and not to 
the person’s mental state) and does not satisfy the requirements of a defense 
in Article 400. 
 78 Proposed Section 419 covers the material appearing in current 5/7-1’s second 
sentence. See proposed Section 419 and corresponding commentary.
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Section 417. Defense of Property
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/7-2; 5/7-3
Comment:
 Generally. This provision entitles the owner of property, or someone 
with a special relation to the owner, to use force to protect property from 
invasion, destruction, or theft.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 417 merges the justifications 
provided in the first sentences of current 5/7-2 and 5/7-3, and largely tracks 
the language of 5/7-3. Section 5/7-2’s language — requiring “unlawful entry 
into or attack upon a dwelling” — is captured by Section 417’s requirement 
of “unjustified trespass on or other unjustified interference with” property. 
Section 417 also differs from current 5/7-3 in using “unjustified” rather 
than “tortious or criminal”; requiring that the use of force be “immediately” 
necessary; applying to property in the possession of any, rather than only 
an “immediate,” family or household member; and omitting the current 
provision’s “reasonable belief” elements, which are instead covered by 
proposed Section 511 (q.v.).
 The second sentences of 5/7-2 and 5/7-3 are covered by proposed 
Section 419’s rules governing the use of force likely to cause death or great 
bodily harm (q.v.).
Section 418. Use of Force by Aggressor or Arrestee
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/7-4; 5/7-7
Comment:
 Generally. This provision denies a justification for an aggressor who 
provokes another’s use of force as a makeweight to justify his own, and for 
one resisting an arrest. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 418(1) limits the availability of 
justification defenses for one who initially provokes the use of force against 
himself.79 Section 418(1) is substantively similar to current 5/7-4(c), except 
that, as makes logical sense, it applies to all justifications, rather than only 
those regarding defense of person or property. 
 Section 418(1)(a), like current 5/7-4(c)(1), generally denies a 
justification defense to an aggressor, but permits the use of severe force 
in certain situations where another responds to the use of nondeadly force 
with severe force. Section 418(1)(a) omits current 5/7-4(c)(1)’s “reasonable 
 79 Importantly, Section 418 does not itself justify any conduct, but rather limits 
justifications afforded by other provisions in Article 400. Section 418(1)(a), for example, 
would not justify a fleeing felon’s use of retaliatory force against a peace officer who has 
placed him in “imminent danger of death or great bodily harm.”
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belief” language as unnecessary in light of proposed Section 511’s excuse 
defense for mistakes as to justifications (q.v.), and omits the phrase “other 
than the use of force which is likely to cause death or great bodily harm to the 
assailant” as superfluous.
 Section 418(1)(b) is identical to current 5/7-4(c)(2).
 Section 418(2) is substantively similar to current 5/7-7 in making clear 
that a justification defense is ordinarily unavailable to one resisting even an 
unlawful arrest, but allows one to resist unjustified, severe force where “he has 
exhausted every less harmful means to escape such danger.” Section 418(2)’s 
rule is in keeping with Section 418(1)(a) and current 5/7-4(c)(1), which both 
allow an initial aggressor who is faced with severe force a justification under 
the same conditions. 
 Section 418 omits current 5/7-4(a) and (b). Section 418(1)’s rules 
governing the use of force by one who “initially provokes” the use of force 
against himself covers current 5/7-4(a), which denies a justification defense 
to one who is attempting, committing, or escaping from a forcible felony. 
Section 411’s rules governing culpably causing the conditions of one’s 
justification cover 5/7-4(b), which provides that justification defenses are 
unavailable to one who provokes the use of force against himself “with the 
intent to use such force as an excuse to inflict bodily harm.” See proposed 
Section 411(6) and corresponding commentary. 
 
Section 419. Use of Force Likely to Cause Death or Great Bodily Harm
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/7-1 to 5/7-3; see 
  also 720 ILCS 5/7-5; 5/7-6
Comment:
 Generally. This provision limits the scope of Article 400’s justifications 
to impose restrictions on the use of severe force.80 
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 419 corresponds to provisions 
included in current 5/7-1 to 5/7-3, and also covers language regarding the use 
of severe force in defense of persons appearing in 5/7-5 and 5/7-6. Section 
419 replaces 5/7-2’s reduced requirements for use of deadly force in defense 
of a dwelling, which allow such force to prevent any “assault . . . or offer of 
personal violence” rather than only to prevent death or great bodily harm, 
or to prevent any felony instead of only forcible felonies. That standard is 
inconsistent with the standard for justified conduct expressed in the other 
provisions cited above.
  Section 419 largely tracks the standards for the use of severe force set 
forth in 5/7-1, 5/7-3, 5/7-5, and 5/7-6, with three differences. First, Section 
 80 Like Section 418, Section 419 does not independently authorize the use of force, but 
rather limits justification defenses afforded elsewhere in Article 400.
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419 omits the current provisions’ “reasonable belief” language, which is 
instead covered by proposed Section 511’s excuse defense for mistakes as 
to justifications. See proposed Section 511 and corresponding commentary. 
Second, Section 419 requires that severe force be “immediately necessary” 
to prevent serious injury or a forcible felony, whereas the current provisions 
inconsistently require that such force be merely “necessary” or “necessary to 
prevent imminent . . . harm.” See proposed Section 412 and corresponding 
commentary. Finally, Section 419 uses the defined phrase “force likely to 
cause death or great bodily harm,” whereas current 5/7-1 to 5/7-3 use the 
undefined “force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily 
harm.”81 
Section 420. Definitions
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/2-7.5; 5/2-8; 5/2-13; 
  5/2-14; 5/2-17; 5/2-18; 5/7-8; 
  5/12-7.3(h); 5/31-1(b); 
  5/31A-1.1(c)(1); 725 ILCS 
  5/112A-3(3)
Comment:
 Generally. This provision collects defined terms used in Article 400 and 
provides cross-references to the provisions in which they are defined. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. For discussion of the relationship 
between Article 400’s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary 
for the provision in which each term is initially defined.
 81 Current 5/7-8’s definition for the phrase “force likely to cause death or great bodily 
harm” is substantively the same as proposed Section 414’s definition. Because current 5/7-8’s 
definition is limited to the phrase’s use in current 5/7-5 and 5/7-6, however, the meaning of 
the similar phrase “force which is intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm” is 
unclear.
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ARTICLE 500. EXCUSE DEFENSES
Section 501. General Provisions Governing Excuse Defenses
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/6-2(e); 5/6-4
Comment:
 Generally. Section 501 sets out general rules relating to all excuse 
defenses. These rules are distinctly relevant to excuse defenses and may be 
articulated only in a Code that distinguishes excuses from other defenses. 
(See general commentary preceding commentary for proposed Section 
411.)
 Section 501(1) defines an “excuse defense” as any defense defined in 
Article 500.
 Section 501(2) makes clear that excuses differ from justifications; 
justified conduct may be assisted and may not be resisted,82 while neither 
of these collateral rules applies where a person is excused but not justified. 
This is because it is not the act that is excused, but the actor; the act is still 
considered improper and undesirable.
 Section 501(3) and (4) state that a person’s excuse remains valid even 
if he created the conditions giving rise to the excuse, unless he did so with 
the same level of culpability required by the offense. In such a situation, the 
basis for criminal liability is not the conduct causing the offense (because 
that conduct is excused), but the actor’s earlier conduct in causing the 
conditions of his excuse. For example, a young person may join a gang 
knowing that it frequently engages in criminal activity and, indeed, has its 
own “laws” requiring participation in criminal activity. Later, the person 
may be forced by other gang members at gunpoint to commit a crime he 
would otherwise not commit. Though the person might normally be eligible 
for a duress excuse because he was compelled to commit the crime,83 the 
fact that he knew about the gang’s customs and the likelihood that he would 
be forced into criminal activity vitiates the rationale behind the defense and 
supports holding the gang member liable for his offense. (This person, who 
knew of the gang’s tendencies, could be held liable for an offense requiring 
knowledge; a person who was reckless as to the gang’s involvement in crime 
would, under Section 501(3) and (4), be eligible for liability only for offenses 
requiring recklessness.)
 82 See proposed Section 411 and corresponding commentary.
 83 See infra proposed Section 507 and corresponding commentary.
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 Generally, one of three culpability rules is applied to a person’s conduct 
creating an excusing condition: a general culpability rule of negligence, a 
general culpability rule of recklessness, or a culpability rule tracking the 
culpability requirement for the (excused) offense ultimately committed. 
Section 501(4) follows the third rule, as it seems appropriate to require 
the culpability normally required for the offense committed rather than 
some alternative, possibly conflicting requirement. A contrary rule would 
effectively impute criminal responsibility to persons based on an actual level 
of culpability lower than that usually required for the offense in question.
 However, as Section 501(4)(b) provides, the actor may also have a 
defense for that earlier conduct, notwithstanding the fact that he had the 
requisite culpability when he performed that conduct. For example, the gang 
member in the example above might have an immaturity defense, or might 
have a defense of duress if he were forced against his will to join the gang in 
the first place.
 Section 501(5) states that a mistaken belief in an excuse, unlike a 
mistaken belief in a justification, cannot be a defense to criminal liability. 
While justifications relate to the context and circumstances of an actor’s 
conduct, excuses relate to whether the actor suffers from a disability. The 
actor’s own erroneous belief that such a disability exists (“I thought I was 
insane”) is not relevant to a determination of criminal liability.
 Section 501(6) states that the defendant has the burden of proving an 
excuse defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 501(1) to (5) have no 
corresponding provisions in current law. Illinois courts have, contrary to 
Section 501(3) and (4), refused to allow a compulsion defense when it arises 
from the defendant’s own negligence or fault. See People v. Humphries, 630 
N.E.2d 104, 111 (Ill. App. 1994); People v. Lee, 408 N.E.2d 335, 344 (Ill. 
App. 1980), rev’d on other grounds, 429 N.E.2d 461 (Ill. 1981); People v. 
Rodriguez, 332 N.E.2d 194, 196 (Ill. App. 1975). As discussed above, the 
proposed Code would impose liability only when the defendant acted with 
the culpability required by the offense at the time he caused the excusing 
condition. Where a defendant was negligent as to causing the circumstances 
of duress, liability would be possible only for offenses whose culpability 
requirements are satisfied by negligence, such as negligent homicide.84
 The current rule requiring the defendant be without negligence or 
fault in causing his own duress defense seems to be concerned with the 
potential for defendants to abuse the defense. In other words, the courts in 
those cases did not really seem to consider the defendant’s asserted duress 
defense to be legitimate in the first place. See, e.g., Humphries, 630 N.E.2d 
at 111 (rejecting defendant’s compulsion defense because defendant failed 
to show he was threatened with imminent harm at the time he committed the 
 84 See proposed Section 1105 and corresponding commentary.
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offense); Lee, 408 N.E.2d at 343 (noting that “there is serious doubt whether 
the defense of compulsion is applicable in a murder prosecution” and finding 
that defendant’s testimony failed to establish the “some evidence” necessary 
to have the jury instructed on the compulsion defense); Rodriguez, 332 
N.E.2d at 196 (finding no evidence that defendant was ever threatened with 
bodily harm). In those cases, the excuse under Section 507 would not be 
available regardless of the circumstances leading to the “duress,” because the 
excuse’s requirements would not be satisfied. But in the rare case where the 
defendant is able to show he truly was forced to commit the offense, and was 
unable to control his conduct, he should not face liability unless he culpably 
created the circumstances leading to his duress.85
 Section 501(6) adopts a “compromise position” between current 5/6-
2(e) and 5/6-4, as it places the burden of persuasion on the defendant to prove 
an excuse defense by a preponderance of the evidence. Under current law, the 
defendant must prove the insanity defense by clear and convincing evidence, 
but all other excuses must be disproved by the state beyond a reasonable 
doubt once the defendant has introduced some evidence on the issue. (For 
a description of the difference between the “preponderance” standard and 
the “clear-and-convincing” standard, see IPI (CRIMINAL) 4.18, 4.19 (4th ed. 
2000).) These evidentiary rules are inconsistent. Excuse defenses are all the 
same in terms of both their underlying principles and their central evidentiary 
issue (the defendant’s state of mind). Accordingly, they should be treated 
similarly with respect to the burden of proof. Because excuses apply only 
to conduct normally considered criminal, and because all excuses involve 
information and evidence uniquely in the possession of the defendant, the 
proposed Code considers it appropriate to shift the burden to the defendant 
for excuses. At the same time, there does not appear to be any particular 
reason to require proof by clear and convincing evidence, rather than simply 
a preponderance. For example, approximately one percent of felony cases 
rely on an insanity defense, and only about 25 percent of those are successful 
— even though some states do not shift the burden of proof for the insanity 
defense at all. See Lisa A. Callahan et al., The Volume and Characteristics 
of Insanity Defense Pleas: An Eight-State Study, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. 
PSYCHIATRY & L. 331 (1991).
 85 Note that proposed Section 501(6) places the burden of persuasion on the defendant 
to prove duress, or any other excuse defense, by a preponderance of the evidence. This is a 
higher burden for the defendant than under current law, which only requires that the defendant 
produce “some evidence” to raise the defense, then requires the State to disprove the defense 
beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Colone, 372 N.E.2d 871 (Ill. App. 1978).
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Section 502. Involuntary Acts; Involuntary Omissions
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/4-1
Comment:
 Generally. Section 502 creates a defense for persons whose conduct 
would normally constitute an offense, but was not voluntary and could not 
be controlled by the actor. The involuntary act defense in Section 502(1) is 
applicable in cases where the defendant’s conduct is not the product of his 
effort or determination, as where the defendant is sleepwalking or suffers a 
seizure. This defense differs from the defenses of impaired consciousness 
(Section 503) or insanity (Section 504) in that the defendant’s lack of control 
over his conduct at the time of the offense need not result from a confirmable 
psychological or physiological disease or defect. At the same time, in 
most cases addressed by proposed Sections 503 and 504, the defendant’s 
impairment will not be so severe as to render his conduct completely 
involuntary. Section 502(2) provides a similar defense in cases where liability 
is based on an omission. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 502 takes the voluntariness 
element from current 720 ILCS 5/4-1 — the rest of which is addressed 
in proposed Section 204 (q.v.) — and creates a distinct provision treating 
involuntariness as an excuse, rather than describing voluntariness as a basic 
offense requirement. Voluntariness does not describe the harm or evil of 
the offense, nor is it a necessary component of the requirement of “an act” 
as opposed to an omission. Rather, involuntariness indicates that a person 
is not blameworthy for his conduct, even though that conduct satisfies all 
requirements of an offense. In other words, involuntariness is an excusing 
condition — it applies when special conditions or circumstances demonstrate 
an actor’s blamelessness for a violation of the rules of conduct. Although 
current Chapter 720 merges voluntariness with the act requirement, Illinois 
case law reflects a view of the voluntariness issue as a potential excuse 
rather than an offense requirement. The courts have not treated voluntariness 
as an element of the offense, but have seen its absence as an affirmative 
“automatism defense” rooted in the absence of criminal responsibility, and 
regarding which the defendant is required to introduce evidence. See, e.g., 
People v. Grant, 377 N.E.2d 4, 8 (Ill. 1978) (recognizing a defense, separate 
from insanity, of involuntary conduct, but finding trial court did not err in 
failing to instruct jury on the defense sua sponte); People v. Wirth, 395 
N.E.2d 1106, 1110 (Ill. App. 1979) (finding insufficient evidence to support 
defendant’s proffered instruction on an involuntary act defense).
 Section 502(1) defines involuntary acts as acts that are “not a product of 
the person’s effort or determination.” Current Chapter 720 offers no definition 
of “voluntary” or “involuntary,” but the Illinois Supreme Court has referred 
to involuntary acts as those which a person “lacks the volition to control or 
prevent.” Grant, 377 N.E.2d at 8.
 Section 502(2)(a), like current 5/4-1, provides a defense to persons 
who are incapable of performing a required act. The proposed provision 
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expands the current rule to include cases where the person is mentally 
incapable of performing, or otherwise cannot reasonably be expected under 
the circumstances to perform, the omitted act. Imposing liability on such 
persons is inconsistent with any basis for criminal punishment; granting a 
defense is consistent with similar provisions regarding incapacity to control 
one’s conduct, as set out in proposed Sections 503, 504, and 506 (q.v.).
 Section 502(2)(b) recognizes the potential conflict that arises when an 
actor may be subject to omission liability if he does not act, yet may be subject 
to liability for commission of another offense if he does act: for example, 
where the defendant is charged with failing to pay mandated benefits, but 
is in liquidation or in bankruptcy proceedings that prohibit such payments. 
Because Section 502(2)(b) applies only if the avoided act is unjustified, that 
act must be one that the legislature has found significant and blameworthy, 
and that does not satisfy the “lesser evils” provision. Where this is the case, 
inaction is by definition a lesser or equal evil and therefore preferable to 
action, even if the inaction would also normally constitute an offense. Section 
502(2)(b) is necessary to avoid the problem of conflicting liabilities. In the 
very limited (and perhaps only theoretical) set of circumstances where the 
actor’s conduct is required by a legal duty, yet also constitutes an offense and 
is not justified under a recognized justification defense, he should not be held 
liable for his failure to act.
Section 503. Impaired Consciousness
Corresponding Current Provision(s): None
Comment:
 Generally. This provision creates an excuse for cases where a person’s 
consciousness is altered due to a medically demonstrable physiological 
disease or defect, rather than a “mental disease or defect” as in insanity, that 
negates the person’s blameworthiness. This provision recognizes that there 
can be physiological causes of the kind of dysfunction that merits an excuse, 
like epilepsy, brain tumors, chemical imbalances, etc., that may not qualify 
as “mental illnesses” and thus may not fall within the scope of the insanity 
defense. Additionally, the terms of Section 502’s “involuntary act” excuse are 
extremely strict and would cover very few of these cases, as hardly any acts 
are not “a product of the person’s effort or determination.” Section 503 covers 
acts that involve some cognitive control, and therefore fall outside Section 
502, but where there is still sufficient impairment of control that the person 
should not be held accountable for his acts.
 Relation to current Illinois law. No provision in current Chapter 720 
corresponds to Section 503, whose form is very similar to proposed Sections 
504 and 506 (q.v.). Illinois case law, however, hints at the desirability of a 
specific defense of this kind. Courts have struggled to consider cases of the 
type Section 503 covers within the confines of the “automatism” defense or 
the insanity defense. See, e.g., People v. Grant, 377 N.E.2d 4, 7-9 (Ill. 1978) 
(epilepsy).
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Section 504. Insanity
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/6-2
Comment:
 Generally. This provision sets out a defense excusing persons who 
perform conduct constituting an offense, but do so under the influence of an 
uncontrollable mental illness, making criminal liability inappropriate.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 504(1) and (2) correspond 
to 5/6-2(a), but are worded more precisely. Section 504(2)(a) covers the 
presumably uncontroversial situation where the person literally does not 
know what he is doing — or does not know the situation in which he is 
doing it. Section (2)(b) substantively corresponds to current 5/6-2(a), under 
which a defendant is excused if “he lacks substantial capacity to appreciate 
the criminality of his conduct.” The current wording is nebulous, for it leaves 
open the question of how great a capacity is “substantial capacity,” and it uses 
the undefined word “appreciate” rather than a clearer word such as “know.” 
Section (2)(c) is a variation on language (“lacks substantial capacity to . . . 
conform his conduct to the requirements of law”) that was recently deleted 
from 5/6-2(a). See PUB. ACT 90-593 (1998). This standard merits re-inclusion, 
as it covers persons who in the abstract are clearly not blameworthy, and 
there is no demonstrated risk that inclusion of such a standard in the insanity 
defense will lead to inappropriate acquittals — or, indeed, that it will change 
the outcome of insanity-defense cases at all. (See commentary for proposed 
Section 501.) Moreover, to the extent concern exists that the insanity 
defense is subject to abuse, such concern should lie with the relatively broad 
“capacity” aspect of the defense rather than the narrow “volitional” rule. 
Further, current Illinois law recognizes a volitional-impairment defense where 
the impairment results from involuntary intoxication, see 720 ILCS 5/6-3(b); 
it is inconsistent to deny the defense where the impairment arises from the 
defendant’s mental illness. Cf. 720 ILCS 5/7-11 (providing a defense where 
a defendant is unable to control his conduct due to compulsion). Research 
demonstrates strong public support for an excuse covering persons whose 
mental illness impairs their ability to control their conduct; abolition of the 
“volitional” aspect of the insanity defense therefore controverts popular 
sentiment without conveying any legitimate benefit.86
 Section 504(3)(a) is the same as current 5/6-2(b). Section 504(3)(b) 
explicitly excludes from the definition of “mental disease or defect” 
intoxication, which other proposed provisions address. (See proposed 
Sections 302 and 506 and corresponding commentary.)
 86 See, e.g., PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY AND BLAME 128-39 
(1995); Daniel S. Bailis et al., Community Standards of Criminal Liability and the Insanity 
Defense, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 425 (1995).
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 Section 504 does not include the “guilty but mentally ill” (GBMI) 
provisions in current 5/6-2(c) and (d). The underlying basis for the GBMI 
verdict — that the insanity defense has been subject to abuse — is empirically 
unsound. Indeed, following enactment of the GBMI verdict in Illinois, the 
number of insanity acquittals actually increased. See Christopher Slobogin, 
The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict: An Idea Whose Time Should Not Have 
Come, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 494, 507 (1985). (See also commentary for 
proposed Section 501.) In addition, allowing the verdict raises significant 
concerns. It is problematic for the factfinder (often a lay jury) to make 
a clinical determination of whether an offender is in need of psychiatric 
treatment.87 The GBMI verdict also enables, and encourages, jurors to 
consider matters unrelated to guilt, when determination of guilt is their sole 
responsibility. Finally, a jury faced with the choice between a verdict of “not 
guilty by reason of insanity” and GBMI may select the latter, not because it 
finds the offender blameworthy, but because it believes the offender needs 
confinement and treatment. Such insane-but-dangerous offenders should be 
dealt with through civil commitment standards rather than the GBMI verdict. 
(Note, however, that although the GMBI verdict raises significant policy 
concerns, it has recently been held constitutional by the Illinois Supreme 
Court. See People v. Lantz, 712 N.E.2d 314, 320-22 (Ill. 1999).)
 As to the burden of proof for insanity (current 5/6-2(e)), see commentary 
for proposed Section 501(6).
Section 505. Immaturity; Transfer to Juvenile Court
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/6-1
Comment:
 Generally. This provision creates a “defense” for persons whose 
immaturity prevents them from understanding the wrongfulness or nature of 
their conduct. Any person under the age of 18 who is found to be immature is 
automatically transferred to juvenile court.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 505 replaces the “all-or-
nothing” immaturity defense of 5/6-1 — according to which any person 
under age 13 is conclusively deemed immature, while any person over 
that age is conclusively deemed mature — with a more nuanced approach. 
The proposed provision lowers to 12 the age at which a defendant receives 
a conclusive presumption of immaturity. It also provides a presumption 
of immaturity for defendants under age 16, but requires those defendants 
 87 Note that a finding of GBMI does not even require treatment in all cases. Rather, 
the Department of Corrections is only required to conduct a “periodic inquiry” into the 
inmate’s mental illness and may provide any level of treatment, including no treatment, as “it 
determines necessary.” See 730 ILCS 5/5-2-6(b).
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to show that their immaturity prevented them from appreciating the 
wrongfulness or consequences of their actions. Defendants over age 16 are 
given no presumption, but may still litigate the issue and obtain the defense 
if they can demonstrate (by a preponderance of the evidence, according to 
proposed Section 501(6)) that they are entitled to it.
 Section 505 governs only the treatment of juveniles in adult court and 
should have no impact on proceedings in juvenile court. Thus, Section 505 is 
not anticipated to interfere with the jurisdictional or other rules set out in the 
Juvenile Court Act of 1987. See 705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq.
Section 506. Involuntary Intoxication
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/6-3(b)
Comment:
 Generally. Section 506 provides a defense for a person who commits 
an offense while under the influence of a state of intoxication that he did not 
voluntarily create.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 506 is substantively similar 
to current 5/6-3(b), but replaces the negative phrasing of 5/6-3(b) (“is 
responsible . . . unless”) with a more direct statement (“is excused . . . if”). 
Cf. IPI (CRIMINAL) 24-25.03 (4th ed. 2000) (stating that a person “is not 
criminally responsible for his conduct if” involuntarily intoxicated). The 
precise formulation of the excuse standard in Section 506(2) has been altered 
in a fashion that parallels the alteration for the insanity defense set out in 
proposed Section 504 (q.v.). (The voluntary intoxication rule of 5/6-3(a) is in 
fact a rule of imputation of an offense element and is addressed in proposed 
Section 302 (q.v.).) Section 506(4) makes clear that, as with other excuse 
defenses, a person may be liable for an offense if he is culpable in causing 
his own involuntary intoxication. See supra proposed Section 501(4) and 
corresponding commentary.
Section 507. Duress
 Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/7-11
Comment:
 Generally. Section 507 defines a defense for persons who were forced 
to perform a criminal act under coercion that an ordinary person would not 
be able to resist. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 507 is similar to current 5/7-
11, but creates a “sliding scale” for duress rather than a fixed standard for 
the necessary level of compulsion. Current law requires “compulsion of 
threat or menace of the imminent infliction of death or great bodily harm.” 
ILL Code  V II Gen Part   77 7/2/03, 1:19:03 PM
78
Proposed Criminal Code Offi cial Commentary — Volume 2
That formulation fails to recognize the possibility that a reasonable person 
might feel compelled to commit a minor offense based on a serious, but less 
severe, threat. Section 507(1) requires “a threat that a person of reasonable 
firmness in the person’s situation would have been unable to resist.” Under 
Section 507’s formulation, if the offense the actor is coerced to commit is not 
especially serious, a less serious degree of coercion is necessary to make the 
defense available.
 Section 507(3) provides a list of factors to consider in determining 
whether the level of coercion was sufficient to provide a duress defense. The 
advantage of such an approach is that it allows the factfinder to consider all 
relevant facts and circumstances, and suggests to the factfinder what factors 
may be relevant, without requiring the defendant to satisfy a rigid set of 
elements that may not be dispositive, or even significant, in every case.
 For example, current law denies the duress defense in cases of murder. 
See 720 ILCS 5/7-11 (barring defense for “an offense punishable with 
death”); People v. Gleckler, 411 N.E.2d 849, 854 (Ill. 1980). In nearly all 
cases, the proposed list of factors would lead the factfinder to deny the 
defense for such a serious offense. However, unlike current law, Section 507 
would allow the defendant to assert a defense in the rare case (e.g., defendant 
faces a serious threat of death to himself and his family if he does not obey) 
where the defendant is able to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
a person of reasonable firmness would have been unable to resist the threat 
and would have committed the offense. Likewise, current 5/7-11 precludes 
the defense in cases where someone other than the defendant is threatened 
with harm; the proposed provision would allow the defendant the opportunity 
to prove to the factfinder that a reasonable person in his position would have 
acted similarly.88
Section 508. Ignorance Due to Unavailable Law
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/4-8(b)(1)
Comment:
 Generally. This provision upholds the legality principle of criminal law, 
which allows criminal liability only where a written statement of the law’s 
commands exists prior to the alleged violation of those commands. While 
ignorance of the law is generally not an excuse, fairness dictates that citizens 
not be punished for conduct if the government provided inadequate notice of 
the conduct’s prohibition. The rationale for criminal liability does not apply 
 88 As discussed above, the proposed Code also abandons the rule, established in case 
law, that a person may not assert a duress defense if he was negligent or “at fault” in causing 
the circumstances of the duress. However, a person may be liable for an offense if he causes 
the excusing condition while acting with the culpability required by the offense. See supra 
commentary for Section 501(4).
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where the defendant did not know, and could not reasonably have known, that 
his conduct was criminal. 
 Section 508(3) requires that the defendant not know that the conduct in 
question is criminal. This prevents exploitation of the law’s unavailability by 
persons for whom that unavailability was irrelevant.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 508 corresponds to current 5/4-
8(b)(1), but is broader, as it includes any unavailable law, rather than only 
administrative regulations or orders. The same fairness concerns apply with 
equal force to any other statement of the law as to the forms of statement 
included in 5/4-8(b)(1).
 Section 508(4) reorganizes the elements of the defense in 5/4-8(b)(1) 
into a set of factors for the court to consider in deciding whether the law 
was made available to the reasonable person. The factors in Section 508(4) 
focus both on the government’s efforts in making the law available and on the 
defendant’s efforts in determining the actual state of the law. See commentary 
for proposed Section 507.
Section 509. Reliance Upon Official Misstatement of Law
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/4-8(b)(2)-(4)
Comment:
 Generally. Section 509, like Section 508 (q.v.), upholds the legality 
principle, but instead of applying in the case where no statement of the 
law is available, it applies where an existing official statement of the law is 
inaccurate, and a person relies on that inaccurate statement.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 509 is substantively similar to 
current 5/4-8(b)(2)-(4). However, like proposed Section 508, Section 509 
reorganizes the elements of the defenses in subsections (b)(2) to (4) into a 
set of factors for the court to consider. This approach does not draw fixed, 
arbitrary lines as current law does. For example, under current law, based on 
an interpretation of the term “public officer” in 5/4-8(b)(4), a person may 
reasonably rely on the official statement of an administrative agency, but may 
not rely on the official statement of a circuit judge. See People v. Knop, 557 
N.E.2d 970, 974-75 (Ill. App. 1990). See commentary for proposed Section 
507.
Section 510. Reasonable Mistake of Law Unavoidable by Due Diligence
Corresponding Current Provision(s): None
Comment:
 Generally. Section 510 creates a defense for persons who, even after 
affirmatively seeking in good faith to determine the law’s requirements, 
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make a reasonable mistake as to those requirements and unwittingly engage 
in prohibited conduct. The defense is allowed only if the offender exercised 
due diligence in an effort to determine the law’s requirements, and only if the 
subsequent mistake is reasonable. There is little likelihood that the defense 
would be subject to abuse, as (under proposed Section 501(6)) the defendant 
has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he 
exercised due diligence, that he was honestly mistaken, and that the mistake 
was reasonable.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 510 has no corresponding 
provision in current Chapter 720.
Section 511. Mistake as to a Justification
Corresponding Current Provision(s): Various; see 720 ILCS 5/7-1, -2, 
  -3, -5, -6, -9, -13
Comment:
 Generally. This provision sets out a defense for people who perform 
conduct that constitutes a defense, but do so under the mistaken impression 
that the conduct is legally justified in their situation.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 511 has no single corresponding 
provision in current law, but reflects a rule embodied in Chapter 720’s 
provisions covering specific justifications, which are defined to require that 
the actor “reasonably believes” himself to be justified. See 720 ILCS 5/7-
1, -2, -3, -5, -6, -9, -13. A defense for some actors who mistakenly believe 
themselves to be justified is appropriate, but is more properly addressed by 
means of a separate provision such as Section 511, for at least two reasons. 
First, the rationale for this defense relates to the actor’s mental state, not to 
whether the act itself is objectively justified; therefore, this defense is more 
appropriately treated as an excuse rather than as a justification. Second, 
the current Chapter 720 formulation requiring “reasonable belief” in a 
justification means that an honest, but negligent, belief that one’s conduct is 
justified may give rise to criminal liability. Negligence liability is generally 
considered inappropriate, especially for serious offenses, and justifications 
frequently apply to serious offenses. 
 Section 511(1) and (2) provide that the requisite culpability level as 
to one’s mistaken belief that one is justified should parallel the culpability 
level imposed by the underlying offense itself. Accordingly, in some 
circumstances even an unreasonable belief that one is justified may enable 
a defense that precludes or mitigates liability. Cf. 720 ILCS 5/9-2(a)(2) 
(providing mitigation from first-degree to second-degree murder based on 
unreasonable belief that use of force is justified). For example, a person who 
kills another while under the reckless belief that the act is in self-defense may 
have an excuse defense to intentional murder under proposed Section 1101, 
but may still be liable for reckless homicide under proposed Section 1104.
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 Section 511(3) defines the term “primary culpability required by the 
offense charged.” Because different elements of an offense may have different 
culpability requirements, it is necessary to make clear which element of the 
offense governs whether a person’s mistake as to a justification will excuse 
his conduct. Section 511(3) provides that in cases involving an offense with 
a result element, the relevant culpability level is that required by the result 
element (e.g., for reckless homicide, recklessness as to causing death). Where 
the offense has no result element, the primary culpability is that required for 
the circumstance element most central to the harm or wrong sought to be 
prohibited by the offense (e.g., for the terroristic threats offense, see proposed 
Section 1203, recklessness as to terrorizing another person). 
Section 512. Definitions
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/6-2
Comment:
 Generally. This provision collects defined terms used in Article 500 and 
provides cross-references to the sections in which they are defined.
 Relation to current Illinois law. For a discussion of the relationship 
between Article 500’s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary 
for the provision in which the term is initially defined.
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ARTICLE 600. NONEXCULPATORY DEFENSES
Section 601. General Provisions Governing Nonexculpatory Defenses
Corresponding Current Provision(s): None
Comment:
 Generally. Section 601 describes the rules that govern the operation of 
the nonexculpatory defenses set out in Article 600. Section 601(1) defines 
“nonexculpatory defense.” Section 601(2) and (3) parallel proposed Section 
501(2) and (5). Conduct subject to a nonexculpatory defense (such as conduct 
by one who has been entrapped) may be resisted, whereas justified conduct 
(such as the use of force in self-defense) may not. A person who is mistaken 
as to a nonexculpatory defense — who, for example, thinks he has been 
entrapped by the police when he has not — is not entitled to any defense.
 Section 601(4) provides a general rule that the defendant must prove 
all nonexculpatory defenses by a preponderance of the evidence. Current 
Illinois law shifts the burden of persuasion to the defendant, and requires 
clear and convincing evidence, for the excuse defense of insanity. If such a 
burden-shifting rule is appropriate for an excuse defense — under which the 
defendant would be considered blameless for committing the offense — it 
should also apply to nonexculpatory defenses, under which the defendant 
makes no assertion of a lack of responsibility for his offense. These defenses 
are not based on a judgment that the underlying conduct is not harmful or 
that the actor is not blameworthy. They apply in situations involving conduct 
ordinarily subject to liability, but where some alternative social interest 
is deemed to override the assessment of criminal liability. Because these 
defenses do not exculpate, the burden should be on the defendant to prove 
that one of them applies.
 Section 601(5) specifies that, unless expressly provided otherwise, 
nonexculpatory defenses are to be ruled on by the court rather than the 
jury. As noted above, these defenses do not involve determinations of guilt, 
innocence, or moral blame, and accordingly do not demand jury resolution. 
Resolution by the court will also be more expedient and may render 
unnecessary a full trial of the facts.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 601 has no directly 
corresponding provision in current Chapter 720, which does not recognize 
nonexculpatory defenses as a distinct class of defenses. However, 
Illinois courts have addressed the issue raised in Section 601(4) for 
the specific nonexculpatory defenses of statute of limitation89 and 
 89 See People v. Morris, 554 N.E.2d 150, 153 (Ill. 1990) (“Where an indictment on 
its face shows that an offense was not committed within the applicable limitation period, it 
becomes an element of the State’s case to allege and prove the existence of facts which invoke 
(continued…)
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entrapment.90 Both defenses are currently treated as standard affirmative 
defenses for which the defendant must raise the defense, but the State has the 
burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defenses do not exist.
 In the absence of a provision similar to Section 601(5), nonexculpatory 
defenses are sometimes resolved by the court, and sometimes by the jury, 
under current Illinois law. See 725 ILCS 5/114-1(a)(2) (authorizing court to 
dismiss charge where prosecution barred by former prosecution or statute of 
limitation); IPI (CRIMINAL) 24-25.04 (4th ed. 2000) (jury instruction defining 
entrapment); 24-25.23 (jury instruction for prosecutions under exception to 
statute of limitation).
Section 602. Prosecution Barred if Not Commenced Within Time 
 Limitation Period
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/2-16; 5/3-5 to -8; 
  725 ILCS 5/111-1; 5/111-2
Comment:
 Generally. Section 602 sets time limitations for bringing prosecutions 
and provides rules governing the operation of the limitations. Time limitations 
encourage prompt investigation of crimes and prevent stale prosecutions. 
This goal must be balanced against the goal of prosecuting blameworthy 
offenders, especially those who have committed serious crimes. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 602(1) sets time limitations for 
prosecutions according to offense grades. This organization assures that the 
time limitation for bringing a prosecution corresponds to the seriousness of 
the offense. In contrast, current 5/3-5(a) sets limitation periods by providing 
lists of specific crimes.91 That organization creates the risk that serious crimes, 
an exception to the limitation period.”); People v. Gwinn, 627 N.E.2d 699, 701 (Ill. App. 1994) 
(citing 725 ILCS 5/114-1(a)(2) and (b) for proposition that defendant is required to raise issue 
or risk waiving the defense); People v. Clark, 389 N.E.2d 911, 931 (Ill. App. 1979) (State has 
burden of proving that offense occurred within limitation period).
 90 See People v. Tipton, 401 N.E.2d 528, 532-33 (Ill. 1980) (once defendant has raised 
the defense, State must prove beyond reasonable doubt that defendant was not entrapped); 
People v. Latona, 644 N.E.2d 424, 431 (Ill. App. 1994) (same). The current entrapment 
defense is codified in Article 7 of the Criminal Code, and thus is treated as an “affirmative 
defense” for which the prosecution bears the burden of persuasion. See 720 ILCS 5/3-2(b) 
(“If the issue involved in an affirmative defense . . . is raised then the State must sustain the 
burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as to that issue together with 
all the other elements of the offense”); 5/7-14 (“A defense of . . . exoneration[] based on the 
provisions of this Article is an affirmative defense.”).
 91 In addition, other specific offenses defined outside Chapter 720 contain their own 
limitation provisions. See, e.g., 35 ILCS 105/14 (establishing 3-year limitation period for 
violations of Use Tax Act); 35 ILCS 505/15(7) (establishing 5-year limitation period for 
violations of Motor Fuel Tax Law); 740 ILCS 10/6(2) (establishing 4-year limitation period 
for violations of Illinois Antitrust Act).
 89 (…continued)
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which should be subject to longer limitation periods, will fall under the three-
year limitation period in 5/3-5(b). See, e.g., People v. Berg, 660 N.E.2d 1003, 
1004 (Ill. App. 1996) (refusing to apply 5/3-5(a)’s rule allowing prosecutions 
for “arson” to be commenced at any time in case involving aggravated arson, 
because that crime was not specifically listed in 5/3-5(a)).
 For many crimes, Section 602(1) extends the limitation period found in 
5/3-5. For example, under 5/3-5(b), any felony not listed in 5/3-5(a) is subject 
to a three-year limitation period, while under Section 602(1) those crimes 
could be brought within five years, ten years, or at any time, depending on the 
offense’s grade. Similarly, Section 602(1)(d) extends the limitation period for 
offenses other than felonies from one and a half years to two years.92
 Section 602(2) greatly simplifies current 5/3-6’s rules governing 
extended limitation periods. Current law defines extended limitation periods 
according to specific types of criminal activity, thereby requiring ten different 
and overlapping subsections. That organization is needlessly confusing. For 
example, 5/3-6(a)(1), (d), and (j) all apply to crimes involving juvenile 
victims, and 5/3-6(c), (e), (i), and (j) all apply to sex crimes. Moreover, 
current law’s organization of the extended limitation periods creates the risk 
that crimes deserving an extended limitation period will be excluded because 
they are not specifically mentioned in 5/3-6. See, e.g., People v. Sifford, 
617 N.E.2d 499, 501 (Ill. App. 1993) (holding that 5/3-6’s rule extending 
limitation period for sexual assault and sexual abuse crimes does not apply 
to offense of “indecent liberties with a child”). In contrast to current law, 
Section 602(2) uses only two subsections, covering any crime involving a 
juvenile victim and any crime whose discovery may have been delayed. 
 Section 602(3) states more precisely than current 5/3-5(b) exactly when 
the limitation period begins. Current 5/3-5(b) simply states that a prosecution 
must be commenced within three years or 18 months after the commission 
of an offense. Current law’s lack of a precise statement regarding the start of 
the limitation period creates serious ambiguity and has prompted at least one 
Illinois court to suspend logic in an effort to avoid a limitation defense. See 
People v. Calderon, 633 N.E.2d 890, 892 (Ill. App. 1994) (limitation period 
for criminal sexual assault began to run on day the victim gave birth to child 
resulting from assault, and not on day of assault), vacated, 640 N.E.2d 946 
(Ill. 1994). In contrast, Section 602(3) explicitly states that the limitation 
period starts to run the day after every element in an offense has occurred. 
This reflects the principle applied by most Illinois courts. See, e.g., People 
v. Mudd, 507 N.E.2d 869, 873 (Ill. App. 1987) (“Statutes of limitations 
normally begin to run only ‘when the crime is complete[,]’ . . . and the crime 
here was complete only upon the existence of the last element, the death of 
the victim.”) (internal citation omitted). With respect to crimes involving a 
 92 Section 602(1)(d) also differs from current 5/3-5(b)’s treatment of offenses other 
than felonies in applying to “any other offense,” thus making it clear that it imposes the same 
limitation period for petty and business offenses as it does for misdemeanors. 
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series of acts or continuing conduct, Section 602(3) is substantively similar to 
current 5/3-8, but clarifies the start of the limitation period for cases involving 
the defendant’s complicity in a continuing course of conduct. 
 Section 602(4) is substantively similar to current 5/2-16’s definition 
of “prosecution” in providing that a prosecution is commenced when an 
indictment is returned or an information is filed, but also incorporates the 
Code of Criminal Procedure’s rule that a prosecution may be commenced 
by filing a “complaint.” See 725 ILCS 5/111-1 (providing that “prosecution 
may be commenced by . . . [a] complaint”); 5/111-2(b) (prosecutions for 
misdemeanors and petty and business offenses “may be by . . . complaint”); 
cf. People v. Robins, 338 N.E.2d 222, 225 (Ill. App. 1975) (“[I]t is clear that 
the statutory definition of ‘prosecution’ must be read to include the word 
‘complaint.’”).
 Section 602(5) is substantively similar to current 5/3-7, but omits 5/3-
7(c) and (d).93 The omission of current 5/3-7(c)’s language regarding quashed 
charging instruments and subsequent proceedings on appeal is not meant to 
change the current rule that those specific situations toll the running of the 
limitation period; rather, 5/3-7(c)’s language is covered by the general rule 
of proposed Section 602(5)(c). Section 602(5) omits current 5/3-7(d), on the 
other hand, to simplify the tolling rules and prevent the general rules from 
being overwrought by numerous specific provisions; under Section 602, any 
proceedings that occur before a grand jury has returned an indictment are not 
part of a “pending” prosecution, and do not toll the statute of limitation.
 Section 602(6) is functionally similar to current 5/2-16’s definition 
of “prosecution” in providing that a prosecution is “pending” for tolling 
purposes “through the final disposition of the case upon appeal.”
Section 603. Entrapment
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/7-12
Comment:
 Generally. Section 603 sets out a defense covering cases where the 
defendant likely would not have committed the crime had the police not 
induced him to do so. This defense is meant to curb excessively coercive 
or manipulative police conduct. It does not, however, suggest a lack of 
 93 Section 602(5)(b) also differs from current 5/3-7(b) in tolling for time that the 
defendant is a “public servant” rather than a “public officer.” Proposed Section 108’s 
definition of “public servant” is broader than current 5/2-18’s definition of “public officer.” 
See proposed Section 108 and corresponding commentary. This terminological difference is 
not of substantive import, however, as Section 602(5)(b) only applies where the defendant is 
charged with theft of funds while in “public office.” Like current 5/3-7(b), Section 602(5)(b) 
aims to prevent officeholders from benefitting by using their powers while in office to conceal 
their own prior misdeeds.
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blameworthiness in the defendant, who has committed a crime under 
circumstances that would not provide a truly exculpating defense such as 
duress. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 603(1) is substantively similar 
to current 5/7-12, with two differences. First, Section 603(1) omits as 
superfluous current 5/7-12’s requirement that inducement be “for the purpose 
of obtaining evidence for . . . prosecution.”
 Second, Section 603(1)(b) limits the defense by requiring that the 
government’s conduct created a “substantial risk that a reasonable law-
abiding person” would also have been induced to commit the offense. 
Section 603(1)(b)’s language makes clear that the entrapment defense does 
not apply in situations where a defendant is “induced” to commit an offense 
by governmental conduct that is neither coercive nor manipulative.
 Section 603(2), limiting the entrapment defense by prohibiting its 
use in cases where the defendant causes or threatens bodily harm, has no 
corresponding provision in current Chapter 720. Section 603(2) reflects the 
view that such crimes are sufficiently serious that an otherwise blameworthy 
offender should not be exonerated because of police misconduct. (Note 
that the entrapment defense differs significantly from the duress defense in 
this regard. The duress defense exculpates and excuses the defendant, but 
where the entrapment defense applies, it reflects no determination that the 
defendant’s behavior was anything other than fully culpable and wrongful. 
See proposed Section 507 and corresponding commentary.)
 Section 603(3) requires a defendant to admit that he performed the 
conduct constituting the alleged offense before he will be allowed to raise an 
entrapment defense. Illinois courts interpret the existing entrapment defense 
to require a defendant to admit that he committed the underlying offense. See, 
e.g., People v. Landwer, 665 N.E.2d 848, 855 (Ill. 1995); People v. Gillespie, 
557 N.E.2d 894, 896 (Ill. 1990). Section 603(3) differs slightly in that it 
would enable the defendant to litigate whether he possessed the requisite 
culpability or was entitled to an exculpating excuse defense, such as a duress 
defense, in addition (or in the alternative) to having been entrapped.
Section 604. Unfitness to Plead, Stand Trial, or be Sentenced
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 725 ILCS 5/104-10 et seq.
Comment:
 Generally. Section 604 sets the fitness standard under which defendants 
will not be required to face criminal adjudication. This defense ensures 
that all criminal defendants will have the mental capacity to exercise their 
constitutional rights to aid in their own defense, testify on their own behalf, 
confront witnesses, and effectively communicate with counsel.
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 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 604(1) is functionally the same 
as current 725 ILCS 5/104-10’s presumption of fitness to plead, stand trial, 
or be sentenced.
 Section 604(2) incorporates by reference the rules and standards 
regarding fitness that are set forth in Article 104 of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure.94
 
Section 605. Former Prosecution for Same Offense as a Bar to Present
 Prosecution
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/2-1; 5/2-5; 5/2-9; 
  5/3-4(a)
Comment:
 Generally. Section 605 sets out the rules governing the effect of former 
prosecutions for the same offense. This provision protects a defendant’s Fifth 
Amendment right not to be tried or punished twice for the same offense.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 605 is generally similar to 
current 5/3-4(a). Section 605(1) and (3) are substantively similar to 5/3-
4(a)(1) in barring prosecution where the defendant was previously acquitted 
or convicted, but the proposed subsections directly incorporate the definitions 
of “acquittal” and “conviction” currently set out in 5/2-1 and 5/2-5. The last 
sentence of Section 605(1) is substantively similar to the last paragraph of 
current 5/3-4(a), but provides that a “finding of guilty” — rather than a 
“conviction” — of an included offense is an acquittal of the greater offense; 
this modification is consistent with decisions holding that a plea of guilty to 
an included offense, although resulting in a conviction, is not an acquittal of 
the greater offense. See People v. McCutcheon, 368 N.E.2d 886, 888-89 (Ill. 
1977); cf. Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 501-02 (1984).
 Section 605(2) is substantively the same as current 5/3-4(a)(2), but uses 
“after the information or complaint was filed or the indictment was returned” 
rather than “before trial” to make clear that a prosecution terminated prior to 
the creation of a charging instrument will not bar a subsequent prosecution. 
 Section 605(4) clarifies 5/3-4(a)(3) by describing situations that do 
not constitute “improper termination” of a prosecution. Section 605(4) 
codifies Illinois case law in that it expressly excludes prosecutions that were 
improperly terminated but do not warrant a former-prosecution defense, either 
 94 Section 604(2) incorporates Article 104 in its entirety, including its provisions 
governing burdens of persuasion for, and jury determinations of, fitness issues. See, e.g., 725 
ILCS 5/104-11(c) (“When a bona fide doubt of the defendant’s fitness has been raised, the 
burden of proving that the defendant is fit by a preponderance of the evidence and the burden 
of going forward with the evidence are on the State.”); 725 ILCS 5/104-12 (“The issue of the 
defendant’s fitness may be determined in the first instance by the court or by a jury.”). These 
explicit provisions would supersede the rules provided in proposed Section 601(4) and (5).
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because the defendant consented to the termination or because the court was 
not able to enter judgment due to a necessary mistrial or legal defect. See, 
e.g., People v. Camden, 504 N.E.2d 96, 99 (Ill. 1987) (no double-jeopardy 
issue where mistrial “can be said to be attributable to the defendant by virtue 
of his motion or consent”); People v. Yarbrough, 534 N.E.2d 695 (Ill. App. 
1989) (prior prosecution which, due to circumstances beyond the control of 
parties or court, resulted in mistrial does not bar subsequent prosecution for 
same offense).
 Section 605(5) cross-references the definition of “included offense” that 
is currently codified at 720 ILCS 5/2-9. It is anticipated that the definition 
will be moved into the Code of Criminal Procedure by the conforming 
amendments bill to be presented with the Code to the General Assembly.
 
Section 606. Former Prosecution for Different Offense as a Bar to
 Present Prosecution
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/3-3; 5/3-4(b)
Comment:
 Generally. Section 606 sets out rules governing the effect on a criminal 
prosecution of former prosecutions for a different offense. This provision 
requires, in certain circumstances, that different crimes arising out of the 
same conduct be tried together. Like Section 605 (q.v.), this provision 
protects a defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights by preventing the prosecution 
from relitigating a factual issue decided in the defendant’s favor at a previous 
trial. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 606 is generally similar to 
current 5/3-4(b). Section 606(1)(b) clarifies 5/3-4(b)(1) by specifically 
elaborating when an offense should have been charged in a previous 
prosecution. Current 5/3-4(b)(1) indirectly incorporates this language by 
referencing current 5/3-3. Section 606(1)(c)(i) also clarifies that prosecution 
is barred where a former prosecution was based on the same conduct and 
resulted in a conviction or acquittal of an offense that does not “prevent a 
substantially different harm or wrong.”
 Section 606(2) clarifies 5/3-4(b)(2) by changing the phrase “before 
trial” to “after the information or complaint was filed or the indictment was 
returned.” (See proposed Section 605(2) and corresponding commentary.) 
Section 606(2) also makes clear that prosecution is barred where a former 
prosecution was terminated by an “acquittal” requiring a determination that 
is inconsistent with a fact that must be established for conviction.
 Section 606(3) is substantively the same as current 5/3-4(b)(3), and 
incorporates Section 605(4)’s definition of “improper termination.” 
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Section 607. Former Prosecution in Another Jurisdiction as a Bar to 
 Present Prosecution
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/3-4(c)
Comment:
 Generally. Section 607 sets out the rules governing the effect of former 
prosecutions from different jurisdictions. Like Section 605 (q.v.), this 
provision protects defendants from multiple prosecutions for the same acts. 
The rationale for this defense applies even though the prosecution occurred 
in a different jurisdiction.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 607 is generally similar to 
current 5/3-4(c), with three differences. First, like Section 606(1)(c)(i), 
Section 607(1)(a) clarifies that prosecution is barred where a former 
prosecution was based on the same conduct and resulted in a conviction or 
acquittal of an offense that does not “prevent a substantially different harm 
or wrong.” Second, Section 607(2) clarifies 5/3-4(c)(2) by changing the 
term “before trial” to “after the information or complaint was filed or the 
indictment was returned,” see proposed Section 605(2) and corresponding 
commentary, and by providing that the rule applies to terminations by 
acquittals. See proposed Section 606(2) and corresponding commentary.
 
Section 608. Prosecution Not Barred Where Former Prosecution Was 
 Before Court Lacking Jurisdiction or Was Fraudulently Procured 
 by Defendant or Resulted in Conviction Held Invalid
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/3-4(d)
Comment:
 Generally. Section 608 excludes various cases where former prosecutions 
should not act as a bar to subsequent prosecutions, because the original court 
lacked jurisdiction to hear the case; the defendant surreptitiously obtained the 
prior prosecution with the intent of avoiding a harsher sentence; or the prior 
conviction was invalidated on due process grounds unrelated to the merits.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 608 is substantively the same 
as current 5/3-4(d), but omits 5/3-4(d)(2)’s references to the “setting aside, 
reversal, or vacating” of convictions as redundant of being “held invalid” 
and exception for convictions resulting in acquittals as superfluous. As 
Illinois courts recognize with respect to current 5/3-4(d)(2), subsequently 
invalidated convictions are excluded from the former-prosecution defenses 
because, unlike acquittals, they do not address the merits of the defendant’s 
conviction. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 664 N.E.2d 164, 166 (Ill. App. 
1996) (“The fact that a conviction is later vacated for constitutional reasons 
is generally not considered to be the functional equivalent of an acquittal, 
absent some suggestion that the evidence was insufficient to convict.”) (citing 
Montana v. Hall, 481 U.S. 400, 403 (1987)). 
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Section 609. Definitions
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/2-1; 5/2-5; 5/2-9; 
  5/2-17; 5/2-18
 Generally. This provision collects defined terms used in Article 600 and 
provides cross-references to the provisions in which they are defined. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. For discussion of the relationship 
between Article 600’s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary 
for the provision in which each term is initially defined. 
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ARTICLE 700. LIABILITY FOR CORPORATIONS AND 
OTHER NON-HUMAN ENTITIES
General Comment:
 The proposed Code has added the phrase “or unincorporated 
association” in brackets after “corporation” throughout, so that the General 
Assembly may consider imposing liability on these groups to the same extent 
as incorporated associations. Unincorporated associations should merit 
criminal liability to the same extent as corporations, as such associations 
often resemble corporations in every respect except for the fact they have not 
formally incorporated. The concerns with deterrence of criminal conduct and 
punishment of a collective criminal enterprise are present with unincorporated 
associations no less than with corporations.
Section 701. Liability of Corporation [or Unincorporated Association]
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILS 5/5-4
Comment:
 Generally. Section 701 sets out the circumstances under which a 
corporation may be held criminally liable for its actions. Liability is imposed 
on corporations in certain circumstances to deter their agents from violating 
the law or failing to perform a legal duty. Liability under this provision is 
limited by the due diligence defense in Section 701(2), which prevents 
liability (except for absolute-liability offenses) in situations where a corporate 
agent attempted in good faith to follow the law.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 701(1)(a) is substantively 
similar to 5/5-4(a)(1), but employs a slightly different approach. Current 5/5-
4(a)(1), in addition to imposing two general rules (that corporate liability may 
attach to all misdemeanors and to all offenses for which the legislature has 
expressed its intent to impose liability), provides a “laundry list” of specific 
offenses — most of them environmental offenses — for which liability will 
apply. It is inappropriate to select certain offenses for which corporations are 
subject to liability unless there is a general principle behind the selection; 
if such a principle exists, the Code should express the principle rather than 
listing offenses individually.
 Section 701(1)(a) has been drafted with this idea in mind. The proposed 
Code is substantively similar to current 5/5-4(a)(1), but excludes reference to 
the specific statutory provisions listed therein. Rather, the proposed provision 
more broadly allows corporate liability for any misdemeanor, petty offense, 
or business offense. Moreover, Section 701 allows corporate liability for any 
offense that indicates a legislative purpose to provide corporate liability. This 
formulation maintains a default rule similar to current Illinois law: serious 
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criminal liability will not be imposed on corporations absent a legislative 
expression of intent. However, the proposed provision slightly lowers the 
threshold for imposition of liability on corporations by eliminating the 
current requirement that legislative intent to impose liability be “clearly” 
indicated.
 Section 701(1)(b) has no directly corresponding provision in current 
law. However, several provisions in current Illinois law specifically impose 
liability on corporations for their omission to discharge a specific duty. See, 
e.g., 35 ILCS 105/14 (imposing liability on corporations for failing to file a 
use tax return).
 Section 701(1)(c) is the same as current 5/5-4(a)(2), except that one 
phrase has been moved to enhance clarity.
 Section 701(2) is the same as current 5/5-4(b) in providing a due 
diligence defense, except that the sentence has been reorganized, and divided 
into subsections, to enhance clarity. 
 Section 701(3), like current 5/5-4(c), defines terms used in the 
provision. The proposed provision replaces “the high managerial agent” with 
“a high managerial agent,” as there may be more than one high managerial 
agent with the authority described. In addition, the term “agent” has been 
changed to “corporate agent” to avoid potential confusion, as the proposed 
Code also uses the term “agent” in other contexts.
Section 702. Relationship to Corporation [or Unincorporated 
 Association] No Limitation on Individual Liability or Punishment
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILS 5/5-5
Comment:
 Generally. This provision prevents individuals from escaping liability 
by virtue of having acted on behalf of a corporation, and establishes that 
individuals may be punished fully as individuals even though their liability 
stems from the actions of their corporation.95 
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 702 is the same as current 
5/5-5, except that explanatory introductory phrases have been added, and the 
sentence in Section 702(1) has been reorganized to enhance clarity. Cf. IPI 
(CRIMINAL) 5.11 (4th ed. 2000) (using similar sentence structure).
 95 As under current law, a person may only be accountable for conduct he performs on 
behalf of a corporation to the same extent he would be liable for performing such conduct on 
his own behalf. In other words, a person may not be accountable under this provision for an 
offense that applies only to corporations, and not to individuals. See People v. Parvin, 533 
N.E.2d 813, 817 (Ill. 1988) (finding defendant not accountable for corporation’s failure to file 
retailers’ occupation tax return where defendant, as an individual, was not subject to the filing 
requirements).
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Section 703. Definitions
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILS 5/5-4(c)
Comment:
 Generally. This provision collects defined terms used throughout 
Article 700 and provides cross-references to the sections in which they are 
defined.
 Relation to current Illinois law. For a discussion of the relationship 
between Article 700’s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary 
for the provision in which the term is initially defined.
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ARTICLE 800. INCHOATE OFFENSES
Section 801. Criminal Attempt
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/8-4 
Comment:
 Generally. Section 801 defines the requirements for liability for an 
attempt to commit an offense. Attempts are subject to liability because, like 
completed offenses, they involve a culpable mental state and overt conduct. 
Yet attempts differ from completed offenses in that, due either to fortuity 
of circumstance or the actor’s refraining from further conduct, the offense’s 
resulting harm does not occur, or occurs to a lesser extent.
 As defined in Section 801(1), attempt liability requires that a person 
engage in some conduct that would constitute a “substantial step toward 
commission of the offense.”96 Attempt liability, like criminal liability 
generally, requires an overt act. The general requirement of an act ensures that 
the criminal law does not punish “mere thoughts.” The specific requirement of 
a “substantial step” ensures that the law does not punish “mere preparation,” 
where the actor still has an opportunity to recant and abandon his criminal 
plan, and that only would-be criminals who have shown a certain degree of 
firmness of criminal purpose are subject to liability. The performance of an 
overt act amounting to a substantial step also supplies evidence that the actor 
did, in fact, have a culpable mental state.
 96 Current 5/8-4(a) also establishes a “substantial step” test. However, although the 
substantial step test’s true focus is on how far an actor has gone from the beginning of the 
causal chain leading to the offense, Illinois courts have sometimes read the provision as 
creating a “dangerous proximity” test, which focuses on how close to the end of the causal 
chain he has come. See People v. Smith, 593 N.E.2d 533, 537 (Ill. 1992); People v. Terrell, 
459 N.E.2d 1337, 1341 (Ill. 1984) (quoting Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 388 (1912) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting)). For example, in Smith, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed a 
conviction for attempted robbery, finding that the defendant’s acts were not a “substantial step” 
because it would be “improper to conclude that defendant came within a dangerous proximity 
to success.” Smith, 593 N.E.2d at 537. The Court so held as a matter of law, although whether 
a defendant has taken a “substantial step” toward committing an offense should normally be 
a question for the jury. Rather than asking whether there was sufficient evidence for the jury 
to find that the defendant had taken a substantial step toward the offense, the Court engaged 
in an independent inquiry as to how far away the defendant was from completing the offense. 
That analysis both misreads the statute and improperly takes the substantial step determination 
away from the jury.
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 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 801(1) is similar to current 5/8-
4(a),97 with two important differences. First, although Section 801(1) requires 
that a person must “intend[] to engage in the conduct that would constitute 
the offense,” as to other elements he need only have “the culpability required 
for commission of the offense,” whereas 5/8-4(a) requires that a person act 
“with intent to commit a specific offense.” (Note that the offender must have 
intent not only as to the conduct constituting a substantial step, but as to 
all the conduct that would constitute the offense. That is, the person must 
actually, and intentionally, perform a substantial step, but must also have the 
intent to perform all the other conduct that would amount to the completed 
offense for attempt liability to be appropriate.) 
 The current formulation, on the other hand, increases the culpability 
level for all elements of the substantive offense to “intent,” which may cause 
improper results or confusion. For example, current 5/9-1(a)(2) imposes 
liability for the completed offense of first-degree murder where the actor 
“knows” his conduct creates “a strong probability of death or great bodily 
harm,” but Illinois courts, following 5/8-4(a), have required that attempted 
first-degree murder requires “specific intent” as to all elements of the 
offense.98 By imposing a requirement of intent for all attempt elements, 
 97 Current Illinois law also defines numerous offenses to prohibit both completing 
certain conduct and “attempting” such conduct. See, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/16B-2(c) (library 
theft committed where one “borrows or attempts to borrow” library material); 5/16D-3(a)(4) 
(computer tampering committed where one “inserts or attempts to insert” virus); 5/17-6(a) 
(state benefits fraud committed where one “obtains or attempts to obtain” government money 
or benefits); 5/17-24(c)(1) (financial institution fraud committed where one “executes or 
attempts to execute” plan to defraud); 5/21-1.5(b) (offense committed where one “transfers 
or attempts to transfer” anhydrous ammonia); 5/24-3.5(b) (unlawful purchase of firearm 
committed where one “purchases or attempts to purchase” firearm); 5/29B-1(a) (money 
laundering committed where one “engages or attempts to engage” in financial transaction); 
625 ILCS 5/16-201 (one who “attempts to commit” Vehicle Code offense “shall be guilty of 
such offense”). This approach to defining offenses often short-circuits, for no clear reason, the 
general grading rules for attempts set forth in the General Part, under which attempted felonies 
are typically graded one grade lower than the completed offense, see 720 ILCS 5/8-4. The 
proposed Code ensures that matters addressed by Section 801 are dealt with consistently by 
omitting such references from offense definitions.
 98 Accordingly, an attempted-murder charge cannot be based on current 5/9-1(a)(2), 
which allows for murder liability where one kills another person and “knows [his] acts create 
a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another.” See People 
v. Trinkle, 369 N.E.2d 888, 890, 892 (Ill. 1977) (“It is not sufficient that the defendant shot 
a gun ‘knowing such act created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm.’ . . . To 
obtain a conviction on the charge of attempted murder, the indictment must charge a specific 
intent to commit the specific offense, and the jury must be accordingly instructed”); People 
v. Holmes, 627 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ill. App. 1993) (“Clearly, the instructions given in this case 
would allow the jury to convict defendant upon a showing that he acted with knowledge that 
his actions created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. Since such instructions 
would permit the jury to convict defendant even if they did not believe he acted with the intent 
to kill the victim, the instructions given were improper.”); People v. Kraft, 478 N.E.2d 1154, 
(continued…)
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current law may make it more difficult to prosecute some attempts than 
their corresponding completed crimes. For example, the current offense of 
“predatory criminal sexual assault of a child” may require recklessness, or 
even no culpability, as to the circumstance element of the victim’s age.99 
But under current 5/8-4(a), in a case of attempted predatory criminal sexual 
assault, the State apparently would have to prove a “specific intent” that the 
victim be underage. This heightened culpability standard for attempts relative 
to completed crimes leads to inconsistencies and improper results under the 
criminal law.
 Second, Section 801(1) requires an intent to engage in conduct that 
is an offense “given [the offender’s] perception of the circumstances.” This 
language allows for the imposition of liability where, because the offender is 
mistaken as to the circumstances, the crime he attempts would be impossible to 
commit. Accordingly, it is similar to current 5/8-4(b)’s rule that impossibility 
1157-58 (Ill. App. 1985) (“All authorities agree that the crime of attempt is a specific intent 
crime and ‘an instruction must make it clear that to convict for attempted murder nothing less 
than a criminal intent to kill must be shown.’ . . . [I]t is clear that a discrepancy exists between 
the culpable mental state for attempt which requires an intent to commit the offense and the 
alternative culpable mental states for murder which include not only intent to kill another, but 
also intent to do great bodily harm . . . or knowledge that one’s acts create a strong probability 
of death or great bodily harm.”) (quoting People v. Harris, 377 N.E.2d 28 (Ill. 1977)).
 Applying similar principles, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that the offense of 
“attempted second-degree murder” (or “attempted manslaughter”) does not exist in Illinois. 
See People v. Lopez, 655 N.E.2d 864, 867 (Ill. 1995) (“[T]he intent required for attempted 
second degree murder, if it existed, would be the intent to kill without lawful justification, 
plus the intent to have a mitigating circumstance present. However, one cannot intend either a 
sudden and intense passion due to serious provocation or an unreasonable belief in the need to 
use deadly force.”); see also People v. Reagan, 457 N.E.2d 1260 (Ill. 1983).
 Attempted “second-degree murder,” as that offense is currently defined — intentional 
killing mitigated by provocation or a mistake as to a justification — would exist under Section 
801(1), although “attempted reckless homicide” would not. Cf. commentary for proposed 
Section 1103. Because that offense’s conduct element is defined only in relation to causing the 
result element of death, one cannot intend “to engage in the conduct that would constitute the 
offense,” i.e., conduct that would cause death, while being only reckless as to causing death. 
Section 801(1) would allow attempt liability, however, for other crimes of recklessness where 
the offense was not completed. For example, a person stopped just before spilling a toxic 
chemical into the water supply could be convicted of “attempted reckless endangerment,” 
because that person intended to perform all the conduct necessary for the offense of reckless 
endangerment, but was prevented from doing so. 
 99 It is unclear what level of culpability is required as to the victim’s age under current 
5/12-14.1. On the one hand, proper application of current 5/4-3(b) would require a culpability 
level of recklessness to be “read in” as to that circumstance element. On the other hand, current 
5/12-17(b) provides a “defense” for reasonable mistakes as to the victim’s age for certain kinds 
of criminal sexual abuse and aggravated criminal sexual abuse, but not for predatory criminal 
sexual assault — thereby suggesting that, notwithstanding 5/4-3(b), 5/12-14.1 might impose 
absolute liability as to the victim’s being underage. See commentary for proposed Section 
1306(1). 
 98 (…continued)
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is no defense to attempt. At the same time, this language maintains the 
possibility of liability where the offender’s “perception” is inaccurate and, in 
fact, his conduct (if completed) would constitute the offense although he does 
not realize it. Taking the example of statutory rape under the proposed Code, 
an offender’s negligently inaccurate “perception” that the victim has reached 
the age of consent will not excuse him from liability. See proposed 207(2) 
(only “reasonable” mistake negates requirement of negligence); proposed 
Section 1306(1) (requiring negligence as to victim’s age for Article 1300 
offenses not providing otherwise). In short, this language reflects the view 
that a person’s faulty “perception” of the circumstances may lead to liability, 
either where the person perceives himself to be committing a crime, or where 
the person’s subjective perception rests on a culpably faulty understanding of 
the surrounding circumstances.
 Section 801(2)(a) states that conduct constitutes a “substantial step” 
under Section 801(1) only if it is “strongly corroborative of the person’s 
intention to engage in the offense conduct.” Because the substantial step test 
may lead to liability at an earlier point in the chain of conduct leading to an 
offense than the dangerous-proximity test endorsed by the Illinois courts, 
see supra note 96, it is important to impose such a limitation to ensure 
that attempt liability will arise only where the person’s intent to engage in 
criminal behavior is clear.
 Section 801(2)(b) establishes that a person satisfies the substantial 
step requirement if he believes he has completed the conduct constituting an 
offense or believes he has committed the last act needed to cause a prohibited 
result. Section 801(2)(b) does not alter the standard of Section 801(1), but 
merely establishes a bright-line rule that performing all the requisite conduct 
toward an offense will always meet the substantial step test. There is no 
directly corresponding provision in current law.
Section 802. Criminal Solicitation
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/8-1; 5/8-1.1; 5/8-
  1.2; see also 720 ILCS 5/8-3
Comment:
 Generally. Section 802 provides for liability for a person who solicits 
another person to commit an offense. The offense of solicitation recognizes 
that a person who intends to promote an offense, and is willing to instigate 
such conduct, merits criminal liability. The independent act of solicitation 
takes the place of the “substantial step” toward commission of the offense 
required for attempt liability, or the “overt act” toward commission of the 
offense required for conspiracy liability.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 802 is similar to current 5/8-1, 
and would also replace current 5/8-1.1 and 5/8-1.2, addressing solicitation 
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of murder and solicitation of murder for hire, respectively.100 Current 5/8-1.1 
and 5/8-1.2 differ from 5/8-1 only with respect to their grading provisions; 
grading of inchoate offenses is addressed in proposed Section 807 (q.v.).
 Section 802(1) is similar to current 5/8-1(a), with two modifications 
that track Section 801’s modifications to attempt. See proposed Section 
801(1) and corresponding commentary. First, for offense elements other than 
conduct (which requires intent) the person need only act with the culpability 
required by the underlying offense. This language prevents an elevation 
of culpability levels for circumstance and result elements that could lead 
to undesirable outcomes. For example, under current 5/8-1, a person who 
encouraged another to engage in conduct, knowing that such conduct would 
result in a person’s death, would not be liable for solicitation of murder 
because he did not intend anyone to die. See People v. Latona, 644 N.E.2d 
424, 431 (Ill. App. 1994) (“Solicitation of murder is a specific intent crime. 
Therefore, it is not sufficient that defendant solicited the commission of an 
act knowing ‘that such act[] create[d] a strong probability of death or great 
bodily harm.’”) (citations omitted); cf. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-1 
Committee Comments at 408 (West 1993) (“Specific intent that the principal 
offense be committe[d] is required, and the offense of solicitation is complete 
when the principal offense is commanded, encouraged or requested with that 
intent.”).
 Second, like Section 801(1), Section 802(1) allows for liability based on 
the offender’s perception of the circumstances, which effectively eliminates 
the impossibility defense for solicitation in current 5/8-3. The rationale for 
preventing an impossibility defense applies to conspiracies and solicitations 
with equal force as to attempts. There seems to be no compelling reason to 
treat inchoate crimes differently from one another in this respect, as current 
law does. 
 Section 802(2) has no directly corresponding provision in Chapter 720. 
Section 802(2) makes clear that a person need not actually communicate with 
another to be held liable for solicitation, provided the person’s conduct is 
designed to effect such communication. The person’s endeavor to communicate 
his criminal intentions makes his culpability clear; it does not matter that, by 
fortuity, the communication was never received. For example, under Section 
802(2), a person sending a letter soliciting another to commit murder would 
not escape liability simply because the letter was not received. Illinois courts 
 100 Current Illinois law also defines several specific offenses imposing liability on one 
who “solicits” another in the planning or commission of an offense, thus duplicating current 
5/8-1. See, e.g., 10 ILCS 5/29-20(1),(2) (imposing liability for one who “solicits” another to 
unlawfully apply for or cast absentee ballot); 720 ILCS 5/11-20.1(a)(7) (child pornography 
committed where one “solicits” another to provide minor child); 5/31A-1.2(c)(2) (imposing 
liability where correctional institution employee “solicits the delivery” of contraband to 
inmate). The proposed Code generally omits such language from offense definitions to ensure 
that the matters addressed by Article 800 are dealt with consistently from one offense to 
another. Cf. supra note 97 (discussing current provisions criminalizing both completing and 
“attempting” certain conduct).
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have not expressly ruled on whether a solicitation must be successfully 
received in order for a defendant to be found guilty of solicitation; existing 
case law is unclear on the issue. See, e.g., People v. McCommon, 399 N.E.2d 
224, 231 (Ill. App. 1974) (“The offense of solicitation is complete when the 
principal offense is commanded, requested or encouraged with specific intent 
that the principal offense be committed.”).
Section 803. Criminal Conspiracy
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/8-2(a); see also, e.g., 
  720 ILCS 5/46-3; 550/9; 570/405 
  to 570/405.2; 10 ILCS 5/29-18; 
  610 ILCS 95/3; 625 ILCS 5/4-
  103.1
Comment:
 Generally. Section 803 establishes liability for the offense of conspiracy, 
which is committed when two or more persons enter an agreement to commit 
a crime. Conspiracy differs from other inchoate offenses in that criminal 
enterprises are considered harmful in and of themselves, rather than merely 
insofar as they are unsuccessful efforts to commit other substantive offenses. 
Conspiracy liability, like attempt liability, requires more than mere intent 
to commit a crime; an “overt act” in furtherance of the conspiracy is also 
necessary. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 803 corresponds to the current 
general conspiracy provision (5/8-2), but current Illinois law also includes 
numerous provisions covering conspiracy to commit various specific 
offenses.101 Under current law, with both a general provision and specific 
provisions, there is sometimes confusion as to which provision should 
apply. See, e.g., People v. Robinson, 614 N.E.2d 531, 532 (Ill. App. 1993) 
 101 Some of current law’s overlapping conspiracy provisions restate much of current 5/8-
2’s content, including 5/8-2(b)’s rules regarding unconvictable co-conspirators. See, e.g., 625 
ILCS 5/4-103.1 (vehicle theft conspiracy); 720 ILCS 5/46-3 (conspiracy to commit fraud); 720 
ILCS 570/405.1 (drug conspiracy). Several other current offenses are defined to criminalize 
“conspiring” to perform certain conduct, but less clearly incorporate, or track, current law’s 
general conspiracy provision. See, e.g., 35 ILCS 200/21-306(a)(4) (imposing liability where 
one “conspires to violate” prohibitions against indemnity fund fraud); 230 ILCS 5/36(a) 
(imposing liability where one administers or “conspires to administer” drug to racehorse); 
305 ILCS 5/8A-13(b) (imposing liability where one executes or “conspires to execute” plan 
to defraud); 610 ILCS 95/3 (imposing liability where two or more persons “willfully and 
maliciously combine or conspire together” to impede railroad business); 625 ILCS 5/16-201 
(one who “conspires to commit” Vehicle Code offense “shall be guilty of such offense”); 720 
ILCS 5/31A-1.2(c)(2) (imposing liability where correctional institution employee “conspires 
to deliver” item of contraband to inmate); 720 ILCS 370/1 (imposing liability for one who 
“conspires with” another to tamper with pay telephone).
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(acknowledging that specific conspiracy provision usually preempts general 
provision, but finding no preemption in this case, as specific provision in 
Cannabis Control Act did not apply to facts). Section 803 provides one 
uniform formulation, thus eliminating this problem.
 Section 803(1) is similar to current 5/8-2(a), but includes the alterations 
reflected in the other proposed inchoate offenses: focusing on the conduct 
and culpability requirements defined in the underlying offense rather than 
imposing a uniform “intent” requirement, and denying an impossibility 
defense. See commentary for proposed Sections 801 and 802. However, like 
proposed Section 801(1), Section 803(1) does maintain an intent requirement 
as to the conduct element of conspiracy — the formation of an agreement 
— and also requires an intent to carry out (or that a co-conspirator carry 
out) all the other conduct that would constitute the substantive offense. See 
commentary for proposed Section 801(1).
 Like the proposed attempt and solicitation provisions, Section 803(1) 
imposes liability based on the defendant’s “perception of the circumstances.” 
Section 803(1) thus amends current law to allow prosecution for unilateral 
agreements: it would impose liability on any person who agrees with another 
to commit a crime, even if the agreement is that only one person will engage 
in conduct constituting a crime, and even if the other person does not actually 
agree to the conspiracy at all. Under current Illinois law, a person will face 
liability only if there was mutual agreement between the two (or more) 
conspirators. For example, current Illinois law would not impose liability 
where the co-conspirator was an undercover officer who never intended to 
further the criminal objective. See People v. Foster, 457 N.E.2d 405, 409 (Ill. 
1983) (holding that current conspiracy provision “encompasses the bilateral 
theory of conspiracy”); cf. People v. Breton, 603 N.E.2d 1290, 1294-95 (Ill. 
App. 1992) (holding that current offense of “solicitation of murder for hire” 
does not require actual agreement, but noting that “a purported agreement 
between a defendant and a government agent only feigning agreement will 
not support a conspiracy conviction”). Section 803(1) recognizes that a 
conspirator who believes he is agreeing with another to commit a crime is as 
deserving of liability as one whose agreement is actually reciprocated. Such 
a person has expressed his intent to pursue a criminal objective and made 
steps in furtherance of that objective. This formulation is consistent with the 
rule in current 5/8-2(b) that a conspirator’s liability is independent of his co-
conspirators’ liability.
 Section 803(2), barring multiple convictions for a single conspiracy 
to commit several offenses, has no directly corresponding provision in 
current law. Section 803(2) is similar to the Illinois courts’ rule that multiple 
conspiracy convictions may not be premised on a single agreement, but 
broadens that rule to also prevent multiple inchoate convictions arising from 
a single “continuous conspiratorial relationship.” Cf. People v. Burleson, 
365 N.E.2d 1162, 1166 (Ill. App. 1977) (“[A] person charged with multiple 
conspiracies cannot be convicted of more than a single conspiracy if he has 
with the necessary intent entered into a single agreement to commit a crime 
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even if multiple overt acts are committed in furtherance of that agreement. . . . 
[H]owever, . . . a person charged with multiple conspiracies can be convicted 
of those multiple conspiracies if, with the necessary intent, he entered into 
multiple, although partially overlapping agreements to commit crimes so 
long as overt acts are committed in furtherance of those agreements.”). By 
declining to focus solely on whether the conspiracies involved were formed 
as part of the same “agreement,” Section 803(2) avoids any need to inquire 
into the precise times at which various objectives were agreed to.
 Section 803(3) requires an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. 
Section 803(3) is substantively the same as current 5/8-2(a)’s final sentence, 
but changes “act” to “overt act,” “furtherance” to “pursuance,” “agreement” 
to “conspiracy,” “committed” to “done,” and “co-conspirator” to “person 
with whom he conspired.”
Section 804. Unconvictable Confederate No Defense
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/8-2(b)
Comment:
 Generally. Section 804 makes clear that a person may not escape 
liability for conspiracy solely because his co-conspirator(s) are not subject 
to prosecution or conviction for the same offense. One conspirator’s 
blameworthiness for his agreement to pursue criminal objectives is not 
contingent on the status of any other members of the criminal enterprise. For 
example, where one member of a conspiracy manipulates or coerces another 
person who lacks the capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct, 
the manipulator should not escape liability merely because the confederate 
cannot be found criminally liable. Indeed, the manipulative co-conspirator is 
arguably even more culpable in such a situation. This rule is consistent with 
the unilateral-agreement rule for conspiracy. See commentary for proposed 
Section 803(1). 
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 804 is nearly identical to current 
5/8-2(b),102 with two minor differences. First, Section 804 omits 5/8-2(b)(3)’s 
rule regarding co-conspirators who are “not amenable to justice” as vague and 
redundant. Second, Section 804(2) clarifies that a co-conspirator’s conviction 
of a different “grade” of an offense, like a co-conspirator’s conviction for a 
different “offense,” does not provide a defense to conspiracy.
 102 Current 5/8-2(b)’s rules are also reiterated in several specific offenses that 
unnecessarily duplicate the general conspiracy provision by criminalizing conspiracies to 
commit specific offenses. See, e.g., 625 ILCS 5/4-103.1(b) (vehicle theft conspiracy); 720 
ILCS 5/46-3(b) (conspiracy to commit fraud); 570/405.1(b) (drug conspiracy).
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Section 805. Defense for Victims and Conduct Inevitably Incident
Corresponding Current Provision(s): None
Comment:
 Generally. Section 805 provides a defense to the offenses of solicitation 
and conspiracy where the defendant is a victim of the offense or his conduct 
is inevitably incident to its commission. Section 805(a) protects people who 
are victims of the underlying offense — such as, for example, a person who 
agrees to pay money to an extortionist, thereby technically entering into a 
“conspiracy” with the extortionist.
 Section 805(b) covers situations where, because a person’s conduct is 
ancillary to the underlying crime, it is unclear whether the person should 
be held liable. See commentary for proposed Section 301(2). For example, 
it is not clear whether an unmarried partner should be liable for conspiracy 
to commit bigamy, or whether the purchaser should be liable for conspiracy 
to traffic in stolen goods. Under Section 805(b), the legislature would 
still be free to decide on a case-by-case basis that such people should be 
subject to liability by writing the specific underlying offense to reflect that 
understanding.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Although no provision in Chapter 
720 directly corresponds to Section 805, current 5/5-2(c) provides a similar 
defense to complicity liability. Since the same rationale for allowing the 
defense in complicity situations applies to the offenses of solicitation and 
conspiracy, the defense has been added for those offenses. 
Section 806. Defense for Renunciation Preventing Commission of the 
 Offense
Corresponding Current Provision(s): None
Comment:
 Generally. Section 806 provides a defense for persons who, after 
committing an inchoate offense, voluntarily renounce their criminal purpose 
and prevent the inchoate offense from becoming a completed offense. (As 
Section 806(2) makes clear, however, renunciation is not “voluntary” when it 
is merely a response to a fear of being caught, or a tactical decision to pursue 
the crime in a different way.) Under Section 806(3), the defendant would bear 
the burden of proving this defense by a preponderance of the evidence. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 806 has no directly 
corresponding provision in current law. Illinois courts have ruled that 
renunciation (also termed “withdrawal” or “abandonment”) may provide a 
defense to the completed crime, but will not create a defense to conspiracy 
or attempt. See, e.g., People v. Adams, 530 N.E.2d 1155, 1158 (Ill. App. 
1988) (“The traditional rule is that since the crime of conspiracy is complete 
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with the agreement and an overt act, no subsequent action can exonerate the 
conspirator of that crime.”); People v. Davis, 388 N.E.2d 887, 890 (Ill. App. 
1979) “([T]he weight of authority appears to be that once the elements of 
criminal attempt are complete, abandonment of the criminal purpose will not 
constitute a defense to the charge of attempt.”).103 Sound policy considerations 
oppose that rule, however.
 One obvious beneficial effect of a renunciation defense is that it 
rewards actors who abandon a criminal undertaking, and gives an incentive 
to prevent others from committing the offense. Allowing the defense makes 
further sense in the attempt context when a substantial step test is used 
to determine liability. As noted above,104 Illinois courts have misread the 
substantial step test in the current statute as a “dangerous proximity” test. 
Under a “proximity” test, there is little need for a renunciation defense, as 
inchoate offense liability will not arise until a point when it has become 
highly unlikely that the actor would be able to renounce, even if he wanted 
to do so. However, when the focus is properly on the steps an actor makes 
toward an offense, it is more likely that there will be cases where an actor has 
done enough to incur inchoate liability, but still has sufficient time and power 
to renounce his criminal purpose and prevent the offense from occurring. 
Moreover, given the Illinois courts’ misreading of the substantial step test, 
many of the defendants who would enjoy Section 806’s renunciation defense 
would likely not even be subject to attempt liability under current law.
 Section 806 places three important limitations on the renunciation 
defense to ensure that it is not abused. First, Section 806(1) requires 
that renunciation be both “voluntary and complete.” As Section 806(2)’s 
definition of “voluntary and complete” makes clear, renunciation will not 
provide a defense if it is motivated by a fear of apprehension, or a decision 
to pursue the crime at another time or against a different victim. Second, 
Section 806(1) limits the defense to cases in which the defendant has actually 
“prevented” the offense from occurring. Finally, under Section 806(3), the 
defendant bears the burden of persuasion to prove the renunciation defense 
by a preponderance of the evidence. 
 103 However, in People v. Brown, 414 N.E.2d 475, 480 (Ill. App. 1980), the court 
recognized that “[n]oted and distinguished commentators on criminal law” are strongly 
supportive of a rule that allows a defense of voluntary abandonment to an attempt charge 
and that several states have aligned themselves with this progressive view. Although it was 
unwilling to unilaterally create such a rule in Illinois, the court stated that it supported the 
rule and urged the legislature to “seriously consider . . . the arguments . . . with regard to the 
salutary and beneficial, as well as equitable, effects from establishing the defense of voluntary 
abandonment.” Brown, 414 N.E.2d at 481.
 104 See supra commentary for proposed Section 801, especially at note 96.
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Section 807. Grading of Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/8-1(b); 5/8-1.1(b); 
  5/8-1.2(b); 5/8-2(c); 5/8-4(c); 
  see also 720 ILCS 5/46-3; 550/9; 
  570/405 to 570/405.2; 10 ILCS 
  5/29-18; 610 ILCS 95/3; 625 
  ILCS 5/4-103.1
Comment:
 Generally. Section 807 grades all inchoate offenses one grade lower 
than the most serious offense attempted, solicited, or agreed to. This system 
relates the seriousness of the inchoate offense to that of the underlying 
offense, but recognizes that the inchoate offense does not generate the 
resulting harm with which the underlying offense is concerned.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 807 introduces consistency 
to the grading of inchoate offenses. Current Illinois law has no single rule 
governing the proper grade for an inchoate crime relative to a completed 
offense, and instead provides separate grading rules for each type of inchoate 
offense. Section 807 is substantively the same as current 5/8-4(c) and 5/8-
1(b) in grading attempts and solicitations of felonies one grade lower than 
the target offense,105 but extends that rule to also apply to misdemeanors. 
Current 5/8-4(c) and 5/8-1(b), by contrast, abandon the grading scheme for 
felonies by providing that attempts and solicitations of misdemeanors may be 
punished the same as the target offense. 
 Section 807 also greatly simplifies the grading for conspiracies. Current 
5/8-2(c) creates a complicated grading scheme punishing some conspiracies 
more severely than their target offenses, some less severely, and some at the 
same level. Current 5/8-2(c) first sets forth a general rule that conspiracies 
may be punished at the same level as their target offenses. That general rule, 
however, has three exceptions. First, current 5/8-2(c) grades conspiracies to 
commit 11 specific prostitution, weapons, gambling, and drug offenses as 
Class 3 felonies;106 the completed forms of those offenses, on the other hand, 
 105 Current Chapter 720 also sets forth separate grading rules for solicitation of murder 
(5/8-1.1(b)), solicitation of murder for hire (5/1.2(b)), and attempted first-degree murder (5/8-
4(c)(1)). Section 807 does not provide special grading rules for particular offenses, but would, 
like the current provisions, grade an inchoate offense toward first-degree murder as a Class X 
felony. Cf. proposed Section 1101(2) (grading first-degree murder as Class [X-plus] felony). 
Section 807 also declines to address the appropriate minimum and maximum sentences 
for particular kinds of solicitations and attempts and aggravations for attempts involving 
firearms. Those matters are instead addressed, respectively, by the proposed authorized terms 
of imprisonment for Class X felonies and Article 7100’s proposed offense for using a firearm 
during a felony. See proposed Section 903; proposed Section 7101.
 106 Current 5/8-2(c) purports to grade conspiracies toward both the completed and 
inchoate forms of the 11 listed offenses as Class 3 felonies, thus suggesting the possibility of 
liability for conspiring to commit an attempt, a solicitation, or perhaps even a conspiracy. The 
proposed Code rejects such “double-inchoate” liability as conceptually impossible.
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are graded as anything from a Class B misdemeanor to a Class 2 felony. 
Second, current Illinois law provides that conspiracies to commit first-degree 
murder, aggravated kidnaping, and treason — three of the most serious 
offenses in current Chapter 720 — may be graded no higher than Class 2 
felonies. Finally, current 5/8-2(c) provides that, with the exception of certain 
drug conspiracies, all other conspiracy offenses — including conspiracies 
to commit such serious offenses as causing a catastrophe and sexually 
assaulting a child — may be graded no higher than Class 4 felonies. Section 
807’s general rule imposing liability of one grade, but only one grade, lower 
than the completed offense grades conspiracy consistently across offenses, 
and consistently with other inchoate offenses.
 Section 807 also replaces the grading provisions of other specific 
conspiracy offenses found elsewhere in Chapter 720 and outside the Criminal 
Code. See commentary for proposed Section 803. To the extent that they 
punish “conspiracies” more severely than the ordinary substantive offense, 
those provisions appear to reflect a concern with the independent harm of 
group criminality, rather than an effort to punish the inchoate offense of 
conspiracy toward a substantive offense.107 That concern is more properly 
addressed in the sentencing provisions. See proposed Section 905(4) and 
corresponding commentary.
Section 808. Possessing Instruments of Crime
Corresponding Current Provision(s): Various; see, e.g., 720 ILCS 
  5/14-2(a)(2); 5/16-6; 5/16-15; 
  5/16D-3(a-5); 5/16F-4; 5/17-
  1(C)(2) to (4); 5/17-23(a),(b); 
  5/19-2; 5/21-1.4; 250/17
Comment:
 Generally. Section 808 establishes an offense for the possession 
of instruments of crime. Section 808(1) defines the offense to prohibit 
possession of an instrument of crime with the intent to use it criminally. 
Section 808(2) defines the term “instrument of crime.” Section 808(3) grades 
the offense as a Class A misdemeanor.
 107 For example, current 720 ILCS 550/9 and 570/405 impose greater penalties for drug-
related conspiracies than exist for the underlying drug offenses. However, those sections also 
require that the conspiracy consist of three or more people and that the defendant either obtain 
something worth more than $500 or organize, direct, or finance the transaction. Similarly, 
current 570/405.2 imposes a greater penalty where an offense is committed by three or more 
people in furtherance of the activities of an organized gang and the defendant occupied a 
position of management. These sections seem designed to punish the organized or group 
nature of the offenses, rather than punishing the underlying efforts toward accomplishing the 
offense itself.
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 Relation to current Illinois law. Chapter 720 includes no general 
possession offense, but includes numerous specific offenses criminalizing the 
possession of various instruments of crime. See, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(2) 
(defining Class 4 felony for possession of eavesdropping device); 5/16-6 
(defining Class A misdemeanor for possession of coin-operated machine key 
or device); 5/16-15 (defining Class A misdemeanor for possession of theft 
detection shielding device); 5/16D-3(a-5) (defining Class B misdemeanor for 
possession of software designed to enable “falsification of electronic mail 
transmission information or other routing information”); 5/16F-4 (defining 
Class A misdemeanor for possession of “unlawful wireless device”); 5/17-
1(C)(2) to (4) (defining Class A misdemeanors for possession of fraudulently-
obtained checks, implements of check fraud, and checking identification 
cards); 5/17-23(a),(b) (defining Class 3 and Class 4 felonies for possession 
of counterfeit UPC labels); 720 ILCS 5/19-2 (defining Class 4 felony for 
possession of burglary tools); 5/21-1.4 (defining Class A misdemeanor for 
possession of “jackrocks”); 250/17 (defining Class 3 felony for possession of 
“contrivance designed to reproduce instruments purporting to be credit cards 
or debit cards”). Section 808 replaces these offenses with one concise and 
consistent offense definition.
Section 809. Definitions
Corresponding Current Provision(s): None
 Generally. This provision collects defined terms used in Article 800 and 
provides cross-references to the provisions in which they are defined. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. For discussion of the relationship 
between Article 800’s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary 
for the provision in which each term is initially defined.
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ARTICLE 900. OFFENSE GRADES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS
General Comment Regarding Article 900:
 Article 900 is not intended to address all issues regarding the sentencing 
and disposition of offenders. It is anticipated that such issues will be dealt 
with more comprehensively in other statutory chapters on sentencing or 
in a set of sentencing guidelines. Article 900 deals only with those basic 
issues necessary to make clear the meaning of the Criminal Code’s general 
scheme of liability. For example, it provides a frame of reference without 
which the offense grades set out in the Special Part of the Code would be 
incomprehensible. Article 900’s silence as to other, more complex sentencing 
issues does not indicate a lack of awareness or concern about such issues, but 
an understanding that they are beyond the scope of the current project.
 The current degrees of liability, such as maximum and minimum 
sentences, discussed in the proposed Code are also preliminary. The primary 
focus of the current project is to ensure that the grading of different offenses 
is rational and proportional, and not to determine the appropriate absolute 
severity of punishment attaching to a grade. Accordingly, proposed grades 
are intended only to assess the relative seriousness of offenses, and not 
the sentencing consequences of a conviction for any offense. The proper 
sentencing ranges and fines that should apply to a given grade are for the 
General Assembly to determine.
Section 901. Classified Offenses
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 730 ILCS 5/5-5-1
Comment:
 Generally. This provision provides a classification of all criminal 
offenses into grades for purposes of determining the extent of liability.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 901 is substantively similar to 
current 5/5-5-1, but replaces 5/5-5-1(b)’s separate category for first-degree 
murder with a new offense category — “Class [X-plus]” — that may include 
other offenses as well. Section 901 also recognizes “petty offenses and 
business offenses” as an offense category; under current 5/5-5-1(d), such 
offenses are “not classified.” 
Section 902. Unclassified Offenses
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 730 ILCS 5/5-5-2
Comment:
 Generally. This provision provides classifications for offenses that are 
defined outside the Code. 
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 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 902 is substantively similar to 
current 5/5-5-2, but makes one amendment to current 5/5-5-2(a). Whereas 
5/5-5-2(a) classifies as Class 4 felonies only those non-Code felonies that do 
not specify a particular felony classification, Section 902(1) more broadly 
classifies all felonies outside the Code as Class 4 felonies. This ensures that 
no serious felony offense will appear outside the Criminal Code.108
Section 903. Authorized Terms of Imprisonment
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3(c)(5); 
  5/5-8-1; 5/5-8-3
Comment:
 Generally. This provision establishes the maximum and minimum 
terms of imprisonment for each class of offenses.109 The proposed sentencing 
ranges are bracketed to reflect the fact that the draft proposals are merely 
tentative. See “General Comment,” supra.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 903 consolidates the authorized 
terms of imprisonment for felonies and misdemeanors, which currently 
appear in two separate provisions in Chapter 730. Section 903(1) through 
(6), which provide the authorized terms of imprisonment for felonies, 
are substantively similar to current 5/5-8-1(a), but omit the current law’s 
references to aggravating factors for specific categories of offenders in 
5/5-8-1(a)(1) through (2.5). Because the authorized terms of imprisonment 
in Section 903 are subject to exceptions provided elsewhere in the Code, 
the special rules provided in current 5/5-8-1(a) may be set forth — and they 
are more appropriately set forth — in the specific provisions to which they 
apply.
 Section 903(1) corresponds to current 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(a), but amends the 
current law in applying to other possible offense(s) (categorized as “Class 
[X-plus]”) in addition to first-degree murder, lowering the minimum term of 
imprisonment from 20 years to 12 years, and raising the maximum term from 
60 years to life. 
 108 It is anticipated that some offenses currently outside the Code — specifically, offenses 
related to weapons, drugs, and gambling, and provisions directed at facilitating prosecutions 
against criminal enterprises or similar “crime-control” offenses — will be moved into Articles 
7100 to 7400 of the new Code by means of “conforming amendments” legislation. See, e.g., 
205 ILCS 685/7 (structuring a transaction; Class 2 felony). Section 902’s rules for non-Code 
offenses obviously would not apply to such offenses once they were moved into the Criminal 
Code.
 109 Determination of the specific sentence within the appropriate range, currently 
addressed by 5/5-5-3.1 and 5/5-5-3.2(a), is an issue to be resolved by other statutory chapters 
or by development of detailed sentencing guidelines.
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 Section 903(2) to (6) are identical to current 5/5-8-1(a)(3) to (7).
 Section 903(7) is substantively similar to current 5/5-8-3(a)(1), but 
prescribes a maximum sentence of one year rather than allowing “any term 
less than one year.”
 Section 903(8) and (9) are identical to current 5/5-8-3(a)(2) and (3). 
 Section 903(10), in declining to authorize imprisonment for petty and 
business offenses, is substantively similar to current 5/5-5-3(c)(5).
 Section 903 omits current 5/5-8-1(b) through (f), which address various 
procedural issues related to felony sentences of imprisonment.110 Because 
these issues relate to treatment of offenders after they have been convicted 
and sentence has been imposed, they are more properly addressed in the 
Code of Corrections. 
 Similarly, Section 903 omits current 5/5-8-3(b), which explicitly 
provides that the County Jail Good Behavior Allowance Act, 730 ILCS 130/1 
et seq., applies to sentences of imprisonment for misdemeanor violations. 
This statement is probably unnecessary, and if needed, it properly belongs in 
that Act or in the Code of Corrections.
Section 904. Authorized Fines
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1; 5/5-9-1.3(a)
Comment:
 Generally. This provision establishes the maximum fine for each class 
of offenses. The proposed maximum fines are bracketed to reflect the fact 
that the draft proposals are merely tentative. See supra “General Comment.”
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 904, like current 5/5-9-1(a), 
provides “default” rules for fines that may be modified by specific offense 
provisions. Section 904, however, always acts only as a default, enabling 
a specific provision to raise or lower the applicable fine range; by contrast, 
current 5/5-9-1(a) sometimes defers to other provisions and sometimes 
controls them. Current 5/5-9-1(a)(1) and (a)(2) allow specific provisions to 
raise the maximum fine, but not to lower it; (a)(4) allows specific provisions 
 110 Current 5/5-8-1(b) provides that the sentencing judge “shall set forth his reasons 
for imposing the particular sentence.” (The Illinois Supreme Court, however, has construed 
the term “shall” to be “permissive rather than mandatory.” People v. Davis, 442 N.E.2d 855, 
858 (Ill. 1982) (holding that term “shall,” if read to impose mandatory requirement, would 
unconstitutionally infringe on separate powers of judiciary).) Current 5/5-8-1(c) provides the 
circumstances under which sentences may be reduced. Current 5/5-8-1(d) provides parole 
and mandatory supervised release terms for various offenses and offense categories. Current 
5/5-8-1(e) establishes procedures whereby certain defendants’ sentences may be ordered to 
run concurrently with previous and unexpired sentences of imprisonment imposed by other 
jurisdictions. Finally, current 5/5-8-1(f) allows for the reduction of previous and unexpired 
sentences of imprisonment imposed by Illinois courts where defendants are subsequently 
sentenced to terms of imprisonment by other jurisdictions.
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to lower the maximum fine, but not to raise it; (a)(3) is silent on the issue, 
suggesting no modification of the range is allowed; and (a)(5) specifies no 
range, thus deferring completely to the specific provision. To the extent it 
operates to prevent particularized fine ranges, current 5/5-9-1(a) runs counter 
to the general statutory principle that specific statements govern general ones, 
and also inappropriately cabins the legislature’s discretion to tailor fines for 
specific offenses as it sees fit. 
 Section 904 generally authorizes the greater of two amounts as the 
maximum fine for an offense: (1) twice the amount of the harm caused 
thereby or gain derived therefrom; or (2) the amount specified for its offense 
class. These methods are set out in Section 904(1) and (2), respectively.111
 Section 904(1) is similar to current 5/5-9-1.3(a) — which authorizes a 
fine of “twice the amount of the value of the property which is the subject of 
the offense” for theft, computer crime, and deceptive practices felonies — 
but generalizes the principle, authorizing a maximum fine of “twice the harm 
caused [by] or the gain derived” from any offense. Section 904(1) recognizes 
more broadly what current 5/5-9-1.3(a) recognizes with respect to a small 
number of felony offenses: criminal fines may provide better deterrence 
against certain offenses, and fairer punishment of certain offenders, when 
they are based on the harm caused by or gain derived from criminal acts. 
Consider, for example, theft of lost or mislaid property, a petty offense under 
current law (720 ILCS 5/16-2). A person finding $10,000 worth of property 
belonging to his neighbor is more likely to give it back if he faces a maximum 
prospective fine of $20,000 (leaving him $10,000 poorer than before the 
theft), rather than $1,000 (leaving him $9,000 richer), for keeping it. The 
larger fine is both a better deterrent and a fairer punishment.112
 Further, Section 904(1) generally assures that authorized criminal 
monetary penalties will at least parallel — and in most cases, exceed 
— corresponding civil penalties, thus maintaining and reinforcing the moral 
authority and sanctioning power of criminal law relative to civil law.
 111 The material in current Chapter 720 Articles 36 to 38, establishing rules for the 
seizure and forfeiture of property upon conviction for various offenses, deals with procedural 
matters properly addressed outside the Criminal Code. It is anticipated that these provisions 
will be transferred to the Code of Corrections by means of the “conforming amendments” 
legislation to be introduced to the General Assembly with the proposed Code.
 112 This is especially true for many regulatory offenses outside the Code, which will 
commonly be punished through fines rather than imprisonment. See, e.g., 35 ILCS 505/15 
(evading motor fuel sales tax); 205 ILCS 657/90 (failure to obtain a banking license); 240 
ILCS 40/15-45 (withholding records relating to grain sales); 415 ILCS 5/44 (improper 
disposal of hazardous waste); 815 ILCS 5/14 (acting as securities dealer or investment advisor 
without a license); 815 ILCS 705/25 (making false statement or omitting any material fact in 
the course of selling a franchise). Regulatory offenses of this type are typically committed 
by corporations or unincorporated associations for which significant jail time will not be 
appropriate. Section 904’s increased fine structure ensures that these non-Code offenses may 
still receive serious punishment even where an offense’s grade is lowered to a Class 4 felony 
by operation of proposed Section 902.
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 Section 904(2) is similar to current 5/5-9-1(a), but more closely 
tracks the seriousness of offenses and the blameworthiness of offenders by 
authorizing a unique maximum fine for each offense class. Section 904(2), 
on the whole, also authorizes higher fines than current 5/5-9-1(a). The 
authorized maximum fines have been raised to account for inflation and to 
provide a viable alternative or supplement to imprisonment, increasing the 
sanctioning options available for imposition of criminal liability.
 Section 904(2)(a) through (f) specify six different maximum fines 
for each of the six felony classes, ranging from $10,000 for Class 4 
felonies to $250,000 for Class [X-plus] felonies. Current 5/5-9-1(a)(1), 
in contrast, authorizes a single maximum fine of $25,000 for all felonies. 
Section 904(2)(g) through (i) authorize three different maximum fines for 
each of the three misdemeanor classes, ranging from $2,000 for Class C 
misdemeanors to $5,000 for Class A misdemeanors. Current 5/5-9-1(a)(2) 
and (3), in contrast, authorize a single maximum fine of $1,500 for Class 
B and Class C misdemeanors, and a higher maximum fine of $2,500 for 
Class A misdemeanors. Section 904(2)(j) is substantively similar to current 
5/5-9-1(a)(4) in authorizing a maximum fine of $1,000 for petty offenses, 
but also establishes a $1,000 maximum fine for business offenses where the 
statute defining the offense does not specify a fine.
 Section 904(3) follows the form of current 5/5-9-1(a)(1), which 
provides that the maximum authorized fine for corporations is twice that 
authorized for individuals, but applies the rule to all offense classes rather 
than just felonies.
 Section 904 omits current 5/5-9-1(b) through (f), which address 
assorted issues related to criminal fines, because these issues are more 
properly addressed in the Code of Corrections.113 Section 904 also eliminates 
several provisions regarding additional fines for specific offenses and the 
proper distribution of proceeds therefrom. See 730 ILCS 5/5-9-1.1 to -1.3; 
-1.5 to -1.8; -1.10; -1.11. Potential fine amounts are adequately covered 
by the general fine structure in proposed Section 904(2); issues relating to 
distribution of those amounts may be addressed in the Code of Corrections.
 113 Current 5/5-9-1(b) explicitly provides that “[a] fine may be imposed in addition 
to a sentence of conditional discharge, probation, periodic imprisonment, or imprisonment.” 
Current 5/5-9-1(c) imposes “an additional penalty of $5 for each $40, or fraction thereof, of 
fine imposed” that is to be added to fines for most offenses. Current 5/5-9-1(c-5) requires the 
imposition of an additional fee for offenses involving driving under the influence of alcohol 
or drugs. Current 5/5-9-1(d) sets forth the factors that courts are required to consider in 
determining the amount and method of paying a fine. Current 5/5-9-1(e) authorizes the court 
to order the manner in which fines are to be paid. Current 5/5-9-1(f) requires that certain fines, 
fees, and penalties be collected and disbursed by the circuit clerk. 
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 Section 905. General Adjustments to Offense Grade
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 730 ILCS 5/5-8-2; 5/5-5-3.2(b) 
  to (d); 740 ILCS 147/10; see 
  also 705 ILCS 405/5-105(3)
Comment:
 Generally. This provision allows for extended terms of imprisonment 
by increasing the grade of an offense by one grade where an enumerated 
aggravating factor is present. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 905 corresponds to current 
5/5-8-2(a) and 5/5-5-3.2(b).114 Section 905’s initial statement is similar to 
current 5/5-5-3.2(b) in authorizing extended terms of imprisonment based 
on the existence of specified aggravating factors, but clarifies that the court 
may impose an extended term of imprisonment if any one of the specified 
factors exists, rather than saying that all the factors “may be considered by the 
court.” Section 905 also points out that a factor should not be used to aggravate 
punishment if it is already reflected in the elements of the underlying offense of 
conviction. Compare, e.g., Section 905(3) (authorizing aggravation if “offense 
was accompanied by exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of 
reckless cruelty”), with proposed Section 1102(1)(a) (defining second-degree 
murder offense for homicide committed “recklessly . . . under circumstances 
manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life”).
 In keeping with current constitutional law, Section 905 allows that the 
fact of a prior conviction (at issue in Section 905(1) and (2)) may be found by 
the court, but all other facts (such as those at issue in Section 905(3) and (4)) 
must be found beyond a reasonable doubt by the trier of fact.115
 Section 905(1) is similar to current 5/5-5-3.2(b)(1) but extends the 
aggravation for previous convictions of any offense of the same grade or a 
 114 Illinois courts have read current 5/5-8-2(a) to create a general rule that “extended-
term sentences may only be imposed for the offenses within the most serious class of offense 
of which the accused is convicted.” People v. Jordan, 469 N.E.2d 569, 576 (Ill. 1984). Where 
the defendant is sentenced to death or life imprisonment for murder, however, extended-term 
sentences may be imposed for offenses of other classes. See People v. Terry, 700 N.E.2d 992, 
993-96 (Ill. 1998); People v. Young, 529 N.E.2d 497, 503-06 (Ill. 1988). Illinois courts also 
hold that extended-term sentences may be imposed for “separately charged, differing class 
offenses that arise from unrelated courses of conduct regardless of whether the cases are 
separately prosecuted or consolidated.” People v. Coleman, 652 N.E.2d 322, 327 (Ill. 1995). 
In contrast, Section 905 provides that a grade adjustment is appropriate with respect to any 
offense of conviction for which a specified aggravating factor is present.
 115 Although Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), does not require the jury to 
make factual findings regarding prior convictions, and although other amendments in Public 
Act 91-953 make a corresponding exception for such findings, that Act’s amendment to 730 
ILCS 5/5-8-2 does not exempt the fact of prior conviction — one of the factors set forth in 730 
ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(b) — from the requirement of a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt. Section 
905 allows the court to find that a prior conviction exists, avoiding the potential prejudice that 
would result from requiring submission of a defendant’s criminal history to the jury.
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higher grade, rather than just felonies. The proposed change replaces similar 
aggravations for recidivist behavior provided in numerous substantive 
provisions with one general aggravation covering all offenses.116
 Section 905(2) is identical to current 5/5-5-3.2(b)(11). 
 Section 905(3) is identical to current 5/5-5-3.2(b)(2), but has deleted 
the reference to “the court find[ing]” the factor, as Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
530 U.S. 466 (2000), requires that the jury find this fact beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Section 905(3) also replaces the word “wanton” with “reckless” — 
which has the same meaning under current law, see 720 ILCS 5/4-6 — 
because the proposed Code does not define or use the term “wanton.”
 Section 905(4) is similar to current 5/5-5-3.2(b)(8), in that it is designed 
to aggravate punishment for group activity. However, Section 905(4) broadens 
the reach of the rule to cover group activity committed in furtherance of any 
“criminal organization,” rather than just the activities of “organized gangs.”
 Section 905(5)(a) defines the term “criminal organization” and is similar 
to the definition of “organized gang” in current 740 ILCS 147/10. However, 
Section 905(6) broadens the reach of the provision by eliminating the 
requirement that the criminal organization have an “established hierarchy.” 
In addition, Section 905(5)(a) defines the term “course or pattern of criminal 
activity” similarly to 147/10, except that it requires the commission of three 
or more crimes within a three-year period, whereas 147/10 requires only 
two or more crimes within a five-year period. Commission of two crimes 
separated by five years does not suggest ongoing, organized criminal activity 
strongly enough to warrant imposition of a one-grade sentencing increase. 
 Section 905(5)(b) defines the term “delinquent minor” by reference to 
current 705 ILCS 405/5-105(3).
 Section 905 omits current 5/5-5-3.2(b)(3), (b)(4) to (7), (b)(9) and (10), 
(c), and (d), which set forth special aggravating factors justifying extended 
terms of imprisonment for specific offenses. These special aggravating 
factors are of limited applicability and are more appropriately provided in 
the particular provisions to which they might apply.117 See 720 ILCS 5/5-5-
 116 The material in current Chapter 720 Article 33B, providing mandatory life sentences 
for third or subsequent offenses, deals with more particular sentencing issues — as opposed 
to grading issues — properly addressed outside the Criminal Code. It is anticipated that these 
provisions, should the General Assembly choose to retain them, will be transferred to the Code 
of Corrections by means of the “conforming amendments” legislation to be introduced to the 
General Assembly with the proposed Code.
 117 Current law’s use of general aggravations that apply to all felonies, while also 
employing specific aggravations within specific offenses, creates needless overlap and 
introduces confusion, if not incoherence. Such overlap recently led an Illinois court to find 
that the competing, and inconsistent, aggravations for theft against persons over 60 years of 
age violated the Proportionate Penalties clause (Article I, § 11) of the Illinois Constitution. 
See People v. Graves, 773 N.E.2d 1243, 1248 (Ill. App. 2002) (finding penalty for “theft by 
deception” against victim over 60 years old, which provides for a maximum sentence of 7 
years, unconstitutionally disproportionate to penalty for “unauthorized theft,” which allows 
maximum extended sentence of 14 years for same conduct).
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3.2(b)(3) (multiple homicide offenses); 5/5-5-3.2(b)(4) (felonies committed 
against certain categories of victim); 5/5-5-3.2(b)(5) (criminal sexual 
assault and aggravated criminal sexual assault — gang-rape situation); 
5/5-5-3.2(b)(6) (aggravating for felony “committed as part of a ceremony, 
rite, initiation, observance, performance, practice or activity of any actual 
or ostensible religious, fraternal, or social group”); 5/5-5-3.2(b)(7) (first-
degree murder by past serious offender); 5/5-5-3.2(b)(9) (unlawful use 
of weapons — gang member); 5/5-5-3.2(b)(10) (aggravating for “using 
a firearm with a laser sight attached to it”); 5/5-5-3.2(c) (aggravating for 
certain sexual offenses where the victim is a minor); 5/5-5-3.2(d) (unlawful 
use of weapons — weapon “not readily distinguishable”). 
Section 906. Authorized Sentence for Multiple Offenses
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4
Comment:
 Generally. This provision establishes a rule for determining cumulative 
authorized sentences for defendants convicted of more than one offense. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 906 is functionally similar 
to current 5/5-8-4 in addressing the terms of imprisonment for defendants 
convicted of multiple offenses. Section 906’s initial statement that the 
provision applies “[w]hen a defendant is being sentenced for more than one 
offense” is substantively similar to that in the first sentence of 5/5-8-4(a), and 
makes clear the proposed sentencing scheme only applies to convictions tried 
together in the same trial as provided by current law’s joinder rules. See 725 
ILCS 5/111-4; 5/114-7. The current rules for sentencing offenses that are not 
tried together remain unchanged.
 Section 906 eliminates current 5/5-8-4’s special rules for particular 
offenses and factual circumstances and provides a universal sentencing rule 
that authorizes neither consecutive nor concurrent sentences for multiple 
offenses. Under Section 906, each additional offense of conviction increases 
the defendant’s total authorized sentence, but the defendant serves a full 
sentence only for the most serious offense.118 As a defendant’s offenses 
become more numerous and less serious, the defendant’s total authorized 
sentence continues to increase, but in progressively smaller amounts.
 118 In the event that an offense is overturned on appeal, the defendant should be 
resentenced in accordance with this scheme, reapplying the scheme using only those offenses 
that remain in effect. Thus, if the most serious offense were overturned on appeal, on remand 
the court would give the full sentence for the most serious remaining offense, and so on, rather 
than simply deleting that portion of the sentence represented by the most serious offense 
without enhancing the punishment for the remaining offenses.
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 Section 906’s mechanism for sentencing multiple convictions provides 
fairer punishment than the crude consecutive-or-concurrent dichotomy 
of current 5/5-8-4(b). Consecutive sentencing often results in cumulative 
sentences that seem overly severe as measures of the total harm caused.119 
Concurrent sentencing, conversely, provides no punishment at all for a 
defendant’s less serious offenses, thus trivializing to the point of total 
irrelevance any offenses other than the most serious one. Section 906 provides 
an intermediate approach to sentencing for multiple offenses, ensuring that 
each additional offense leads to some increase in overall punishment while 
avoiding raw aggregation of offenses into an unduly severe cumulative 
sentence.
 Current 5/5-8-4(a) requires that multiple sentences of imprisonment 
be served either consecutively or concurrently. Consecutive sentences are 
required under current law if one of the offenses of conviction is: (1) first-
degree murder, a Class X felony, or a Class 1 felony and the defendant — or 
another person for whose conduct the defendant is accountable120 — inflicted 
serious bodily injury;121 (2) sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, or 
predatory criminal sexual assault of a child; (3) armed violence based upon 
one of several specified predicate offenses; (4) committed while the defendant 
was committed to the Department of Corrections; (5) escape or attempted 
escape under 730 ILCS 5/3-6-4; (6) a felony committed while on pretrial 
 119 In recognition of the potential harshness of consecutive sentences, current 5/5-8-
4(c) imposes limitations on the length of cumulative consecutive sentences. Current 5/5-8-
4(c)(1) and (2) set forth separate rules for the laws in effect prior to and on or after February 
1, 1978, respectively. Under both provisions, the maximum cumulative consecutive sentence 
for felonies is determined by reference to the maximum authorized sentence “for the 2 most 
serious felonies involved.” (5/5-8-4(c)(2) differs from (c)(1), however, in that it looks to the 
maximum extended-term sentences for the two most serious felonies, and applies only to 
sentences for offenses “committed as part of a single course of conduct during which there 
was no substantial change in the nature of the criminal objective.”) With respect to defendants 
sentenced only for misdemeanors, both (c)(1) and (c)(2) provide that the cumulative 
consecutive sentence may not exceed “the maximum for one Class A misdemeanor.”
 The scheme 5/5-8-4(c) imposes may lead to anomalous and undesirable results. For 
example, courts have read 5/5-8-4(c)(2) in some circumstances to limit a defendant’s total 
maximum sentence for multiple offenses to an amount less than the maximum authorized 
sentence if the defendant had committed only one offense. See People v. Pullen, 733 N.E.2d 
1235, 1239 (Ill. 2000) (holding defendant was subject to 28-year maximum consecutive 
sentence for committing multiple Class 2 felonies, even though defendant would have been 
eligible for up to a 30-year sentence, as a Class X offender under Section 5/5-5-3(c)(8), had he 
committed one offense).
 120 See People v. Sangster, 437 N.E.2d 625, 627-28 (Ill. 1982).
 121 Before 5/5-8-4(a)(i) was amended to refer to first-degree murder, the provision was 
construed as “requiring consecutive sentencing where the defendant has been convicted of 
either a Class X or Class 1 felony and where he had inflicted severe bodily injury during the 
commission of that felony.” People v. Whitney, 720 N.E.2d 225, 229 (Ill. 1999) (emphasis 
added). The Illinois Supreme Court has yet to re-examine Whitney in light of the recent 
amendment to 5/5-8-4(a)(i). 
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release or in pretrial detention for another felony of which the defendant was 
also convicted; or (7) a felony committed while free on bond or in detention 
following conviction for another felony. See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-4(b), (f) to (i). 
 Current law requires that sentences run concurrently if: (1) consecutive 
sentences are not required and the “offenses were committed as part of a 
single course of conduct during which there was no substantial change in the 
nature of the criminal objective”; (2) the defendant was serving a sentence 
of imprisonment for a misdemeanor when convicted of a felony; or (3) the 
court does not specify that sentences are to run consecutively. See 730 ILCS 
5/5-8-4(a), (d).
 Where neither a consecutive nor a concurrent sentence is required 
under 5/5-8-4, the sentencing court may impose either consecutive or 
concurrent terms, subject to 5/5-8-4(b)’s limitation that the court may impose 
a consecutive sentence only if it finds that such a sentence “is required to 
protect the public from further criminal conduct by the defendant.”122 
 Section 906 omits current 5/5-8-4(c) and (e). Current 5/5-8-4(c) sets 
forth rules governing the maximum length of consecutive sentences and 
is therefore unnecessary under the proposed scheme, which eliminates 
consecutive sentences. Current 5/5-8-4(e) establishes rules for serving 
consecutive sentences where at least one of the sentences is for a felony.
Section 907. Definitions
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 705 ILCS 405/5-105(3); 720 
  ILCS 5/1-5; 740 ILCS 147/10
Comment:
 Generally. This provision collects defined terms used in Article 900 and 
provides cross-references to the sections in which they are defined.
 Relation to current Illinois law. For a discussion of the relationship 
between Article 900’s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary 
for the provision in which the term is initially defined.
 122 Current 5/5-8-4(b) provides that the court “shall” set forth the basis for a consecutive 
sentence in the record. The Illinois Supreme Court, however, has construed the term “shall” 
to be “permissive rather than mandatory.” People v. Hicks, 462 N.E.2d 473, 477 (Ill. 1984) 
(holding that term “shall,” if read to impose mandatory requirement, would unconstitutionally 
infringe on separate powers of judiciary).
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ARTICLE 1100. HOMICIDE OFFENSES
General Comment Regarding Article 1100:
 In addition to the substantive changes discussed in the commentary 
below, Article 1100 changes some of the nomenclature of Illinois homicide 
law. As a result, Article 1100 and current Illinois law sometimes use the same 
name to refer to different offenses, and also sometimes use different names to 
refer to the same offense. Most significantly, most of the conduct criminalized 
by Section 1102’s offense of “second-degree murder” is currently treated as 
“first-degree murder” under current 5/9-1(a)(2) and (a)(3), while much of 
what current 5/9-2 calls “second-degree murder” is labeled “first-degree 
manslaughter” under Section 1103. Section 1104 uses the term “second-
degree manslaughter” to refer to the conduct criminalized by current 5/9-3’s 
separate offenses of “involuntary manslaughter” and “reckless homicide.” 
Except where the context indicates otherwise, the commentary uses the 
proposed offense names rather than the current ones.
Section 1101. Murder in the First Degree
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1); 730 ILCS 
  5/5-8-1(a)(1)(a); see also 730 
  ILCS 5/5-8-2(a)(1)
Comment:
 Generally. Section 1101 defines first-degree murder to require 
knowingly causing the death of another person, and grades it as the most 
serious offense in the proposed Code. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 1101(1) is substantively similar 
to current 5/9-1(a)(1) in imposing liability where one knowingly causes 
death,1 but makes three substantive modifications to the offense definition to 
ensure that first-degree murder liability is imposed for only the most serious 
offenses and to avoid overlap with General Part provisions.
 1 Section 1101(1) rejects the common-law concept of “malice” in favor of the culpability 
scheme set forth in Article 200. The 1961 Code also intended to abolish any requirement of 
“malice.” See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1, Committee Comments — 1961, at 13 (West 
1993) (“Section 9-1 is intended . . . to avoid the use of the difficult ‘malice’ language. . . . The 
words relating to the mental states of intent and knowledge are used in the sense in which they 
are defined in Article 4.”); People v. Jeffries, 646 N.E.2d 587, 594 (Ill. 1995) (“Because the 
term ‘malice aforethought’ was not susceptible to clear definition, the legislature eliminated 
any reference to it in the definition of murder in the new criminal code.”) (citations omitted).
 Nevertheless, Illinois courts occasionally suggest that malice remains an element 
of murder. See, e.g., People v. Stokes, 689 N.E.2d 625, 630 (Ill. App. 1997) (“To sustain a 
charge of attempt to murder, it is sufficient to discharge a weapon in the direction of another 
(continued…)
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 First, Section 1101(1) requires knowingly causing the death of another,2 
and does not apply where one causes death while intending only to inflict 
great bodily harm. Section 1101(1)’s formulation reflects the view that the 
offense should reach only those who satisfy a stated culpability requirement 
as to causing the specific harm the offense prohibits. Although one who 
intends to cause great bodily harm is certainly blameworthy — and in nearly 
all cases will at least satisfy the culpability requirements for second-degree 
murder, second-degree manslaughter, or negligent homicide under the 
proposed Code — there is a meaningful difference between intending injury 
and knowingly killing another person. For this reason, “[m]ost modern codes 
define murder as not including the intent-to-do-serious-bodily-injury type.” 2 
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 7.3, 
at 198 (1986); see also id. n.5 (citing 22 jurisdictions that do not include such 
cases as murder, versus 9, including Illinois, that do).
 Section 1101(1)’s formulation also avoids potential confusion in jury 
instructions for attempted first-degree murder. Under current law, courts 
ordinarily give a general attempt instruction along with an instruction for 
the substantive offense. Because current 5/9-1 does not require culpability 
specifically as to causing death, however, Illinois is forced to use a special 
instruction for attempted first-degree murder requiring a finding that the 
defendant acted with an “intent to kill.” See IPI (CRIMINAL) 6.05X (4th ed. 
2000). This approach appears to conflict with current 5/8-4’s general rules 
for attempt liability, but is necessary to distinguish battery (or its attempt) 
from attempted first-degree murder. It has also “served as a continuing 
source of confusion and uncertainty among members of the bar.” People v. 
Kraft, 478 N.E.2d 1154, 1157 (Ill. App. 1985); see also People v. Holmes, 
627 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ill. App. 1993) (“Numerous courts confronted with 
the exact situation presented here have found error.”); People v. Jeter, 616 
N.E.2d 1256, 1260 (Ill. App. 1993) (observing that erroneous “instructions 
continue to be used by the trial courts” and citing 15 cases finding attempted-
murder instructions erroneous). Section 1101(1) anticipates the availability 
of attempt liability under Section 801, and avoids confusion by omitting the 
intent-to-injure murder formulation.
individual, either with malice or total disregard for human life.”); People v. Medrano, 648 
N.E.2d 218, 223 (Ill. App. 1995) (“Murder is the unlawful killing of another person with 
malice aforethought.”); People v. Jerome, 564 N.E.2d 221, 225 (Ill. App. 1990) (“In drafting 
the murder . . . statute, the legislature intended to retain the common-law concepts of express 
and implied malice but to replace those terms with the more modern and less ambiguous 
terms of intent and knowledge respectively.”). As one Illinois court has observed, this reading 
“diminishes both the clear language of these . . . statutes and the legislative intent in enacting 
them.” People v. Newbern, 579 N.E.2d 583, 595 (Ill. App. 1991).
 2 Section 1101(1), like current 5/9-1(a)(1), also imposes liability where one intentionally 
causes the death of another. Section 1101(1) omits 5/9-1(a)(1)’s language concerning one who 
“intends to kill,” however, in recognition of proposed Section 205(6)’s stated rule that proof of 
intent will satisfy a culpability requirement of knowledge.
 1 (…continued)
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 Second, Section 1101(1) omits as redundant current 5/9-1(a)’s requirement 
that the offender act “without lawful justification,” since proposed Section 400 
clearly provides that justifications are complete defenses barring liability. 
See proposed Section 400 and corresponding commentary. Section 1101(1)’s 
omission of this language also makes clear that the absence of a justification 
is not an element of the offense for which the prosecution bears the burden of 
production. See proposed Section 107(3) (imposing burden of production on 
State for “offense elements,” but on defendant for “affirmative defenses”). 
 Third, Section 1101(1) omits current 5/9-1(a)(1)’s language covering 
cases where the offender kills one person while intending to harm another 
as unnecessary in light of Section 303, which permits imputation of intent 
or knowledge in the “transferred intent” situation. See proposed Section 303 
and corresponding commentary (imputation appropriate where “a different 
person . . . is injured”). 
 Section 1101(2) is substantively similar to current 730 ILCS 5/5-8-
1(a)(1)(a) in authorizing longer prison sentences for first-degree murder 
than for Class X felonies, but does so by grading the offense as a Class 
[X-plus] felony rather than by prescribing a unique sentence. This approach 
eliminates any need for aggravating factors warranting life imprisonment 
or an “extended” imprisonment term, because life imprisonment is always 
an authorized sentence for Class [X-plus] felonies under Article 900. See 
proposed Section 903 and corresponding commentary; cf. 730 ILCS 5/5-8-
1(a)(1)(b),(c) (listing aggravating factors warranting life imprisonment); 5/5-
8-2(a)(1) (authorizing “extended” term of up to 100 years based on certain 
aggravating factors). Current 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(d)’s mandatory added 
sentences for cases involving firearms, however, would remain as sentencing 
rules defining the level of punishment a defendant would receive within the 
assigned grade.
 Section 1101(2) also provides that, subject to the standards and 
procedures to be set forth in Section 1109, first-degree murder is an offense 
“for which the death penalty may be imposed.” Using this language in Section 
1101(2), rather than in Article 900 for Class [X-plus] felonies generally, 
makes clear that the death penalty may be imposed only for first-degree 
murder — and not for Class X felonies that are aggravated to Class [X-plus] 
felonies for sentencing purposes. Cf. proposed Section 905 (authorizing one-
grade adjustment based on certain aggravating factors).
 Section 1101 omits current 5/9-1(a)(2) and (a)(3), which impose first-
degree murder liability for homicidal acts known to “create a strong probability 
of death or great bodily harm” and for felony murder, respectively. Section 
1101’s rejection of first-degree murder liability for these offenses, like its 
exclusion of those who intend only great bodily harm, reflects the view that 
the Code’s most serious offense should not reach those who are reckless, 
negligent, or have no culpability whatever as to causing the particular harm 
(death) with which it is concerned. Second-degree murder liability will be 
available, however, for most of the conduct covered by 5/9-1(a)(2) and (a)(3). 
See proposed Section 1102 and corresponding commentary.
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Section 1102. Murder in the Second Degree
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(2),(3); 5/9-3.3;
  730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(a); see
  also 730 ILCS 5/5-8-2(a)(1)
Comment:
 Generally. This provision defines and grades the offense of second-
degree murder and establishes a special permissive inference for the offense. 
Section 1102 imposes an intermediate punishment for offenses that, though 
considered less serious than first-degree murder, are considered more serious 
than the reckless killings covered by Section 1104. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 1102(1) defines two bases for 
second-degree murder liability. Section 1102(1)(a) is substantively similar to 
current 5/9-1(a)(2), but amends the offense definition to clearly distinguish 
second-degree murder from reckless homicide.3 Section 1102(1)(a) prohibits 
“recklessly caus[ing] the death of another person under circumstances 
manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life.” Current 5/9-
1(a)(2), by contrast, prohibits causing death through acts one knows to “create 
a strong probability of death or great bodily harm.” Like Section 1102(1)(a), 
current 5/9-1(a)(2) is intended to apply to offenders who, although they 
did not knowingly cause death, are thought to be more blameworthy and 
dangerous than others who recklessly cause death. See 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 5/9-1, Committee Comments — 1961, at 15 (West 1993) (“Clearly, 
no sharp dividing line can be drawn, but the Committee chose ‘strong 
probability’ as the plainest description of the situation which lies between 
the ‘practical certainty’ of the preceding subsection [requiring culpability of 
‘knowledge’], and the ‘likely cause’ and ‘substantial and unjustifiable risk’ of 
the involuntary manslaughter provision (§ 9-3, using ‘recklessly’ as defined 
in § 4-6).”). 
 Current 5/9-1(a)(2)’s “strong probability” requirement, however, 
does not clearly communicate a more demanding culpability requirement 
than current 5/9-3’s requirement of recklessness as to causing death.4 
Although knowingly creating a “strong probability” would seem to require 
 3 Section 1102(1)(a) also omits current 5/9-1(a)(2)’s language covering the “transferred 
intent” situation and 5/9-1(a)’s requirement that the offender act “without lawful justification,” 
as proposed Sections 303 and 400 cover the omitted language. See also commentary for 
proposed Section 1101(1).
 4 The 1961 Code drafters expressed a belief that the “strong probability” requirement 
“would seem to require a minimum of further definition in jury instructions, and to permit 
ready comparison with the other two situations mentioned, when the evidence requires 
instructions thereon.” 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1, Committee Comments — 1961, at 15 
(West 1993). The term has, in fact, received no “further definition in jury instructions” at all. 
See IPI (CRIMINAL) 7.01 et seq. (4th ed. 2000) (failing to define knowingly creating a “strong 
probability”). Accordingly, there has been no clear resolution of the tensions noted in the text 
between the “strong probability” requirement and the standard definition of recklessness. 
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a greater disregard of potential harm than the “substantial risk” required 
for recklessness, it is unclear whether current 5/9-1(a)(2)’s culpability 
requirement is more stringent than the recklessness standard in all respects. 
Whereas the “strong probability” test focuses only on the objective magnitude 
of the risk of harm, recklessness also requires consideration of the actor’s 
subjective awareness of the risk and the context in which the risk is created. 
See 720 ILCS 5/4-6 (requiring disregard of “unjustifiable” risk constituting 
“gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would 
exercise in the situation”); cf. 2 LAFAVE & SCOTT, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 
§ 7.4, at 202 n.17 (1986) (noting current 5/9-1(a)(2) “seems incorrectly to 
focus exclusively upon the degree of risk”). Thus it is possible that a person 
whose acts lead to another’s death could be liable under 5/9-1(a)(2)’s “strong 
probability” formulation, but not satisfy the requirements of the reckless 
homicide offense, which is meant to define a lower standard of liability.5 It 
may be due to the ambiguity of the relation between the “strong probability” 
test and the recklessness standard that only one other jurisdiction allowing 
culpability as to harm, rather than death, as a basis for murder liability 
appears to use 5/9-1(a)(2)’s “strong probability” language. See N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 30-2-1(B).
 5 Although current law’s distinction between the “strong probability” requirement and 
recklessness is unclear, Illinois courts have often held as a matter of law that certain factual 
situations may satisfy one, but categorically do not satisfy the other. That is, they have refused 
to allow jury instructions for current 5/9-3’s reckless homicide offense where a defendant who 
pointed a gun in the decedent’s “general direction” claims that he intended neither death nor 
injury. See, e.g., People v. Jefferson, 631 N.E.2d 1374, 1386 (Ill. App. 1994) (“Illinois courts 
consistently hold that when the defendant intends to fire a gun, points it in the general direction 
of her intended victim, and shoots, such conduct is not reckless, regardless of the defendant’s 
assertion that she did not intend to kill anyone.”); People v. Hennon, 593 N.E.2d 587, 592 (Ill. 
App. 1992) (“Generally, an involuntary manslaughter instruction is not warranted where a 
defendant voluntarily and willfully commits an act which has a natural tendency to cause death 
or great bodily harm.”); cf. People v. Cannon, 273 N.E.2d 829, 831 (Ill. 1971) (instructions on 
involuntary manslaughter properly refused despite testimony that defendant “did not intend to 
kill anyone”); People v. Latimer, 220 N.E.2d 314, 317 (Ill. 1966) (instructions on involuntary 
manslaughter properly refused despite testimony that defendant “merely intended to frighten” 
decedent).
 Although a rational jury may certainly find that such a case warrants murder liability, 
it seems questionable to impose a de facto rule that it would be irrational for a jury to impose 
reckless-homicide liability instead. As some Illinois courts have recognized, a jury may 
rationally find — when given the opportunity to do so — that a defendant in such a case 
caused death only recklessly. See, e.g., People v. Kelly, 322 N.E.2d 527, 532 (Ill. App. 1975) 
(“It was a question for the jury whether firing a gun aimed toward the decedent was a reckless 
performance of an act likely to cause death or bodily harm to a person 18 feet away. Obviously 
the jury believed defendant’s testimony that he did not intend to kill . . . .”); cf. People v. 
Hines, 334 N.E.2d 233, 238 (Ill. App. 1974) (reducing conviction to involuntary manslaughter 
because jury could have rationally found that defendant intended only to “scare” decedent). It 
is anticipated that under the proposed Code, in most cases of this kind, it would be appropriate 
to provide jury instructions under both Section 1102(1)(a) and Section 1104 and allow the jury 
to determine what degree of liability the offender deserves.
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 Section 1102(1)(a), by contrast, clearly articulates a higher culpability 
requirement than recklessness by explicitly incorporating the recklessness 
standard and adding an additional requirement.6 The provision requires that 
the offender recklessly cause death “under circumstances manifesting an 
extreme indifference to the value of human life.” This formulation limits the 
offense to offenders who, although lacking the culpability required for first-
degree murder, are more blameworthy than those who recklessly cause death 
without such depraved indifference. Section 1102(1)(a)’s language would 
also cover most of the intent-to-injure cases that are treated as first-degree 
murder under current Illinois law.7 See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (imposing 
first-degree murder liability where defendant “intends to . . . do great bodily 
harm”).
 Section 1102(1)(b) is substantively similar to current 5/9-1(a)(3) in 
imposing liability where one causes death in the course of attempting or 
committing a forcible felony,8 but makes three substantive modifications to 
the definition of felony murder. First, Section 1102(1)(b) requires that the 
offender “in fact” cause the death of another person. This language makes 
it clear that Section 1102(1)(b) imposes absolute liability as to causing the 
death of another person,9 which is in keeping with the Illinois courts’ general 
rule that “[f]elony murder is premised on strict liability for one who kills or is 
 6 Because Section 1102(1)(a)’s offense requires recklessness as to causing death, the 
proposed Code does not impose liability for attempts to commit that offense. As discussed 
in the commentary for the proposed second-degree manslaughter offense, proposed Section 
801’s requirement that one intend to “engage in the conduct that would constitute the offense” 
precludes the possibility of attempting an offense that requires recklessness as to a result 
element. See infra note 29.
 7 A defendant’s intent to inflict great bodily harm is relevant to the determinations of 
both his recklessness as to causing death and whether he acted with “extreme indifference to 
the value of human life.” Therefore, in nearly all such cases a jury may be instructed, and may 
find the defendant liable, under Sections 1102(1)(a) and/or 1104. The proposed formulations 
reflect a slightly different focus than current law, however, because they directly address the 
defendant’s culpability as to the central harm involved in a homicide case — causing death 
— rather than using his culpability as to a different form of harm (causing injury) as a proxy 
for that issue.
 8 Because Section 1102(1)(b) requires the attempt or commission of a forcible felony, 
felony murder’s offense elements incorporate the offense elements of the predicate forcible 
felony. See proposed Section 202(1) (defining “elements of the offense” to include objective 
elements and culpability requirements “contained in the offense definition”). Thus, as under 
current 5/1-5(b)’s second sentence, jurisdiction for felony murder is appropriate where the 
predicate felony is attempted or committed in Illinois. See proposed Section 105(2) and 
corresponding commentary.
 9 Because Section 1102(1)(b) imposes absolute liability as to causing death, inchoate 
liability for felony murder is not possible under the proposed Code. This is consistent with the 
Illinois courts’ rejection of attempt liability for felony murder under current 5/9-1(a)(3). See 
People v. Viser, 343 N.E.2d 903, 910 (Ill. 1975) (“There can be no felony murder where there 
has been no death, and the felony murder ingredient of the offense of murder cannot be made 
the basis of an indictment charging attempt murder. . . . There is no such criminal offense as 
an attempt to achieve an unintended result.”).
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responsible for a killing during the course of a felony.”10 Section 1102(1)(b)’s 
use of the phrase “in fact” avoids the application of a culpability requirement 
of recklessness under the General Part’s “read-in” provision. See proposed 
Section 205(4) and corresponding commentary.11 In imposing absolute 
liability (as to the element of causing death), however, Section 1102(1)(b) 
does not dispense with the proposed Code’s general rules governing causation 
and accountability for the conduct of another. Section 1102(1)(b) imposes the 
 10 People v. Hall, 683 N.E.2d 1274, 1280 (Ill. App. 1997); see also People v. Shaw, 713 
N.E.2d 1161, 1173 (Ill. 1999) (“Whether the perpetrator intended to murder the victim during 
the course of a felony is irrelevant.”).
 There is Illinois authority stating that felony murder requires knowledge that one’s 
conduct creates a “strong possibility” of death. See People v. McEwen, 510 N.E.2d 74, 78 
(Ill. App. 1987) (“To summarize, a killing constitutes felony murder where it is shown that an 
actor intentionally brought about the death of another or that the actor had knowledge that his 
conduct was practically certain to cause death or created a strong possibility that death would 
result.”). The Illinois Supreme Court case cited in support of this proposition, however, merely 
states that culpability with respect to death is required for forms of murder other than felony 
murder. See People v. Guest, 503 N.E.2d 255, 266 (Ill. 1986) (discussing requirements of 
murder under 5/9-1(a)(1) and (a)(2)). 
 11 As Illinois courts have recognized, the prosecution must still prove any culpability 
required for the forcible felony upon which felony murder is predicated. See People v. Harper, 
665 N.E.2d 474, 484 (Ill. App. 1996).
 There is current case law authority holding that “the predicate felony upon which the 
murder conviction is based must involve a knowing or intentional state of mind.” People v. 
Land, 523 N.E.2d 711, 719 (Ill. App. 1988) (reversing felony-murder conviction predicated on 
reckless cruelty to child). Under the proposed Code, the fact that an offense definition requires 
less than knowledge as to one, some, or even all its objective elements would not, by itself, 
compel the conclusion that the offense is not a “forcible felony.” Section 108’s definition of 
“forcible offense” includes any felony whose offense elements require the creation of “a risk 
of death or great bodily harm.” For example, sexual assault of a minor requires only negligence 
as to the minor’s age under proposed Section 1306, but that offense could be considered a 
forcible felony under the proposed definition.
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same requirements for causation12 and accountability13 as are required for 
any other offense. See proposed Sections 203 and 301 and corresponding 
commentary.
 Second, Section 1102(1)(b) is substantively similar to current 5/9-
1(a)(3) in requiring that the offender cause death in the course of “attempting 
or committing a forcible felony,” but states explicitly that the offender must 
cause death “while” the predicate offense is occurring. Although 5/9-1(a)(3) 
also uses the present tense to impose liability where “in performing the 
acts which cause the death . . . [the offender] is attempting or committing” 
a felony, the Illinois Supreme Court has read 5/9-1(a)(3) to allow liability 
 12 Section 1102(1)(b) requires that the offender, or one for whose conduct he is 
accountable, “cause[] the death of another person”; current 5/9-1(a)(3) similarly imposes 
liability only where one “kills an individual” and commits or attempts a forcible felony “in 
performing the acts which cause the death.”
 Perhaps because the Illinois Criminal Code currently lacks a provision establishing rules 
to govern the causation issue, the Illinois courts have been unclear in articulating the causation 
requirement for felony murder. The Illinois courts often state that the defendant is liable if 
death was a “foreseeable consequence of his initial criminal acts.” People v. Lowery, 687 
N.E.2d 973, 978, 979 (Ill. 1997); see also People v. Hickman, 319 N.E.2d 511, 513 (Ill. 1974) 
(holding that accidental killing of police officer by fellow officer was “direct and foreseeable 
consequence” of escape from burglary and would support liability); People v. Pugh, 634 
N.E.2d 34, 35 (Ill. App. 1994); People v. Graham, 477 N.E.2d 1342 (Ill. App. 1985). Some of 
the same cases suggest, however, that there is no true requirement of proximate causation for 
felony murder. See, e.g., People v. Jenkins, 545 N.E.2d 986, 996 (Ill. App. 1989) (approving 
instruction omitting causation requirement altogether, because it “stated the law . . . more 
accurately” than IPI instruction including causation requirement); see also Pugh, 634 N.E.2d 
at 35 (stating that “forcible felonies are so inherently dangerous that a resulting homicide, 
even an accidental one, is strongly probable”); People v. Davis, 527 N.E.2d 552, 558 (Ill. 
App. 1988) (holding that Hickman’s language regarding death as “direct and foreseeable 
consequence” of defendant’s conduct did not state an “essential element” of felony murder); 
cf. Lowery, 687 N.E.2d at 978 (upholding liability for defendant where death was caused by 
independent act of another person). Proposed Section 203 would supersede current case law 
concerning felony murder’s causation requirement to the extent that it is inconsistent with that 
provision.
 13 Although the accomplice (like the principal) need have no culpability as to causing 
death, accomplice liability for felony murder is appropriate only where the offender had 
the culpability required for the predicate forcible felony and either (1) caused the person to 
commit the forcible felony, or (2) intentionally aided, solicited, or conspired with the person 
in the forcible felony’s planning or commission. Accomplice liability is inappropriate, though, 
where the conduct causing death occurs during the attempt or commission of a forcible felony 
for which the defendant is not accountable. See proposed Section 301 and corresponding 
commentary. For this reason, Section 1102(1)(b) does not adopt the Illinois courts’ “common-
design” rule, or any similar rule applicable in the context of felony murder, to the extent that 
such a rule would permit accomplice liability for felony murder where the defendant does 
not satisfy the rules governing complicity as to the specific forcible felony used as a basis for 
felony-murder liability.
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for killings taking place before14 or after15 the attempt or commission of the 
predicate felony. Section 1102(1)(b)’s language makes clearer that felony-
murder liability is improper where the conduct causing death occurs before or 
after the underlying offense. (Like current law, however, Section 1102(1)(b) 
requires only that the conduct causing death — and not the death itself — 
occur “while” the underlying offense is being attempted or committed. Thus 
a burglar could be held liable where he shoots someone during the burglary, 
but the victim does not die of the gunshot wounds until much later.)
 Third, Section 1102(1)(b) explicitly states that felony murder must 
be predicated on a felony “other than an assault that causes the death.” 
This language is in keeping with the Illinois courts’ construction of current 
5/9-1(a)(3), under which liability may not be imposed “where the acts 
constituting forcible felonies arise from and are inherent in the act of 
murder itself.”16 Section 1102(1)(b) allows neither an assault (a category that 
includes such other offenses as endangerment) nor another form of homicide 
(such as manslaughter, as current 5/9-1(a)(3) explicitly states, or reckless 
or negligent homicide) to serve as a predicate for felony-murder liability. 
Otherwise, any grading distinctions between these offenses would be lost, as 
all homicides, and all assaults resulting in death, could be elevated to felony 
murder automatically. As the Illinois Supreme Court has observed, the effect 
of allowing felony-murder liability to be predicated on an assault causing 
death “could be to . . . effectively eliminate the need for the State to prove an 
 14 See People v. Pitsonbarger, 568 N.E.2d 783, 790 (Ill. 1990) (holding that State need 
only prove that killing and underlying felony were part of the “same criminal episode”). The 
Pitsonbarger court appears to have incorrectly based its holding on current 5/9-1(b)(6), which 
provides that the defendant is eligible for the death penalty for committing murder “in the 
course of another felony,” rather than on current 5/9-1(a)(3)’s offense definition.
 15 The Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly held that felony-murder liability is 
appropriate where death is caused during an escape from a forcible felony, under the theory 
that “the period of time and activities involved in escaping to a place of safety are part of the 
crime itself.” People v. Hickman, 319 N.E.2d 511, 513 (Ill. 1974); see also People v. Lowery, 
687 N.E.2d 973, 979 (Ill. 1997); People v. Bongiorno, 192 N.E. 856, 857 (Ill. 1934). Yet as the 
Illinois Supreme Court has recognized in the context of accomplice liability for robbery, an 
escape is ordinarily not “part of the crime,” because it is not an offense element. See People v. 
Shaw, 713 N.E.2d 1161, 1172 (Ill. 1998) (reversing felony-murder conviction where defendant 
aided only in escape, because “[t]he offense of robbery is complete when force or threat of 
force causes the victim to part with possession or custody property against his will”); People v. 
Dennis, 692 N.E.2d 325, 334 (Ill. 1998) (reversing armed robbery conviction where defendant 
aided only in escape, because “[i]n a case where an escape is accomplished without force, 
it cannot reasonably be argued that such escape is part of the substantive offense”). Under 
Section 1102(1)(b), the underlying felony’s offense definition would guide the determination 
of whether the defendant caused death “while attempting or committing” that felony.
 16 People v. Morgan, 758 N.E.2d 813, 838 (Ill. 2001). Prior to Morgan, current law 
was not entirely clear on this issue. Cf. People v. Viser, 343 N.E.2d 903, 908-09 (Ill. 1975) 
(rejecting rule, adopted in other jurisdictions, that “an assault upon the person killed cannot be 
made the basis of a felony murder charge”); People v. Toney, 722 N.E.2d 643, 650 (Ill. App. 
1999) (observing that lower court’s holding in Morgan was “seemingly inconsistent” with 
Viser), vacated, 759 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 2001).
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intentional or knowing killing in most murder cases.” People v. Morgan, 758 
N.E.2d 813, 838 (Ill. 2001).
 Section 1102(2) establishes a permissive inference that Section 
1102(1)(a)’s culpability requirements are established where the defendant 
“unlawfully delivered a controlled substance to the victim and the victim dies 
as a result.” Section 1102(2) is similar in its effect to current 5/9-3.3(a), but 
achieves that result by employing a permissive inference rather than defining 
a separate offense of “drug-induced homicide.” In doing so, Section 1102(2) 
facilitates prosecution for second-degree murder in such cases, but avoids 
imposition of absolute liability and thereby enables the defendant to litigate 
the issue where he can demonstrate a lack of culpability.17 See proposed 
Section 107(4) and corresponding commentary. 
 Section 1102(2) also makes two substantive modifications to assure 
that recklessness and extreme indifference are not inappropriately inferred.18 
First, the permissive inference operates only if the defendant “delivered a 
controlled substance to the victim,” whereas current 5/9-3.3(a) imposes 
liability on any person in the chain of supply, no matter how far removed 
from the transaction causing death. Section 1102(2) limits the inference’s 
applicability in recognition that the person who delivers the drug is much more 
likely to know the victim, and the amount of drug delivered to that particular 
victim, and therefore to satisfy the offense’s culpability requirements. Of 
course, despite the limited reach of the inference, other persons in the chain 
of supply would also be subject to second-degree murder liability if they 
could be shown to satisfy Section 1102(1)(a)’s requirements.
 Second, Section 1102(2) omits current 5/9-3.3(a)’s reference to the 
death of “any person” as a result of drug use. The current provision’s use 
of this language appears designed to clarify that any person in a drug-using 
decedent’s chain of supply may be held liable, but suggests that liability 
may also be imposed where the drug user causes the death of a third 
person. Section 1102(2) explicitly requires that the offender deliver drugs 
“to the victim” in recognition that his behavior clearly reflects a depraved 
indifference toward only that person’s life. If the drug user’s condition caused 
him to kill another person while driving, for example, the dealer might be 
held liable as an accomplice to reckless homicide — or also might be held 
 17 It is not clear whether current 5/9-3.3 effectually provides for absolute liability as to 
causing death. Although the provision seems designed to impose absolute liability, current 
5/4-3(b) would require recklessness to be “read in” as to causing death unless the offense 
definition “clearly indicates a legislative purpose to impose absolute liability.” 720 ILCS 
5/4-9. The Illinois courts have not yet ruled on whether current 5/9-3.3 “clearly indicates” a 
legislative intent to impose absolute liability.
 18 Section 1102(2) also omits as unnecessary current 5/9-3.3(a)’s requirement that 
one “violate[] Section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act” (720 ILCS 570/401) 
in delivering a controlled substance. Section 1102(2)’s ban on “unlawfully” delivering a 
controlled substance would reach any delivery violating 570/401 (which criminalizes any 
unauthorized delivery of a controlled substance) or any of current law’s other complex 
regulations governing the delivery of controlled substances. See 720 ILCS 570/100 et seq. 
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liable under Section 1102(1)(a); the only difference is that the automatic 
permissive inference would not apply in such a case.
 Section 1102(3) corresponds to current 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1)(a).19 
The current provision treats the offenses corresponding to Section 1102(1)(a) 
and (1)(b) as first-degree murder. Section 1102(3) grades second-degree 
murder as a Class X felony based on the understanding that, even though 
the offenses it covers are among the most serious offenses in the Criminal 
Code, they are less serious than the offenses falling within Section 1101’s 
definition of first-degree murder, a Class [X plus] felony. See commentary 
for proposed Section 1101(2). Section 1102(3)’s lower grading also reflects 
the availability of Class [X plus] sentencing in especially serious cases.20 See 
proposed Section 905 (authorizing one-grade adjustment based on certain 
aggravating factors).
Section 1103. Manslaughter in the First Degree
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/9-2
Comment:
 Generally. Section 1103 defines first-degree manslaughter, which 
provides a mitigation from murder where an offender acted under the 
influence of an extreme disturbance. Although the influence of such a 
disturbance does not absolve all responsibility for the objectively harmful, 
and wrongful, act of killing another, it is thought to reduce the offender’s 
blameworthiness relative to those who commit murders unattributable to any 
such influence.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 1103(1) allows mitigation 
from first- or second-degree murder to first-degree manslaughter where the 
offender causes (or attempts to cause) death “under the influence of extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation.” 
Section 1103(1) is functionally similar to current 5/9-2(a)(1)’s mitigation to 
what is currently called “second-degree murder,” but broadens the reach of 
the mitigation to better assure that its scope is consistent with its purpose.
 19 Based on the application of Section 1102(2), see supra, Section 1102(3) also 
corresponds to the grading provisions for “drug-induced homicide” in current 5/9-3.3(b) and 
(c). Section 1102(3) is the same as current 5/9-3.3(b) in grading the offense as a Class X felony, 
but omits 5/9-3.3(c)’s increased minimum sentences for cases involving particular kinds of 
drug-offense violations to ensure consistent grading with other means of committing second-
degree murder. Under the proposed Code, the offender would be subject to liability for both the 
homicide and the underlying drug offense, and the liability for the latter would obviously vary 
depending on the offense. See proposed Sections 254 and 906 and corresponding commentary 
(defining rules to govern convictions and sentencing for multiple offenses).
 20 The death penalty is not available, however, where second-degree murder is 
aggravated to a Class [X plus] felony under proposed Section 905. The death penalty is 
imposed solely for first-degree murder under the proposed Code. See proposed Section 
1101(2) and corresponding commentary.
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 Section 1103(1)(a) allows mitigation where one kills another “under the 
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance,” whereas current 5/9-
2(a)(1) requires that the offender act “under a sudden and intense passion.” 
Section 1103(1)(a)’s standard recognizes that the basis for the mitigation 
defense is similar to that for excuses. An act that, though deliberate, was 
driven by the influence of an extreme disturbance is thought to deserve less 
punishment than one that reflects the exercise of deliberation or unhampered 
free will.21 By requiring consideration of the actor’s state of mind at the 
time of the killing, Section 1103(1)(a) also abandons the current standard’s 
implicit “cooling off” requirement, which bars mitigation where sufficient 
time has passed for the reasonable person to have cooled his passions. See, 
e.g., People v. Yarbrough, 645 N.E.2d 423, 426 (Ill. App. 1994) (“We find 
that the length of time which passed and the defendant’s actions within that 
period were such that defendant was not acting under sudden and intense 
passion[.]”). Section 1103 would not apply where the offender had “cooled 
off” and was not acting under any provoking influence, but its more flexible 
approach also recognizes that one’s disturbance might actually increase as 
frustration and anger grow over time. At the same time, Section 1103(1)(b) 
limits the potential for long-delayed responses to support the mitigation, as it 
retains the requirement that the offender’s response to the influence must be 
“reasonable” (see infra). 
 Section 1103(1)(a) also omits current 5/9-2(a)(1)’s requirement that the 
offender’s act result from “serious provocation” by the victim (or intended 
victim22). Under the “serious provocation” standard, the Illinois courts have 
held that an emotional disturbance, “no matter how violent,” may not provide 
a mitigation unless it results from a specific type of “provocation which the 
law recognizes as reasonable.” People v. Garcia, 651 N.E.2d 100, 110 (Ill. 
1995); see also People v. Tenner, 626 N.E.2d 138, 152 (Ill. 1993); People 
v. Austin, 549 N.E.2d 331, 334 (Ill. 1989). Current Illinois law recognizes 
only the following types of provocation as reasonable: “substantial physical 
injury or substantial physical assault, mutual quarrel or combat, illegal arrest, 
and adultery with the offender’s spouse.” Garcia, 651 N.E.2d at 110; see also 
Tenner, 626 N.E.2d at 151-52; People v. McCarthy, 547 N.E.2d 459, 463 (Ill. 
1989); People v. Chevalier, 544 N.E.2d 942, 944 (Ill. 1989).
 The Illinois courts’ use of these rigid categories has resulted in an 
arbitrarily narrow mitigation defense. For example, the Illinois courts have 
consistently held that “[w]ords, . . . no matter how vile, can never constitute 
serious provocation.” Garcia, 651 N.E.2d at 110; see also People v. Simpson, 
 21 Current Illinois homicide law, in fact, elsewhere explicitly recognizes the relevance 
of acting “under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance” to an offender’s 
relative blameworthiness. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(c)(2) (providing that extreme disturbance is 
mitigating factor relevant to imposition of death penalty). 
 22 Section 1103(1) does not incorporate current 5/9-2(a)(1)’s explicit rule regarding 
offenders who try to kill people who have provoked them but “negligently or accidentally” 
kill third persons, as proposed Section 303 defines a general rule for the “transferred intent” 
situation that language addresses.
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384 N.E.2d 373, 375 (Ill. 1978); People v. Crews, 231 N.E.2d 451, 453 (Ill. 
1967). Similarly, the Illinois courts have generally limited the “adultery” 
category of provocation to cases “where the parties are discovered in the 
act of adultery or immediately before or after such act, and the killing 
immediately follows such discovery.”23 In Chevalier, the Illinois Supreme 
Court relied on both of these restrictions in upholding refusals of mitigation 
instructions in two cases involving admissions of adultery accompanied 
by highly provocative conduct. See 544 N.E.2d at 943 (noting that, during 
arguments, one spouse “disparaged the defendant’s sexual abilities” and the 
other “flaunted the fact that she slept with the victim in the marital bed”). 
Under the current approach, the issue of provocation becomes a strictly 
legal determination rather than a factual determination for the jury to 
make regarding the relative moral severity of the crime. Section 1103(1)(a) 
makes no explicit conclusions regarding the adequacy of certain kinds of 
“provocation” or any other causes of extreme disturbance, and instead 
allows the jury to focus on the actor’s state of mind in determining whether 
mitigation is appropriate.
 Section 1103(1)(b) is substantively similar to current 5/9-2(b) in 
requiring that there be a reasonable basis for the offender’s disturbance, 
but provides that reasonableness is to be determined “from the viewpoint 
of a person in the defendant’s situation”24 and “under the circumstances as 
the defendant believes them to be.” Section 1103(1)(b)’s language, which 
is similar to that used in the General Part’s definitions of “recklessness” 
and “negligence,” makes clear that an individualized objective standard 
is appropriate. See proposed Section 206(3)-(4) and corresponding 
commentary. This standard reinforces the mitigation’s general focus on the 
actor’s blameworthiness relative to one who does not act under the influence 
 23 Chevalier, 544 N.E.2d at 944. There is also authority holding that mitigation is barred 
where one discovers infidelity by a partner other than a spouse, regardless of the relationship’s 
duration or resemblance to marriage. See People v. McDonald, 212 N.E.2d 299, 302 (Ill. App. 
1965) (where defendant lived with decedent for 25 years, court would not apply the “exculpatory 
features of crime passionel to the killing of a mistress”); cf. McCarthy, 547 N.E.2d at 463 
(“Illinois has not recognized the validity of common law marriages since the early part of this 
century . . . , and therefore it could be argued that allowance of the partial exculpation of voluntary 
manslaughter in the circumstances described would be inconsistent with that longstanding 
expression of public policy.”); Yarbrough, 645 N.E.2d at 427 (“To date, no Illinois court has 
extended the adultery category beyond a legal marriage to marital-type relationships.”).
 24 “The defendant’s situation” is intended to include both the factual context of the offense 
and certain characteristics of the defendant. Current Illinois law, by contrast, appears to consider 
only the surrounding factual circumstances in determining whether the defendant’s passion was 
reasonable. Cf. People v. Austin, 549 N.E.2d 331, 335 (Ill. 1989) (“[I]t has been held that the 
alleged provocation on the part of the victim must cause the same passionate state of mind in an 
ordinary person under the same circumstances.”). With respect to the defendant’s characteristics, 
Section 1103(1)(b) is intended to require consideration of specific and demonstrable factors like 
the defendant’s physical attributes, age, and any disabilities, but not such broad and intangible 
aspects as his genetic make-up, intelligence, or general temperament. Because no identifiable 
principle can properly distinguish those characteristics that should be considered from those 
that should not, Section 1103(1)(b) leaves the proper extent of individualization as an issue to be 
determined by the court and/or the jury on a case-by-case basis.
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of an extreme disturbance. Section 1103(1)(b) ensures that the manslaughter 
mitigation does not reduce liability for one who is disturbed for no good 
reason, but covers one whose extreme disturbance was understandable given 
the facts of the case.
 Section 1103(1) generally differs from current 5/9-2(a)(1) in allowing 
for mitigation to first-degree manslaughter from any form of murder, 
including felony murder. Section 1103(1)’s broader scope reflects the view 
that it is inconsistent to allow mitigation for one who intentionally kills 
another, but not for one who lacks culpability altogether as to causing death. 
Moreover, as some Illinois courts have recognized, the current practice serves 
to bar mitigation for many cases of intentional murder, because felony murder 
is commonly charged where the defendant intentionally causes death.25
 Section 1103(1) also allows for mitigation where one attempts murder 
under the influence of an extreme disturbance, but does not cause death. 
Under current Illinois law, by contrast, the Illinois Supreme Court has 
held that the offense of “attempted second-degree murder” (or “attempted 
manslaughter”) does not exist, because “one cannot intend . . . a sudden 
and intense passion due to serious provocation.” People v. Lopez, 655 
N.E.2d 864, 867 (Ill. 1995). Current law’s failure to extend the mitigation 
defense to attempted murder leads to an anomalous and clearly undesirable 
result: because attempted murder is a more serious offense than first-degree 
manslaughter, the offender is punished more severely if his intended victim 
lives than if he dies.26 Section 1103(1), in conjunction with Article 800’s rules 
for attempt liability, avoids such an anomaly. The proposed Code recognizes 
 25 See People v. Kidd, 692 N.E.2d 455, 459 (Ill. App. 1998) (disregarding 5/9-2(a)(1)’s 
plain language because legislature did not “intend an illusory second degree murder statute . . . 
that exists at the choice of the prosecutor and will be applied only in cases in which it could be 
of no benefit to the defendant”), abrogated by People v. Morgan, 758 N.E.2d 813 (Ill. 2001).
 Section 1102(1)(b)’s requirement that felony murder be predicated on a forcible 
felony “other than an assault that causes the death” avoids such a short-circuiting of Section 
1103’s mitigation in many, but not necessarily all, intentional murder cases. Cf. People v. 
Williams, 517 N.E.2d 745, 751 (Ill. App. 1987) (“[A] defendant facing two people in mutual 
combat can be seriously provoked, and if he kills both, he is guilty of two counts of voluntary 
manslaughter. It would be absurd to state that under the identical facts, if one of the victims 
dies and one lives, he is now guilty of murder because as to the one that lives, he is guilty of 
aggravated battery, and hence, under the felony murder doctrine, the affirmative defense of 
provocation is inapplicable.”), abrogated by People v. Morgan, 758 N.E.2d 813 (Ill. 2001).
 26 Curiously, the Illinois courts’ failure to recognize the offense of “attempted second-
degree murder” does not appear to be the only respect in which current law rewards an 
offender acting under a “sudden and intense passion” for actually causing the death of another, 
as opposed to merely attempting to cause death. Current 5/33A-2 defines three “armed 
violence” offenses criminalizing committing felonies while armed with a dangerous weapon. 
Current 5/33A-3 grades the offenses from a Class 2 felony to a Class X felony with a minimum 
term of imprisonment of 25 years. Originally, the provision did not provide any exceptions to 
the general rule that “any felony” may predicate an armed violence conviction. In the face of 
that seemingly unambiguous language, the Illinois Supreme Court held that the legislature did 
not intend voluntary manslaughter (now second-degree murder) to serve as a predicate felony 
for armed violence. See People v. Alejos, 455 N.E.2d 48 (Ill. 1983). The Illinois Supreme 
Court also held that involuntary manslaughter may not serve as a predicate offense for armed 
violence. See People v. Fernetti, 470 N.E.2d 501 (Ill. 1984). (continued…)
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attempted first-degree manslaughter as an offense27 and grades it as less 
serious than the completed offense. See proposed Sections 801 and 807 and 
corresponding commentary.
 Section 1103(2) is substantively the same as current 5/9-2(c)’s first 
sentence in providing that the defendant carries the burden of persuasion 
on the manslaughter mitigation by a preponderance of the evidence. Section 
1103(1)’s requirement that first-degree manslaughter be committed “under 
circumstances that otherwise would be murder,” along with the General 
Part’s rules governing evidentiary burdens, cover 5/9-2(c)’s second and third 
sentences. Section 1103(2), like current law, does not permit liability for 
first-degree manslaughter unless the State has proved the elements of murder 
beyond a reasonable doubt. See proposed Section 107 and corresponding 
commentary.
 Section 1103(3), like current 5/9-2(d), grades the offense as a Class 1 
felony.
 Section 1103 omits current 5/9-2(a)(2)’s “imperfect self-defense” 
mitigation, which is instead covered by Section 511’s rules governing 
mistakes as to justifications. Section 511, like current 5/9-2(a)(2), operates to 
lower the grade of homicide where one causes death under an unreasonable 
mistake as to the justifying conditions — such as where a person recklessly 
or negligently believes that he is being attacked by an armed assailant. 
Section 511’s effect is substantively similar to current 5/9-2(a)(2), with 
three important differences. First, Section 511 effectively lowers the grade 
of homicide only where there is an unreasonable mistake as to a justification, 
 26 (…continued)
 As a result of this construction, one who commits aggravated battery by knowingly 
causing great bodily harm while armed with — but not necessarily using — a Category II 
weapon (such as a knife with a three-inch blade) would be imprisoned for a minimum of ten 
years. By contrast, one who used the same weapon to knowingly cause another’s death under 
a “sudden and intense passion” — a circumstance that provides a mitigation for homicide, but 
not for battery — would be liable for a Class 1 felony and imprisoned for a minimum term of 
only four years. Moreover, the State may not circumvent the courts’ construction of 5/33A-2 
by charging what was really a second-degree murder as the less serious offense of aggravated 
battery. See People v. Drakeford, 564 N.E.2d 792, 793 (Ill. 1990) (holding that armed violence 
conviction could not be “predicated on aggravated battery when a simultaneous conviction for 
second degree murder is returned for the same act”). Illinois courts have yet to reevaluate this 
construction in light of 5/33A-2’s current language, which explicitly recognizes exceptions 
to the general rule that “any felony” may predicate an armed violence charge, but does not 
include second-degree murder or its attempt within the exceptions.
 By contrast, any felony — including any homicide offense — may predicate proposed 
Section 7101’s offense for possessing or using a dangerous weapon during a felony.
 27 Attempted first-degree manslaughter is a possible offense under the proposed Code 
because, unlike the current attempt provision, Section 801 does not require that the offender 
act “with intent to commit a specific offense.” 720 ILCS 5/8-4(a). Section 801 requires, rather, 
intent only to “engage in the conduct that would constitute the offense” — and explicitly 
provides that “the culpability required for commission of the offense,” rather than an elevated 
requirement of intent, governs the substantive offense’s other objective elements. See proposed 
Section 801 and corresponding commentary. 
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whereas current 5/9-2(a)(2) also allows mitigation for unreasonable mistakes 
as to compulsion (an excuse) and entrapment (a nonexculpatory defense). 
The proposed Code does not recognize a defense for any mistakes as to 
excuses or nonexculpatory defenses, much less for unreasonable mistakes. 
See proposed Sections 501(5) and 601(2) and corresponding commentary.
 Second, because Section 511 treats an unreasonable mistake as to a 
justification as an excuse rather than as a mitigation, it “lowers” the grade 
of homicide in a different way than current 5/9-2(a)(2)’s mitigation. Under 
Section 511, an unreasonable mistake provides a complete defense, rather 
than a mitigation, for most forms of murder liability.28 Nevertheless, Section 
511 allows liability for second-degree manslaughter where the unreasonable 
mistake is reckless, or for negligent homicide where it is negligent. 
Current 5/9-2(a)(2)’s approach, by contrast, punishes one who makes an 
unreasonable mistake at the same level as one who acts under the influence 
of an extreme disturbance — regardless of whether the mistake is reckless or 
negligent. Section 511’s approach follows the views that killing based on an 
unreasonable mistake as to a justification is less serious than killing without 
any pretense of justification, and that one who makes a reckless mistake 
deserves greater punishment than one who is only negligently mistaken. See 
proposed Section 511 and corresponding commentary.
 Finally, Section 511’s approach ensures rational treatment of cases 
where one attempts murder under a reckless or negligent mistake as to 
a justification, but does not cause death. As with current 5/9-2(a)(1)’s 
mitigation defense, the Illinois Supreme Court has held that 5/9-2(a)(2) does 
not allow for an offense of “attempted second-degree murder,” because “one 
cannot intend . . . an unreasonable belief in the need to use deadly force . . 
. [or] to unlawfully kill while at the same time intending to justifiably use 
deadly force.” People v. Lopez, 655 N.E.2d 864, 867 (Ill. 1995). As a result 
of this deficiency, current Illinois law grades committing murder under an 
unreasonable mistake as a Class 2 felony, but grades the inherently less 
serious offense of attempting murder under an unreasonable mistake as 
a Class X felony. By comparison, current Illinois law typically grades a 
completed reckless homicide as a Class 3 felony. See 720 ILCS 5/9-3.
 The proposed Code, on the other hand, recognizes that causing the 
resulting harm of an offense — in this case, death — should, if anything, 
lead to greater punishment than failed efforts to cause that result under 
 28 Under Section 511(1)(b), an unreasonable mistake bars liability for an offense if it 
“is less culpable than the primary culpability required by the offense charged.” One cannot 
make an intentional or knowing mistake — a mistake can be, at most, reckless — so any 
mistake would negate the required culpability for Section 1101(1) (knowingly causing death). 
A mistake would also negate culpability under Section 1102(1)(a) (requiring recklessness and 
extreme indifference to the value of human life), unless the mistake was both reckless and 
reflected the necessary indifference to the value of human life. See proposed Section 511 and 
corresponding commentary. Felony-murder liability, on the other hand, requires no culpability 
and thus admits of no mistake defense.
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the same precise circumstances. Under Article 1100 and proposed Section 
801, attempts based on unreasonable mistakes as to justifications would not 
count as any form of attempted homicide: Section 511 precludes liability 
for attempted murder, and the proposed Code does not generally support 
liability for attempted reckless or negligent homicide. See commentary for 
proposed Sections 1104(1) and 1105(1). Article 1200, however, includes 
specific offenses governing reckless conduct resulting in danger or injury 
short of death, which will typically allow for conviction of a Class 3 or Class 
4 felony for attempts committed under reckless mistakes as to justifications. 
Whereas the current rules sometimes result in the anomaly that an attempt 
is graded much higher than the completed offense, the proposed Code’s 
approach ensures that attempts under reckless mistakes are always punished 
less severely than recklessly causing death. Cf. 1104(2) (grading reckless 
homicide as Class 2 felony).
Section 1104. Manslaughter in the Second Degree
Corresponding Current Provision(s):  720 ILCS 5/9-3; see also 625 
ILCS 40/5-7(e); 625 ILCS 45/5-
16(A)(5); 720 ILCS 5/12-2.5; 720 
ILCS 5/12-21.6
Comment:
 Generally. Section 1104 criminalizes recklessly causing the death of 
another. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 1104(1)’s offense definition 
is substantively similar to current 5/9-3(a), but states more directly that 
the offender must “recklessly” cause death,29 whereas current 5/9-3(a) less 
clearly requires that the “acts . . . which cause the death are such as are 
likely to cause death or great bodily harm” and are performed “recklessly.” 
Section 1104(1)’s simpler phrasing avoids introduction of a separate, and 
potentially confusing, reference to the likelihood of harm, since proposed 
Section 206(3)’s definition of recklessness already requires the offender 
to “consciously disregard[] a substantial and unjustifiable risk” of causing 
 29 The proposed Code does not allow for an offense of attempted second-degree 
manslaughter. Under the General Part’s attempt provision, attempt liability requires that one 
intend to “engage in the conduct that would constitute the offense,” and this cannot typically 
be shown for crimes of recklessness where the prohibited resulting harm does not occur. See 
proposed Section 801(1) and corresponding commentary. Relevant cases would properly be 
treated as assault under proposed Section 1201, or reckless endangerment (or injuring) under 
proposed Section 1202, rather than as a form of attempted homicide.
 Current 5/8-4(a)’s requirement that one act “with intent to commit a specific offense” 
similarly precludes the possibility of “attempted involuntary manslaughter” or “attempted 
reckless homicide” under current law. Cf. People v. Lopez, 655 N.E.2d 864, 867 (Ill. 1995) 
(holding that attempted second-degree murder does not exist in Illinois).
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death. Section 1104(1)’s culpability requirement is in keeping with the 
Illinois courts’ construction of current 5/9-3(a)’s language.30
 Section 1104(1) also consolidates 5/9-3(a)’s separate offenses of 
“involuntary manslaughter” and “reckless homicide,” as well as the Vehicle 
Code offenses for homicides resulting from driving a snowmobile or watercraft 
while intoxicated, into the single offense of second-degree manslaughter. The 
original 1961 Code, responding to a concern that juries might be reluctant to 
convict motorists of “manslaughter,” even where the offender’s conduct was 
reckless, treated “reckless homicide” as a separate offense and graded it as a 
less serious offense than other types of “involuntary manslaughter.” See 720 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-3, Committee Comments — 1961, at 604-05 (West 
1993). Since that time, however, community sentiments concerning reckless 
driving have changed significantly. A contemporary jury is unlikely to return 
a not-guilty verdict for one who has recklessly killed another, merely because 
he did so with a vehicle rather than by other means. In fact, the current Code 
already reflects the decline of the sensibilities that originally motivated the 
1961 Code’s distinction, as 5/9-3 now generally grades “reckless homicide” 
 30 See People v. DiVincenzo, 700 N.E.2d 981, 988 (Ill. 1998) (noting that “a defendant 
may act recklessly where he commits deliberate acts but disregards the risks of his conduct”); 
People v. Jakupcak, 656 N.E.2d 442, 448 (Ill. App. 1995) (noting that recklessness as to death 
or great bodily harm required for “reckless homicide”).
 The Illinois courts have sometimes suggested, though, that current 5/9-3(a)’s “reckless 
homicide” offense requires a level of culpability other than recklessness. See, e.g., People 
v. Harvey, 528 N.E.2d 1053, 1054 (Ill. App. 1988) (“[C]riminal liability does not attach to 
every act of negligence resulting in injury, or even death, but only to negligence of such a 
reckless or wanton characteristic as to show an utter disregard for the safety of others under 
circumstances likely to cause injury.”) (citing People v. Crego, 70 N.E.2d 578, 581 (Ill. 
1946)); People v. LaCombe, 432 N.E.2d 672, 676 (Ill. App. 1982) (“Reckless conduct alone 
is not sufficient to sustain a conviction; the reckless conduct must be wilful and wanton.”); 
People v. Friesen, 374 N.E.2d 15, 19 (Ill. App. 1978) (“[T]he gist of [reckless homicide] is not 
merely negligence, but criminal negligence.”); People v. Chiappa, 368 N.E.2d 925, 927 (Ill. 
App. 1977) (“The gravamen of the offense of involuntary manslaughter with a motor vehicle 
is criminal negligence, which must be reckless or wanton negligence.”). Section 1104(1) 
imposes a culpability requirement of “recklessness” as it is defined in the Code’s General Part. 
See proposed Section 206(3) and corresponding commentary.
 The Illinois courts have also often stated that liability may not be imposed where 
one “accidentally” causes death. See, e.g., People v. Buckley, 668 N.E.2d 1082, 1088 (Ill. 
App. 1996) (“It is well-settled that an act performed accidently[sic], carelessly, or even 
negligently is insufficient to prove or sustain a conviction for involuntary manslaughter.”); 
People v. Hoover, 620 N.E.2d 1152, 1161 (Ill. App. 1993) (“An accident is not to be equated 
with recklessness, and an accidental discharge of a gun will not support a conviction for 
involuntary manslaughter.”); People v. Spani, 361 N.E.2d 377, 378 (Ill. App. 1977) (“An act 
that is committed accidentally does not involve a mental state cognizable to . . . involuntary 
manslaughter.”); People v. Carlton, 326 N.E.2d 100, 104 (Ill. App. 1975) (“If the jury believed 
that the shooting was an accident, the elements of the crimes of murder and involuntary 
manslaughter as stated in those instructions could not have been proven. . . . An accident is not 
a voluntary act.”). This line of cases seems to bar liability only for non-reckless “accidents” 
causing death. Section 1104 is consistent with these cases to the extent they would still allow 
liability for “accidents” that result from someone’s reckless behavior.
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as seriously as it grades other types of “involuntary manslaughter” — and 
in some cases treats it as a more serious offense. See 720 ILCS 5/9-3(e) 
(aggravating reckless homicide to Class 2 felony where driver was under 
influence of alcohol or drugs). Accordingly, there is no longer any reason to 
maintain separate offenses for different means of recklessly causing the death 
of another.
 Section 1104(1) omits as unnecessary current 5/9-3(a)’s requirement 
that the offender kill “without lawful justification” and its statement that 
liability may be predicated on either “lawful or unlawful” acts. Section 
400 provides that justifications are complete defenses barring liability, and 
Section 1104(1) would reach any other reckless acts, whether lawful or 
unlawful, as the offense definition makes no exception for unjustified but 
“lawful” acts.
 Section 1104(1) also makes one minor substantive change. The proposed 
provision requires recklessness as to causing death, whereas current 5/9-3(a) 
also allows liability for one who is reckless as to causing great bodily harm. 
Given proposed Section 108’s definition of “great bodily harm” as harm that 
“creates a substantial risk of death,” nearly all offenders who are reckless as 
to causing great bodily harm will be reckless as to causing death as well. At 
the same time, it is appropriate for the reckless homicide offense to focus 
on the offender’s culpability as to the specific harm that offense prohibits, 
rather than using culpability as to some other harm as a proxy. In the limited 
cases where one was reckless as to causing great bodily harm but not death, 
liability for negligent homicide or for reckless injuring would be appropriate. 
See proposed Sections 1105 and 1202 and corresponding commentary.
 Section 1104(2) grades the offense as a Class 2 felony. Current 5/9-3(d) 
ordinarily grades the offense as a Class 3 felony,31 but current 5/9-3(e) and 
(f) aggravate the offense to a Class 2 felony where the offender is under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs,32 or causes the death of a family or household 
member. Moreover, current 5/12-2.5(b) grades a specific category of reckless 
homicides — those where endangering a vehicle results in death — as a 
Class 1 felony. Section 1104(2)’s grade reflects a desire to grade all cases of 
reckless homicide uniformly and a recognition that reckless homicide is more 
serious than such Class 3 felonies as recklessly causing between $10,000 and 
$100,000 in property damage. See proposed Section 2206(3)(b) and (3)(g).
 Section 1104 omits current 5/9-3(b) and (c), which together establish 
that recklessness “shall be presumed” for persons driving under the influence 
 31 The Vehicle Code offenses for homicides resulting from driving a snowmobile or 
watercraft while intoxicated, and the offense of “endangering the life or health of a child” 
when death results, are also graded as Class 3 felonies. See 625 ILCS 40/5-7(e); 625 ILCS 
45/5-16(A)(5); 720 ILCS 5/12-21.6(d).
 32 Current 5/9-3(e-5) also aggravates the offense level where the offender kills more 
than one person under the influence of alcohol or drugs. Under the proposed Code, multiple 
counts of second-degree manslaughter (such as where one recklessly causes multiple victims’ 
deaths in an automobile accident) would be subject to additional punishment for each offense 
of conviction. See proposed Section 906 and corresponding commentary.
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of alcohol and drugs. The Illinois Supreme Court recently held that this 
language creates an unconstitutional mandatory presumption. See People 
v. Pomykala, 784 N.E.2d 784, 790 (Ill. 2003) (“Section 9-3(b) contains 
language of a mandatory presumption that a reasonable juror could conclude 
requires a finding of recklessness without any factual connection between 
the intoxication and the reckless act, unless this presumed connection is 
disproved.”). Rather than creating a constitutionally questionable mandatory 
presumption of recklessness, the proposed Code achieves the same result 
by treating voluntary intoxication as a basis for imputing recklessness. See 
proposed Section 302(2) and corresponding commentary.
Section 1105. Negligent Homicide
Corresponding Current Provision(s): None
Comment:
 Generally. Section 1105 defines the offense of negligent homicide. 
Although the criminal law generally considers recklessness the minimum 
culpability level for which liability is appropriate, Section 1105 departs 
from that usual standard in recognition that the harm involved — the death 
of a human being — is much graver than those punished by other offenses.33 
Section 1105 imposes liability on those who ignore a “substantial and 
unjustifiable risk” of causing death and whose acts, constituting a “gross 
deviation” from the reasonable person’s standard of care, kill another person. 
See proposed Section 206(4) (defining negligence).
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 1105(1) has no corresponding 
provision in current Chapter 720, which does not include a negligent 
homicide offense. The proposed Code joins the overwhelming majority of 
jurisdictions that have enacted modern criminal codes by imposing liability 
for negligent homicide. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.4 (defining negligent 
homicide offense); id. cmt. n.30 (noting that of 34 states with revised codes 
as of 1980, all but 5 codes include negligent homicide offense).
 Section 1105(2) grades the offense as a Class 4 felony.
Section 1106. Homicide of an Unborn Child
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/9-1.2; 5/9-2.1; 5/9-3.2;
  see also 720 ILCS 510/2(4)
Comment:
 Generally. This provision criminalizes homicide of an unborn child. 
An independent offense criminalizing such conduct is necessary because the 
 33 The proposed Code does not allow for an offense of attempted negligent homicide, 
for the same reasons that it would preclude attempted second-degree manslaughter. See supra 
note 29; see also proposed Section 801 and corresponding commentary.
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offense definitions for murder and manslaughter require causing the death of 
another “person,” which Section 108 defines to include only “a human being 
who has been born alive.” Section 1106 provides exceptions to liability for 
the unborn child’s mother, conduct performed during abortions, and medical 
acts performed during diagnostic testing and therapeutic treatment. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 1106 consolidates current 
5/9-1.2, 5/9-2.1, and 5/9-3.2. Section 1106(1) defines the offense as causing 
“the death of an unborn child under circumstances that would be [murder 
or manslaughter] . . . if the unborn child had been born.” Section 1106(1)’s 
offense definition is substantively similar to those under current law, with two 
differences. First, Section 1106(1) incorporates the elements of murder and 
manslaughter by reference,34 whereas current 5/9-1.2, 5/9-2.1, and 5/9-3.2 
unnecessarily restate those offenses’ requirements in the context of homicide 
of an unborn child. Section 1106(1) differs from the current unborn-child 
offense definitions in the same substantive respects that proposed Sections 
1101 through 1104 differ from the current offense definitions for murder 
and manslaughter. See proposed Sections 1101 to 1104 and corresponding 
commentary.
 Second, Section 1106(1) omits as unnecessary current 5/9-1.2(a)(1) 
and (a)(2)’s language concerning the sufficiency of causing or creating a risk 
of harm “to the pregnant woman,” as well as 5/9-1.2(a)(3)’s requirement of 
knowledge of the woman’s pregnancy. Section 1106(1) requires the same 
culpability as to causing the death of an unborn child as the corresponding 
murder or manslaughter offense definition would require as to killing 
“another person.” The General Part’s “transferred intent” provision allows for 
imputation of the required culpability as to causing the death of an “unborn 
child” where the offender has that level of culpability (or a higher one) as 
to causing the death of “another person.” (The offender’s culpability as to 
causing the pregnant mother’s death may satisfy the required culpability as 
to causing the death of an “unborn child,” regardless of his culpability as 
to the specific fact of her pregnancy.) See proposed Section 303(1)(b) and 
corresponding commentary.
 Section 1106(2) states three exceptions to the offense. Section 
1106(2)(a)’s exception for the unborn child’s mother has the same substantive 
effect as the rule in current 5/9-1.2(b)(2), 5/9-2.1(d)(2), and 5/9-3.2(c)(2) 
that the offense cannot be committed by “the pregnant woman whose unborn 
child is killed.”
 Section 1106(2)(b)’s exception for abortions to which the pregnant 
woman has consented is substantively the same as the first sentences of 
current 5/9-1.2(c), 5/9-2.1(e), and 5/9-3.2(d).
 34 Like current law, Section 1106(1) does not recognize the offenses of “felony murder 
of an unborn child” or “negligent homicide of an unborn child.” Cf. 5/9-1.2(a) (tracking 
elements of current 5/9-1(a)(1) and (a)(2), but not (a)(3), the felony-murder provision).
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 Section 1106(2)(c)’s exception for conduct performed “pursuant to 
usual and customary standards of medical practice during diagnostic testing 
or therapeutic treatment” is identical to those in the second sentences of 
current 5/9-1.2(c), 5/9-2.1(e), and 5/9-3.2(d).
 Section 1106(3)(a)’s definition of “abortion” is identical to that in 
current 510/2(4).
 Section 1106(3)(b)’s definition of “unborn child” is identical to those in 
current 5/9-1.2(b)(1), 5/9-2.1(d)(1), and 5/9-3.2(c)(1).
 Section 1106(4) grades the offense as one grade lower than the 
corresponding murder or manslaughter offense, whereas the current 
provisions generally grade causing the death of an unborn person on a par 
with causing the death of a person who has been born. Section 1106(4)’s 
lower grading is in keeping, however, with current 5/9-1.2(d)(1), which 
recognizes that first-degree murder of an unborn child is less serious than 
“ordinary” first-degree murder by explicitly providing that “the death penalty 
may not be imposed” where one intentionally causes the death of an unborn 
child. Moreover, additional punishment for an offense based on causing or 
creating a risk of harm to the pregnant mother will be available in the vast 
majority of cases involving homicide of an unborn child.
Section 1107. Causing or Aiding Suicide
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/12-31
Comment:
 Generally. Section 1107 criminalizes causing, aiding, or soliciting a 
suicide. Although Article 1100 declines to recognize attempted suicide as 
an offense, instead limiting homicide liability to causing “another’s” death, 
Section 1107 recognizes that the concerns motivating the rejection of liability 
for attempting one’s own suicide are not present where one is culpably 
involved in another person’s suicide. Section 1107’s offenses clarify the 
availability of homicide liability for causing another to commit suicide, and 
they allow for liability analogous to inchoate or accomplice liability where 
one aids or solicits another to commit suicide. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 1107(1) is substantively 
similar to current 5/12-31(a)(1) in criminalizing causing another to commit 
suicide, but makes four modifications to the offense definition that clarify 
the offense’s relationship to Article 1100’s other offenses. First, Section 
1107(1) treats causing suicide as one specific form of murder, manslaughter, 
or negligent homicide, whereas current 5/12-31(a)(1) treats it as a separate 
offense — and, in the case of intentionally or knowingly causing a suicide, 
a less serious crime than murder or first-degree manslaughter. Section 
1107(1)’s approach recognizes that one who causes a suicide satisfies the 
homicide offenses’ shared requirement of causing the death of another 
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person. This formulation also allows offenses under Section 1107(1) to 
incorporate grading distinctions, as homicide offenses generally do, between 
the various levels of culpability as to causing death.35
 Second, Section 1107(1) is substantively similar to current 5/12-
31(a)(1) in imposing liability where one causes another to commit suicide 
by duress, but omits 5/12-31(a)(1)’s limitation of liability to specific kinds of 
coercion, and also imposes liability where one causes a suicide by force or 
deception. Section 1107(1)’s broader scope recognizes that an offender who 
satisfies a homicide offense’s culpability requirements, in addition to Section 
203’s causation requirements,36 should not escape liability for causing a 
suicide merely because he employed one unacceptable means of inducing 
the other person’s suicide rather than another.
 Third, Section 1107(1) clarifies that liability for causing another to 
commit suicide is appropriate “only if” the conditions set forth in the offense 
definition are satisfied. This language makes clear that liability for murder, 
manslaughter, or negligent homicide may not be imposed where one causes 
a suicide by means other than force, duress, or deception. Thus, Section 
1107(1) would preclude homicide liability for one who “knowingly causes” 
her lover to commit suicide by ending the relationship in the face of repeated 
warnings that he would kill himself if she were to ever leave him.
 Finally, Section 1107(1) requires that one cause another to commit 
suicide, whereas current 5/12-31(a)(1) also imposes liability where one 
causes another to “attempt” suicide. Section 1107(1)’s omission of this 
language recognizes the availability of attempt liability for efforts that do 
not lead to the victim’s completed suicide. See proposed Section 801 and 
corresponding commentary.
 Section 1107(2) is substantively similar to current 5/12-31(a)(2) 
in criminalizing knowingly aiding another in committing suicide, but 
broadens the offense in two respects. First, Section 1107(2) omits current 
5/12-31(a)(2)’s requirement that the aid consist of either “provid[ing] the 
“physical means” or “participat[ing] in a physical act” by which suicide 
 35 Current 5/12-31(b) grades 5/12-31(a)(1)’s offense as a Class 2 or Class 3 felony, 
depending on whether the offender’s conduct results in suicide or its attempt. Section 1107(1), 
by contrast, grades the offense as high as a Class [X plus] felony and as low as a Class 4 
felony, depending on the offender’s culpability as to causing death. Where an offender causes 
a suicide attempt by force, duress, or deception, attempt liability will ordinarily be appropriate. 
See proposed Section 801(1) and corresponding commentary.
 36 Section 1107(1) defines the offense as “causing” another to commit suicide by force, 
duress, or deception, whereas current 5/12-31(a)(1) requires that suicide or its attempt be a 
“direct result” of coercion. Section 1107(1)’s language makes it clear that proposed Section 
203 governs the required causal relation between the offender’s conduct and the victim’s 
suicide. Section 203 complements Section 1107(1)’s requirement that death be caused by 
force, duress, or deception by explicitly providing that conduct is not a “proximate cause” of a 
result where it is “too dependent upon another’s volitional act.” See proposed Section 203 and 
corresponding commentary.
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is “attempted or committed.” Section 1107(2)’s broader scope reflects the 
view that one who knowingly aids another in committing suicide merits 
criminal punishment, regardless of the particular means by which he renders 
assistance. (Under Section 1107(5), whether a suicide or attempted suicide 
actually resulted from the assistance is a factor relevant to grading.)
 Second, Section 1107(2) differs from current 5/12-31(a)(2) in imposing 
liability not only for aiding another’s suicide, but also for soliciting a suicide. 
This language allows the offense to reach one who knowingly commands, 
encourages, or requests another to commit suicide, thus enabling liability for 
such conduct as encouraging one already contemplating suicide to jump from 
a high window ledge, or convincing another to join a “suicide pact.” 
 Section 1107(3)’s exception for good-faith attempts to comply with 
the Illinois Living Will Act, the Health Care Surrogate Act, or the Power 
of Attorney for Health Care Law, is substantively the same as current 5/12-
31(c).
 Section 1107(4), defining “suicide” to mean “intentionally causing 
one’s own death,” has no corresponding provision in current Chapter 720. 
Because of this limited definition, Section 1107(1)’s offense does not affect 
potential homicide liability for one who culpably causes another to “kill 
himself” unintentionally, as where a victim jumps from a window to escape 
an assailant and dies.
 Section 1107(5) grades Section 1107(2)’s offense as a Class 3 felony, 
Class 4 felony, or Class A misdemeanor, depending on the offender’s role in 
causing a suicide or attempted suicide. This scheme is similar to current 5/12-
31(b)’s grading for violations of current 5/12-31(a)(2), with two differences. 
First, Section 1107(5)(a) and (5)(b) require that the offender “cause” another 
person to commit or attempt suicide, whereas current 5/12-31(b) require 
that the suicide or attempt be a “direct result” of the prohibited conduct. 
The proposed language makes clear that proposed Section 203 governs the 
required causal relation between the offender’s conduct and the victim’s 
suicide. See also supra note 36.
 Second, Section 1107(5)(a) and (5)(b) increase the offense grades for 
assistance resulting in suicide from a Class 4 felony to a Class 3 felony, and 
assistance resulting in an attempted suicide from a Class A misdemeanor to 
a Class 4 felony. Under the proposed scheme, a successful effort to cause 
another to commit suicide is an offense whose grade falls between the grade 
for reckless homicide (a Class 2 felony under Section 1104) and that for 
negligent homicide (a Class 4 felony under Section 1105). This scheme seeks 
to strike a balance between the offender’s culpability in encouraging another 
to commit suicide and the fact that the suicide victim’s own independent 
intervening act was the direct cause of his death.
 Section 1107 omits current 5/12-31(a)’s definition of “attempted 
suicide.” The meanings of the terms “attempted suicide,” “duress,” and 
“solicits” should be determined by reference to the relevant terms defined 
and used in the proposed Code’s General Part. See proposed Sections 507 
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(defining excuse of duress), 801 (defining inchoate offense of attempt), 802 
(defining inchoate offense of solicitation).
Section 1108. Concealing a Homicide
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/9-3.1
Comment:
 Generally. Section 1108 criminalizes concealing the death of 
someone known to have been killed. Such conduct harmfully interferes 
with governmental operations associated with possible homicides, such as 
gathering evidence for a criminal investigation. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 1108(1) is substantively similar 
to current 5/9-3.1(a) in criminalizing concealing another person’s death,37 
but states the offender must know the death was caused “by a person” rather 
than “by homicidal means,” which is less clear.38 Unlike the current offense, 
Section 1108(1) would reach the case where a person conceals a death caused 
by suicide. Although it would be the unusual case in which a person would 
knowingly conceal a suicide, Section 1108(1)’s broader scope assures that the 
offense reaches all those who interfere with potential police investigations,39 
and also those who know a death was inflicted by a person, even if they do 
not know whether it was a suicide or homicide.
 37 There is authority stating, in spite of current 5/9-3.1(a)’s requirement of concealing 
the “death” of another, that liability may be imposed where one conceals only the cause of 
death. See People v. Hummel, 365 N.E.2d 122, 124 (Ill. App. 1977) (offense committed “where 
the body itself is concealed or where the homicidal nature of death is actively concealed, as 
in making a homicide appear an accident”) (quoting People v. Vath, 347 N.E.2d 813, 817 (Ill. 
App. 1976)). Under the proposed Code, liability for an obstructing-justice offense, also a Class 
4 felony, would be available for the vast majority of cases involving concealing the cause of 
another’s death. See proposed Section 5301.
 38 In criminalizing concealing a death knowing that it was caused “by a person,” Section 
1108(1) does not require that the conduct causing death constitute a crime. Section 1108(1) is 
consistent with current Illinois law’s understanding of the phrase “homicidal means” in this 
respect. See IPI (CRIMINAL) 7.13 (4th ed. 2000) (defining “homicidal means” as “any act[s], 
lawful or unlawful, of a person which cause the death of another person”); see also People 
v. Mahon, 395 N.E.2d 950, 958 (Ill. App. 1979) (upholding instruction stating that homicide 
includes “cases in which the law justifies or excuses the taking of human life”); People v. 
Coslet, 349 N.E.2d 496, 499 (Ill. App. 1976) (instruction limiting offense to unjustified killing 
“would have led to a strained and inaccurate reading of the statute”), rev’d in part on other 
grounds, 364 N.E.2d 67 (Ill. 1976).
 39 The Illinois courts have held — even though the offense definition contains no language 
imposing such a requirement — that current 5/9-3.1(a) requires concealing a homicide “with 
the specific purpose of preventing or delaying its discovery.” People v. Kirkman, 522 N.E.2d 
588, 591 (Ill. App. 1988); see also People v. Stiles, 360 N.E.2d 1217, 1220 (Ill. App. 1977); 
IPI (CRIMINAL) 7.14 (4th ed. 2000) (defining “concealed” to require acting “for the purpose of 
preventing or delaying . . . discovery”). While preventing or delaying a misdeed’s discovery 
will probably be the motive for most cases of concealing of homicide, the proposed provision, 
like current 5/9-3.1(a), does not treat such a requirement as an offense element.
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 Section 1108(2) grades concealing a homicide as a Class 4 felony, 
whereas current 5/9-3.1(c) grades the offense as a Class 3 felony — the 
same grade current 5/9-3(d) assigns for reckless homicide. Section 1108(2)’s 
grading recognizes the offense’s closer resemblance to negligent homicide 
and obstructing justice, which are also graded as Class 4 felonies. See 
proposed Sections 1105 and 5301 and corresponding commentary.
 Section 1108 omits current 5/9-3.1(b), which provides that multiple 
convictions and consecutive sentences are required where the offender 
committed murder or manslaughter against the person whose death he 
concealed. The proposed Code already allows for multiple convictions and 
enhanced punishment in this situation. See proposed Sections 254 (providing 
rules governing multiple convictions) and 906 (providing rules governing 
sentences for multiple offenses). 
Section 1109. Procedures and Standards in Adjudication of Sentences
 for Capital Offense
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/9-1(b) to (h)
Comment:
 Generally. [This provision, which will set forth the procedures 
and standards of adjudication for death-penalty cases, will be based on 
recommendations # 28 and 61 of the Report of the Governor’s Commission 
on Capital Punishment.] 
 Relation to current Illinois law. [Commentary explaining the 
differences between Section 1109 and current law’s procedures and standards 
of adjudication for death-penalty cases will be inserted here.] 
Section 1110. Definitions
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/2-8; 5/9-1.2(b)(1);
  5/9-2.1(d)(1); 5/9-3.2(c)(1); 
  5/15-4; 510/2(4); 570/102(f)
Comment:
 Generally. This provision collects the defined terms used in Article 1100 
and provides cross-references to the provisions in which they are defined.
 Relation to current Illinois law. For discussion of the relationship 
between Article 1100’s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary 
for the provision in which the term in question is initially defined.
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  ARTICLE 1200. ASSAULT, ENDANGERMENT, AND 
THREAT OFFENSES
Section 1201. Assault
Corresponding Current Provision(s): Various; see, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/2-
3.5; 5/4-1(b)(14); 5/12-1; 5/12-2; 
5/12-3; 5/12-3.1; 5/12-3.2; 5/12-
3.3; 5/12-4; 5/12-4.1; 5/12-4.2; 
5/12-4.2-5; 5/12-4.3; 5/12-4.4; 
5/12-4.6; 5/12-4.7; 5/12-7.3(h); 
5/12-10; 5/12-10.1; 5/12-16.2; 
5/12-32; 5/12-34; 725 ILCS 
5/112A-3(3)
Comment:
 Generally. This provision defines and grades the offense of assault. 
Section 1201 uses the term “assault,” rather than “battery,” to refer to 
causing bodily harm or making physical contact of an insulting or provoking 
nature. Most cases involving conduct prohibited by current 5/12-1 and 
5/12-2’s offenses of “assault” and “aggravated assault” — which criminalize 
“plac[ing] another in reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery” — 
would be treated as attempted assault under Section 1201. Cases involving 
threats to commit assault are covered by Section 1203’s offense for terroristic 
threats.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 1201 consolidates the 
prohibitions of over a dozen offenses in current Chapter 720. Section 
1201(1)’s definition of the basic offense is substantively the same as current 
5/12-3(a), but makes three minor formal modifications. First, Section 1201(1) 
omits current 5/12-3(a)’s language concerning one who acts “intentionally” 
in recognition of proposed Section 205(6)’s general rule that proof of intent 
will satisfy a culpability requirement of knowledge.
 Second, Section 1201 omits as redundant current 5/12-3(a)’s requirement 
that the defendant act “without lawful justification.” The proposed General 
Part provides that justifications, excuses, and nonexculpatory defenses 
are complete defenses barring liability. See proposed Section 400 and 
corresponding commentary.
 Finally, Section 1201(1) omits as superfluous current 5/12-3(a)’s 
statement that the offense occurs when a prohibited harm is caused “by any 
means.”
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 Section 1202(2)(a) through (2)(c) separate the offense into four offense 
grades, ranging from a Class 2 felony to a Class A misdemeanor.40 Current 
Chapter 720 also grades assault as low as a Class A misdemeanor, see 5/12-
3(b), but grades it as high as a Class X felony with a minimum imprisonment 
term of 20 years, see 5/12-4.2-5(b) (causing bodily harm to peace officer or 
medical technician with machine gun or gun with silencer) — a more severe 
penalty than current Illinois law typically imposes for attempted first-degree 
murder, see 5/8-4(c)(1). By grading the most serious violations as Class 2 
felonies, Section 1202(2)(a) ensures that assault is never graded as high as 
the more serious offense of knowingly killing another under the influence 
of an extreme disturbance. Cf. proposed Section 1103(3) (first-degree 
manslaughter; Class 1 felony).
 Section 1201(2)(a) grades “heinous assault” as a Class 2 felony. Section 
1201(2)(a)(i) is substantively the same as current 5/12-4(a) in criminalizing 
knowingly causing great bodily harm,41 but grades the offense as a Class 
2 felony rather than as a Class 3 felony.42 Section 1201(2)(a)(i) increases 
the offense grade on the understanding that knowingly causing great bodily 
harm, or torturing another, is a serious offense on a par with recklessly killing 
another person or engaging in sexual intercourse with a minor, and more 
serious than any other form of injuring or endangerment. Section 1201(2)(a) 
also covers much of the conduct covered by current 5/12-16.2’s Class 2 felony 
for “criminal transmission of HIV,” insofar as transmitting a life-threatening 
disease constitutes causing “great bodily harm.” See proposed Section 108 
(defining “great bodily harm” to include “life-threatening disease”).
 Section 1201(2)(a)(ii) is substantively similar to current 5/12-32(a)’s 
“ritual mutilation” offense in grading an assault involving torture as a Class 2 
felony, but with three modifications. First, Section 1201(2)(a)(ii) does not limit 
aggravation to cases where torture occurs “as part of a ceremony, rite, initiation, 
observance, performance or practice.” Section 1201(2)(a)(ii)’s broader scope 
 40 The offense elements set out in Section 1201(2)’s grading provisions, like any other 
elements, are governed by Article 200’s rules concerning the requirements for liability, such 
as Section 203’s causation rules and 205’s culpability rules. See proposed Section 202(1) 
(defining “elements” of an offense to include elements “contained in the . . . provisions 
establishing the offense grade”) and corresponding commentary.
 41 Although current 5/12-4(a) defines the offense to reach only one who “knowingly 
causes great bodily harm,” at least one Illinois court has held that the current offense definition 
requires no culpability as to the extent of resulting harm. See People v. Rickman, 391 N.E.2d 
1114, 1118 (Ill. App. 1979) (requiring no culpability as to extent of bodily harm because 
“[a]nyone who engages in a scuffle must be deemed to be aware that someone may be injured 
as a result”). By its terms, Section 1201(2)(a)(i), like current 5/12-4(a), requires knowledge as 
to causing “great” bodily harm. Cf. proposed Section 205(2) and corresponding commentary. 
 42 Section 1201(2)(a)(i) also omits as unnecessary current 5/12-4(a)’s explicit 
culpability requirement of acting “intentionally” and imposition of liability for one who causes 
“permanent disability or disfigurement.” See proposed Section 108 (defining “great bodily 
harm” to include causing “serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment 
of the function of any bodily member or organ”); proposed Section 205(6) (allowing proof of 
intent to satisfy culpability requirement of knowledge).
ILL Code  V II Spc Part_a   146 7/2/03, 12:58:10 PM
147
Part II: Defi nition of Specifi c Offenses
reflects the view that torturing another, regardless of the factual context in 
which the torture occurs, is seriously harmful and wrongful conduct.
 Second, Section 1201(2)(a)(ii) omits current 5/12-32(a)’s aggravation 
for one who “mutilates” or “dismembers” another, which is instead covered 
by 1201(2)(a)(i)’s grading provision for causing “great bodily harm.” 
 Third, Section 1201(2)(a)(ii) omits current 5/12-32(a)’s requirement 
that torture occur without the victim’s effective consent. Current 5/12-32(a) 
requires the absence of consent as an offense element, even though current 
5/12-3(a) does not recognize consent as a defense to the less serious offense 
of causing ordinary bodily harm. The proposed General Part includes a 
general consent provision stating that consent to bodily harm provides a 
defense if “the bodily harm . . . consented to is not serious.” See proposed 
Section 251(2) and corresponding commentary.
 Section 1201(2)(a)(iii) is substantively similar to current 5/12-34 in 
criminalizing female circumcision, with three differences. First, Section 
1201(2)(a)(iii) omits as unnecessary current 5/12-34(a)’s language providing 
that consent is not a defense, as the General Part’s consent provision would 
apply to this offense, and consent to infliction of serious bodily harm is not a 
defense under that provision. See proposed Section 251(2) and corresponding 
commentary.
 Second, Section 1201(2)(a)(iii) omits current 5/12-34(b)’s exception for 
surgical procedures, which is covered by Section 415’s justification defense 
for medical treatment. See proposed Section 415(2) and corresponding 
commentary.
 Finally, under Section 1201(2)(a)(iii), female circumcision is graded as 
a Class 2 felony, whereas current 5/12-34(c) grades the offense as a Class X 
felony. The proposed grading for this offense is based on the understanding 
that Class X felony liability should be reserved for the most serious offenses, 
and that female circumcision is closer to knowingly causing great bodily 
harm, torturing, or recklessly causing death, than to such Class X felonies as 
second-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder.
 Section 1201(2)(b) grades “aggravated assault” as a Class 3 felony. 
Section 1201(2)(b)(i) is similar to current 5/12-4(c) and (d) in grading assault 
as a Class 3 felony where one causes bodily harm by administering a food or 
drug,43 but differs from the current provisions in a few respects. With respect 
to drugs, Section 1201(2)(b)(i) provides a grade for any offense involving 
causing bodily harm with any type of drug, whereas current 5/12-4(c) 
provides an unnecessarily long list including any “intoxicating, poisonous, 
stupefying, narcotic, anesthetic, or controlled substance.”44
 43 Section 108 defines “bodily harm” to include the “impairment of physical condition.” 
Thus, Section 1201(2)(b)(i) would cover cases where one knowingly causes another to become 
intoxicated by administering a drug without the victim’s consent.
 44 Section 1201(2)(b)(i) also omits current 5/12-4(c)’s phrase “causes him to take” as 
redundant of “administers”; omits “by threat or deception” as redundant of “without his consent”; 
and omits “for other than medical purposes” as covered by the General Part’s justification for 
medical treatment, see proposed Section 415(2) and corresponding commentary. 
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 With respect to food, Section 1201(2)(b)(i) aggravates the offense 
whenever one knowingly causes bodily harm by administering food, 
whereas current 5/12-4(d) imposes liability only where one “gives” another 
food “that contains any substance or object . . . intended to cause physical 
injury.” Section 1201(2)(b)(i) would not impose offense liability, but would 
allow attempt liability, where an offender gives another person food for the 
purpose of causing injury, but does not actually cause harm. Yet Section 
1201(2)(b)(i) is also broader than 5/12-4(d) in that it would aggravate for 
causing any kind of bodily harm by administering food without consent, 
rather than merely physical injury resulting from a foreign substance or 
object. See proposed Section 108 (defining bodily harm as “physical pain, 
illness, or any impairment of physical condition”). As with drugs, Section 
1201(2)(b)(i) would apply where the food itself causes bodily harm, such as 
where one causes illness by deliberately giving another spoiled meat, or food 
to which the victim is allergic. At the same time, the provision’s culpability 
requirement that the offender “knowingly” cause bodily harm would preclude 
liability for unwittingly giving someone adulterated or spoiled food.
 Section 1201(2)(b)(ii), like current 5/12-4(b)(8), grades an assault 
committed in public as a Class 3 felony, but uses the simpler phrase “in a 
public place” instead of “on or about a public way, public property or public 
place of accommodation or amusement.”
 Section 1201(2)(b)(iii) and (2)(b)(iv) incorporate the aggravations for 
domestic battery45 in current 5/12-3.2(b)’s second and third sentences.46 
 45 Section 1201(2)(b)(iii) and (2)(b)(iv) also correspond to current 5/12-4(b)(16)’s 
aggravation to a Class 3 felony where assault is committed in or near a domestic violence 
shelter. Section 1201(2)(b) omits this specific aggravation, as the vast majority of cases where 
5/12-4(b)(16) would apply will be graded as a Class 3 felony under (2)(b)(ii), (iii), and/or (iv).
 46 Section 1201 omits current 5/12-3.2’s other rules and 5/12-3.3’s offense of “aggravated 
domestic battery.” As current 5/12-3.2 makes clear in tracking 5/12-3(a)’s offense definition 
and in assigning a first domestic battery violation the same offense grade that current 5/12-3(b) 
prescribes, current Illinois law retains a separate domestic battery offense only to establish 
special sentencing and civil liability rules for domestic violence. Section 1201 displaces only 
the provisions in current 5/12-3.2 that define and grade the offense of domestic battery.
 Under the proposed Code, domestic assaults not covered by 1201(2)(b)(iii) and 
(2)(b)(iv)’s aggravations are graded, as they are under 5/12-3.2(b)’s first sentence, at the same 
level as assaults against victims who are not family or household members. It is anticipated 
that current 5/12-3.2(b)’s fourth and fifth sentences (which require “48 consecutive hours of 
imprisonment” for certain repeat offenders) and 5/12-3.2(c) (which concerns liability for 
counseling costs where a child witnesses a domestic battery) will be preserved elsewhere 
in Illinois law through the “conforming amendments” bill to be presented to the General 
Assembly. (As discussed in the text above, Section 1201(2)(b)(iii) and (2)(b)(iv) cover current 
5/12-3.2(b)’s second and third sentences.)
 Similarly, Section 1201(2)(a)(i)’s aggravation to a Class 2 felony where the offender 
knowingly causes great bodily harm covers current 5/12-3.3’s Class 2 felony of “aggravated 
domestic battery.” The mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment imposed by 5/12-3.3(b)’s 
second and third sentences would remain as sentencing options under Section 1201(2)(a)(i), 
and could be explicitly mandated in the Code of Corrections through the “conforming 
amendments” enactment.
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Section 1201(2)(b)(iii) is substantively similar to current 5/12-3.2(b)’s third 
sentence in increasing the offense grade for assaulting a family or household 
member, but aggravates to a Class 3 felony rather than a Class 4 felony. 
Section 1201(2)(b)(iii) also makes two modifications to the facts giving rise 
to aggravation. First, Section 1201(2)(b)(iii) applies where the defendant has 
previously been convicted of “any forcible offense” whereas current 5/12-
3.2(b)’s third sentence aggravates only for prior convictions for the particular 
forcible offenses of aggravated battery, stalking, aggravated stalking, 
unlawful restraint, or aggravated unlawful restraint. Section 1201(2)(b)(iii)’s 
broader scope would allow for enhanced penalties where the defendant has 
previously committed of any type of assault against the victim, including 
sexual assault.
 Second, because Section 1201(2)(b)(iii)’s aggravation provides a 
greater enhancement and is broader in its application to prior offenses 
than the current aggravation, it has been limited to situations where the 
defendant has previously been convicted of a forcible offense “against the 
victim.” Current 5/12-3.2(b), on the other hand, increases the offense grade 
for prior violence against any family or household member. Since Section 
1201(2)(c)(i) increases the base grade for assaults causing bodily harm to 
Class 4 felony, however, most assaults against other family members would 
have the same grade under the proposed Code that they have under 5/12-
3.2(b).
 Section 1201(2)(b)(iv) is substantively similar to current 5/12-
3.2(b)’s47 second sentence in increasing the offense grade where the offender 
violates an order of protection,48 with three modifications. First, Section 
1201(2)(b)(iv) aggravates the offense grade where the offender commits 
assault in violation of an order of protection, whereas current 5/12-3.2(b)’s 
second sentence only applies where the defendant has previously violated 
an order of protection. By treating the order of protection itself, rather than 
a violation thereof, as being on a par with a prior conviction for a crime of 
violence, Section 1201(2)(b)(iv) punishes the independent harm that occurs 
when one disregards a court’s commands.
 Second, Section 1201(2)(b)(iv) increases the offense grade for an 
assault against any person, whereas current 5/12-3.2(b)’s second sentence 
 47 The proposed Code does not incorporate two other current provisions that address 
matters related to orders of protection. It is anticipated that current 5/1-8’s procedural rule 
regarding orders of protection will be preserved in either the Code of Criminal Procedure 
(725 ILCS 5/100-1 et seq.) or the Domestic Violence Act (750 ILCS ILCS 60/101 et seq.) 
through the “conforming amendments” bill to be presented to the General Assembly. Section 
1201(2)(b)(iv), along with the proposed stalking and harassment offenses, addresses the 
conduct prohibited by current 5/12-30’s separate offense for violating orders of protection. 
See proposed Section 1204(2) and corresponding commentary; proposed Section 6105(2)(a) 
and corresponding commentary.
 48 Section 1201(2)(b)(iv) omits the aggravation for a prior domestic battery conviction 
in 5/12-3.2(b)’s second sentence, which is instead covered by Article 900’s grade adjustment 
for repeat offenders. See proposed Section 905(1).
ILL Code  V II Spc Part_a   149 7/2/03, 12:58:11 PM
150
Proposed Criminal Code Offi cial Commentary — Volume 2
only applies where the offender commits domestic battery. Section 
1201(2)(b)(iv)’s broader scope reflects the view that assaulting another in 
violation of a court order is always relevant to the offense’s seriousness, 
regardless of whether the victim is a family or household member. For 
example, a person who violates a restraining order and assaults the person 
the order protects merits aggravated punishment, even though his victim is 
not a member of his household. 
 Finally, Section 1201(2)(b)(iv) increases the offense grade to a Class 3 
felony, rather than a Class 4 felony, in recognition that most assaults will be 
graded as Class 4 felonies under Section 1201(2)(c)(i).
 Section 1201(2)(c) grades the base-level offense according to the 
type of assault committed. Assault is a Class 4 felony where the offender 
causes bodily harm, and a Class A misdemeanor where the offender makes 
physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature. Current 5/12-3(b), by 
contrast, grades the offense as a Class A misdemeanor regardless of the type 
of assault. Section 1201(2)(c)’s higher grading for violations of Section 
1201(1)(a) reflects the view that knowingly causing bodily harm is more 
serious and harmful than an offensive touching. The definition of “bodily 
harm” in Section 108 requires the offender to cause “substantial physical 
pain,” which would demand something more serious than a mere shove, 
slap, or (in nearly all cases) single punch. Moreover, grading contact of an 
insulting or provoking nature as a Class A misdemeanor makes sense in light 
of the proposed harassment offense, which treats the similar, but less serious, 
conduct of insulting in a manner likely to provoke as a Class B misdemeanor. 
See proposed Section 6105.
 Section 1201(2)(d) provides for a one-grade adjustment for assaulting 
certain types of victims. Section 1201(2)(d)’s adjustment applies to violations 
that would otherwise constitute “aggravated assault” under 1201(2)(b) or the 
base-level offense under 1201(2)(c).49 Section 1201(2)(d)(i) is substantively 
similar to current 5/12-4(b)(6)50 in increasing the offense grade where the 
 49 Section 1201(2)(d)’s grade adjustment may not be used, however, to increase 
1201(2)(a)’s “heinous assault” offense to a Class 1 felony. As discussed above, Section 
1201(2) does not allow assault to be graded higher than a Class 2 felony, on the understanding 
that the offense is less serious than, for example, first-degree manslaughter. Cf. proposed 
Section 1103(3) (first-degree manslaughter; Class 1 felony).
 50 Section 1201(2)(d)(i) also corresponds to current 5/12-4(d-5)’s offense for “throwing, 
tossing, or expelling” blood, seminal fluid, urine, or feces at a correctional employee. Such 
conduct constitutes making “physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature,” which 
is criminalized by Section 1201(1)(b). Unlike current 5/12-4(d-5), however, Section 
1201(2)(d)(i) would not itself reach “attempts” to cause correctional employees to come 
into contact with such substances. Rather, liability for attempted assault is governed by the 
proposed attempt provision. See Section 801 and corresponding commentary. Because of the 
definition of “custodial officer” in Section 5302(2), Section 1201(2)(d)(i) also tracks 5/12-4(d-
5)’s aggravation for a sexual offender who throws such substances at a Department of Human 
Services employee.
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victim is a peace officer, custodial officer,51 or community policing volunteer, 
but differs from the current provision in four respects. First, Section 
1201(2)(d)(i)’s adjustment applies to both “aggravated assault” violations 
under 1201(2)(b) and the base-level offense under 1201(2)(c), whereas 
current 5/12-4(b)(6) only increases the grade of the basic offense. Section 
1201(2)(d)(i)’s grade adjustment allows, as do Section 1201(2)(d)’s other 
provisions, for more severe punishment where more than one aggravating 
factor is present.52
 Second, Section 1201(2)(d)(i) applies only where one assaults an officer 
or volunteer “performing his or her duty,” whereas current 5/12-4(b)(6) also 
increases the offense grade where one assaults the person “to prevent” or “in 
retaliation for” the performance of duties. Assaults that interrupt an officer’s 
immediate ability to perform his duties are especially significant and merit 
aggravation. (The proposed aggravation would also apply where the assault 
“prevented” an officer’s efforts to perform his duty.)
 Third, Section 1201(2)(d)(i) requires recklessness as to the victim’s 
status, whereas current 5/12-4(b)(6) requires the defendant “[k]now[] the 
individual harmed to be” a peace officer, custodial officer, or community 
policing volunteer. Cf. proposed Section 205(3) (providing that culpability 
level of recklessness is to be “read in” where none otherwise stated). Section 
1201(2)(d)(i)’s lower culpability requirement reflects the view that assaulting 
a peace officer while reckless as to the victim’s status is sufficiently wrongful 
and serious to merit aggravation.
 Finally, Section 1201(2)(d)(i) omits current 5/12-4(b)(6)’s aggravations 
for assaulting firemen and Department of Human Services employees 
supervising and controlling sexual offenders, as it does 5/12-4’s other 
aggravations for assaulting teachers ((b)(3)), park-district employees ((b)(4)), 
public-aid employees ((b)(5)), emergency medical technicians ((b)(7)), 
public-transportation employees and passengers ((b)(9)), judges ((b)(12)), 
Department of Children and Family Services employees ((b)(13)), and 
merchants who detain defendants under allegations of retail theft ((b)(15)). 
Section 1201(2)(d)(i)’s narrower scope reflects the view that assaulting a 
peace officer is more serious than assaulting, for example, a park-district 
employee, and that the current recognized categories of victim reflect a 
certain arbitrariness — it is not clear, for example, why the aggravation 
should not apply to all public employees, rather than just the ones currently 
 51 “Custodial officer” is defined in Section 5302(2) to include correctional officers 
and those who supervise civil detainees. This term therefore includes the victims covered by 
the aggravation in current 5/12-4(b)(6) for assaults against employees of the Department of 
Human Services who supervise or control sexually dangerous or sexually violent persons.
 52 Current 5/12-4(e) has been recently amended to similarly account for multiple 
aggravating factors for assaults of peace officers. Whereas assaulting a peace officer is 
ordinarily a Class 3 felony, current 5/12-4(e) grades the offense as a Class 2 felony where 
the offender knowingly causes great bodily harm. Section 1201(2)(a)(i), by contrast, grades 
knowingly causing great bodily harm to any victim as a Class 2 felony.
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listed.53 Moreover, an aggravation from the base offense will be available 
under Section 1201(2)(b)(ii)’s provision for assaulting a person “in a public 
place” in most cases.
 Section 1201(2)(d)(ii) is substantively similar to current 5/12-4(b)(11)’s 
aggravation for assaulting a pregnant victim, but applies to “aggravated 
assault” violations under 1201(2)(b) in addition to base-level violations under 
1201(2)(c) and lowers the required culpability as to the victim’s pregnancy 
from knowledge to recklessness. Section 1201(2)(d)(ii)’s grade adjustment 
for assaulting a pregnant woman also covers current 5/12-3.1 and 5/12-4.4’s 
separate offenses of battery, and aggravated battery, of unborn children 
— which unnecessarily duplicate 5/12-4(b)(11)’s consideration of harm to 
fetuses. It is difficult to envision a case that involves knowingly causing bodily 
harm to an unborn child without also being at least reckless as to causing 
bodily harm to the pregnant mother. Indeed, bodily harm or great bodily harm 
to the unborn child will usually constitute bodily harm or great bodily harm to 
the pregnant mother. See proposed Section 108 (defining “bodily harm” and 
“great bodily harm”). There is no need to aggravate twice based on the same 
concern: the risk or infliction of harm to the unborn child.
 Section 1201(2)(d)(iii) aggravates for assaulting a physically or 
mentally handicapped person. With respect to physically handicapped 
persons, Section 1201(2)(d)(iii)’s grade adjustment is substantively similar 
to current 5/12-4(b)(14), but applies to violations under both 1201(2)(b) and 
1201(2)(c) and lowers the required culpability as to the victim’s disability 
from knowledge to recklessness. 
 Section 1201(2)(d)(iii)’s aggravation for assaulting a mentally 
handicapped person is similar to current 5/12-4.3’s offense, but differs 
from the current provision in three respects. First, Section 1201(2)(d)(iii) 
aggravates for assaulting a “mentally handicapped person,” whereas current 
5/12-4.3 more narrowly criminalizes assaulting a “severely or profoundly 
mentally retarded person.” Section 1201(2)(d)(iii)’s broader scope reflects 
the judgment that assaulting any mentally handicapped person is seriously 
wrongful conduct and deserves punishment equivalent to that for assaulting a 
physically handicapped person.
 Second, as with Section 1201(2)(d)’s grade adjustments for other 
victims, the proposed provision increases the offense grade for both 
“aggravated assault” and the basic offense. Current 5/12-4.3, by contrast, 
aggravates only where one causes great bodily harm. Section 1201(2)(d)(iii) 
more generally recognizes the significance of harming such persons by also 
providing a grade adjustment for assaults not resulting in great bodily harm.
 Third, Section 1201(2)(d)(iii) does not allow the offense to be graded 
any higher than a Class 2 felony, whereas current 5/12-4.3 grades the offense 
 53 The availability of liability under proposed Section 5310 also addresses much of the 
content of current 5/12-4(b) that is not covered by Section 1201(2)(d)(i)’s grade adjustment. 
See proposed Section 5310(2) (committing offense against public servant with the intent 
to influence performance of duties, or annoy, harass, intimidate, or victimize because of 
performance of duties; Class 2 or Class 3 felony). 
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as a Class X felony. Section 1201(2)(d)’s lower grading reflects the view, as 
does its refusal to grade other types of assault higher than a Class 2 felony, 
that even the most serious forms of assault are less serious than the Class 1 
felony of first-degree manslaughter, and much less serious than such Class X 
felonies as second-degree murder or attempted first-degree murder.
 Section 1201(2)(d)(iv) adjusts the offense grade where the victim is 
more than 60, or less than 13, years old. Section 1201(2)(d)(iv)’s aggravation 
for young victims corresponds to current 5/12-4.3, and differs from that 
provision in the same respects that Section 1201(d)(iii) does.
 Section 1201(2)(d)(iv)’s aggravation for assaulting a senior is 
substantively similar to current 5/12-4(b)(10),54 with one modification.55 Section 
1201(2)(d)(iv) provides a one-grade aggravation for any type of aggravated or 
ordinary assault, whereas current 5/12-4(b)(10) only aggravates to a Class 
3 felony where the offender “causes bodily harm” to a senior. See People 
v. Lewis, 763 N.E.2d 422, 426 (Ill. App. 2002) (holding that 5/12-4(b)(10) 
“requires a finding that the accused caused bodily harm to the victim”).
 Section 1201(3) provides definitions of terms used in the offense 
definition and grading provisions for assault. Section 1201(3)(a)’s definition 
of “community policing volunteer” is identical to that in current 5/2-3.5. 
Section 1201(3)(b)’s definition of “family member” is similar to the first 
sentence of current 5/12-7.3(h) — which defines “family member” for 
purposes of the stalking offense — but adds spouses and former spouses, 
to make the definition more similar to the separate current definition of 
“family or household members” in 725 ILCS 5/112A-3(3), and also adds 
grandchildren and step-grandchildren. Section 1201(3)(c)’s definition of 
“household member” is the same as the second sentence of current 5/12-
7.3(h)’s definition of “family member.” Section 1201(3)(d) defines “torture,” 
which current Chapter 720 does not define for purposes of current 5/12-32’s 
offense of ritual mutilation. Section 1201(3)(d)’s definition is, however, 
identical to current 5/9-1(b)(14)’s definition of “torture” for purposes of 
establishing an aggravating factor for murder.
 54 Section 1201(2)(d)(iv) is also analogous to current 5/12-4.6, which aggravates assault 
to a Class 2 felony where one “knowingly causes great bodily harm . . . to an individual of 60 
years of age or older.” Under Section 1201(2)(a)(i), however, knowingly causing great bodily 
harm is always a Class 2 felony, regardless of the victim’s age.
 55 Section 1202(2)(d)(iv) lowers the required culpability as to the victim’s seniority 
from knowledge to recklessness. Cf. proposed Section 205(3) (providing that culpability level 
of recklessness is to be “read in” where none otherwise stated). But although current 5/12-
4(b)(10) imposes liability only where one “knowingly . . . causes bodily harm to an individual 
of 60 years of age or older,” there is authority stating that the provision requires no culpability 
as to the victim’s age because the legislature indicated a requirement of knowledge as to the 
victim’s status in other provisions in 5/12-4(b) by using the phrase “knows the individual 
harmed to be.” See People v. White, 608 N.E.2d 1220, 1229 (Ill. App. 1993) (“The knowledge 
element refers to the mens rea for the offense and does not mean that the defendant had to 
have prior knowledge of the victim’s age.”) (citing People v. Jordan, 430 N.E.2d 389 (Ill. 
App. 1981)). This construction of the offense definition, although somewhat understandable 
given the provision’s less-than-transparent language, fails to properly apply current 5/4-3(b)’s 
rule that a culpability requirement prescribed for an offense as a whole “applies to each . . . 
element” of the offense. See also proposed Section 205(2) and corresponding commentary.
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 Finally, Section 1201 omits several current assault offenses and 
aggravations that are either covered by other offenses56 or criminalize 
conduct that does not merit a distinct offense or aggravation.57
Section 1202. Reckless Injuring; Endangerment
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/12-5; see also, e.g., 
5/12-2.5; 5/12-4.5; 5/12-4.8; 5/12-
4.9; 5/12-5.1; 5/12-5.5; 5/12-21.6; 
5/45-2; 120/5; 415 ILCS 5/44; 
625 ILCS 5/11-501; 5/11-503; 
40/5-7; 45/5-16
Comment:
 Generally. Section 1202 defines and grades the offenses of endangerment 
and reckless injuring. Section 1202(1) criminalizes recklessly creating a risk 
 56 Most significantly, Section 1201 omits current Chapter 720’s numerous offenses and 
aggravations for assaults involving weapons, such as 5/12-4(b)(1), 5/12-4.2, 5/12-4.2-5, and 
5/12-4.3. Additional liability is available for assaults that involve firearms and other weapons 
under Article 7100. Moreover, liability for attempted homicide is available for much of the 
conduct prohibited by the current offenses and aggravations. For example, in nearly any 
possible case of causing bodily injury by discharging a firearm, firearm with a silencer, or 
machine gun, see 5/12-4.2 and 5/12-4.2-5, the defendant would be liable for attempted first-
degree murder.
 Similarly, Section 1201 omits current 5/12-4.1’s Class X felony for causing great bodily 
harm “by means of a caustic or flammable substance, a poisonous gas, a deadly biological or 
chemical contaminant or agent, a radioactive substance, or a bomb or explosive compound.” 
Any harm in addition to causing great bodily harm, which is itself a Class 2 felony under 
Section 1201(2)(a)(i), is addressed by the availability of liability for endangerment under 
Section 1202 or for possessing and using catastrophic devices under Sections 2204 and 2205.
 Finally, Section 1201 does not incorporate current 5/12-4(b)(2)’s aggravation for cases 
where the defendant is “hooded, robed or masked, in such manner as to conceal his identity,” 
because such conduct is incidental to the commission of the offense and does not reflect any 
additional harm or injury.
 57 Section 1201 omits current 5/12-4.7’s Class 1 felony of “drug induced infliction of 
great bodily harm,” which appears designed to impose absolute liability as to causing great 
bodily harm and to aggravate punishment for drug offenses. Article 1200 declines to depart 
from the ordinary rule that recklessness is the minimum culpability level appropriate for 
criminal liability. Moreover, current 5/12-4.7 often does not operate to aggravate punishment 
for drug offenses because the predicate drug-offense violation is an included offense of “drug 
induced infliction of great bodily harm” — and is often as, or more, serious than the 5/12-4.7 
offense. (Current Illinois law bars liability for both a greater and an included offense. See 
commentary for proposed Section 254.)
 Section 1201 also omits current 5/12-10 and 5/12-10.1, which criminalize, respectively, 
tattooing a minor and piercing the body of a minor without a parent’s written consent. 
Assuming that consent does not provide a defense under the facts of a particular case, assault 
liability may be appropriate for such conduct. Cf. proposed Section 251 (providing rules 
governing availability of consent defense). The omission of current 5/12-10 and 5/12-10.1 
reflects the view that the prohibited conduct is not so inherently serious as to merit inclusion 
of special tattooing and body-piercing offenses in the proposed Code.
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of bodily harm. Section 1202(2) grades the offense as anything from a Class 
B misdemeanor to a Class 3 felony, depending on both the seriousness of the 
risk created and whether someone is actually injured as a result.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 1202(1) is substantively similar 
to current 5/12-5(a)’s offense for “reckless conduct,” but makes four minor 
changes to the offense definition.58 First, Section 1202(1) defines the offense 
to apply where one “creates a substantial risk” of harm, whereas current 
5/12-5(a) applies where one “endangers” another. Section 1202(1)’s definition 
makes clear, using language that tracks the definition of “recklessness,” that 
the offense does not criminalize creating a minor risk of injury. See proposed 
Section 206(3)(c) (recklessness as to result requires disregard of “substantial 
. . . risk” that conduct will cause result).
 58 In addition to current 5/12-5, current Illinois law contains numerous offenses 
criminalizing creating a risk of bodily harm by specific means or to certain persons, such 
as by causing “an object to fall from an overpass in the direction of a moving motor vehicle 
traveling upon any highway” (5/12-2.5); tampering with food, drugs, or cosmetics (5/12-4.5); 
possessing infected domestic animals (5/12-4.8); inducing or encouraging a child athlete to 
ingest a drug designed for quick weight gain or loss (5/12-4.9); permitting residential real 
estate to deteriorate (5/12-5.1); “gross carelessness or neglect” in operating a steamboat or 
other public conveyance (5/12-5.5); “willfully” permitting a child to be endangered (5/12-
21.6); disclosing the location of a domestic violence victim (5/45-2); and hazing (120/5). Such 
overlap is unnecessary and potentially harmful, as it may introduce confusion or contradiction 
between different offenses. By addressing the various sorts of endangerment and reckless 
assault together in a single provision, Section 1202 ensures that the offense is defined and 
graded consistently. (Article 1200 also excludes current 5/12-5.2’s civil remedies against 
managers of dangerous residential real estate, which are expected to be preserved elsewhere 
in Illinois law through the “conforming amendments” bill to be presented with the proposed 
Code.)
 The proposed Code still allows for additional punishment where a person commits 
another offense (such as a homicide or property damage offense by dropping a brick from 
an overpass) or endangers multiple persons (such as by tampering with food to be served 
to several patrons of a restaurant). Cf. proposed Section 254 (providing rules for multiple 
convictions); proposed Section 906 (providing rules governing authorized sentences for 
multiple convictions); proposed Section 2204 (defining offense of causing or risking 
catastrophe). It is also anticipated that civil or regulatory consequences associated with 
violations of current law’s overlapping offenses will be preserved through the “conforming 
amendments” bill to be presented to the General Assembly.
 Section 1202 would also cover the conduct prohibited by several offenses outside 
Chapter 720 that criminalize endangering others by, for example, disposing of hazardous 
waste (415 ILCS 5/44), driving recklessly (625 ILCS 5/11-503), and driving under the 
influence (625 ILCS 5/11-501, 40/5-7 and 45/5-16). The proposed Code would prevent such 
non-Code offenses from being graded any higher than Class 4 felonies, see proposed Section 
902(1) and corresponding commentary, but would not displace the regulatory or collateral 
consequences currently associated with such offenses. For example, it is anticipated that the 
current collateral consequences of driving under the influence — such as the suspension or 
revocation of driving privileges — would be preserved through the “conforming amendments” 
bill to be presented to the General Assembly with the proposed Code.
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 Second, Section 1202(1) criminalizes creating a substantial risk of 
“bodily harm,” whereas current 5/12-5(a) prohibits endangering another’s 
“bodily safety.” Section 1202(1)’s language makes explicit the offense’s 
relation to assault, which both Article 1200 and current Illinois law define 
in terms of causing “bodily harm.” See 720 ILCS 5/12-3(a)(1); proposed 
Section 1201(1)(a). Section 1202(1)’s language also renders unnecessary 
current 5/12-5(a)’s imposition of liability where one actually “causes bodily 
harm,” which is instead treated as a grading factor under 1202(2)(a).
 Third, Section 1202(1) shifts the offense’s focus from the conduct 
creating the risk of harm to the creation of the risk itself. Current 5/12-
5(a) defines the offense to prohibit “perform[ing] recklessly the acts which 
cause the harm or endanger safety,” which suggests that liability depends 
on the defendant’s awareness of his own conduct, rather than on his overall 
awareness of creating a risk of harm by his conduct. Section 1202(1) more 
clearly and concisely imposes liability on one who “recklessly creates a 
substantial risk of bodily harm.”
 Finally, Section 1202(1) omits as superfluous current 5/12-5(a)’s 
language that liability may be imposed for endangering “by any means,” 
and regardless of whether the conduct is “otherwise . . . lawful or unlawful.” 
Article 400 deals exhaustively with any justifications that would prevent 
liability, and Section 1104(1) would reach any other reckless acts, whether 
lawful or unlawful, as the offense definition makes no exception for 
unjustified but “lawful” acts.
 Section 1202(2) imposes differing grades for the offense, ranging 
from a Class 3 felony to a Class B misdemeanor, based on consideration of 
both the seriousness of the risk created and on the extent of harm actually 
caused, if any. Current 5/12-5(b), by contrast, neither accounts for the 
seriousness of the risk created nor distinguishes causing actual harm from 
merely “endangering” another59 — and would grade equally, as a Class A 
 59 Although current 5/12-5(b) does not distinguish between endangerment and 
actually causing bodily harm, some of current law’s other specific endangerment offenses 
recognize resulting harm as a relevant grading factor. See 720 ILCS 5/12-2.5(b) (vehicular 
endangerment; Class 1 felony where death results); 5/12-21.6(d) (endangering life or health 
of a child; Class 3 felony where death results); 120/10 (hazing; Class 4 felony where death 
or great bodily harm results); 625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(1)(C) (DUI; Class 3 felony where great 
bodily harm results); 625 ILCS 5/11-503(c) (aggravated reckless driving; Class 4 felony where 
great bodily harm results); 625 ILCS 40/5-7(d),(e); 625 ILCS 45/5-16(A)(4),(5) (operating 
snowmobile or watercraft under the influence; Class 4 felony where great bodily harm results, 
Class 3 felony where death results).
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misdemeanor, either recklessly causing great bodily harm, or merely creating 
a risk of physical pain.60
 Section 1202(2)’s more sophisticated approach to recklessly caused 
harm avoids such anomalous results. Section 1202(2)(a) applies where 
injury occurs, and grades the offense as a Class 3 felony in cases of great 
bodily harm and as a Class A misdemeanor in cases of ordinary bodily 
harm. Section 1202(2)(b) applies where the offender endangers another, and 
grades the offense as a Class 4 felony in cases involving a risk of death or 
great bodily harm and as a Class B misdemeanor in cases involving a risk of 
ordinary bodily harm.
 The proposed Code does not incorporate current 5/24-1.2, 5/24-1.2-5, 
and 5/24-3.2(b), which criminalize knowingly discharging a firearm in the 
direction of others. Current Illinois law grades the discharge offenses from a 
Class 1 felony to a Class X felony with a minimum imprisonment term of 12 
years, depending on the potential victim’s occupation and the type of firearm 
involved.61 The grading for these offenses is unduly severe when compared to 
the grading for other current offenses criminalizing endangerment or actual 
infliction of injury or death. For example, current 5/20.5-5 grades knowingly 
causing a catastrophe — which, in this context, requires “serious physical 
injury to 5 or more persons” — as a Class X felony. Similarly, current 
5/9-2 grades the current second-degree murder offense — which requires 
knowingly causing another’s death under a sudden and intense passion — as 
a Class 1 felony. Current 5/9-3 grades recklessly killing another person as a 
Class 3 felony. By contrast, current 5/12-5 grades “reckless conduct,” which 
is similar to the discharge offenses in criminalizing risk-creation as opposed 
to actual infliction of injury, as a mere Class A misdemeanor.
 60 In fact, because Chapter 720 does not criminalize either recklessly causing a 
catastrophe or creating a substantial risk of catastrophe, recklessly causing great bodily harm 
to five or more persons would currently also be an offense only under 5/12-5(b), and would 
therefore also be graded as a Class A misdemeanor — the same grade 5/12-5(b) assigns for 
merely creating a risk of physical pain to a single person. Article 2200, by contrast, specifically 
criminalizes recklessly causing, or creating a risk of, a catastrophe. See proposed Section 2204 
and corresponding commentary. Together, Articles 1200 and 2200 present a more nuanced 
approach to reckless conduct that more comprehensively distinguishes between various levels 
of recklessly created harm or risk.
 61 Current 5/24-1.2 grades knowingly discharging any type of firearm in the direction 
of a building or vehicle one “reasonably should know to be occupied” as a Class 1 felony, 
but aggravates the offense to a Class X felony where the offense occurs near a school, and 
to a Class X felony with a minimum imprisonment term of ten years where the firearm is 
discharged in the direction of certain categories of person (such as peace officers, emergency 
medical technicians, and teachers). Current 5/24-1.2-5 is similar to 5/24-1.2, but only applies 
to “machine guns” and guns equipped with silencers; current 5/24-1.2-5 grades discharging 
such a firearm in the direction of an ordinary person as a Class X felony, and aggravates the 
offense to a Class X felony with a minimum term of 12 years where the firearm is discharged 
in the direction of certain persons, as noted above. Finally, current 5/24-3.2(b) treats recklessly 
discharging a firearm known to be loaded with an “armor piercing bullet” as a Class X felony 
where the bullet strikes another.
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 Although it is certainly more serious than most of the other conduct 
covered by the current offense of “reckless conduct,” the act of firing a gun in 
another’s direction, without any explicitly required culpability as to causing 
bodily harm, and without the requirement of any actual resulting harm or 
injury, is less serious than knowingly causing a catastrophe, knowingly 
killing another under the influence of an extreme disturbance, or recklessly 
killing another person.62 The proposed Code adopts the view that the conduct 
in question is more properly treated as a combination of a weapons offense 
and endangerment (or, where injury or death occurs, an assault or homicide 
offense) than as a distinct offense. This scheme enables the amount of 
liability to reflect the actual amount of harm caused.
 Section 1202 grades recklessly creating a substantial risk of great 
bodily harm — which will almost invariably occur where one knowingly or 
recklessly discharges a firearm in another’s direction — as a Class 4 felony, 
and aggravates the offense grade to a Class 3 felony where the defendant 
causes great bodily harm. In recognition that the endangerment offense 
does not fully account for the special harms presented by cases involving 
guns, proposed Section 7101 would impose additional liability for a Class 
3 felony where one endangers another by discharging a firearm. Moreover, 
the proposed Code preserves the current regulatory offenses criminalizing 
the possession of particularly dangerous items, such as current 5/24-2.1’s 
Class 3 felony for possessing armor-piercing bullets. Significantly, under 
the proposed sentencing rules for multiple offenses, the offender would be 
punished for each additional offense of conviction. See proposed Section 906 
and corresponding commentary.
 Section 1203. Terroristic Threats
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/12-1; 5/12-2; 
  5/12-4(d-3); 5/12-9
Comment:
 Generally. Section 1203 criminalizes creating a risk of terror by 
threatening to commit a serious offense. The offense addresses the grave fear 
for personal safety or security that such threats may cause, even when the 
threatened crime is not carried out, or even intended.
 62 The proposed Code would, of course, impose liability for attempted murder where 
one discharges a gun in another’s direction with the intent to kill that person. See proposed 
Section 801(1) (imposing attempt liability where one takes substantial step toward offense 
“with the culpability required for commission of the offense”). Like current 5/8-4(c)(1), 
the proposed Code grades attempted first-degree murder as a Class X felony. See proposed 
Section 807 (grading inchoate offenses one grade lower than substantive offense); proposed 
Section 1101(2) (grading first-degree murder as Class [X plus] felony.
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 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 1203(1) is similar to, but expands 
the scope of, current 5/12-9(a)’s offense for threatening public officials.63 
Section 1203(1) criminalizes terrorizing any person by threat. In the absence 
of an offense like Section 1203(1), current Illinois law imposes liability for 
terrorizing a person who is not a public official only if the defendant threatens 
to commit an assault against that person.64 Section 1203(1) recognizes that 
one may terrorize another by threatening to commit crimes other than assault, 
and that the gravity and harmfulness of such conduct exist even if the victim 
is not a public official.
 Section 1203(1) also makes three other slight modifications to the 
offense as set out in 5/12-9(a). First, Section 1203(1)(a) defines the offense 
as “being reckless as to terrorizing” another person, whereas current 
5/12-9(a) applies where one makes a threat that “would place” another “in 
reasonable apprehension of” harm. Section 1203(1) requires recklessness 
as to “terrorizing,” rather than as to causing “reasonable apprehension,” to 
ensure that the offense punishes only serious threats made by offenders who 
culpably disregard a risk of causing serious alarm.
 Second, Section 1203(1)(b) applies where the threatened offense is 
likely to cause “great bodily harm” or “substantial property damage.” Current 
5/12-9(a), by contrast, reaches threats to cause ordinary “bodily harm” or 
any level of property damage.65 Here again, Section 1203(1)(b) increases the 
required seriousness of the threatened conduct to better assure that the offense 
only reaches those who are reckless as to the risk of terrorizing others.
 Finally, Section 1203(1)(b) uses the simple term “threatens,” whereas 
current 5/12-9(a)’s offense uses the language “delivers or conveys . . . a 
communication . . . containing a threat.” The current language is unnecessarily 
elaborate, and might also be read to suggest that the offense does not reach 
a verbal threat issued in person or a threat implied by conduct, such as 
brandishing a knife. Section 1203(1)(b) uses the term “threatens” in its 
ordinary sense, which is less similar to 5/12-9’s formulation than to current 
 63 In generalizing the offense to include threats to persons other than public officials, 
Section 1201 also omits current 5/12-9(a)(2)’s requirement that the defendant threaten 
“because of . . . [a] factor relating to the official’s public existence” and 5/12-9(b)’s definitions 
of “public official” and “immediate family.”
 64 See 720 ILCS 5/12-1(a), 5/12-2(a) (assault or aggravated assault committed where 
one “places another in reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery”); cf. 5/12-4(d-3) 
(aggravated battery committed where one “shines or flashes a . . . laser device that is attached 
or affixed to a firearm, or used in concert with a firearm, so that the laser beam strikes upon or 
against the person of another”). 
 Several offenses in current Chapter 720 include as offense elements threats to commit 
crimes other than assault, but those offenses require some additional conduct, or are aimed at 
some additional harm, beyond the threat itself. See, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/12-6 (intimidation); 5/12-
7.3 (stalking); 5/32-4(b) (jury and witness tampering); 5/32-4a (harassing family members of 
jurors, witnesses, or representative of child in custody proceeding).
 65 Section 1203(1)(b) also omits current 5/12-9(a)(1)(i)’s language regarding threats to 
commit sexual assault as redundant of the phrase “any offense likely to cause . . . unlawful 
confinement or restraint,” which would cover such threats.
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5/12-7.3(g)’s definition of the phrase “transmits a threat” to include “a verbal 
or written threat or a threat implied by a pattern of conduct or a combination 
of verbal or written statements or conduct.” Section 1203(1)(b)’s broader 
understanding of threats recognizes that the seriousness of terrorizing another 
by threat does not depend fundamentally on the means of issuing the threat.
 Section 1203(2) grades the offense as a Class A misdemeanor, whereas 
current 5/12-9(c) grades the offense of threatening a public official as a 
Class 3 felony — the same grade that would apply for actually causing great 
bodily harm to, or even recklessly causing the death of, a public official. 
Cf. 720 ILCS 5/9-3(d)(1) (involuntary manslaughter; Class 3 felony); 5/12-
4(e) (aggravated battery; Class 3 felony). At the same time, current Illinois 
law treats threatening great bodily harm to a person other than an official 
as a mere Class C misdemeanor. See 720 ILCS 5/12-1(b). Section 1203(2) 
reflects the view that the offense is neither as serious as other Class 3 felonies 
(such as Section 1201(2)(b)’s aggravated assault offense) nor as trivial as 
other Class C misdemeanors (such as Section 5305’s offense for refusing to 
aid a peace officer). Section 1203(2) instead provides that the offense is a 
Class A misdemeanor, the same grade current 5/12-2(b) typically prescribes 
for the somewhat analogous current offense of “aggravated assault.”
Section 1204. Stalking
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3; 5/12-7.4; 
  see also 720 ILCS 5/12-7.5
Comment:
 Generally. This provision defines and grades the offense of stalking, 
which is aimed at the intrusiveness, harassment, and terror associated with 
repeatedly being followed or watched by another. As the Illinois Supreme 
Court has observed, the offense of stalking is designed “to prevent violent 
attacks by allowing the police to act before the victim [is] actually injured 
and to prevent the terror produced by harassing actions.” People v. Bailey, 
657 N.E.2d 953, 960 (Ill. 1995).
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 1204 consolidates the 
prohibitions of current 5/12-7.3 and 5/12-7.4.66 Section 1204(1)(a) is 
substantively the same as current 5/12-7.3(a)’s introductory language, but 
 66 Section 1204 does not incorporate current 5/12-7.5’s separate offense of 
“cyberstalking.” Whereas Section 1204(1) and current 5/12-7.3 and 5/12-7.4 require that 
the defendant follow or place the victim under surveillance, the current “cyberstalking” 
provision creates a special offense for one who “harasses another through the use of electronic 
communication” — conduct that does not involve “stalking” as that offense is defined and 
generally understood. Harassment by electronic communications does not create the same 
level of fear or invasion as — and is therefore meaningfully different from — being physically 
followed or placed under surveillance. Instead, liability under proposed Section 1203 
(terroristic threats) and/or 6105 (harassment) would be appropriate for such conduct.
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omits the phrase “without lawful justification” as covered by proposed 
Section 400, uses “surveils” rather than “places . . . under surveillance,” and 
omits “or any combination thereof” as superfluous.
 Section 1204(1)(b) is substantively similar to current 5/12-7.3(a) 
in imposing liability where the offender recklessly places the victim in 
reasonable apprehension that he or another person will receive bodily harm 
or unlawful confinement or restraint,67 with three modifications. First, 
Section 1204(1)(b) limits liability to cases involving threats to the victim or 
a “household member,” whereas current 5/12-7.3(a)(3) allows liability where 
a threat involves any household member or family member, presumably 
including family members who do not live with the victim. Section 
1204(1)(b) does not allow liability to be predicated on threats to family 
members who are not household members, as such threats seem closer to the 
conduct prohibited in Section 1203 (terroristic threats) than to the specific 
concerns of the stalking offense: direct intimidation, a sense of menace, and 
disruption of one’s feeling of safety within one’s own home.
 Second, Section 1204(1)(b) omits as superfluous current 5/12-7.3(a)’s 
language regarding a threat of either “immediate or future” bodily harm 
(the proposed language covers both), and also omits the current language 
regarding threats to commit sexual assault as redundant of the reference to 
apprehension of “unlawful confinement or restraint,” which would cover 
such threats.
 Finally, Section 1204(1)(b) omits current 5/12-7.3(a)(1)’s language 
requiring the offender to “transmit[] a threat” as redundant of the requirement 
that the defendant place the victim in reasonable apprehension of harm. 
 Section 1204(2) grades the offense as a Class 3 felony if the defendant 
violates an order of protection in committing the offense, and as a Class 4 
felony otherwise. Section 1203(2)(a) is substantively the same as current 
5/12-7.4(a)(3) in aggravating the offense to a Class 3 felony where the 
defendant violates an “order of protection,” but omits as redundant the current 
provision’s references to a “temporary restraining order” or an injunction 
under current 750 ILCS 60/214, as the general phrase “order of protection” 
comprehends both of those types of court orders.
 67 As under current 5/12-7.3(a), Section 1204(1) requires recklessness as to causing a 
reasonable apprehension of bodily harm or unlawful confinement or restraint. See 720 ILCS 
5/4-3(b) (imposing “read-in” culpability requirement of recklessness); proposed Section 
205(3) (same). Unlike Section 1203’s terroristic threats offense, Section 1204(1) only imposes 
liability where the defendant actually causes fear of impending harm. Section 1204 requires 
that the offender follow or surveil the victim on two separate occasions — conduct that may be 
objectively reasonable and harmless in some circumstances, but may be extremely disturbing 
in others — whereas Section 1203 requires an overt threat, whose tendency to arouse fear is 
obvious and clearly intended by the offender.
 Because Section 1204 depends on the actual elicitation of fear, but defines an offense 
that may be highly disturbing where some fear is aroused, Section 1204(1) requires only a 
“reasonable apprehension” of harm, rather than Section 1203’s stricter requirement of conduct 
tending to “terrorize” the victim.
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 Section 1204(2)(a) omits current 5/12-7.4(a)(1) and (a)(2)’s aggravations 
to a Class 3 felony for cases involving bodily harm, confinement, or restraint, 
in recognition that such conduct is separately criminalized by other offenses 
in the proposed Code and, in fact, is sometimes graded more seriously 
standing alone than under current 5/12-7.4’s “aggravated stalking” offense. 
See proposed Section 1201(2) (grading knowingly causing bodily harm from 
Class 4 to Class 2 felony); proposed Section 1202(2)(a) (grading recklessly 
causing bodily harm as Class A misdemeanor and recklessly causing great 
bodily harm as Class 3 felony); proposed Section 1401(3) (grading kidnaping 
from Class 2 to Class X felony); proposed Section 1402(2) (grading unlawful 
restraint as either Class 2 or Class 4 felony). 
 Section 1204(2)(b), like current 5/12-7.3, grades the offense as a Class 
4 felony.
 Finally, Section 1204 omits as unnecessary current 5/12-7.3(b-5) through 
(g) and 5/12-7.4(c) and (d). Current 5/12-7.3(b-5) unnecessarily provides that 
the fact that the defendant is incarcerated does not bar prosecution; if an 
incarcerated person (or one for whose conduct he is accountable) satisfies the 
offense elements, the fact of incarceration would not preclude liability under 
the terms of Section 1204.
 Current 5/12-7.3(c) to (f) and 5/12-7.4(c) and (d) set forth exemptions 
and offense definitions that are intended to make clear that the offense does 
not reach certain constitutionally protected or otherwise innocent conduct, 
such as “picketing . . . that is otherwise lawful and arises out of a bona fide 
labor dispute,” “following” another in one’s own home, or “surveiling” 
another by remaining at one’s own home. Section 1204 is not intended to 
criminalize either constitutionally protected conduct (such as any exercise 
of First Amendment rights) or otherwise innocent conduct (such as conduct 
in one’s own home), and should be construed accordingly. Cf. proposed 
Section 252(3) (providing for dismissal where defendant’s conduct “did not 
actually cause the harm or wrong sought to be prohibited by the law defining 
the offense”); People v. Bailey, 657 N.E.2d 953, 960 (Ill. 1995) (“While the 
stalking and aggravated stalking statutes do not contain the phrase ‘without 
lawful authority,’ we interpret the statutes as only proscribing conduct 
performed ‘without lawful authority.’”).
 Finally, Section 1204 omits current 5/12-7.3(g)’s definition of “transmits 
a threat” because it does not use that phrase.
Section 1205. Abuse and Gross Neglect
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/12-19; 5/12-21; 5/12-
  21.6; 5/12-33
Comment:
 Generally. This provision criminalizes the abuse and neglect of the 
elderly, the disabled, and children by those with a legal duty to provide 
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care or maintenance for such persons. Section 1205(1) prohibits recklessly 
causing mental harm to, or recklessly failing to perform a legal duty to 
provide necessary care for, the elderly, the disabled, and children.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 1205 corresponds to and 
consolidates prohibitions contained in current 5/12-19 and 5/12-21. Section 
1205(1) is substantively similar to current 5/12-19(a) and 5/12-21(a), but 
makes three modifications to the current offense definitions. First, Section 
1205(1) applies to any person “having a duty to provide medical or personal 
care or maintenance” for a senior, child, or handicapped person, whereas 
current 5/12-19 and 5/12-21 list specific persons (such as employees of long-
term care facilities and other caregivers) who owe legal duties to provide 
care or maintenance for the elderly and disabled. It is anticipated that those 
portions of current 5/12-19 and 5/12-21 imposing such legal duties will be 
preserved elsewhere in Illinois law through the “conforming amendments” 
bill to be presented to the General Assembly.
 Second, Section 1205(1) imposes a uniform culpability requirement of 
recklessness as to the offense’s remaining objective elements. The current 
provisions, by contrast, inconsistently require knowledge for the offenses 
in 5/12-19(a)’s first sentence and in 5/12-21(a)(1), recklessness for the 
offense in 5/12-19(a)’s second sentence, and the negligence-like standard 
of “knowingly” failing to perform acts which one “reasonably should know 
are necessary” for the offense in 5/12-21(a)(2).68 Section 1205(1) requires 
recklessness in recognition of the inherent difficulty of proving that one 
“knowingly” caused mental injury or substantial distress, while ensuring that 
the offense only reaches those who are sufficiently culpable to merit criminal 
liability.
 Third, Section 1205(1)’s requirement that the defendant fail to 
provide care or maintenance that is “necessary for the safety and welfare” 
of the victim covers current 5/12-19(a), 5/12-21(a)(1), and 5/12-21(a)(2)’s 
requirements69 that particular sorts of harm (such as physical injury, 
deterioration, endangerment, or a sexual offense) occur. Moreover, liability 
for causing bodily harm, endangering the victim, or a sexual offense is 
available — regardless of whether one is under a legal duty to the victim 
— under the proposed assault, endangerment, and sexual offense provisions. 
See proposed Section 1201 (assault); proposed Section 1202 (endangerment); 
proposed Article 1300 (defining sex offenses). 
 68 Current 5/12-21(a)(1) and (2) are particularly inconsistent in that they effectively 
require knowledge as to causing harm by performing affirmative acts, but only negligence as 
to causing harm by failing to act. Section 1205(1) avoids such inconsistencies by imposing a 
culpability requirement of recklessness for both causing mental harm and failing to provide 
necessary care.
 69 Current 5/12-21(a)(3) also imposes liability where a caregiver knowingly “abandons” 
an elderly or disabled person. Section 1205(1) does not explicitly address abandonment 
because, in any serious case, one who abandons a person for whom he has a legal duty to 
provide necessary care will satisfy the offense’s requirement of recklessly failing to provide 
such care.
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 Section 1205(1)(a) to (c) require that the victim be over 60 years old, 
under 18 years old, or a physically or mentally handicapped person. Section 
1205(1)(a) is similar to current 5/12-21(b)(1)’s definition of “elderly person,” 
but does not include the current provision’s requirement that the victim suffer 
from a “disease or infirmity associated with advanced age” that renders him 
“incapable of adequately providing for his own health and personal care.” 
Section 1205(1) omits this requirement in light of the inherent seriousness 
of recklessly causing mental injury to the elderly and of failing to perform a 
legal duty to provide care or maintenance that is “necessary for the safety and 
welfare” of an elderly person.
 Section 1205(1)(b), providing that the offense applies to children, is 
analogous to the offense of “endangering the life or health of a child” under 
current 5/12-21.6. Current 5/12-21.6 seems to be at least partially directed at 
parents who fail to adequately care for their children in imposing liability for 
those who “willfully . . . permit” the “health” of children to be endangered. 
Unlike Section 1205(1), however, current 5/12-21.6 does not explicitly 
address causing mental harm to children70 or disregarding a legal duty to 
provide necessary care for children.
 Subsection 1205(1)(c) provides that the offense applies to the abuse 
and neglect of a “physically handicapped person” or “mentally handicapped 
person.” Proposed Section 108’s definitions of those terms are substantively 
similar to current 5/12-21(b)(2)’s definition of “disabled person,” but require 
that the victim’s impairment be “long-term and disabling” rather than 
“permanent.” See proposed Section 108 and corresponding commentary. 
Section 1205(1)’s requirement of a legal duty to provide “necessary” care 
renders unnecessary current 5/12-21(b)(2)’s requirement that the impairment 
“render[] such person incapable of adequately providing for his own health 
and personal care.” 
 70 Current 5/12-33’s offense for “ritualized abuse of a child” also seems designed 
to punish causing mental harm to children, but its prohibitions against performing certain 
conduct on, or “in the presence of,” children — such as torturing or mutilating another, 
administering a drug without consent, sexually abusing the child, threatening to commit a 
crime, and placing the child in a coffin with a human corpse — apply only if the conduct is 
“part of a ceremony, rite or any similar observance.” Section 1205(1) criminalizes causing 
mental injury or substantial emotional distress by any means by those having a duty to care 
for children, and would thus allow for liability regardless of whether the harmful conduct is 
performed as part of a ritual.
 Additional liability for much of the conduct prohibited by current 5/12-33 is also 
available under other offenses in the proposed Code. See proposed Section 1201 (assault); 
proposed Section 1203 (terroristic threats); proposed Article 1300 (sexual offenses); 
proposed Section 6205 (abuse of corpse); proposed Section 6207 (cruelty to animals). Where 
that conduct is performed before a child, liability under both Section 1205 and the other 
relevant offense(s) would be allowed. Cf. proposed Section 254 (providing rules for multiple 
convictions); proposed Section 906 (providing rules governing authorized sentences for 
multiple convictions).
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 Section 1205(2) grades the offense as either a Class 2 or Class 3 felony, 
depending on whether it is committed knowingly or recklessly.71 Current 
Illinois law, by contrast, grades “abusing” a long-term care facility resident 
under 5/12-19(a) and “neglecting” an elderly or disabled person under 5/12-
21(a) as Class 3 felonies, “grossly neglecting” a long-term facility resident 
under 5/12-19(a) as a Class 4 felony, and “endangering the life or health of a 
child” as a Class A misdemeanor. Section 1205(2)’s higher grading reflects 
the view that the offense is at least as serious as knowingly causing ordinary 
bodily harm to an elderly person or child, which is graded as a Class 3 felony. 
See proposed Section 1201(2) and corresponding commentary.
 Section 1205 omits several provisions in current 5/12-19 and 5/12-
21 that establish regulatory offenses and are designed to exempt justified, 
innocent, or constitutionally protected conduct. Section 1205(1)’s culpability 
requirement of “recklessness” and the General Part’s justification for medical 
treatment cover current 5/12-19(a) and 5/12-21(d)’s exemptions for good-
faith efforts to treat patients. See proposed Section 415(2) and corresponding 
commentary. Current 5/12-19(e) and 5/12-21(e) exempt persons who provide 
treatment by prayer or spiritual means. Section 1205 is likewise not intended 
to criminalize conduct that is constitutionally protected, and should not 
be construed to impair the First Amendment rights of those who rely on 
treatment by prayer or spiritual means.
 Finally, Section 1205 omits current 5/12-19(b) and (c)’s petty and 
business offenses. It is anticipated that these offenses will be preserved 
elsewhere in the Illinois statutes through the “conforming amendments” bill 
to be presented to the General Assembly.
Section 1206. Definitions
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/2-3.5; 5/2-8; 5/2-13; 
5/2-15a; 5/9-1(b)(14); 5/12-7.3(h); 
5/15-1; 5/31A-1.2(d)(2); 725 ILCS 
5/112A-3(3)
Comment:
 Generally. This provision collects the defined terms used in Article 1200 
and provides cross-references to the provisions in which they are defined.
 Relation to current Illinois law. For discussion of the relationship 
between Article 1200’s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary 
for the provision in which the term in question is initially defined.
 71 Section 1205(1) does not incorporate current 5/12-21(f)’s rule that a defendant’s 
reasonable belief that the victim was not an elderly or disabled person “shall not be a defense.” 
Section 1205(1) requires recklessness as to the offense’s elements, including the victim’s age 
or physical or mental impairment. See proposed Section 205(3). For an offense to constitute a 
Class 2 felony under Section 1205(2)(a), the defendant must satisfy a requirement of knowledge 
as to those elements. See proposed Section 202(1) and corresponding commentary.
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ARTICLE 1300. SEXUAL ASSAULT OFFENSES
Section 1301. Sexual Assault; Aggravated Sexual Assault
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/12-12(f) to -14.1; 
  5/12-15; 5/12-16; 150/5.1
Comment:
 Generally. Section 1301 creates an offense prohibiting persons from 
engaging in sexual intercourse with another person in situations indicating 
a lack of consent: either where the intercourse is occasioned by the use or 
threat of force, or where the victim is unable to give legally valid consent due 
to incapacity or youth.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 1301 replaces the offenses in 
current 5/12-13 to 5/12-14.1, but also covers some of the conduct prohibited 
in current 5/12-15, 5/12-16, and 150/5.1.72 The proposed provision is 
substantively similar to the current offenses, but includes important changes 
in the way those offenses are organized and graded.
 Section 1301(1) defines the offense of sexual assault to include three 
categories of prohibited sexual intercourse. Section 1301(1)(a) generally 
prohibits sexual intercourse with any person, other than one’s spouse,73 
who is under 17 years old. Current law, on the other hand, addresses sexual 
intercourse with minors in five different sections: 5/12-13, 5/12-14, 5/12-
14.1, 5/12-15, and 5/12-16. As noted below, Section 1301 recognizes the 
same distinctions as those various current offenses, but does so by including 
them as grading factors rather than defining separate offenses. The proposed 
provision also imposes a uniform rule requiring that the victim be under 17 
years old. The current offenses involving sexual intercourse, on the other 
 72 The proposed Code does not define separate solicitation offenses such as those in 
current 5/11-6 (indecent solicitation of a child) and 5/11-6.5 (indecent solicitation of an 
adult), because the conduct in question would fall within the general complicity, attempt, 
and solicitation offenses. See proposed Sections 301, 801, and 802 and corresponding 
commentary.
 Although both current offenses address the inchoate conduct of soliciting another to 
commit a sex offense, 5/11-6.5 grades the solicitation of another adult to engage in a sex act 
with a child the same as the underlying offense, while 5/11-6 grades the direct solicitation 
of a child to engage in a sex act at one grade lower than the underlying offense. There is no 
obvious reason to grade direct solicitation of a child less seriously than solicitation of an adult 
to perform the same act with a child. The proposed Code grades any solicitation of an offense 
one grade lower than the completed offense. See proposed Section 807 and corresponding 
commentary. In the case of solicitation of an adult, if the person’s efforts at solicitation 
resulted in a completed offense, he could be held fully liable for the other adult’s offense on a 
complicity theory. See proposed Section 301.
 73 This limitation is necessary because Illinois law allows certain persons under 17 years 
of age to marry. See 750 ILCS 5/203 (allowing persons aged 16 to 18 to marry with parental 
or judicial consent).
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hand, sometimes apply where the victim is up to 18 years old, although they 
typically apply only where the victim is under 17 years old.74 
 Section 1301(1)(b) and (c) are nearly identical to current 5/12-13(a)(1) 
and (2), but are organized slightly differently to enhance clarity. These 
subsections prohibit a person from committing sexual intercourse with 
another by force, or the threat of force, or where he knows the other is unable 
to understand the nature of the act or consent to it.75
 Section 1301(2), which corresponds to current 150/5.1, creates omission 
liability for parents or guardians who knowingly allow another to engage in 
prohibited sexual intercourse with their child. The Illinois Supreme Court 
recently held current 150/5.1 to be unconstitutionally vague. See People 
v. Maness, 732 N.E.2d 545, 550-51 (Ill. 2000) (finding provision, which 
required that parent or guardian take “reasonable steps” to prevent prohibited 
sexual acts involving children, provided inadequate guidelines regarding 
what affirmative actions sufficed to prevent liability). In addition to removing 
the current provision’s requirement that a parent take “reasonable steps,” the 
proposed provision changes the current offense by limiting liability for 
merely “allowing” another’s offense to more serious cases — that is, only 
cases involving sexual intercourse, and not cases of sexual conduct. (Current 
150/5.1 applies to any sexual act prohibited in 5/12-13 to 5/12-16, including 
sexual conduct.) Where a parent or guardian does not only “allow” an 
offense, but affirmatively aids or facilitates another’s offense — whether the 
offense involves sexual intercourse or sexual conduct — full liability against 
the parent for the offense would be possible under the complicity provision. 
See proposed Section 301 and corresponding commentary.
 Section 1301(3)’s definition of “sexual intercourse” is identical to 
current 5/12-12(f)’s definition of “sexual penetration,” but has been broken 
down into subsections to enhance clarity. The proposed Code uses the term 
“sexual intercourse” instead of “sexual penetration” because the definition 
includes various acts that would not intuitively constitute “penetration,” so 
the current term might be misleading.
 74 Compare, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/12-13(a)(3) (offender family member, victim under 
18); 5/12-13(a)(4) (offender in position of authority, victim under 18), with 5/12-15(b), (c) 
(offender under 17 or less than 5 years older, victim under 17); 5/12-16(d) (general prohibition 
for offenders at least 5 years older; victim under 17).
 75 The proposed Code does not create an offense to parallel current 5/12-13(a)(3) 
(prohibiting intercourse with an underage family member). The conduct that provision 
prohibits is covered both by Section 1301(1)(a) (prohibiting sex with persons under 17) 
and by the incest offense in proposed Section 4101. Under the proposed rules governing 
conviction and sentencing for multiple offenses, an offender whose conduct violated current 
5/12-13(a)(3) would be liable for both sexual assault and incest. See proposed Sections 254 
and 906 and corresponding commentaries. Accordingly, no separate offense combining those 
two offenses is necessary.
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 Section 1301(4) grades the sexual assault offense.76 Like current law, 
Section 1301(4)(a) grades as a Class X felony the most serious cases of the 
offense, described as “aggravated sexual assault.” Section 1301(4)(a)(i), 
corresponding to current 5/12-14.1(a)(1), grades the offense as a Class X 
felony where the victim is particularly young and the defendant is 17 or 
older. The proposed provision, however, lowers (from 13 to 9 years old) 
the maximum age of the victim that will support Class X liability. Under 
proposed Section 1301(4)(b)(i), cases involving victims between 9 and 13 are 
graded as Class 1 felonies. Although any age cutoff included within a sexual 
assault offense will be somewhat arbitrary, cases involving children under 
age 9, who are almost certain to be prepubescent, seem especially serious. 
Current law recognizes the under-age-9 category in imposing liability for 
offenders under 17. See, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/12-14(b)(i).
 Section 1301(4)(a)(ii) and (iii), like current 5/12-14(a)(2) and (3), 
grade the offense as a Class X felony where the defendant causes bodily 
harm to or threatens or endangers the life of the victim. Unlike current law, 
the proposed provision does not aggravate the penalty in cases where the 
defendant threatens or endangers the life of a person other than the victim. 
However, in such cases, the defendant may be liable for a separate offense 
against that person. See, e.g., proposed Section 1201 (assault); Section 1202 
(reckless endangerment); Section 1203 (terroristic threats).77 In addition, 
Section 1301(4)(a)(ii) specifically defines the aggravation to apply where 
the offender impregnates the victim, thus avoiding the need for a special 
definition of “bodily harm” that includes pregnancy and applies only to sex 
offenses, as in current 5/12-12(b).78 
 76 Under proposed Section 205(3), the “read-in” culpability requirement of recklessness 
applies to offense elements with no stated culpability term, whether they appear in the 
offense definition or in grading provisions. Thus, a defendant must satisfy the requirement of 
recklessness as to any elements in Section 1301(4), other than the age of the victim, for which 
proposed Section 1306(1) provides an explicit rule allowing negligence to suffice. Cf. People 
v. Terrell, 547 N.E.2d 145, 159 (Ill. 1989) (applying the current “read-in” provision to the 
aggravated sexual assault offense); proposed Section 205 and corresponding commentary.
 77 For a discussion of the proposed rules for convicting and sentencing multiple 
offenses, see proposed Sections 254 and 906 and corresponding commentary.
 78 Note that the definition of “bodily harm” in proposed Section 108 specifically 
includes physical illnesses and thus includes sexually transmitted diseases. Cf. current 5/12-
12(b). The proposed Code does not incorporate the remaining definitions in current 5/12-12. 
Current 5/12-12(a), defining “accused,” is unnecessary because the proposed Code uses the 
word “defendant.” Current 5/12-12(c), defining “family member,” is no longer relevant to 
Article 1300, as sexual acts between family members are now covered by the incest offense 
in proposed Section 4101. The definition of “force or threat of force” in current 5/12-12(d) 
hardly clarifies the phrase’s meaning, as the definition includes the terms it purports to define. 
Current 5/12-12(g), defining “victim,” is unnecessary as that term is within the common 
understanding of the trier of fact.
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 Section 1301(4)(a) does not directly retain a number of other factors 
in current 5/12-14 and 5/12-14.1 that aggravate the offense grade to Class 
X felony. Most such factors aggravate for conduct that is properly seen as 
amounting to an additional offense. The aggravating factors in current 5/12-
14(a)(1), (4), and (7) to (10), and 5/12-14.1(a)(1.1) to (3) address conduct 
covered by other offenses under the proposed Code.79
 Three other current factors that aggravate liability to Class X, all of 
which relate to the status of the victim, have also not been retained in Section 
1301(4)(a). See 720 ILCS 5/12-14(a)(5) (victim is age 60 or older); 5/12-
14(a)(6) (victim is handicapped); 5/12-14(c) (victim is severely or profoundly 
mentally retarded). Sexual assaults involving elderly or handicapped victims 
will often cause bodily harm or endanger the victim’s life, and will therefore 
be a Class X felony under proposed Section 1301(4)(a)(ii) and (iii). Where 
they do not, the victim’s status will often be more appropriate as a factor to 
govern proper sentencing for a Class 1 felony, rather than one that merits a 
per se full-grade aggravation to the Class X category, which includes such 
extremely serious offenses as second-degree murder. Similarly, offenses 
against severely or profoundly mentally retarded persons, although serious 
enough to merit Class 1 felony categorization, are not uniquely worse than 
other offenses involving force or victims unable to give valid consent.
 Finally, proposed Section 1301(4)(a) does not impose Class X liability 
for offenders under age 17 whose victims are under age 9, as current 5/12-
14(b)(i) does. Under Section 1301(4)(b), such offenders (as long as they are 
four years older than the victim) would be guilty of a Class 1 felony. (Under 
Section 1301(4)(a)(ii), an underage offender who caused bodily harm or 
threatened the victim’s life would still be liable for a Class X felony, as is 
true for underage offenders who use or threaten force under current 5/12-
14(b)(ii).) Such younger offenders seem to merit slightly reduced punishment 
vis-à-vis mature adults who engage in the same conduct. Cf. supra discussion 
of Section 1301(4)(a)(i) (aggravating liability to Class X felony where victim 
is under 9 and offender is over 17).
 Section 1301(4)(b)(i) grades sexual assault as a Class 1 felony in 
cases where the victim is less than 13 years old and the defendant is at least 
four years older. As noted above, for victims between age 9 and 13, this is 
generally one grade lower than under current law. However, where the victim 
is between 9 and 13 and the offender is at least four years older but under 17, 
Section 1301(4)(b)(i) imposes a higher grade than the Class A misdemeanor 
 79 Under proposed Sections 254 and 906, defendants in these cases will be subject to 
additional punishment because they have committed multiple offenses. See 720 ILCS 5/12-
14(a)(1),(8)-(10); 5/12-14.1(a)(1.1), (1.2) (sexual assault involving weapon; aggravating 
factor is an offense under proposed Article 7100); 5/12-14(a)(4) (sexual assault plus additional 
felony; factor is an offense by definition); 5/12-14(a)(7), 5/12-14.1(a)(3) (sexual assault plus 
delivery of controlled substance; factor is an assault under Section 1201, a drug offense under 
Article 7200, or both); 5/12-14.1(a)(2) (sexual assault involving great bodily harm; factor is an 
offense under proposed Section 1201).
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defined in current 5/12-15(b). For offenders under age 17, the current 
scheme changes liability from a Class X felony to a Class A misdemeanor 
based on whether the victim was more or less than 9 years old. Compare 
5/12-14(b)(i) with 5/12-15(b). This is a dramatic change in grade based on 
a distinction that is fundamentally arbitrary and that, at the edges, separates 
cases that do not differ a great deal in seriousness. The proposed Code seeks 
to make the consequences of these inevitable grading distinctions more 
rational, containing fewer and less dramatic discrepancies based on arbitrary 
distinctions.
 Section 1301(4)(b)(ii) and (iii), like current 5/12-13(a)(1), (2), and (4), 
grade sexual assault as a Class 1 felony where: (1) the defendant was over 17 
and held a position of trust, authority, or supervision in relation to a victim 
who was under 17; (2) force was used or threatened; or (3) the defendant 
knew the victim could not understand the nature of the act or consent to it.
 Section 1301(4)(c), like current 5/12-16(d), grades sexual assault as a 
Class 2 felony where the victim is between ages 13 and 17 and the defendant 
is significantly older. Section 1301(4)(c) reduces the required age difference 
between offender and victim to four years from five years. The current 
offenses attribute significance in other circumstances to the offender’s being 
age 17 or more, and a four-year requirement assures that any offender over 
age 17 will face significant liability for an offense against any victim under 
13. Similarly, the age of 21 has legal significance in other respects (such as 
granting the right to consume alcohol), so it seems sensible to ensure that 
offenders over age 21, who are expected to be mature, will face significant 
liability for sexual intercourse with any minor under 17.
 Section 1301(4)(d) grades sexual assault as a Class 4 felony where the 
victim is under 13 and the offender is less than four years older. This increases 
the grade for sexual assault (from a Class A misdemeanor) where the victim 
is between 9 and 13 and the offender is less than four years older. See 720 
ILCS 5/12-15(b). Such an increase recognizes the significance of two factors: 
(1) that offenses involving sexual penetration are more serious than offenses 
involving sexual conduct; and (2) that offenses involving victims under age 
13 are more serious than offenses involving victims between ages 13 and 
17. Current law nearly always makes grading decisions that recognize these 
factors, but in the case of offenders under 17, current 5/12-15(b) and (c) treat 
intercourse the same as conduct and treat all victims between ages 9 and 17 
the same, imposing Class A misdemeanor liability for any such offense. The 
proposed grading scheme seeks to make the noted factors relevant in this 
context as well.
 At the same time, Section 1301(4)(d) would operate to reduce the grade 
from Class X felony, see 720 ILCS 5/12-14(b)(i), to Class 4 felony in the 
limited set of cases where the victim is under 9 and the offender is less than 
four years older. This change will only reduce liability for offenders who are 
a maximum of 13 years old. Reduced liability for such youthful offenders 
seems appropriate, and imposing such a grade in this situation also maintains 
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the consistency of the complex overall age-cutoff scheme the proposed Code 
imposes for sexual assault and sexual abuse offenses. 
 Section 1301(4)(e), like current 5/12-15(b) and (c), grades sexual 
assault as a Class A misdemeanor in the remaining cases — that is, those 
where the victim is between 13 and 17, the defendant is less than four years 
older than the victim, and the assault involves no use or threat of force.
 Section 1301(4)(f) sets omission liability for parents who knowingly 
allow their underage children to engage in sexual intercourse at one grade 
lower than it would be for the person engaging in the intercourse. The 
proposed formulation, which ties the grade of punishment to the underlying 
harm caused, is more nuanced than current 150/5.1, which grades any 
violation as a Class 1 felony regardless of the offense committed or the harm 
caused.
 Section 1302. Sexual Abuse; Aggravated Sexual Abuse
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/12-12(e); 5/12-15; 
  5/12-16
Comment:
 General. Section 1302 creates an offense similar to Section 1301’s 
sexual assault offense, but prohibiting improper sexual conduct other than 
“sexual intercourse” as defined in Section 1301.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 1302(1)(a) generally prohibits 
sexual conduct with any person, other than one’s spouse,80 who is under 17 
years old. Current law, on the other hand, addresses sexual conduct with 
minors in both 5/12-15 and 5/12-16. As noted below, and as with proposed 
Section 1301, Section 1302 recognizes the same distinctions as the multiple 
current offenses, but does so by including them as grading factors rather than 
defining separate offenses. The proposed provision also imposes a uniform 
rule requiring that the victim be under 17 years old. The current offenses 
involving sexual conduct, on the other hand, sometimes apply where the 
victim is up to 18 years old, although they typically apply only where the 
victim is under 17 years old.81
 Section 1302(1)(b) and (c) are nearly identical to current 5/12-15(a)(1) 
and (2), but are organized slightly differently to enhance clarity. These 
subsections prohibit a person from committing sexual intercourse with 
 80 This limitation is necessary because Illinois law allows certain persons under 17 years 
of age to marry. See 750 ILCS 5/203 (allowing persons aged 16 to 18 to marry with parental 
or judicial consent).
 81 Compare, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/12-16(b) (offender family member, victim under 18); 
5/12-16(f) (offender in position of authority, victim under 18), with 5/12-15(b), (c) (offender 
under 17 or less than 5 years older, victim under 17); 5/12-16(d) (general prohibition for 
offenders at least 5 years older; victim under 17).
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another by force, or the threat of force, or where he knows the other is unable 
to understand the nature of the act or consent to it.
 Section 1302(2) provides the same definition of “sexual conduct” as 
current 5/12-12(e), but reorganizes it to enhance clarity. 
 Section 1302(3) grades the sexual abuse offense. Subsection 1302(3)(a), 
like current 5/12-16, grades “aggravated sexual abuse” as a Class 2 felony. 
Section 1302(3)(a)(i) is similar to current 5/12-16(c)(1)(i), which imposes 
Class 2 felony liability where the victim is less than 13 and the defendant 
is at least 17, but the proposed provision is slightly more expansive in that 
it reaches any offender who is at least four years older than the victim, and 
thus may apply where the offender is under 17. At the same time, Section 
1302(3)(a)(i) narrows the scope of current 5/12-16(c)(2)(i), which imposes 
Class 2 felony liability where the victim is under 9 and the offender is under 
17. The proposed provision would also impose Class 2 liability, but only 
where the offender is at least four years older than the victim. This age-cutoff 
system only excludes especially young offenders from the aggravation (any 
offender over age 13 would automatically receive Class 2 felony liability), 
and it enables the sexual abuse offense to employ a consistent grading 
scheme — relying on the age differential between victim and offender, rather 
than sometimes using a fixed cutoff line for the offender’s age and sometimes 
not — and also to track the distinctions made in the sexual assault offense. 
See proposed Section 1301(4)(b)(i), (d) and corresponding commentary.
 Section 1302(3)(a)(ii) and (iii) retain the current Class 2 felony grade 
for offenses where the defendant causes bodily harm to, impregnates, or 
threatens or endangers the life of, the victim. See 720 ILCS 5/12-16(a)(2), 
(a)(5). Like proposed Section 1301(4)(a)(ii), this provision specifically 
mentions pregnancy as an aggravating factor, thus avoiding the need to 
specifically include pregnancy as “bodily harm.” See 720 ILCS 5/12-12(b).
 Section 1302(3)(b)(i)(A), like current 5/12-15(a)(1) and (2), grades the 
offense as a Class 4 felony where the defendant uses or threatens to use force, 
or knows the victim is unable to consent.
 Section 1302(3)(b)(i)(B) grades the offense as a Class 4 felony where 
the victim is between 13 and 17 and the defendant is at least four years 
older.82 Current 5/12-16(d) grades this offense as a Class 2 felony. The 
current provision, however, includes all offenses involving either sexual 
intercourse or sexual conduct. Offenses involving intercourse, which are 
generally considered more serious under the statutory scheme than those 
involving sexual conduct, remain a Class 2 felony under proposed Section 
1301(4)(c).
 Section 1302(3)(b)(i)(C) grades the offense as a Class 4 felony where 
the defendant is 17 or older and holds a position of trust, authority, or 
supervision over a victim who is between 13 and 17. Current 5/12-16(f) 
 82 As with the proposed sexual assault offense, the proposed sexual abuse offense 
imposes a four-year minimum age differential, as opposed to current law’s five-year minimum 
differential. See supra commentary for Section 1301(4)(c).
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grades this offense as a Class 2 felony. As is reflected in both the current and 
proposed grading for sexual assault offenses, however, these cases seem less 
serious than those involving bodily harm, threats, or victims under 13 years 
old. Accordingly, the proposed Code applies the distinction recognized in 
those offenses to the sexual abuse offenses as well.
 Section 1302(3)(b)(ii) grades the offense as a Class A misdemeanor 
where the victim is less than 13 years old and the defendant is less than four 
years older. Current 5/12-15(b) does not include this distinction, but grades 
all cases involving either sexual intercourse or sexual conduct as a Class 
A misdemeanor where the offender is under 17 and the victim is between 
9 and 17. The proposed grade is one grade lower than the grade for the 
corresponding category of sexual assault, and one grade higher than the grade 
for relevant sexual abuses involving victims over 13, in order to recognize 
the significance of different age categories of victim and of the difference 
between intercourse and sexual conduct. See supra commentary for Section 
1301(4)(d).
 Section 1302(3)(b)(iii)’s residual grading provision for all remaining 
cases corresponds to current 5/12-15(c), as it would apply where the victim is 
between 13 and 17, the defendant is less than four years older than the victim, 
and the offense does not involve the use or threat of force. The proposed 
provision grades this offense as a Class B misdemeanor, whereas the 5/12-
15(c) offense is a Class A misdemeanor. The current provision, however, 
includes offenses involving either sexual intercourse or sexual conduct. 
Offenses involving intercourse, which are generally considered more serious 
under the statutory scheme than those involving sexual conduct, remain a 
Class A misdemeanor under proposed Section 1301(4)(e).
 The proposed provision does not retain other currently employed 
aggravating factors. Some of those factors aggravate for conduct already 
addressed by other offenses. See 720 ILCS 5/12-16(a)(1) (sexual abuse 
plus weapons offense); 5/12-16(a)(6) (sexual abuse plus other felony); 5/12-
16(a)(7) (sexual abuse plus assault and/or drug offense); 5/12-16(b) (sexual 
abuse plus incest). Under the proposed scheme for multiple convictions, 
additional punishment could be imposed in such cases for the other offense, 
so that aggravation of the penalty for the sexual abuse offense is unnecessary. 
See proposed Sections 254 and 906 and corresponding commentary; see also 
supra note 75 (discussing incest issue in sexual assault context).
 Three current aggravations that deal with specific categories of victim 
have not been retained in the proposed Code. See 720 ILCS 5/12-16(a)(3) 
(victim is age 60 or older); 5/12-16(a)(4) (victim is handicapped); 5/12-
16(e) (victim is severely or profoundly retarded person). Sexual assaults 
involving elderly or handicapped victims will often cause bodily harm or 
endanger the victim’s life, and will therefore be aggravated to a Class 2 
felony under proposed Section 1302(3)(a)(ii) and (iii). Where they do not, 
the victim’s status will often be more appropriate as a factor to govern proper 
sentencing, rather than one that merits a full-grade aggravation. See also 
supra commentary for Section 1301(4).
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Section 1303. Sexual Exploitation of a Child
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/11-9.1
Comment:
 General. Section 1303 defines an offense to prohibit a person from 
encouraging a child to engage in illicit self-exposure.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 1303 is substantively similar 
to current 5/11-9.1(a-5), but has been reorganized to enhance clarity.83 The 
indecency offense addressed in current 5/11-9.1(a) is now included within 
the proposed general indecency offense. See proposed Section 6201 and 
corresponding commentary. The offense in proposed Section 1303 addresses 
harms to children that specifically victimize the children and relate to their 
sexuality, rather than the distinct indecent act of exposing oneself to others. 
 Section 1303(2) grades the offense as a Class A misdemeanor, the same 
as current 5/11-9.1, but removes the aggravation for subsequent offenses, as 
there is a general aggravation for recidivism in proposed Section 905.
 Section 1303 eliminates the definitions in current 5/11-9.1(b) as they 
are no longer necessary to the provision.
 Section 1304. Custodial Sexual Misconduct
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/11-9.2
Comment:
 General. Section 1304 creates an offense covering correctional 
employees and custodial officers who engage in sexual conduct or intercourse 
with others under their custodial supervision.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 1304 is substantively similar 
to current 5/11-9.2, but it has been rephrased to enhance clarity, and it does 
not incorporate certain parts of the current provision. Current 5/11-9.2(d) 
has not been retained in the proposed Code, as it addresses a procedural 
matter that belongs outside the Code. Current 5/11-9.2(e) has been deleted 
as unnecessary; that provision states that consent is not a defense, but the 
proposed General Part already includes a provision pointing out that consent 
is not a defense unless it negates an element of an offense. See proposed 
Section 251 and corresponding commentary. The exemption for married 
couples in 5/11-9.2(f)(1) has been incorporated into the offense definition. 
There is no need to retain current 5/11-9.2(f)(2), as the effect of that 
provision’s exemption is merely to restate the offense’s “read-in” culpability 
of recklessness as to whether the victim was in custody. See proposed Section 
205(3).
 83 As in other provisions in the proposed Code, Section 1303 replaces the term 
“purpose” with “intent,” as “purpose” is not one of the defined culpability terms in proposed 
Section 206. 
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 Section 1304(2) retains the definition in current 5/11-9.2(g)(1), but 
uses the term “penal custody” to distinguish this specific context from other 
contexts in which the Code uses the term “custody,” as when it refers to 
custody of a child. Current 5/11-9.2(g)(2)’s definition of “penal system” 
has been eliminated, as the defined term “correctional employee” limits 
the meaning of “penal system.” The definition of “employee” in current 
subsection (g)(3) is now addressed by proposed Section 5308 (q.v.). Current 
5/11-9.2(g)(4)’s cross-reference to definitions appearing elsewhere has 
been removed, as Section 1307 includes a summary of, and cross-reference 
to, all defined terms in the Article. The definitions of “probation officer” 
and “supervising officer” in 5/11-9.2(g)(5) and (6) have been removed as 
unnecessary, because those terms are not used in the proposed provision. The 
offense is inherently limited to those who have “custody” of or “authority” 
over their victims; it is redundant to further define the offender to be a 
particular type of official exercising such authority.84
 Section 1304(3) grades the offense as a Class 3 felony, as does current 
5/11-9.2(c).
Section 1305. Prohibited Conduct by Convicted Child Sex Offender
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/11-9.3; 5/11-9.4
Comment:
 General. Section 1305 creates an offense prohibiting convicted child 
sex offenders from knowingly approaching, contacting, or communicating 
with children in certain public places where children are expected to be 
present.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 1305 corresponds to current 
5/11-9.3 and -9.4. Section 1305(1) defines an offense similar to current 
law,85 but makes three substantive changes and has been reorganized and 
consolidated to enhance brevity and clarity.
 The most significant change from current law is that the proposed 
offense only applies where the offender knowingly approaches, contacts, or 
communicates with a child in one of the enumerated public places. Section 
1305 eliminates the current prohibitions against loitering or residing within 
a certain distance of such a public place. Those offenses reach considerably 
further than the proposed offense, and thereby — because all the underlying 
 84 Section 1304(1)(b) uses the term “custodial officer,” which is defined in Section 
5302(2) to include both correctional officers and those who supervise civil detainees. Section 
1304(1)(b) is thus similar to current 5/11-9.2 in criminalizing engaging in sexual conduct with 
one who has been civilly committed under the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, but 
would also reach misconduct involving persons who have been civilly committed under other 
statutes.
 85 As under current 5/11-9.3(c)(3) and 5/11-9.4(d)(3), the phrase “any sexual offense” is 
meant to include convictions for child sex offenses from other state and federal jurisdictions. 
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conduct addressed by these offenses is inchoate and preliminary in nature 
— run the risk of criminalizing innocent or even unavoidable or unwitting 
conduct. The proposed provision limits liability to conduct that is less likely 
to be purely innocent, yet still expands the scope of liability for this type of 
inchoate conduct beyond what is normally required for an attempt, in order 
to provide additional protection against would-be child sex offenders.86
 Second, Section 1305(1)(a)(ii) states that liability may only be imposed 
where the sex offender knows, or has been notified, that he is a person subject 
to the offense.87 As discussed above, the proposed offense does not require any 
actual harm, but addresses conduct that is at most preparatory in nature, thus 
increasing the risk that liability will be imposed on persons whose conduct 
was innocent and who may have had no reason to be aware of the offense’s 
prohibitions. Moreover, it remains possible to impose attempt liability on 
offenders whose conduct amounts to a substantial step toward a sex offense, 
regardless of whether the offender was on notice as to the separate Section 
1305 offense. See proposed Section 801 and corresponding commentary.
 Third, Section 1305(1) changes the age requirement for the children 
involved in the prior and current offenses from under 18 years old to under 
17 years old, tracking the age requirements in the proposed underlying sex 
offenses (Sections 1301 through 1303).
 Section 1305(2) corresponds to current 5/11-9.3(a) and 5/11-9.4(a) 
by providing exceptions for parents or guardians who have children present 
and persons who obtain suitable permission to be present at the location in 
question. The proposed Code removes these exceptions from the offense 
definition and places them into a separate subsection to enhance clarity.
 Section 1305(3) incorporates current 5/11-9.4(d)(4)’s definition of 
“public park.” 
 86 In addition to the offense under Section 1305, such offenders may commit an 
attempted sex offense if, under the circumstances, their conduct in approaching or contacting 
a child can be considered a substantial step toward the commission of the sex offense. See 
proposed Section 801 and corresponding commentary. Where the offender engages in 
prohibited conduct separate from that required by the proposed offense (e.g., touching or 
abducting the child), the offender may face liability for multiple offenses. For a discussion 
of the proposed rules for convicting and sentencing multiple offenses, see commentary for 
proposed Sections 254 and 906.
 87 The exact procedures for notifying convicted child sex offenders that they are subject 
to this offense would need be added to the Code of Corrections, or another chapter of current 
law, as conforming amendments to the Criminal Code. One obvious way to provide such 
notice would be to inform persons when they are sentenced for a child sex offense, or released 
from custody for such an offense, that they are subject to Section 1305. Cf. 730 ILCS 150/1 et 
seq. (Sex Offender Registration Act).
 Section 1305 does not include the definitions of “child sex offender” and “sex 
offense” in current 5/11-9.3(c)(1) and (2) and 5/11-9.4(d)(1) and (2), as it is anticipated that 
these definitions will be included in the provisions governing procedures for notification of 
offenders.
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 The definition of “school” in current 5/11-9.3(c)(4) has not been used, as 
the proposed offense incorporates the definition into the offense definition. This 
change avoids the problem of having one definition of the term “school” solely 
for this offense and another general definition for the rest of the Code. See 
proposed Section 108 (defining “school” to include colleges and universities).
 The definitions in current 5/11-9.3(c)(6) (“school official”), and 5/11-
9.4(d)(5) (“facility providing programs,” etc.) have not been incorporated, as 
the terms are within common understanding and the current definitions do 
not clarify the terms’ meanings. 
 Section 1305(4) grades the offense as a Class 4 felony, as do both 
current 5/11-9.3(d) and 5/11-9.4(e).
Section 1306. General Provisions Relating to this Article
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/12-17; 5/12-18
Comment:
 General. Section 1306 provides two general rules that govern each of 
the provisions in Article 1300. Section 1306(1) clarifies that where an offense 
requires a victim to be of a certain age, the defendant need only be negligent 
as to the person’s age, unless expressly provided otherwise.88 In other words, 
a reasonable mistake (but not an unreasonable or reckless mistake) as to 
the victim’s age may negate the required culpability for an offense.89 See 
proposed Section 207 and corresponding commentary. Section 1306(2) 
provides an exemption to the offenses in this Article for medical examinations 
or procedures performed by doctors, licensed medical professionals, parents, 
or caretakers in a manner consistent with reasonable medical standards.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 1306(1) corresponds to 
current 5/12-17(b), but restates that provision’s “defense” as a culpability 
requirement.90 In addition, Section 1306 applies to every offense in this 
 88 Section 1306 thus provides a default rule of negligence as to a victim’s age, but 
preserves the General Assembly’s prerogative to impose a different culpability requirement for 
a specific offense by expressly stating the requirement within that offense.
 89 A reasonable mistake as to age would provide a complete defense only where the 
defendant reasonably believed the victim to be over 17 years of age. In all other cases, the 
defendant would still be liable for the grade of the offense that would apply if the victim were 
the age the defendant reasonably believed the victim to be. For example, an adult defendant 
who had sexual intercourse with someone he reasonably believed was 14, but who was in fact 
12, would be liable for a Class 2 felony under proposed Section 1301(4)(c).
 90 Under current law, this provision defines an affirmative defense, requiring the 
defendant to raise some evidence of his reasonable mistake to obtain a jury instruction on the 
issue. See People v. Lemons, 593 N.E.2d 1040, 1044 (Ill. App. 1992). Under the proposed 
Code, the defendant would not bear the burden of production on the issue. See proposed 
Section 107 and corresponding commentary. Because the defendant’s negligence as to the 
victim’s age is a culpability requirement like any other, it seems appropriate to place a similar 
burden on the State as exists for culpability with respect to any other element.
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Article, and not just to sexual abuse and aggravated sexual abuse, as the 
current provision provides. There is no obvious reason to require negligence 
as to age for some sex offenses, but require either recklessness (if it is intended 
that current 5/4-3(b)’s “read-in” provision applies to these elements) or no 
culpability (if it does not) for others. In selecting a uniform rule, negligence 
seems appropriate because it will allow for liability in nearly all cases, but 
still enables those who acted reasonably and could not have been expected to 
know otherwise to show that their acts were reasonable.
 Section 1306(2)’s exemption for medical procedures is nearly identical 
to current 5/12-18(b).91
 Section 1306 does not incorporate the remaining provisions in current 
5/12-17 to -18.1. The consent definition in current 5/12-17(a) is unnecessary, 
because the proposed General Part includes a provision to govern the 
significance of consent. See proposed Section 251 and corresponding 
commentary. (As with the current provision, a lack of verbal or physical 
resistance and/or dressing in a certain fashion would not constitute consent 
under proposed Section 251.)
 Current 5/12-18(a), which imposes an “anti-presumption” forbidding 
presumptions of an offender’s lack of capacity to commit an offense, is 
confusing and unnecessary. A person’s capacity to commit an offense is 
always governed by the offense definition and by any relevant defenses in the 
General Part. Current 5/12-18(c) to (g) address procedural matters properly 
addressed outside the Code. Current 5/12-18.1 has been removed, as it 
addresses matters of civil liability properly addressed outside the Code.
Section 1307. Definitions
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/2-14; 5/11-9.2(g)(2); 
5/11-9.3(c)(5); 5/11-9.4(d)(4),(6); 
5/12-12; 5/31A-1.1(c)(1); 5/31A-
1.2(d)(2)
Comment:
 General. This provision collects defined terms used in Article 1300 and 
provides cross-references to the provisions in which they are defined.
 Relation to current Illinois law. For a discussion of the relationship 
between Article 1300’s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary 
for the provision in which the term is initially defined.
 91 In People v. Foster, 552 N.E.2d 1112, 1131 (Ill. App. 1990), the court found that 
because current 5/12-18(b) defines an “exception,” rather than a defense or an element of the 
offense, the burden was on the defendant to prove by a preponderance that he was entitled to 
the exception. Under the proposed Code, this exemption is an affirmative defense as to which 
the defendant bears the burden of production, but the State bears the burden of persuasion 
beyond a reasonable doubt. See proposed Section 107 and corresponding commentary.
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ARTICLE 1400. KIDNAPING, COERCION, AND RELATED OFFENSES
Section 1401. Kidnaping; Aggravated Kidnaping
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/10-1; 5/10-2 
Comment:
 Generally. Section 1401 creates an offense prohibiting a person from 
knowingly confining another person against his will. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. The proposed offense corresponds to 
current 5/10-1 and 5/10-2. Section 1401 combines the two current offenses 
into one offense that is substantively similar to current law, but with several 
differences in the offense’s grading. 
 Section 1401(1) defines the basic offense in nearly identical fashion to 
current 5/10-1(a), but adds an explicit codification of the current Illinois rule, 
developed in case law, that parents cannot commit the offense of kidnaping 
their own children.92 Under the proposed Code, parents could still be liable 
for unlawful restraint and/or interference with custody. See proposed Sections 
1402 and 1403 and corresponding commentary.
 Section 1401(1)(a), like current 5/10-1(a)(1), prohibits a person 
from confining another secretly and against his will. As in current law, the 
proposed provision will support liability where either the fact of confinement 
or the place of confinement is secret. See People v. Mulcahey, 381 N.E.2d 
254, 256 (Ill. 1978) (finding defendant, who entered victim’s home while 
she was alone, taped her to chair, and phoned her husband for ransom, had 
“secretly confined” victim under kidnaping statute). 
 92 See, e.g., People v. Marin, 269 N.E.2d 303, 305 (Ill. 1971) (finding defendant not 
guilty of aggravated kidnaping in scheme to extort ransom from child’s grandfather because 
child’s father had consented to scheme); People v. Algarin, 558 N.E.2d 457, 462 (Ill. App. 
1990) (finding defendant, because he was victim’s biological father, not guilty of kidnaping 
where he grabbed his estranged child against her will and physically carried her for blocks 
while running from police and armed with knife).
 The court in Marin based its finding on an interpretation of current 5/10-1(b), which 
states that a child is kidnaped “against his will” if the child’s parent has not consented to the 
confinement. The Marin court read that provision to preclude liability in any case where a 
parent has consented, regardless of whether the defendant-kidnaper is actually the child’s 
parent or whether the child has consented. This reading of 5/10-1(b) is questionable, and 
although the proposed Code adopts the rule barring parental liability, it might still support 
liability — in appropriate cases, and where proposed Section 415’s justification defense does 
not apply — for a non-parent where the parent consents and the child does not.
 In addition, although a parent may not be held liable for kidnaping his or her own child, 
the proposed Code would allow the parent to be convicted as an accomplice to kidnaping 
in a case, like Marin, where the parent is legally accountable for the conduct of another in 
kidnaping the child. See proposed Section 301(3) and corresponding commentary. And where, 
as in Marin, the parent attempted to extort a ransom from a third party, he or she might be 
subject to potential liability for theft, or for an attempt or conspiracy to commit theft, in 
addition to aggravated kidnaping.
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 Section 1401(1)(b) is substantively similar to current 5/10-1(a)(2) and 
(3), but slightly alters the wording and organization of the current definition 
for purposes of clarity and brevity. The proposed definition punishes a person 
who “moves” another against his will in place of current 5/10-1(a)(2)’s 
prohibition against one who “carries” another against his will. The proposed 
language more clearly expresses the intent of the provision, which is to 
prohibit any forceful moving of another, as opposed to an actual physical 
“carrying” of another. This change in language would not mark a substantive 
change, as Illinois courts currently read the term “carries” broadly to include 
any movement of another. See People v. Casiano, 571 N.E.2d 742, 746 (Ill. 
App. 1991) (finding “carries” requirement in kidnaping statute did not mean 
defendant had to physically carry victim, but should be read more broadly to 
mean asportation or movement of another person).
 Section 1401(2) is similar to current 5/10-1(b) and clarifies that 
confinement or movement of a child under age 13 is against the child’s will, 
despite the child’s consent, if it is done without the consent of the child’s 
parent or guardian. Where the child has not consented, the provision does not 
apply, and the conduct may, in appropriate cases, constitute kidnaping even if 
the parent consents. See supra note 92.
 Section 1401(3) grades the kidnaping offense. Section 1401(3)(a)(i) and 
(ii), like current 5/10-2(a)(1) and (3), grade the offense as a Class X felony 
where the defendant intends to obtain a ransom93 or commits another felony 
against the victim. Section 1401(3)(a)(i) also adds an aggravation where the 
offender kidnaps the victim to obtain “performance of other demands,” so that 
the grading for this offense parallels that in proposed Section 1402 (unlawful 
restraint). The proposed provision eliminates as redundant the “inflicts great 
bodily harm” element in current 5/10-2(a)(3), as such conduct constitutes a 
felony against the victim under proposed Section 1201.
 Section 1401(3)(b) adds a middle grading tier, not present in current 
law, that provides Class 1 felony grading for two types of offenses. Subsection 
(3)(b)(i) covers cases where the victim is under 13 years old or severely or 
profoundly mentally retarded. The proposed provision lowers current 5/10-
2(a)(2)’s penalty from a Class X felony to a Class 1 felony, because such 
cases do not seem to merit a two-grade aggravation over the base offense, 
nor do they seem as serious as other Class X offenses, such as second-
degree murder. See proposed Section 1102 and corresponding commentary. 
Subsection (3)(b)(ii) creates an aggravation not present in current law, 
 93 As in current law, the offense of aggravated kidnaping is completed once the 
defendant secretly confines or moves the victim against his will with the intent to obtain 
a ransom. The offense does not require that the defendant communicate the demand or 
ultimately receive the ransom. See People v. Bolla, 448 N.E.2d 996, 1000 (Ill. App. 1983). In 
some cases, the defendant may also be liable for theft if he actually obtains the ransom. See 
proposed Section 2104 and corresponding commentary; see also proposed Sections 254 and 
906 and corresponding commentary (defining rules to govern convictions and sentencing for 
multiple offenses).
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grading the offense as a Class 1 felony where the confinement lasts longer 
than 24 hours. Such cases present a greater imposition on, and source of 
potential terror and harm for, the victim and deserve increased punishment 
over cases where the abduction lasts only a few minutes or hours.94
 Section 1401(3) does not incorporate the aggravation in current 5/10-
2(a)(4) for cases where the defendant wears a hood or conceals himself, 
because such conduct is incidental to the commission of the offense and does 
not reflect any additional harm or injury. The proposed Code also eliminates 
the aggravations in current 5/10-2(a)(5) through (8) for cases involving 
weapons. Most of the cases covered by these aggravations will necessarily 
involve another felony and will therefore already be subject to aggravation 
under Section 1401(3)(a)(ii). Moreover, the offender may be subject to 
additional liability for separate weapons offenses under proposed Article 
7100. See proposed Sections 254 and 906 and corresponding commentary 
(defining rules to govern convictions and sentencing for multiple offenses); 
see also infra commentary for Section 1402(2).
  Section 1401(3)(c) grades the base offense of kidnaping as a Class 2 
felony, the same as current 5/10-1(c). 
 Section 1401(4) defines “severely or profoundly mentally retarded 
person” in similar fashion to current 5/2-10.1.
 94 Like current law, Section 1401 does not require that the confinement of a person last 
a certain period of time, or that the movement cover a certain amount of space, to constitute 
an offense. Even a brief confinement or short movement may constitute a kidnaping, although 
whether it does may depend on the facts of the particular case. Compare, e.g., People v. Ware, 
751 N.E.2d 81, 88 (Ill. App. 2001) (finding that defendant kidnaped victim when he moved her 
a few feet from hallway to bathroom and detained her for only a few minutes), with People v. 
Lamkey, 608 N.E.2d 406, 409-10 (Ill. App. 1992) (finding that where victim was only detained 
for two minutes in an area open to public view, asportation of victim was merely incidental to 
offense of aggravated criminal sexual assault, and was therefore a lesser included offense of 
the assault).
 Under the proposed Code, whether the restraint or movement of another person may 
lead to additional liability beyond that for another related offense, such as sexual assault by 
force, is governed by the multiple-offense liability rules in proposed Section 254. Where the 
restraint offense under Section 1401 or 1402 is “based on the same conduct” as the sexual 
assault, liability for both offenses should be precluded; because sexual assault presupposes 
and requires some degree of restraining the victim, the harm of that incidental restraint or 
movement is “entirely accounted for by” the sexual assault offense. See proposed Section 
254(1)(a)(i) and corresponding commentary. However, when the restraint or movement is 
distinct from the sexual assault (e.g., the restraint or movement lasts over a long period, or 
occurs at a different time or in a different place than the sexual assault, as when the offender 
first restrains the victim and drags the victim to another location where he commits the 
assault), the two offenses will no longer be based on the “same conduct,” and the limitations 
in proposed Section 254(1)(a) will no longer apply.
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Section 1402. Unlawful Restraint; Aggravated Unlawful Restraint
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/10-3; 5/10-3.1; 
  5/10-4; 5/11-19.2
Comment:
 Generally. Section 1402 creates an offense prohibiting persons from 
knowingly detaining another against his will and without authority. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 1402 consolidates current 
5/10-3, 5/10-3.1, and 5/10-4.95 Section 1402(1) defines the offense in similar 
fashion to current 5/10-3(a). The proposed offense, like the current provision, 
broadly prohibits any knowing detention of another, when the detention is 
against he person’s will96 and without authority.97 As under current law, the 
offense could apply to cases involving parents or guardians who detain their 
own children without authority.98
 Section 1402(2) grades the offense in similar fashion to current law. 
Section 1402(2)(a) covers the same conduct as current 5/10-4(a)(2) (forcible 
detention), but aggravates for restraining peace officers, correctional 
employees, or community policing volunteers,99 and grades the offense the 
same, as a Class 2 felony. Section 1402(2)(b) grades the base offense of 
unlawful restraint as a Class 4 felony, as does current 5/10-3(b).
 95 Section 1402 does not explicitly incorporate the offense in current 5/11-19.2 
(exploitation of a child), although an offense under that provision would typically also be 
an offense under Section 1402. The conduct the current offense prohibits is also covered 
by proposed Sections 1401 (kidnaping; Class X to Class 2 felony) and 6203 (promoting, 
supporting, or living off proceeds of prostitution; Class 2 felony). In many cases, the defendant 
may be convicted for both an Article 1400 offense and a Section 6203 offense and be subject 
to additional liability for each. See proposed Sections 254 and 906 and corresponding 
commentary (defining rules to govern convictions and sentencing for multiple offenses).
 96 Although the requirement that the restraint be against the person’s will may seem to 
be inherent in the requirement of “without authority,” the proposed provision specifically adds 
the element to make the point clear and to parallel the similar requirement in proposed Section 
1401.
 97 The proposed offense replaces the term “legal authority” with “authority.” Any actual 
“authority” cannot be illegal or unlawful, so the word “legal” would be redundant. See, e.g., 
proposed Section 5103. The revision is not intended to effect any substantive change. 
 98 See, e.g., People v. Algarin, 558 N.E.2d 457, 464 (Ill. App. 1990) (finding defendant, 
who was victim’s estranged father, guilty of aggravated unlawful restraint after he grabbed 
victim and physically carried her against her will while armed and running from the police); 
People v. Warner, 424 N.E.2d 747, 749 (Ill. App. 1981) (finding defendant-guardian guilty of 
unlawful restraint for confining victim to his room for 30 days).
 Proposed Section 415, however, would prevent the application of Section 1402 in 
cases involving ordinary household discipline. That provision defines an explicit justification 
defense, not included in the current Code, for parents or guardians who use force to discipline 
or restrain their children, where the force is necessary to safeguard or promote the welfare of 
the children. 
 99 Cf. infra commentary for proposed Section 1404(2)(b).
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 Section 1402 does not incorporate the weapons aggravations in current 
5/10-3.1 and 5/10-4(a)(1). The current scheme of aggravating certain offenses 
based on the presence or use of a weapon, while also defining separate general 
weapons offenses, has created a complex and confusing sentencing scheme 
whose application Illinois courts have found unconstitutional on more 
than one occasion.100 The proposed Code defines, in Article 7100, separate 
weapons offenses that would subject a defendant to additional liability 
beyond the unlawful detention offense. See proposed Sections 254 and 906 
and corresponding commentary (defining rules to govern convictions and 
sentencing for multiple offenses).
 100 For example, in People v. Wisslead, 446 N.E.2d 512, 515-16 (Ill. 1983), the defendant 
was charged with unlawful restraint and armed violence based on detaining his wife with a 
handgun. Under the armed violence statute, the defendant could be held liable for a Class X 
felony for committing unlawful restraint while armed. See 720 ILCS 5/33A-2, -3; Wisslead, 
446 N.E.2d at 514. Although unlawful restraint is a lesser included offense of aggravated 
kidnaping (which includes kidnaping while armed), the latter offense would have only 
subjected the defendant to liability for a Class 1 felony. Id. Because the defendant was subject 
to a greater penalty for the lesser offense of armed violence based upon unlawful restraint, the 
Illinois Supreme Court ruled the armed violence statute violated the Proportionate Penalties 
clause (Article I, § 11) of the Illinois Constitution. Id.; see also People v. Christy, 564 N.E.2d 
770, 774 (Ill. 1990) (finding sentence for armed violence based on kidnaping unconstitutionally 
disproportionate to sentence for identical offense of aggravated kidnaping).
 The legislature apparently attempted to correct this problem by creating the offense 
of aggravated unlawful restraint, which grades use of a deadly weapon during an unlawful 
restraint as a Class 3 felony. Despite this change, an offender is still subject to two vastly 
different penalties for essentially the same conduct: aggravated unlawful restraint is a Class 3 
felony under 5/10-3.1, while armed violence predicated on unlawful restraint remains a Class 
X felony with an enhanced minimum term under 5/33A-2 and -3. In People v. Murphy, 635 
N.E.2d 110, 112-13 (Ill. App. 1994), the court rejected the defendant’s argument that these 
offenses created disproportionate penalties for the same conduct. The court found that the 
two offenses were not identical, because armed violence required the use of a “dangerous 
weapon,” while aggravated unlawful restraint required the use of a “deadly weapon.” See 
Murphy, 635 N.E.2d at 112. (Note, however, that current law does not define the term “deadly 
weapon,” so it is impossible to know how it differs from a “dangerous weapon.” Moreover, 
one would intuitively suppose that using a “deadly weapon” would be more serious than using 
a “dangerous weapon,” but the current grading scheme grades it less seriously.) Even so, 
the court found the statute unconstitutional due to the continuing grading disparity between 
aggravated kidnaping and armed violence based on unlawful restraint.
 The legislature acted again to correct that disparity by raising the penalties for 
aggravated kidnaping (based on use of a weapon) to be comparable to armed violence (Class 
X felony with enhancements). However, the disparity described above still exists between the 
grading of aggravated unlawful restraint and armed violence based on unlawful restraint. The 
proposed Code eliminates these concerns by creating separate offenses to address the use of 
weapons and declining to incorporate weapon-based enhancements for other offenses.
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Section 1403. Interference with Custody
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/10-5; 5/10-5.5; 5/10-7
Comment:
 Generally. Section 1403 creates an offense covering a person who 
interferes with a parent’s custody or visitation rights in violation of a court 
order.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 1403 corresponds to current 
5/10-5(b)(1), (2) and (9), and 5/10-5.5(b). Section 1403(1) makes clear that 
the offense applies only where conduct violates a court order regarding rights 
to “custody” of a child, which would include orders regarding visitation 
authority. (As under current law, the offense may apply even if the court 
issuing the order is in a jurisdiction other than Illinois.) Section 1403 does not 
include the definitions of “child,” “detain,” and “lawful custodian” in current 
5/10-5(a). “Lawful custodian” is not used in the proposed Code, while 
“child” and “detain” are terms whose definitions are within the common 
understanding of the trier of fact.
 In cases, such as those covered by current 5/10-5(b)(3) through (9), 
where a court has not issued a custody or visitation order, the conduct will 
either constitute kidnaping under Section 1401 (assuming the defendant is 
not a parent), unlawful restraint under Section 1402 (assuming the defendant 
does not have lawful authority to detain the child), or no offense at all. The 
proposed Code limits the offense to those cases involving a court order to 
ensure that, in matters relating to disputes over the custody of children, only 
serious interference with clearly defined and established custody rights is 
subject to criminal liability. Cases where one parent obtains physical custody 
of a child and another asserts, but has not yet conclusively established, legal 
custody essentially involve family-law disputes properly handled by civil, 
rather than criminal, authorities.
 Section 1403 also eliminates the luring offense in current 5/10-5(b)(10), 
as the relevant conduct would likely constitute either kidnaping (Section 
1401), unlawful restraint (Section 1402), or an attempt to commit either of 
those offenses (Section 801).
 Section 1403 eliminates the affirmative defenses in current 5/10-5(c). 
The affirmative defense in current 5/10-5(c)(1) is superfluous under the 
proposed Code, because the offense requires the violation of a court order. 
The proposed provision also eliminates as unnecessary the defense in current 
subsection 5/10-5(c)(2) for unavoidable failure to return a child temporarily in 
one’s custody. Like current 5/10-5(b), Section 1403(1) imposes a culpability 
requirement of “intentionally” as to both exerting control over the child and 
violating a court order. See proposed Section 205(2) (governing application 
of stated culpability term). In the cases addressed by 5/10-5(c)(2), the 
defendant has no intent to violate the order. Current 5/10-5(c)(3), providing 
a defense in cases where the defendant is fleeing an incident or pattern of 
domestic violence, is addressed by several of the justification offenses in 
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proposed Article 400. See proposed Section 412 (lesser evils); see also 
proposed Section 415 (allowing use of force by parent to promote welfare 
of child); cf. proposed Section 108 (defining “force” to include confinement 
and restraint). Current 5/10-5(c)(4) is likewise unnecessary because, as noted 
above, the proposed offense no longer covers the luring or attempted luring 
of children under 16.
 Section 1403(2) grades the offense slightly differently than current law. 
Section 1403(2)(a) raises the grade for cases involving interference with 
visitation rights from a petty offense to a Class C misdemeanor, taking the 
position that such interference is not so drastically different from interference 
with custody as to merit such a dramatically reduced relative grade. Section 
1403(2)(b) grades interference with custody as a Class 4 felony, the same as 
current 5/10-5(d).
 Section 1403 eliminates the recidivist provisions in current 5/10-5(d) 
and 5/10-5.5(c) in favor of the general recidivist provision in proposed 
Section 905. Section 1403 also does not incorporate the remaining sentencing 
and procedural provisions in current 5/10-5(d) through (i), and 5/10-5.5(d) 
through (h), as those provisions deal with matters properly addressed in 
the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Code of Corrections, rather than the 
Criminal Code. Section 1403 does not incorporate current 5/10-7 (aiding 
and abetting child abduction), as that provision addresses conduct already 
covered by the general complicity provision in proposed Section 301.
Section 1404. Criminal Coercion
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/12-6; 5/12-6.1; 5/12-
6.2; see also 720 ILCS 5/12-6.3; 
5/12-7; 5/12-7.2
Comment:
 Generally. Section 1404 creates an offense covering persons who 
threaten unlawful acts in order to compel another to engage in certain 
conduct.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 1404 corresponds to current 
5/12-6 to -6.2.101 Section 1404(1) defines the offense similarly to current 
5/12-6(a). (The provision’s organization also parallels proposed Section 2104 
(theft by extortion), which also deals with improper threats.) In addition, the 
proposed provision eliminates as redundant current 5/12-6(a)’s introductory 
language regarding the means of communication of the threat, as such 
communication is implicit in the requirement that the person “threaten” 
 101 Section 1404(1) also covers the conduct prohibited by current 5/12-6.3 (interfering 
with the reporting of domestic violence); 5/12-7 (compelling confession or information by 
force or threat); and 5/12-7.2 (educational intimidation). 
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another.102 Section 1404(1) also replaces the current phrase “without lawful 
authority” with “unlawfully,” but the alteration is not intended to effect a 
substantive change.
 Section 1404(1)(a) merges the content of current 5/12-6(a)(1) and 
(2). The proposed provision replaces the current phrase “physical harm” 
with the Code’s defined term “bodily harm.” See proposed Section 108 and 
corresponding commentary. Section 1404(1)(b) is the same as current 5/12-
6(a)(4). Section 1404(1)(c) is similar to current 5/12-6(a)(5), but clarifies 
that the threatened exposure to “hatred, contempt, or ridicule” must involve 
a “secret,” as merely revealing an embarrassing fact that is already known 
or obvious is a minor threat. Section 1404(1)(d) is similar to current 5/12-
6(a)(6), but replaces the term “public official” with the proposed Code’s 
defined term “public servant.” See proposed Section 108 and corresponding 
commentary. Section 1404(1)(e) is the same as current 5/12-6(a)(7).
 Section 1404(1) does not incorporate the prohibition in current 5/12-
6(a)(3) against threatening “any criminal offense,” because any relevant 
and significant conduct is already covered by the other subsections of this 
offense, or by proposed Section 1203 (terroristic threats). Moreover, the 
current provision is likely unconstitutionally overbroad, as it extends to even 
the most minor infractions. See United States ex rel. Holder v. Circuit Court, 
624 F. Supp. 68, 71 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
 Proposed Section 1404(2) generally grades each form of the offense 
at one grade lower than current law. Section 1402(2)(c) lowers the grade of 
the base offense from a Class 3 felony to a Class 4 felony. A Class 3 felony 
grade seems disproportionate for this offense when compared to other Class 
3 felonies, such as recklessly creating a risk of catastrophe. Moreover, where 
the offender carries through on the threat and commits another offense, he 
may be subject to additional liability for that offense. See proposed Sections 
254 and 906 and corresponding commentary (defining rules to govern 
convictions and sentencing for multiple offenses).
 Section 1404(2)(a) corresponds to current 5/12-6.1 and 5/12-6.2(a)(1) 
and grades the offense as a Class 2 felony where the offense is in furtherance 
of the activities of a criminal organization. To the extent current 5/12-6.1 
covers activities in furtherance of legitimate non-criminal organizations, 
such cases do not seem worthy of Class 2 felony status, a level of punishment 
reserved for offenses such as kidnaping and reckless homicide. 
 Section 1404(2)(b) corresponds to 5/12-6.2(a)(3), but grades cases 
involving coercion of a peace officer, correctional officer, or community 
policing volunteer as a Class 3 felony, rather than as a Class 2 felony. The 
proposed provision eliminates the aggravation in current law for cases 
involving firemen. Firemen do not protect the public peace, apprehend 
 102 As under current law, the threat must have a reasonable tendency to coerce the victim 
to omit or perform the intended act. See, e.g., People v. Gallo, 297 N.E.2d 569, 574 (Ill. 
1973).
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criminal offenders, or have the same amount of interaction with the public, 
and thus do not seem as likely to be victimized by this offense or to merit 
a per se full-grade aggravation in all cases. Cases involving firemen may 
appropriately be addressed by the court at sentencing. Moreover, the 
distinction recognized in current law seems somewhat arbitrary, as it may be 
just as sensible to recognize other similar groups of special victims, such as 
emergency workers, medical professionals, or public officials. To avoid such 
arbitrary distinctions, the proposed provision retains the aggravation only for 
the clearly serious cases involving peace officers and those who serve similar 
functions.
 Section 1404 eliminates the special grading provisions in current 5/12-
6.3 (interfering with the reporting of domestic violence); 5/12-7 (compelling 
confession or information by force or threat); and 5/12-7.2 (educational 
intimidation). Section 1404(1) addresses the conduct those offenses prohibit, 
and there is no obvious reason to grade that conduct differently from other 
forms of coercion. The proposed Code also eliminates the provision in current 
5/12-7.2(d) regarding civil liability, as such issues are properly addressed 
outside the Criminal Code. It is anticipated that 5/12-7.2(d) will be preserved 
by means of “conforming amendment” legislation.
Section 1405. Definitions
Corresponding Current Provision(s):  720 ILCS 5/2-3.5; 5/2-10.1; 5/2-
13; 5/2-17; 5/2-18; 5/15-1; 5/15-
4; 5/31-1(b); 5/31A-1.2(d)(2); 740 
ILCS 147/10
Comment:
 Generally. This provision collects defined terms used in Article 1400 
and provides cross-references to the provisions in which they are defined.
 Relation to current Illinois law. For discussion of the relationship 
between Article 1400’s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary 
for the provision in which each term is initially defined.
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ARTICLE 1500. ROBBERY OFFENSES
Section 1501. Robbery; Aggravated Robbery
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/2-7.1; 5/2-7.5; 5/18-1 
to -5; see also 720 ILCS 5/2-15a; 
5/2-15b; 5/2-19.5; 5/15-1 
Comment:
 Generally. Section 1501 creates an offense covering the taking of 
property from the person or presence of another through the use or threat of 
force. Although the offense involves the taking of property,103 it differs from 
theft by taking (Section 2102) in that it does not require that the actor possess 
the intent to permanently deprive the owner of the property. It is immaterial 
whether the offender intended to keep the property, or whether the property 
belonged to the victim or another.104 Robbery also differs from theft by 
 103 The Illinois Supreme Court has stated that the defendant need not ever possess the 
property for there to be a completed robbery. See People v. Gaines, 430 N.E.2d 1046, 1059 (Ill. 
1981). In Gaines, the defendant pointed a gun at the victim and stated, “This is a stick-up.” The 
victim testified that he pulled two dollars out of his pocket and put them on the floor. After the 
defendant fired his pistol and fled, the victim noticed that one of the bills remained, and he did 
not see what happened to the other bill. The defendant argued that there was no evidence of 
what happened to the other bill, and thus no evidence that he ever took physical possession of 
the money. The Illinois Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s argument, finding that it was 
not necessary to prove that the defendant “picked up and carried off any of the bills.” Id. Under 
the proposed Code, the defendant would have been guilty of attempted robbery, rather than 
robbery, if he never actually gained possession or control of the money. See proposed Section 
801 and corresponding commentary. On these facts, however, it is possible that the jury may 
reasonably have inferred that the defendant took one of the bills. Additionally, the defendant 
might be subject to liability for an attempted homicide offense under Article 1100, an assault 
or endangerment offense under Article 1200, and/or a weapons offense under Article 7100 for 
using and firing a firearm.
 104 See, e.g., People v. Banks, 388 N.E.2d 1244, 1246 (Ill. 1979) (affirming robbery 
conviction where defendant took two rings from wife by force, despite his claim that the 
rings were his). Under current law, the offender also need not have the intent to take another’s 
property at the time he uses or threatens force. There must, however, be some “concurrence” 
between the use or threat of force and the taking of the property for conduct to constitute 
robbery. See People v. Williams, 515 N.E.2d 1230, 1234-35 (Ill. 1987) (affirming robbery 
conviction where defendant struck victim and sexually assaulted her before leaving scene 
with her necklace); see also People v. Lewis, 651 N.E.2d 72, 88 (Ill. 1995) (affirming robbery 
conviction where defendant stabbed victim repeatedly, then took key to victim’s apartment 
from victim’s body as he fled apartment).
 Under the terms of Section 1501, an offender’s acquisition of the property must be 
directly based on his use or threat of force. Where this is not the case, however, the person 
may be charged with separate counts of an assault offense (or attempt) and a theft offense (or 
attempt), and may face liability for both. See proposed Sections 254 and 906 and corresponding 
commentary (defining rules to govern convictions and sentencing for multiple offenses). 
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imposing additional requirements. Robbery requires the taking to be from 
the person or presence of another,105 and also requires that the offender take 
the property “by force or threat of force.”
 Yet although theft and robbery do not precisely overlap, as each contains 
elements not found in the other, there typically should not be liability for both 
offenses under the proposed Code where the same conduct gives rise to both 
offenses. Proposed Section 254(1)(a)(i) would preclude multiple-offense 
liability in such cases, as the harm addressed by the theft offense (taking 
another’s property without consent) is entirely accounted for by the robbery 
offense. See proposed Section 254 and corresponding commentary; cf. 
People v. Jones, 595 N.E.2d 1071, 1074-75 (Ill. 1992) (holding theft a lesser 
included offense of robbery and that information charging robbery implicitly 
set forth requirement that property be taken with intent to deprive owner). 
This is made clear by Section 1501’s grading provision, which (like Section 
2109’s grading provision for theft) takes account of the value of the property 
the offender obtained in determining the grade for robbery. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 1501(1) defines the offense 
in nearly identical fashion to current 5/18-1, and also covers the conduct 
prohibited in 5/18-2 to 5/18-5. Thus, Section 1501 does not include the 
exception for motor vehicles in current 5/18-1(a).
 Because the central concern of the robbery offense is the direct use or 
threat of force against the victim, Section 1501 would not apply where the 
property taken was merely in the victim’s “constructive possession,” as the 
current provisions have been read to apply. See People v. Smith, 399 N.E.2d 
1289, 1292-93 (Ill. 1980) (affirming robbery conviction where victim, a store 
manager, took $4,500 in cash from store and left it in a bag for defendant, 
in response to defendant’s phone threat that he would detonate an explosive 
in the store if victim did not comply with his demand for money). Where 
property is not taken directly from the victim, the offender might be guilty 
of both theft and another offense under Section 1203 (terroristic threats) or 
1404 (criminal coercion), and would face additional liability for each of those 
offenses. See proposed Sections 254 and 906 and corresponding commentary 
(defining rules to govern convictions and sentencing for multiple offenses). 
He would not, however, be guilty of robbery under Section 1501.
 Section 1501 does not require any specific level of force; as under 
current law, a purse-snatching case, for example, may constitute robbery. 
Compare, e.g., People v. Bowel, 488 N.E.2d 995, 998 (Ill. 1986) (finding 
defendant took victim’s purse by force when he pulled the purse from her 
arm while holding her hand immobile and turning her body “slightly”), 
with People v. Patton, 389 N.E.2d 1174, 1177 (Ill. 1979) (reversing robbery 
conviction where defendant took victim’s purse from her body “without any 
sensible or material violence to the person,” despite fact that victim’s arm 
 105 Unlike the current theft offense, see 720 ILCS 5/16-1(b), the proposed theft offenses 
do not aggravate the penalty for theft where it is from the person. See proposed Section 
2109.
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was thrown back “a little bit”). Whether an offender has exerted force in 
taking another’s property is generally an issue to be decided by the trier of 
fact.
 Section 1501(1) refers only to the “threat of force,” and not to 
“threatening the imminent use of force,” as current 5/18-1 does. Robbery 
liability seems appropriate even where the threatened injury may not occur 
immediately — although it is also not anticipated that merely any vague 
threat of harm in the future will suffice for liability. The proposed language 
is also consistent with other provisions in the proposed Code that prohibit 
“force or threat of force.”
 Section 1501(2) grades the offense. The grading categories recognized 
in Section 1501(2)(a) and (b)(i) track proposed Section 2109(2) and (3), and 
are designed to ensure that robbery of property will always be as serious 
an offense as, and nearly always a more serious offense than, mere theft of 
the same property. Section 1501(2)(a) grades the offense as a Class 1 felony 
where the property taken is worth over $10,000106 or is a firearm or motor 
vehicle. Corresponding thefts are graded as Class 2 felonies under Section 
2109(2). The grading for motor-vehicle robbery ensures that the offense is 
graded more seriously than proposed Section 2301’s car invasion offense, 
which does not require that the offender acquire, or attempt to acquire, the 
car. The grading for motor-vehicle robbery is also the same as under current 
5/18-3’s “vehicular hijacking” offense. Section 1501(2)’s general maximum 
grade of Class 1 felony is the same as exists under 5/18-1.
 Section 1501(2)(b)(i) grades the offense as a Class 2 felony where the 
property taken is worth over $1,000. Corresponding thefts are graded as 
Class 3 felonies under Section 2109(3).
 Section 1501(2)(b)(ii) and (iii), like current 5/18-1(b), aggravate the 
penalty above the base grade for robberies whose victims are handicapped107 
or over 60, and for robberies committed in a school or place of worship. 
Section 1501(2)(b)(ii)(C) adds an aggravation for victims under 17 years old, 
for the sake of consistency, as this category of victim is recognized elsewhere 
as having special status. Cf. 720 ILCS 5/18-4(a)(2) (aggravating vehicular 
hikacking offense where person under 16 is in vehicle). Section 1501(2)(b)(iv) 
retains the aggravation in 5/18-5(a) for cases where the offender indicates he 
is armed with a dangerous weapon, regardless of whether or not he is actually 
 106 Where the property taken is worth over $100,000, the Class 1 felony grade is the 
same for both robbery and theft. This grading reflects two considerations: (1) at this monetary 
level, the value of the property is a significant part of the seriousness of the offense, whether 
it is theft or robbery; and (2) at this grading level, the value of the property and the force used 
may both properly guide sentencing determinations, but probably do not collectively warrant 
aggravation to a Class X felony — a category reserved for such serious offenses as second-
degree murder.
 107 The proposed aggravation applies to mentally handicapped as well as physically 
handicapped victims, both because such victims seem equally deserving of special status and 
in order to maintain consistency with other grading aggravations in the Code.
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armed. In all these cases, the offense is aggravated to a Class 2 felony, 
whereas the current provisions aggravate to a Class 1 felony.108
 Section 1501(2)(c) grades all other offenses as a Class 3 felony, one 
grade below current 5/18-1’s Class 2 felony grade for the base offense. This 
grade reflects the fact that more serious liability under Section 1501(2)(a) or 
(b), and/or additional liability for an Article 1200 offense, or liability under 
both Article 1200 and Section 2109, will be available where a significant 
amount of property is taken and/or an assault is committed against the 
victim.
 The proposed Code eliminates the offense of armed robbery in 
current 5/18-2, as such cases will already be covered by the aggravation 
in 1501(2)(b)(iv) and would also be subject to additional liability for a 
weapons offense under Article 7100. See proposed Sections 254 and 906 
and corresponding commentary (defining rules to govern convictions and 
sentencing for multiple offenses). Likewise, the proposed Code eliminates 
the aggravated vehicular hijacking offense in current 5/18-4, as the conduct 
described in that offense is already covered by the general robbery offense, 
the felony-murder provision (Section 1102(1)(b)), assault offenses (Article 
1200), and/or weapons offenses (Article 7100).109
 Section 1501(3) makes clear that the value of the property involved in a 
robbery is to be determined according to the same rules governing the value 
of property involved in a theft under Section 2109(7).
 108 The conduct prohibited in current 5/18-5(a-5) (robbery plus injection of a controlled 
substance) is covered by the base robbery offense and the proposed assault offense (Section 
1201). Under the proposed rules for convicting and sentencing multiple offenses, an offender 
under current 5/18-5(a-5) would likely face punishment for both offenses under the proposed 
Code, and thus a total sentence close to the current Class 1 felony penalty for aggravated 
robbery. See proposed Sections 254 and 906 and corresponding commentary.
 109 Both 5/18-2’s armed-robbery offense and 5/18-4’s aggravated-vehicular-hijacking 
offense have, when compared to current 5/33A-2’s armed-violence offense, been held to 
create violations of the Illinois Constitution’s Proportionate Penalties clause (Art. I, § 11). In 
People v. Lewis, 677 N.E.2d 830 (Ill. 1997), a case involving a robbery with a handgun, the 
Illinois Supreme Court compared the penalty for armed violence predicated on robbery to the 
penalty for armed robbery. Although the offenses required the same elements — committing 
robbery while armed with a dangerous weapon — 5/18-2 graded armed robbery as a Class 
X felony, while 5/33A-3 graded armed violence with a “Category I weapon” (such as a 
handgun) as a “Class X felony for which the defendant shall be sentenced to a minimum 
term of imprisonment of 15 years.” The Illinois Supreme Court held that those penalties were 
unconstitutionally disproportionate. See 677 N.E.2d at 835.
 The legislature subsequently amended 5/18-2 to grade armed robbery involving a firearm 
as a “Class X felony for which 15 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed 
by the court.” In People v. Walden, 769 N.E.2d 928 (Ill. 2002), the Illinois Supreme Court 
held that this amended penalty, when compared to the penalty for armed violence predicated 
on aggravated robbery, still creates a constitutionally impermissible disproportionality. 
Whereas armed violence with a firearm imposes a minimum sentence of either 10 or 15 years, 
depending on the type of firearm involved, current 5/18-2 imposes a sentence of 21 to 45 years 
for armed robbery while in possession of a firearm. See also People v. Garcia, 770 N.E.2d 208 
(Ill. 2002); People v. Blanco, 770 N.E.2d 214 (Ill. 2002).
(continued…)
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 Section 1501(4)(a) provides a definition of the term “dangerous 
weapon.” Current 5/18-2 uses, but does not define, this term. As a result, 
Illinois courts have identified four categories of weapons which may or may 
not be found to be dangerous, depending on the ability of the item to inflict 
serious injury in a given case. See, e.g., People v. Skelton, 414 N.E.2d 455, 
458 (Ill. 1980) (holding as a matter of law that toy gun used by defendant was 
not sufficiently susceptible of use in a manner likely to cause serious injury); 
People v. Elliott, 702 N.E.2d 643, 647 (Ill. App. 1998) (finding evidence 
sufficient for jury to reasonably conclude that pepper spray was a dangerous 
weapon). The proposed provision offers a definition to guide courts in 
deciding whether a given item is a dangerous weapon. In addition, the 
definition includes an illustrative list of items that will always be considered 
dangerous weapons. The list explicitly includes both any “firearm” and any 
“gun not ordinarily used as a weapon,” meaning that such items will satisfy 
an offense element requiring a “dangerous weapon.”
 Section 1501(4)(b) defines “firearm” in nearly identical fashion to 
current law, but uses the defined term “gun not ordinarily used as a weapon” 
to exclude items like pneumatic guns and signaling devices, rather than 
listing all the specific types of non-firearm “guns.” See 720 ILCS 5/2-7.1 
(incorporating by reference the definition of “firearm” provided in 430 ILCS 
65/1.1); 5/2-7.5 (same).
 Section 1501(4)(c) cross-references Section 108’s definition of “force,” 
a term that current Chapter 720 defines only in the context of sexual offenses. 
See proposed Section 108 and corresponding commentary.
 109 (…continued)
 Similarly, in People v. Beard, 679 N.E.2d 456 (Ill. App. 1997), a case involving a 
hijacking of a car with a sawed-off shotgun, the court compared the penalty for armed violence 
predicated on vehicular hijacking to the penalty for aggravated vehicular hijacking. Although 
the offenses criminalized essentially the same conduct — taking another’s motor vehicle while 
armed with a dangerous weapon — 5/18-4 graded aggravated vehicular hijacking as a Class 
X felony, while 5/33A-3 graded armed violence with a sawed-off shotgun as a Class X felony 
with a minimum term of imprisonment of 15 years. The Illinois Supreme Court held that 
the penalty for armed violence predicated on vehicular hijacking with a Category I weapon 
violated the Proportionate Penalties clause. See id. at 458.
 The legislature has since amended 5/18-4(b) in similar manner to the armed-robbery 
amendment noted above, grading an aggravated vehicular hijacking involving a firearm as 
a “Class X felony for which 15 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed 
by the court.” The Illinois courts have yet to evaluate this new penalty, but it would appear 
to be unconstitutionally disproportionate to that for armed violence. As with the amended 
armed-robbery grading provision found unconstitutional in Walden, whereas armed violence 
with a firearm imposes a minimum sentence of either 10 or 15 years, depending on the type 
of firearm involved, current 5/18-4(b) imposes a more severe sentence of 21 to 45 years for 
aggravated vehicular hijacking while in possession of a firearm.
 The proposed Code avoids such concerns about constitutionality by defining a single 
general offense to address the actual use or possession of a weapon — as opposed to Section 
1501(2)(b)(iv)’s aggravation for indicating that one is armed — in the course of any felony. 
See proposed Section 7101 (criminalizing possession or use of dangerous weapon in course 
of felony).
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 Section 1501(4)(d) defines the term “gun not ordinarily used as a 
weapon” to cover nearly all the items excluded by the current definition of 
“firearm.” See 720 ILCS 5/2-7.1 (incorporating by reference the definition 
of “firearm” provided in 430 ILCS 65/1.1); 5/2-7.5 (same). Because this 
term does not include antique or historical guns, however, such guns would 
fall within the proposed Code’s definition of “firearm,” whereas they are 
specifically excluded from the current definition of “firearm.” To the extent 
such guns present similar dangers to other firearms, it seems sensible to treat 
them as “firearms” in the unlikely event that one is used in the commission of 
an offense. Moreover, it is easier to draw a clear definitional line excluding 
such non-weapon “guns” as pneumatic guns and rivet guns, whereas the 
distinction between a “normal” firearm and an “old” firearm may be narrower 
and more difficult to draw in specific cases.
 Section 1501(4)(e) through (i) provide cross-references for other defined 
terms used in Section 1501. For discussion of the relationship between those 
terms and current law, refer to the commentary for the provision in which 
each term is initially defined.
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ARTICLE 2100. THEFT AND RELATED PROVISIONS
Section 2101. Consolidation of Theft Offenses
Corresponding Current Provision(s): None
Comment:
 Generally. This provision assures that the offense definitions and grading 
provisions in Article 2100 are read together as applying to different forms of 
the same offense. The Code could achieve the same result by having one very 
large theft section with many subsections, but such an approach would be 
awkward. A consolidation provision avoids the problem of having to charge 
several different offenses to make sure an indictment covers conduct that may 
fall into different categories, such as theft, embezzlement, or receipt of stolen 
goods. In this way, the provision preempts issues regarding offense liability 
or grading that stem from disputes as to “which kind” of theft a defendant’s 
conduct constitutes. The consolidation of theft offenses also enables Article 
2100 to have a unified grading provision and unified defense provisions.
 A consolidation provision making theft “a single offense” does not 
preclude the possibility of charging multiple counts of that offense — just 
as, for example, arson is a “single offense” but may be charged in multiple 
counts. (See proposed Sections 253 and 254 and corresponding commentary 
for rules governing the circumstances under which there may be a conviction 
for multiple counts of the same offense.)
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 2101 has no corresponding 
provision in current Chapter 720.
Section 2102. Theft by Unlawful Taking or Disposition
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/15-2; 5/15-3; 5/15-7; 
5/16-4; 5/16-1(a)(1), (5); 5/16-
1.1; 5/16A-3(a); 5/16E-3(a)(1), 
(4); 5/16G-25; 5/20-1(b); see also 
625 ILCS 5/18c-7502; 720 ILCS 
5/42-1; 215/4; 370/1; 765 ILCS 
835/1
Comment:
 Generally. This provision defines the most straightforward form of 
theft: knowingly taking property that belongs to another person.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 2102(1) corresponds to current 
5/16-1(a)(1),110 but adopts several organizational and substantive changes. 
 110 Section 2101 also addresses most of the thefts covered by current 5/16-1(a)(5). Any 
other such thefts would be covered by proposed Section 2105 (q.v.).
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First, Section 2102(1) effectively adopts the culpability requirement of 
current 5/16-1(a)(A), eliminating the alternative culpability requirements in 
current 5/16-1(a)(B) and (C).111 These alternative culpability requirements 
were originally intended to cover “special situations” where it may be difficult 
to prove the intent to deprive. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 ¶ 16-1 Committee 
Comments (Smith-Hurd 1964). However, these alternative requirements are 
needlessly confusing and rarely used by prosecuting authorities. See 1 JOHN 
F. DECKER, ILLINOIS CRIMINAL LAW: A SURVEY OF CRIMES AND DEFENSES § 11.14 
- § 11.15, at 572-73 (3d ed. 2000). Further, most of the situations covered 
by these additional culpability requirements have been incorporated into the 
definition of “deprive” in proposed Section 2102(2) (q.v.). 
 In addition, Section 2102(1) covers the same conduct addressed 
by other current provisions that prohibit theft by taking in the context of 
specific circumstances or forms of property, such as theft from coin-operated 
machines (5/16-5; entitled “theft,” but defines a property damage offense); 
retail theft (5/16A-3(a)); library theft (5/16B-2(a)); delivery container theft 
(5/16E-3(a)(1),(4)); looting (5/42-1); animal research facility theft (215/4); 
and telephone coin box tampering (370/1). The overlap created by such 
provisions introduces unnecessary and undesirable confusion.112
 Section 2102(2) defines several terms. Section 2102(2)(a), defining 
“deprive,” is substantively similar to current 5/15-3, but specifically includes 
situations where the actor withholds the property for such an extended period 
as to appropriate a major portion of its economic value. This addition, as 
well as Section 2102(2)(a)(ii)’s inclusion of “dispos[ing]” of property, should 
cover the situations that current 5/16-1(a)(B) and (C)’s “uses, conceals or 
abandons” language addresses.
 Section 2102(2)(b), defining “obtain,” is similar to current 5/15-7, but 
includes a “purported transfer” as well as an actual transfer and replaces 
“interest or possession” with “legal interest.” Section 2102(2)(c), defining 
 111 Under proposed Section 205(2), the culpability requirement of “knowingly” should 
be read to apply to the subsequent elements within the grammatical clause in which it appears. 
As a result, the State must prove that the defendant knew the property taken belonged to 
another. But cf. People v. Jones, 495 N.E.2d 1371, 1372-73 (Ill. App. 1986) (requiring no 
culpability as to fact that another person owned property in prosecution under 5/21-1(a) for 
“knowingly damaging . . . property of another”).
 112 The proposed Code also eliminates as unnecessary other provisions related to the 
current offenses noted in the text. See 720 ILCS 5/16A-1 to -2.13, -5, -6, -8, -9; 5/16B-1, -4; 
5/16E-1, -2; 215/1 to /3; 370/2. Current 5/16A-4 and -5, addressing the rights of merchants to 
detain suspected shoplifters, are addressed by the justification rules for private persons’ use 
of force in making arrests. See proposed Section 414 and corresponding commentary. It is 
anticipated that other related provisions, concerning regulatory matters, will be preserved by 
means of “conforming amendments” legislation. See 720 ILCS 5/16A-7; 5/16B-3; 215/6 to /8. 
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“owner,” is the same as current 5/15-2. Section 2102(2)(d), defining 
“property of another,” uses the same definition as current 5/20-1(b),113 but 
replaces “building or other property, whether real or personal” with “any 
property.”114
 Section 2102(3) creates two permissive inferences related to theft. 
Section 2102(3)(a) is substantively similar to current 5/16-1.1 and adopts 
most of 5/16-1.1’s wording. The proposed provision, however, makes clear 
that its rule creates a permissive inference, as opposed to 5/16-1.1’s “prima 
facie evidence” rule, whose evidentiary significance is less transparent. 
(See proposed Section 107 and corresponding commentary for a discussion 
of permissive inferences.) Section 2102(3)(a)(ii) also inserts the word 
“receiving” before “written demand” to clarify the rule for when the statutory 
failure-to-respond periods begin. Finally, subsection (3)(a)(iii) replaces 
“identification . . . that contained a materially fictitious name, address, or 
telephone number” with “materially fictitious identification,” which is briefer 
and more inclusive.
 Section 2102(3)(b) creates an inference of intent to deprive in cases 
where a person intentionally conceals unpurchased merchandise on 
the premises of a mercantile establishment. The proposed provision is 
substantively similar to the inference in current 5/16A-4. 
Section 2103. Theft by Deception
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/15-4; 5/16-1(a)(2); 
5/16-1.2; 5/16-1.3, 5/16A-3(f); 
5/16B-2(c); 5/16C-2; 5/16G-15, 
-20; see also, e.g., 225 ILCS 
470/56; 230 ILCS 10/18; 765 
ILCS 1040/8
 113 The proposed Code eliminates the similarly defined term “offenders [sic] interest in 
property” in current 5/16G-25. That term relates to the specific current offense of financial-
identity theft, which the proposed Code does not incorporate, as it is addressed by the 
proposed offense for unauthorized impersonation, as well as the more general offense of theft 
by deception. See infra proposed Sections 2103 and 3105 and corresponding commentary.
 114 The term “property” is defined broadly in proposed Section 108 as “anything of 
value.” See commentary for Section 108 for a discussion of the relation between the proposed 
definition and that in current 5/15-1. 
 The proposed Code eliminates current 5/15-8, defining “obtains control,” as redundant 
of the definition of “obtains” in Section 2102(2)(b). Likewise, current 5/16-4 has been 
eliminated as redundant of the definition of “property of another” in Section 2102(2)(d).
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Comment:
 Generally. This provision covers situations where the offender 
knowingly obtains the property of another115 by means of trickery or 
falsehood rather than by “taking” it outright, as in proposed Section 2102.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 2103 addresses the offense of 
theft by deception in one provision, replacing the general theft-by-deception 
provisions in current law (5/15-4 and 5/16-1(a)(2)) as well as other specific 
deception-related sections in current law.116
 Section 2103(1) is similar to current 5/16-1(a)(2), but eliminates 
the additional intent-to-deprive culpability requirement imposed on that 
provision by 5/16-1(a)(A). (As for the culpability requirements in 5/16-
1(a)(B) and (C), see supra commentary for proposed Section 2101.) Theft by 
deception differs from theft by taking in that the offender’s intent to deprive 
the owner of the property is made clear by his deliberate deceptive act itself, 
rendering a separate additional culpability requirement unnecessary for this 
offense.
 115 As with Section 2102 (theft by taking), this provision should be read to require that 
the actor know that the property belongs to another. See supra commentary for Section 2102 
and infra commentary for Sections 2104 and 2110(1)(a).
 116 See, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/16-1.3 (financial exploitation of an elderly person or person 
with a disability); 5/16A-3(f) (retail theft); 5/16B-2(c) (library theft); 5/16C-1 to 5/16C-3 
(unlawful sale of household appliances); 235/1 (use of coin slugs).
 Current Illinois law also contains dozens of offenses criminalizing making very specific 
kinds of misrepresentations “with the intent to” or “for the purpose of” obtaining property, 
as well as performing certain conduct “fraudulently,” with an “intent to defraud,” or as part 
of a “scheme,” “design,” “artifice to defraud,” or “deception.” See, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/16-3.1 
(making false report of loss with “intent to defraud” insurer); 5/16D-5(a) (using computer 
as part of “scheme, artifice to defraud, or as part of a deception”); 5/16G-15 and -20 (using 
another’s financial identity to “fraudulently” obtain property); 5/17-1(B)(d),(e) (passing bad 
check with “intent to defraud”); 5/17-1(C)(2)-(4) (possessing check, “implement of check 
fraud,” or cash machine card with “intent to defraud”); 5/17-6(a) (using false identification 
or “misrepresentation” to obtain state benefits); 5/17-8(a) (attempting to obtain health care 
benefits with “intent to defraud or deceive”); 5/17-9 (using wires as part of “scheme or design” 
to unlawfully obtain public aid benefits); 5/17-10 (using mail as part of “scheme or design” 
to unlawfully obtain public aid benefits); 5/17-11 (resetting or disconnecting odometer with 
“intent to defraud”); 5/17-11.1 (resetting or disconnecting hour meter of used farm implement 
with “intent to defraud”); 5/17-13 (“fraudulently” selling real property twice); 5/17-16 
(“fraudulently” producing infant to claim inheritance); 5/17-24 (using wires or mail as part 
of “scheme or artifice to defraud,” or attempting to execute “scheme or artifice to defraud” 
financial institution); 5/17A-1 and -3 (unlawful acquisition of benefits by person subject to 
deportation); 5/17B-0.05 et seq. (“WIC fraud”); 5/33C-4 (“fraudulently” obtaining public 
funds reserved for minority- or female-owned business); 5/33E-14 (making false statement on 
vendor application); 250/10 to /12 and /17.01 to /17.03 (credit card fraud). Where an offender 
unsuccessfully attempted to obtain property using a fraudulent scheme, he would be liable 
either for attempted theft or one of the applicable fraud offenses in Article 3100. Where an 
offender actually obtained property by means of such a scheme, he would likely be liable for 
both the theft and the applicable fraud offense in Article 3100. See proposed Section 254 and 
corresponding commentary. 
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 Section 2103(2) incorporates the definition of deception from current 
5/15-4. Section 2103(2)(a) is similar to current law, with several changes. 
First, Section 2103(2)(a) expands upon current 5/15-4(a) in making clear 
that the false impression may be one of law, value,117 intention, or other state 
of mind. Second, this subsection combines current 5/15-4(a) and (e) into 
one provision. The prohibited conduct in current 5/15-4(e) — promising 
performance that the offender knows will not be performed — is included 
within Section 2103(2)(a)’s prohibition against knowingly creating a false 
impression. Third, Section 2103(2)(a) clarifies the evidentiary rule in current 
5/15-4(e) regarding a person’s failure to perform a promise. Current 5/15-
4(e) states that the failure to perform standing alone is “not evidence” of the 
person’s intention to perform. One reading of that section would operate to 
completely exclude a person’s failure to perform a promise as evidence of his 
intent to perform. Therefore, Section 2103(2)(a) makes clear that although 
such a failure is some evidence, it is not sufficient evidence; more than 
the mere failure to perform a promise is needed to support an inference of 
deceptive intent. Finally, 2103(2)(a) changes the phrase “impression which is 
false and which the offender does not believe to be true” in current 5/15-4(a) 
to the simpler language “false impression.” However, this alteration does not 
make a substantive change, as the culpability requirement of “knowingly” 
would require proof that the offender knew the impression was false. (See 
proposed Section 205(2) and corresponding commentary.)
 Section 2103(2)(b) incorporates the language of current 5/15-4(b), but 
also expands the prohibition to include circumstances where the defendant 
stands in a fiduciary or confidential relationship to a person and knows that 
the person is being influenced by the false impression.
 Section 2103(2)(c) is similar to current 5/15-4(c), except that the phrase 
“pertinent to the disposition of the property” has been changed to “that would 
affect his judgment of a transaction.” The term “pertinent” is ambiguous 
and unclear, failing to provide a clear standard for deciding whether the 
information in question is sufficiently significant. The proposed language 
clarifies the focus of the inquiry, making central the potential impact of the 
information on the victim’s willingness to engage in the transaction. Illinois 
courts similarly require that a deception induce the victim’s reliance. See, 
e.g., People v. Davis, 491 N.E.2d 1153, 1156 (Ill. 1986).
 Section 2103(2)(d) is the same as current 5/15-4(d), but has been 
reorganized to enhance clarity.
 Section 2103(3) has no corresponding provision in current Chapter 
720. Section 2103(3) limits the reach of the offense of theft by deception in 
two areas. Section 2103(3) excludes from the offense deceptions which are 
irrelevant to any pecuniary interest, such as when a salesman misrepresents 
 117 The creation of a false impression as to value would include a person’s use of a “false 
monetary instrument, token, or note,” as is also prohibited in the provision covering theft of 
services. See proposed Section 2106.
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his personal opinions or beliefs to establish a better rapport with a customer. 
Section 2103(3) also excludes “puffing” by statements that are unlikely 
to deceive an ordinary person in the group addressed. Illinois courts have 
recognized a similar limitation on the offense by requiring that a deception 
actually induce the victim’s reliance. See, e.g., People v. Davis, 491 N.E.2d 
1153, 1156 (Ill. 1986).
 Section 2103(4) is similar to current 5/16-1.2, with two changes. First, 
Section 2103(4) creates a “permissive inference,” as opposed to the “prima 
facie evidence” rule in current 5/16-1.2. (See supra commentary for Section 
2102(3); see also proposed Section 107 and corresponding commentary for 
a discussion of permissive inferences.) Second, the amount of consideration 
required to trigger the inference has been raised from $3,000 to $10,000 to 
adjust for inflation and to limit the inference to larger-scale service contracts 
such as building renovation or construction.
Section 2104. Theft by Extortion
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/15-5; 5/16-1(a)(3)
Comment:
 Generally. This provision covers situations where the offender obtains 
another person’s property118 by means of a threat rather than by outright 
taking (Section 2102) or deception (Section 2103). 
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 2104(1) is similar to current 
5/16-1(a)(3), but eliminates the additional intent-to-deprive culpability 
requirement imposed on that provision by 5/16-1(a)(A). (As for the culpability 
requirements in 5/16-1(a)(B) and (C), see supra commentary for proposed 
Section 2102(1).) As with the offense of theft by deception, a person using 
a threat to obtain another’s property thereby shows his intent to deprive the 
other person of the property. (See proposed Section 2103 and corresponding 
commentary.) Therefore, the additional culpability requirement of intent is 
superfluous.
 Section 2104(1)(a) merges current 5/15-5(a) to (c) into one subsection. 
The proposed subsection is the same as current law, except that Section 
2104(1)(a) uses the term “bodily harm,” rather than “physical harm,” to keep 
this provision’s language consistent with other provisions in the proposed 
Code. (See proposed Section 108 and corresponding commentary.)
 Section 2104(1)(b) is similar to current 5/15-5(d) but, like Section 
2104(1)(a), eliminates the word “criminal” as redundant of “offense.”
 118 As with other forms of theft, this provision should be read to require that the actor 
know that the property belongs to another. See supra commentary for Sections 2102 and 2103 
and infra commentary for Section 2110(1)(a).
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 Section 2104(1)(c) combines current 5/15-5(e) to (g) into one subsection 
and requires that the information that would “expose any person to hatred, 
contempt, or ridicule” or “harm [his] credit or business repute” must be “a 
secret.”
 Section 2104(1)(d) is substantively similar to current 5/15-5(h), but 
has been rephrased to enhance clarity. Moreover, the proposed Code uses 
the more inclusive term “public servant” rather than “public official.” Cf. 
proposed Section 108 (defining “public servant”).
 Section 2104(1)(e) to (g) are identical to current 5/15-5(i) to (k).
 Section 2104(2) has no corresponding provision in current Chapter 720. 
Section 2104(2) creates a defense for property obtained by an honest claim 
of restitution, indemnification, or compensation. This defense would protect, 
for example, property obtained in settlement of a legitimate legal claim.
Section 2105. Receiving Stolen Property
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/15-6; 5/16-1(a)(4); 
5/16-16, -16.1; 250/4; see also 625 
ILCS 5/4-103 to -104; 720 ILCS 
245/1; 335/1 
Comment:
 Generally. This provision creates an offense governing receipt or 
possession of stolen property.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 2105 creates an offense similar 
to current 5/16-1(a)(4),119 but with three important changes. First, Section 
2105(1) requires recklessness as to whether the property has been stolen,120 
instead of knowledge or reason to know. Current 5/16-1(a)(4) effectively 
creates a negligence standard as to whether the offender knew the property 
was stolen; negligence is generally disfavored, in Illinois law and elsewhere, 
as a basis for criminal liability. Section 2105(4) achieves a similar practical 
result by creating permissive inferences to govern cases where a reckless 
disregard of a substantial risk that the property was stolen seems especially 
likely, but allowing the defendant to litigate the issue where he was genuinely 
unaware, and had no objective reason to be aware, that the property was 
stolen.
 119 Section 2105 would also cover any thefts under current 720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(5); 5/16-
16 and 5/16-16.1; or 250/13 that would not be covered by proposed Section 2102 (q.v.), as 
well as the offense of “possession of a stolen motor vehicle” as defined in current 625 ILCS 
5/4-103.
 120 Section 2105, like current law, still requires that the property must actually have been 
stolen. See, e.g., People v. Karreker, 633 N.E.2d 150, (Ill. App. 1994) (holding that because the 
State failed to prove there was an owner of the property other than the defendant, it could not 
prove that the property was stolen).
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 Second, Section 2105(1) extends the offense beyond receiving stolen 
property to include situations where a person retains or disposes of property 
after learning that it is stolen property. Current 5/16-1(a)(4) imposes liability 
only on persons who knew the property was stolen at the time they obtained 
it. But cf. People v. Dickerson, 353 N.E.2d 427, 428 (Ill. App. 1976) (holding 
that the defendant, who did not know when he received property that it 
was stolen, could not be charged under 16-1(d) [current 5/16-1(a)(4)] for 
“receiving” stolen property, but noting that he could have been charged under 
the theft-by-taking section [current 5/16-1(a)(1)] for exerting unauthorized 
control over the property once he became aware it had been stolen).
 Third, the proposed offense eliminates the additional culpability 
requirement, imposed by current 5/16-1(a)(5)(A), that the offender intend to 
permanently deprive the owner. Section 2105(2) achieves a similar practical 
result, however, by creating an exception that excludes from liability 
situations where the accused received, retained, or disposed of the property 
with the intention to restore it to the owner. 
 Section 2105(3)(a), defining “receiving,” has no corresponding 
provision in current Chapter 720. Section 2105(3)(a) broadly defines 
“receiving” to cover cases of actual and constructive possession. Illinois 
courts have adopted a similar rule in interpreting current law. See, e.g., 
People v. Mertens, 396 N.E.2d 595, 600 (Ill. App. 1979) (finding that each 
of the four defendant family members had constructive possession of stolen 
property where the property was found throughout the house where the 
family resided).
 Section 2105(3)(b), defining “stolen,” uses the same definition as 
current 5/15-6.
 As noted above, Section 2105(4) establishes four separate permissive 
inferences to allow a jury to infer that a person was reckless as to the property 
being stolen. The inferences are aimed at people who regularly deal in stolen 
merchandise, such as vehicle “chop shops,” fences, and black markets, or 
where it is objectively clear that the merchandise has been stolen. Together 
these inferences cover much of the conduct addressed in the stolen motor 
vehicle provisions in Chapter 625.121
 Section 2105(4)(a)(i) creates an inference in cases where the person 
is found in possession or control of property that has been stolen multiple 
 121 See 625 ILCS 5/4-103 et seq. Current 625 ILCS 5/4-103.1 and -103.3 create vehicle 
theft conspiracy offenses that aggravate the penalty from a Class 2 to a Class 1 or Class X 
felony. Under the proposed Code, this inchoate conduct would, like any other conspiracy, 
be graded at one offense grade lower than the object offense. To the extent that the current 
offenses are aimed at inchoate conduct, there is no reason to grade that conduct differently 
than any other conspiracy. To the extent that the current offenses are aimed at participation 
in a criminal enterprise, such conduct may subject the offenders to Class 1 liability under the 
proposed aggravation in Section 905(4) for offenses committed in furtherance of a criminal 
organization. In any event, Class X liability seems inappropriate for a theft offense, as motor-
vehicle theft is less serious than such Class X felonies as second-degree murder. 
(continued…)
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times. Section 2105(4)(a)(ii) creates an inference in cases where the person 
possess or controls property knowing that its serial number or identifying 
marks have been removed, altered, or obscured.122 Section 2105(4)(b) creates 
an inference in cases where the person has received other stolen property 
within a year of the charged offense. Section 2105(4)(c) creates an inference 
where the person is a dealer and knowingly acquires the property at far below 
its reasonable value. Section 2105(4)(d) defines “dealer,” a term used several 
times in current Chapter 720, but defined only with respect to dealers of air 
rifles. See 720 ILCS 535/1(3). Section 2105(3)(d)’s definition is consistent 
with current law. 
 
Section 2106. Theft of Services
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/16-3(a), (c), 5/16-7 
to -11, 5/16-17, 5/16F-3; see also 
740 ILCS 90/5
Comment:
 Generally. This provision makes clear that, as with other forms of 
property, it is theft to obtain unlawfully another person’s labor or services.
 121 (…continued)
 Current 625 ILCS 5/4-103.2 creates an aggravated Class 1 felony offense for various 
forms of conduct related to vehicle theft. Most of the conduct in this current offense would 
violate multiple provisions of the proposed Code or constitute multiple counts of the same 
offense, and thus may be subject to increased liability under the proposed rules for convicting 
and sentencing multiple offenses. See proposed Sections 254 and 906 and their corresponding 
commentaries. Current 625 ILCS 5/4-103.2 (a)(1) and (2) aggravate the offense in cases 
where the person is found in possession of multiple stolen vehicles or parts, or commits 
multiple offenses within a period of a year. The proposed Code would achieve similar results 
by aggregating the value of the stolen property under Section 2109(7). Current 625 ILCS 
5/4-103.2(a)(3) and (5) aggravate to a Class 1 felony for cases involving particularly valuable 
vehicles. Where the vehicle in question was valued at over $100,000, the proposed Code 
would again achieve the same result. Current subsection (a)(4) creates an aggravated offense 
related to the possession of vehicle identification documents. Such conduct is addressed by 
the offenses in proposed Sections 3101 and 5203. Current 5/4-103.2(a)(6) and (a)(7) address 
conduct likely covered by both a theft offense and an Article 5300 offense. Current 5/4-
103.2(a)(8) creates an aggravated false report offense covered by proposed Section 5204.
 122 This inference is intended to address the theft-related conduct in several current 
provisions involving the destruction or altering of serial numbers, identification numbers, or 
marks. See 720 ILCS 5/16-16 (removal or alteration of serial number on a firearm); 5/16C-
2 (unlawful sale of household materials); 5/16E-3(a)(3) (defacing, removing, or concealing 
name or mark of a delivery container); 245/1 (defacing identification number on construction 
equipment); 335/1 (destruction or alteration of manufacturer’s serial numbers); see also 625 
ILCS ILCS 5/4-103. To the extent that a person damages the property of another in this 
manner without obtaining control, he would be liable for criminal damage under proposed 
Section 2206.
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 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 2106 covers the general 
theft of service offense in current 5/16-3 and several other specific theft-
of-services offenses in current law. Section 2106(1)(a) defines the offense 
in similar fashion to 5/16-3(a), but requires culpability of “knowing” as to 
obtaining the services and as to the fact that they are normally provided only 
for compensation. Current 5/16-3(a) provides no culpability term for either 
of these elements, thus imposing a recklessness standard for both under 
the “read-in” culpability provision (5/4-3(b)). The proposed formulation 
heightens the culpability standard to ensure that only truly blameworthy 
persons are subject to prosecution, and to make the culpability requirement 
uniform with that for other forms of theft. Section 2106(1)(a) also adds a 
phrase covering theft by means of a worthless “payment.”
 Section 2106(1)(b), regarding embezzlement of services, has no directly 
corresponding provisions in current Chapter 720, but is intended to cover the 
conduct in current 5/16-7 to 5/16-11 and 5/16F-3.123 
 Section 2106(2), defining “services,” has no corresponding provision 
in current Chapter 720. The proposed provision provides an illustrative 
list of items that qualify as services. Cf. proposed Section 108 (defining 
“includes”). Section 2106(2) specifically includes “copyrighted or patented 
material or other intellectual property” in order to protect intangible property 
rights like the recorded sounds and images covered by current 5/16-7 and -8. 
The proposed definition of “services” also includes “advertising services,” 
meaning that Section 2106 would cover the conduct addressed by the current 
“theft of advertising services” offense. See 720 ILCS 5/16-17.
 Section 2106(3), creating a permissive inference of intent for “dine-
and-dash”-type situations, has no corresponding provision in current Chapter 
720.
 Section 2106 eliminates the special grading provisions in current 
5/16-3(c) and 5/16-7 to -8. Under proposed Section 2109, theft of services 
is graded the same as other forms of theft.124 For example, proposed Section 
2109 would grade theft of services valued at $15,000 as a Class 2 felony, 
while the same crime would only constitute a Class A misdemeanor under 
current 5/16-3.
 123 The proposed Code eliminates current 5/16-12, 5/16-13, 5/16F-2, and 5/16F-4 to 
-6. Current 5/16-12 and 5/16F-4 address conduct covered by the general inchoate offenses 
in Article 800. Current 5/16-13 and 5/16F-6 address civil-liability issues properly addressed 
outside the Criminal Code. Current 5/16F-2 contains definitions that no longer appear in the 
Code. Current 5/16F-5 provides for restitution and belongs in the Code of Corrections.
 124 Current 5/16-7 and -8 contain specialized grading provisions related to the number 
of unauthorized recordings involved in the offense. This scheme appears designed to account 
for the difficulty of valuing intangible rights. Cf. People v. Zakarian, 460 N.E.2d 422, 426 (Ill. 
App. 1984) (holding recorded sounds or images are not property and thus not subject to the 
current theft offense). However, under proposed Section 2109(7), the “amount involved” in a 
theft is “the highest value[] by any reasonable standard.” This approach allows prosecutors to 
prove the value of the services stolen by showing such things as profits derived from illegal 
sales or usage, or the standard licensing fees for the stolen material.
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Section 2107. Theft by Failure to Make Required Disposition of
 Funds Received
Corresponding Current Provision(s): Various; see, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/17-
1(A)(i); 5/17B-10(a); 15 ILCS 
520/21; 20 ILCS 1605/10.3, 10.4; 
215 ILCS 5/508.1; 225 ILCS 
454/20-20(h)(8), 20-80; 760 ILCS 
55/17; 810 ILCS 5/9-306.01
Comment:
 Generally. This provision defines as an offense the retention of funds 
received subject to an agreement to transfer the funds to a third party. In some 
situations, one who promises to make certain payments or other disposition 
of property should be punished for dealing with the property as his own. 
Without such a provision, the conduct in question would constitute breach of 
contract, but arguably not theft, as the offender has obtained control of the 
victim’s funds with the victim’s agreement.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 2107 has no directly 
corresponding provision in current Chapter 720. However, other provisions 
in Illinois law recognize the criminal nature of the conduct prohibited in 
Section 2107 for specific persons and types of property. See, e.g., 720 ILCS 
5/17B-10(a) (administrator misappropriating, misusing, withholding, or 
converting WIC funds; maximum Class 1 felony); 15 ILCS 520/21 (official 
making profit or emolument from public moneys; Class 3 felony); 20 ILCS 
1605/10.3, 10.4 (lottery agent commingling or using lottery proceeds; Class 
4 felony); 215 ILCS 5/508.1 (insurer knowingly misappropriating premiums; 
maximum Class 3 felony); 225 ILCS 454/20-20(h)(8), /20-80 (real estate 
agent commingling or using principal’s money or other property; Class C 
misdemeanor); 760 ILCS 55/17 (trustee intentionally using over $1,000 of 
charitable trust funds for personal benefit; Class 2 felony); 810 ILCS 5/9-
306.01 (debtor disposing of secured collateral without paying secured party; 
Class 3 felony).
 Section 2107(4), defining “financial institution,” is similar to 5/17-
1(A)(i), but also lists insurance companies and investment trusts and includes 
organizations “held out to the public as” depositories or investment centers. 
Section 2108. Theft of Property Lost, Mislaid, or Stolen by Mistake
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/16-2
Comment:
 Generally. This provision defines as theft the unlawful retention of 
property that the possessor knows to belong to someone else.
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 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 2108 is similar to current 
5/16-2, but with several important differences. First, Section 2108(1) expands 
the offense to cover mistakenly delivered property as well as lost property. 
Mistakenly delivered property may not technically have been “lost,” as it may 
not have been in the possession of its rightful owner, but a person who keeps 
$1,000 of delivered goods meant for his neighbor is as blameworthy as the 
person who keeps $1,000 in cash that he finds in a lost wallet.
 Second, Section 2108(1) replaces 5/16-2’s specific knowledge-of-
ownership requirement — that the offender know the identity of the owner or 
know of a reasonable method of identifying the owner — with a requirement 
that the person take “reasonable measures to restore the property to a person 
entitled to have it.” Under this formulation, the offender’s knowledge or 
potential knowledge of the owner’s identity would obviously be a factor in 
determining the reasonableness of his efforts. This standard, however, also 
allows consideration of, and adjustment for, the nature of the property when 
deciding what measures are reasonable. The person who accidentally comes 
into possession of an extremely valuable or unique item should be required 
to undertake a more thorough search for the rightful owner than the person 
who finds a $5 bill on a busy street corner. Section 2108(1) also adjusts for 
the elimination of the knowledge-of-ownership requirement by requiring the 
offender to know that the property was lost, mislaid, or delivered by mistake. 
This requirement prevents the extension of the offense to innocent conduct.
 Finally, Section 2108(2) raises the grading of the offense from a petty 
offense to one grade lower than it would otherwise receive under proposed 
Section 2109. For example, theft of a lost item valued in excess of $10,000 
would be a Class 3 felony. This grading system recognizes that a person 
who fails to take reasonable measures to return lost, and valuable, property 
merits more serious liability than petty-offender classification would allow, 
although arguably less serious liability than a person who takes another’s 
property outright.
Section 2109. Grading of Theft
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/15-9; 5/16-1(b); see 
also, e.g., 5 ILCS 175/10-140, 
/15-210, /15-215; 305 ILCS 
5/8A-6; 720 ILCS 5/16-1.3(a); 
5/16-3(c); 5/16-7(c), -8(b); 5/16-
10(b); 5/16-11(e); 5/16A-10; 
5/16B-5; 5/16E-4(a); 5/16G-15, 
-20; 5/17A-3; 5/17B-20; 5/42-2
Comment:
 Generally. Section 2109 provides a uniform set of offense grades for all 
forms of theft defined in Article 2100.
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 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 2109 provides a single grading 
scheme for all forms of theft. This scheme is broadly similar to that in current 
5/16-1(b), but is not limited to certain forms of theft. Current law, in addition 
to providing a grading scheme in 5/16-1(b), employs specific penalties for 
numerous other specific theft offenses.125 Section 2109 eliminates these 
specific penalties, as there is no obvious reason for distinguishing these 
specific forms of theft from other thefts for grading purposes.
 Section 2109’s general method of grading thefts according to the value 
of property involved is similar to current 5/16-1(b), except that Section 2109 
adds additional “layers” to the grading hierarchy, introducing a new grading 
distinction at the $1,000 level and a more limited distinction for certain thefts 
involving less than $50. The current scheme alters the grade at three “cut-
off” value levels: $300, $10,000, and $100,000. As in current 5/16-1(c), the 
value of the theft involved is an element of the offense that the State must 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Although the provision does not contain 
an explicit culpability requirement as to value, a requirement of recklessness 
must be read in under proposed Section 205.126 
 Section 2109(2), like current law, grades theft of a firearm or motor 
vehicle as a Class 2 felony. (Theft of a firearm or motor vehicle worth more 
than $100,000, however, would be a Class 1 felony. See proposed Section 
254(2).)
 Section 2109(4)(b) includes a special grading provision for theft of a 
credit or debit card, as such items may have little or no inherent value, or at 
least, a value that is difficult to ascertain. Theft of such cards is graded as a 
 125 See, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/16-1.3(a) (financial exploitation of elderly or disabled person; 
Class 4 felony to Class 1 felony); 5/16-3(c) (theft of services, Class A misdemeanor; theft of 
rented property, Class 4 felony); 5/16-7(c), -8(b) (unlawful use of recorded sounds or images, 
or of unidentified sound or video recordings; Class 4 felony for each); 5/16-10(b) (theft of 
cable television; Class A misdemeanor or Class 4 felony); 5/16-11(e) (theft of cable television; 
Class A misdemeanor); 5/16A-10 (retail theft; Class A misdemeanor to Class 3 felony); 
5/16B-5 (library theft; petty offense to Class 3 felony); 5/16E-4(a) (“delivery container theft”; 
Class B misdemeanor).
 Current law also contains a number of provisions that are couched in the language of 
fraud, but appear to be aimed more at theft of property, as they punish the offender according 
to the amount of property involved. See, e.g., 5 ILCS 175/10-140, /15-210, /15-215 (fraud 
offenses involving the unlawful use of a signature device; Class 2 felony for frauds involving 
more than $50,000); 305 ILCS 5/8A-6 (public aid fraud; Class A misdemeanor to Class 1 
felony); 720 ILCS 5/16G-15 (financial identity theft; Class A misdemeanor to Class 1 felony); 
5/16G-20 (aggravated financial identity theft; Class 4 felony to Class X felony); 5/17A-3 
(unlawful acquisition of welfare benefits; Class A misdemeanor to Class 1 felony); 5/17B-20 
(WIC fraud; Class A misdemeanor to Class 1 felony).
 126 Under proposed Section 207, a reasonable or negligent mistake as to the value of 
property stolen would, if believed by the trier of fact, constitute a defense to the offense of 
theft, but with two important limitations. First, a thief who steals jewelry mistakenly believing 
it to be $100 costume jewelry, but later realizes that its true value is $10,000, will lose the 
mistake defense if he subsequently attempts to capitalize on the higher value. Moreover, even 
where the thief never finds out the jewelry’s true value, he remains liable for theft at the value 
he assumed the jewelry to be worth ($100).
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Class 4 felony, which is the same grade imposed under current 720 ILCS 250/4 
(“receiving” another’s credit card without consent) and 250/5 (“receiving” 
and retaining lost credit card). Improper use of a credit or debit card may also 
constitute a separate offense under proposed Section 3108 (q.v.).
 Section 2109(7) expands current 5/15-9 by allowing prosecutors to 
prove value by any reasonable standard. In most cases, that standard will be 
the fair market value of the property or services acquired. In special cases, 
such as with copyrighted materials or trade secrets, the State may use other 
standards of valuation. See supra commentary for proposed Section 2106. 
By contrast, current 5/15-9 uses the term “market value” for negotiable 
instruments and “actual value” for non-negotiable interests, but does not 
clarify the distinction between those two concepts. Section 2109(7) further 
clarifies current law by establishing that amounts involved in multiple thefts, 
whether committed against one or multiple persons, “pursuant to one scheme 
or course of conduct” may be aggregated to determine the grade of the 
offense.
 Section 2109(8), like current law, provides an aggravation for thefts 
at schools or places of worship, and for thefts from an elderly victim, but 
combines all these aggravating factors into a single provision stating a general 
enhancement rule. Instead of the current general rule favoring a one-grade 
increase, the proposed rule aggravates by doubling, for grading purposes, 
the value of the property stolen. This ensures that grading variations will 
continue to track the value of the stolen property, and also ensures that the 
upper and lower bounds of liability are not distorted to inappropriate levels 
due to an automatic alteration of grade for certain offenders.
 Section 2109(8) also expands current 5/16-1(b)(7) and 5/16-1.3 to 
enhance the grade for all thefts whose victim is 60 years old or older, and 
not just thefts involving certain values of property, or deception, or especially 
infirm victims. The resulting increase tends to lead to similar or slightly 
higher grading for such thefts relative to either 5/16-1(b)(7)127 or 5/16-1.3.128
 Section 2109 generally does not consider whether a theft was “from 
the person” in assigning a grade, as nearly all thefts from the person are 
adequately penalized under the robbery offense. See, e.g., People v. Bowel, 
488 N.E.2d 995 (Ill. 1986) (affirming robbery conviction for defendant who 
grabbed victim’s hand and pulled her arm while taking her purse). Where 
theft from the person does not involve sufficient force or threat to constitute 
robbery, a one-grade aggravation of liability seems unwarranted and may 
lead to inappropriate results. For example, under current 5/16-1(b)(4.1), a 
student who takes a pencil from a fellow student’s pocket in school might be 
liable for a Class 2 felony.
 127 Section 2109(8), like 5/16-1(b)(7), would grade all thefts over $5,000 as a Class 2 
felony, but unlike 5/16-1(b)(7), is clear in holding that theft of still higher amounts (i.e., more 
than $50,000) would lead to even higher liability.
 128 Section 2109(8) grades thefts between $500 and $5,000 (rather than between $300 
and $5,000) as a Class 3 felony, thefts of $5,000-$50,000 (rather than $5,000-$100,000) as a 
Class 2 felony, and thefts over $50,000 (rather than over $100,000) as a Class 1 felony.
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 Section 2109 does not contain a grading provision for repeat offenders 
as appears in current 5/16-1(b)(2), as Article 900 of the General Part includes 
a general provision governing aggravation of offense grade for repeat 
offenders. See proposed Section 905 and corresponding commentary.
Section 2110. Claim of Right
Corresponding Current Provision(s): None
Comment:
 Generally. Section 2110 provides a defense in cases where the actor 
takes or uses property of another, but reasonably believed the owner would 
have consented to his use or acquisition of the property (for example, where 
a person repeatedly borrows his neighbor’s lawnmower, but does not request 
permission in each specific instance).
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 2110 has no corresponding 
provision in current Chapter 720.
 Section 2111. Unauthorized Use of Automobiles and Other Vehicles
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/16-3(b); 5/21-2; 
  see also 620 ILCS 5/43a
Comment:
 Generally. This provision defines as a criminal offense the use or 
retention of a vehicle without consent. Section 2111 covers cases where the 
offender lacks the intent to permanently deprive the owner of the vehicle and 
therefore has not committed theft.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 2111(1)(a) is similar to current 
5/21-2 and covers “joyriding” cases.
 Section 2111(1)(b) and (c) also correspond to current 5/16-3(b), but 
apply only to motor vehicles and cover vehicles given to another person 
for repair as well as rental. In addition, the proposed subsections replace 
current 5/16-3’s bright-line rule, requiring return within three days of the 
owner’s mailing a written demand, with a flexible standard requiring a “gross 
deviation” from the terms of the agreement. In many situations, the rightful 
owner of the vehicle should not be required to submit written demand and 
wait until an additional three days have expired before the unauthorized user 
will be held accountable.
 Section 2111(2) has no corresponding provision in current Chapter 
720. The defense excludes from liability cases where the defendant had 
an objectively reasonable belief that the owner would have consented to 
his use of the vehicle. (The defendant would be required to advance some 
evidence supporting this belief before the State would be required to disprove 
it. See proposed Section 107(3)(b).) For example, a person who borrowed 
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a relative’s car for an afternoon, where the relative had freely allowed the 
defendant’s similar use in the past, would not merit criminal liability. For 
the defense to apply, however, the jury would have to find not only that the 
defendant held the belief, but that the belief was objectively reasonable under 
the circumstances.
 Section 2111(3) grades each form of unauthorized use as a Class A 
misdemeanor. Under current 5/21-2, the “joyriding” offense is a Class A 
misdemeanor; under current 5/16-3(c), the unlawful-retention offense is a 
Class 4 felony. There seems to be no compelling reason to grade these similar 
situations differently.
Section 2112. Definitions
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/2-7.1; 5/2-7.5; 5/2-
15b; 5/2-17; 5/2-18; 5/2-19.5; 
5/15-1; 5/15-2; 5/15-3; 5/15-4; 
5/15-6; 5/15-7; 5/16G-25; 5/17-
1(A)(i); 5/20-1(b); 250/2.03; 
250/2.15
Comment:
 Generally. This provision collects defined terms used in Article 2100 
and provides cross-references to the provisions in which they are defined.
 Relation to current Illinois law. For discussion of the relationship 
between Article 2100’s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary 
for the provision in which the term in question is initially defined.
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ARTICLE 2200. PROPERTY DAMAGE AND DESTRUCTION 
PROVISIONS
Section 2201. Arson
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/2-6, 5/20-1 to -1.2, 
  5/21-4(1)(b)
Comment:
 Generally. This provision defines the offense of arson, a crime that 
combines the harms of the two separate offenses of property damage and 
endangerment.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Current Illinois law has three separate 
provisions covering arson: current 5/20-1 (general arson provision); 5/20-1.1 
(aggravated arson); and 5/20-1.2 (residential arson) — plus a separate part of 
another provision to cover arson of government-supported property (current 
5/21-4(a)(b)). Section 2201 merges these offenses into one arson offense.
 Unlike current 5/20-1(a), Section 2201 does not cover arson to property 
other than buildings or habitable structures, as such arson typically does 
not involve the key element that motivates the creation of a distinct arson 
offense: placing human life in jeopardy.129 Such conduct may be punishable 
as criminal property damage (under proposed Section 2206) or, where 
appropriate, endangering by fire or explosion (under proposed Section 2202). 
At the same time, Section 2201(1)(a) expands current law to include damage 
to a “vital public facility” as arson.
 Section 2201(1)(b), addressing arson with the intention to collect 
insurance, is similar to current 5/20-1(b), with two minor changes. First, 
Section 2201(b) eliminates the minimum value amount of $150 in current 
law. It is unlikely that many cases of insurance-fraud arson will involve less 
than $150 worth of property, and in any event, there is no clear reason to 
exclude such cases if they also involve a risk of physical injury. Second, 
Section 2201(b) replaces 5/20-1(b)’s “intent to defraud an insurer” with 
“intention that insurance be collected for such loss,” to avoid reference to 
another offense that might indicate a separate need to prove the elements of 
that offense. “Intent to defraud” may be more difficult to prove than the intent 
to collect insurance, as the person may lack the subjective belief that his 
conduct was fraudulent or prohibited. Further, a person who starts a fire for 
 129 Similarly, under the Criminal Code of 1961, the offense of arson was limited to 
the damage of buildings and habitable vehicles unless the damage was caused by the use 
of explosives. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 ¶ 20-1 (Smith-Hurd 1964). The 1961 Committee’s 
comments state that “it seemed desirable to redefine the various types of burning offenses 
so as to bring within statutory arson the more serious offenses, with a common penalty, and 
the less serious burning offenses into the more accurate description of Criminal Damage to 
Property[.]” 720 ILL. ANN. STAT. 5/20-1, Committee Comments — 1961, at 165 (West 1993).
ILL Code  V II Spc Part_a   210 7/2/03, 12:58:52 PM
211
Part II: Defi nition of Specifi c Offenses
the sake of collecting insurance creates the same risk to persons and property 
whether he “intended to defraud” the insurance company or believed his 
conduct was lawful.
 Section 2201(2)(a), defining “habitable structure,” is similar to current 
5/2-6 (defining “dwelling”). However, its definition is broader, as it includes 
business space and sites of public assembly as well as places in which people 
dwell or reside.
 Section 2201(2)(b), defining “vital public facility,” is similar to current 
5/20.5-5(b), but eliminates the specific facilities contained in that provision, 
as all of them clearly fit within the definition of “habitable structure” as 
well as the general definition of “vital public facility.” Section 2209(2)(b) 
instead provides a non-comprehensive list of facilities whose status under the 
definition is less obvious.
 Section 2201(3), like current 5/20-1, categorizes arson as a Class 2 
felony. However, the proposed provision employs that categorization for all 
types of arson, while current law aggravates the punishment for residential 
arson (Class 1 felony) and aggravated arson (Class X felony). The current 
scheme is troublesome because it grades aggravated arson the same as the 
inherently more serious offense of causing a catastrophe.130 Also troubling is 
that current 5/20-1.1 aggravates the arson offense to a Class X felony based 
on factors that require only negligence, or no culpability level, on the part of 
the offender.131 Other existing offenses — such as endangerment, aggravated 
assault, and reckless homicide or felony murder — may be used separately to 
enhance an offender’s liability where he has knowingly or recklessly caused 
or risked bodily harm. Significantly, under the proposed system of liability 
for multiple offenses, an additional conviction for any such offense would 
impose additional punishment on the offender, rather than being rendered 
insignificant by inclusion within a concurrent sentence. See proposed Section 
906 and corresponding commentary.
Section 2202. Endangering by Fire or Explosion
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/12-5; 5/21-1(1)(b), (c)
Comment:
 Generally. This offense more generally covers conduct that, like 
arson, creates a risk of harm to persons or property and is therefore socially 
 130 Section 2201 leaves open the possibility of an intermediate punishment grade (i.e., 
Class 1 felony) for aggravated offenses that result in more serious harm than “standard” arson, 
but are less serious than causing a catastrophe.
 131 Under current 5/20-1.1(a), the following factors aggravate arson from a Class 2 to 
a Class X penalty: (1) he knows or reasonably should know that one or more persons are 
present (negligence); (2) any person suffers great bodily harm, or permanent disability or 
disfigurement (strict liability); or (3) a fireman or policeman acting in the line of duty is 
injured (strict liability).
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undesirable and morally blameworthy. Unlike arson, this offense does not 
require that damage to another’s property result from an offender’s dangerous 
activity. The offense also has a lower culpability requirement than arson 
— recklessness, rather than knowledge.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 2202 is similar to current 5/12-
5, but specifically punishes reckless endangerment through the use of fire or 
explosives, rather than general reckless conduct. Cf. proposed Section 1202 
(defining general endangerment offense). Section 2202 is also similar to 
current 5/21-1(1)(b) and (c), but those sections require that property damage 
result from the dangerous activity, while Section 2202 focuses instead on 
the element of endangerment, which does not require resulting harm to be 
undesirable and blameworthy. By contrast with 5/21-1(1)(b) and (c), Section 
2202 addresses conduct that generates a specific set of more serious threats — 
to safety, buildings, or vital public facilities — that jeopardize more than mere 
monetary value and therefore merit separate and additional punishment. If, on 
the other hand, the sole harm threatened or caused by a person’s conduct is 
property damage, that conduct would fall under the general property damage 
provision. See proposed Section 2206 and corresponding commentary.
 Section 2202(2)(a) grades the offense as a Class 3 felony if the offender 
“creates a substantial risk of death under circumstances manifesting an 
extreme indifference to the value of human life.” Otherwise, the offense is 
graded as a Class A misdemeanor, the same as current 5/12-5. However, 
the current offense grades all forms of reckless endangerment as a Class A 
misdemeanor, thus failing to account for the increased risk of harm addressed 
in Section 2202(2)(a).
 Likewise, the grading scheme of the current law criminal damage 
offense (720 ILCS 5/21-1) seems inadequate in punishing the conduct 
covered by Section 2202. Current 5/21-1(2) bases the offense grade on 
the extent of property damage, but that liability scheme fails to account 
for the independent harm caused by placing people or property in serious 
jeopardy. For example, a person who sets a fire that threatens to burn down 
a neighbor’s occupied home, but is put out by firefighters before doing so, 
should not receive only trifling liability (or be completely exonerated) based 
on the fortuity that no actual harm resulted. Thus, Section 2202 fills the gap 
in punishment that exists in current law between arson (a Class 2 to X felony) 
and reckless conduct (a Class A misdemeanor). 
Section 2203. Failure to Control or Report a Dangerous Fire
Corresponding Current Provision(s): None
Comment:
 Generally. This provision imposes a duty on certain persons to report or 
control a fire for which they bear legal responsibility. In general, imposition of 
criminal liability for failure to act should be carefully limited. This provision 
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creates omission liability, but the duty to act applies only in especially 
grave circumstances, and only to persons responsible for dealing with those 
circumstances: those who have a preexisting legal duty to do so (such as 
construction site managers), or those who are responsible for the existence 
of the dangerous situation. The duty is further limited in that it only requires 
one of two affirmative actions: giving a prompt alarm, or, if it can be done 
without substantial risk to oneself, taking reasonable measures to put out the 
fire. A number of state codes, and the Model Penal Code, include a similar 
provision. Section 2203(2) grades the offense as a Class A misdemeanor. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 2203 has no corresponding 
provision in current Chapter 720.
Section 2204. Causing or Risking Catastrophe
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/12-5; 5/20-5.5; 
  5/16D-4
Comment:
 Generally. This provision imposes serious criminal liability for persons 
who cause or risk severe harm to numerous individuals, numerous buildings, 
or a vital public facility.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 2204 is similar to 5/20.5-5, but 
expands liability to include recklessly causing a catastrophe, creating a risk 
of catastrophe, threatening to cause a catastrophe, or failure on the part of 
certain persons (specifically, those who, as in proposed Section 2203, are 
bound by a legal duty) to prevent a catastrophe.
 Section 2204(1)(a), defining the offense of causing a catastrophe, is 
substantively similar to current 5/20.5-5(a), but has been reorganized to 
promote clarity. The proposed provision covers all the means of causing 
a catastrophe in current 5/20.5-5(a) either expressly or by use of the term 
“catastrophic agent.” Section 2204(1)(b), defining “catastrophic agent,” 
includes the dangerous substances listed in current 5/20-2(a) (explosives, 
explosive or incendiary devices, or timing or detonating mechanisms) and 
5/20.5-6(a) (poison or poisonous gas, radioactive substances, and deadly 
biological or chemical contaminant or agents).
 Section 2204(1)(c)(i), like current 5/20-5.5(c), grades knowingly 
causing a catastrophe as a Class X felony, but proposed Section 2204(1)(c)(ii) 
expands the offense beyond the current definition to include a Class 1 offense 
for catastrophes caused recklessly rather than knowingly. Like proposed 
Section 2202, this formulation prohibits an aggravated form of reckless 
conduct, which under current law is only punished as a Class A misdemeanor. 
See proposed Section 2202 and corresponding commentary.
 Section 2204(2) defines a Class 3 felony for persons who recklessly 
create a risk of catastrophe. This provision further expands upon the reckless 
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conduct offense in current law (5/12-5) by punishing the risk of endangerment 
to buildings and vital public facilities as well as people. 
 Section 2204(3) has no corresponding provision in Chapter 720. This 
provision creates a Class 4 felony for threatening to cause a catastrophe. Mere 
threats are punished in this context because of their potential for widespread 
fear and disruption of the social order.
 Section 2204(4) has no corresponding provision in Chapter 720. The 
proposed provision imposes a duty on certain persons to take reasonable 
measures to prevent or mitigate a catastrophe. As in proposed Section 2203, 
this provision creates omission liability, but the duty to act applies only in 
especially grave circumstances, and only to persons responsible for dealing 
with those circumstances: those who have a preexisting legal duty to do so, or 
those who are responsible for the existence of the dangerous situation. (See 
proposed Section 2203 and corresponding commentary.) Section 2204(4)(b) 
grades this offense as a Class A misdemeanor.
 Section 2204(5) defines the term “catastrophe” in similar fashion to 
current 5/20-5.5(b). See also Section 2201(2)(b) (defining “vital public 
facility”) and corresponding commentary.
Section 2205. Possession of Device or Substance for Catastrophic Effect
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/20-2, 5/20.5-6
Comment:
 Generally. Ordinarily, possession offenses will be covered by the 
proposed inchoate possession offense. See proposed Section 808. This 
provision covers the unusually serious situation where possession of the 
object in question may itself pose an inherent danger.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 2205 corresponds to current 
5/20-2 and 5/20.5-6. Section 2205(1) combines these two similar offenses 
from current law into one offense prohibiting the possession of catastrophic 
agents with the intent to use them, or knowledge that another will use them, in 
the commission of a felony. Section 2204(1)(b)’s definition of “catastrophic 
agent” makes the offense’s prohibition similar to current 5/20.5-6. See 
proposed Section 2204(1)(b) and corresponding commentary.
 Section 2205(2) grades the offense as a Class 3 felony, whereas current 
5/20-2 and 5/20.5-6 each grades its offense as a Class 1 felony with an 
increased maximum sentence of 30 years. Categorization as an enhanced 
Class 1 felony seems overly high given the preliminary and inchoate nature 
of the prohibited conduct — mere possession, as opposed to any form of 
use — especially in comparison to the substantive offense of causing a 
catastrophe, which is punished as a Class X or Class 1 felony, depending on 
culpability level. It is also worth bearing in mind that any “substantial step” 
toward committing any offense with a catastrophic agent could be punished 
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separately as an attempt to commit that offense.132 See proposed Section 
801. Moreover, such efforts — which go beyond mere possession — would 
frequently allow for liability that, although substantial, is lower than the 
enhanced-Class-1 status given the more preliminary offense under current 
law. For example, a deliberate attempt to create a catastrophe would be 
graded as a Class 1 felony under either current law or the proposed General 
Part. See 720 ILCS 5/8-4(c)(2) and proposed Section 807. The less serious 
act of possession merits a significantly lower offense grade.
 
Section 2206. Criminal Damage
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/21-1; see also 720 
ILCS 5/16-5(a),(c); 5/16B-2.1, 
-5; 5/16D-3; 5/21-1.1; 5/21-1.2; 
5/21-1.3; 5/21-1.5; 5/21-4; 215/4, 
/5; 360/1; 20 ILCS 3435/3; 625 
ILCS 5/18c-7502(a)(i); 765 ILCS 
835/1(a) to (b-5)
Comment:
 Generally. This provision defines, and sets out the offense grades for, 
the offense of criminal property damage.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Current Chapter 720 contains various 
provisions that define different types of property damage; each provision has 
its own grading section. To the extent the offense grades for these various 
provisions are the same, they are superfluous; to the extent they differ, they 
are inconsistent. Therefore, the proposed Code employs one general criminal 
damage offense.
 Section 2206 defines the prohibited conduct more generally than current 
5/21-1(1). Current 5/21-1(1)’s offense definition contains seven subsections, 
covering various forms of prohibited conduct and culpability levels. By 
contrast, Section 2206 defines four more general forms of criminal damage 
that address a broad range of conduct, including that which was covered by 
current 5/21-1(1).
 Section 2206(1)(a) generally prohibits knowing and reckless property 
damage. The proposed Code defines “damaging” property broadly to mean 
“impairing its usefulness or value by any means . . . includ[ing] deleting 
 132 Note that in cases where the offender committed a substantial step towards using 
the device, he may face liability both under Section 2205 and for an attempt. Under proposed 
Section 254(1)(a), multiple-offense liability is only precluded if the offenses are “based on 
the same conduct.” See proposed Section 254 and corresponding commentary. In the case 
described above, the substantial step could constitute conduct separate from mere possession, 
taking the case outside the limitations described in proposed Section 254. Should the offender 
be convicted of both offenses, he would face additional liability for each offense. See proposed 
Section 906 and corresponding commentary.
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or altering computer programs or other electronically recorded data.” See 
Section 2206(2). This broad formulation addresses most of the conduct 
described in 5/21-1(1).133 Likewise, Section 2206(1)(a) covers a variety of 
damage prohibitions found throughout the current Code.134 See, e.g., 720 
ILCS 5/16-5(a) (damaging a coin-operated machine); 5/16B-2.1 (criminal 
mutilation or vandalism of library materials); 5/16D-3(a)(3) (damaging 
or destroying a computer or altering or deleting a computer file); 5/21-
1.1 (damaging, defacing, or destroying fire fighting equipment); 5/21-1.3 
(criminal defacement of property);135 5/21-1.4 (jackrocks); 5/21-4 (criminal 
damage to government supported property); 215/4 (damaging or vandalizing 
animal research facilities and unauthorized killing or injuring animals);136 
360/1 (injuring or destroying telegraph or telephone lines, wires, cables or 
poles).137
 Section 2206(1)(b) allows for negligence liability where the offender 
uses fire, explosives, or other dangerous means. Current 5/21-1(1)(b) provides 
for liability based on recklessness in such situations. In cases involving such 
inherently dangerous activities, negligent behavior will nearly always be 
objectively reckless. Reducing the culpability requirement to negligence, 
however, ensures that a defendant cannot avoid liability merely by saying 
that he was not consciously aware of the dangerousness of his activity. Such 
ignorance should not entirely exonerate a person who engages in conduct that 
is objectively dangerous.
 133 The proposed provision directly covers the conduct prohibited in current 5/21-
1(1)(a), (d), and (f). Current 5/21-1(1)(b) has been expanded to reach any reckless damage, 
regardless of the means employed. Current 5/21-1(1)(c) and (g) are covered to the extent 
property is actually damaged; otherwise the conduct is likely prohibited by proposed Sections 
2202 and 2206(1)(c), the general endangerment offense in Section 1202, and/or one of the 
weapons offenses (Article 7100). Current 5/21-1(1)(e), which bans depositing stink bombs 
on another’s property, would be covered under Section 2206(1)(a) by virtue of the broad 
definition of “damage” in Section 2206(2).
 134 Provisions outside the Code also address conduct now covered by Section 
2206(1)(a). See 20 ILCS 3435/3 (disturbing archaeological resource); 625 ILCS 5/18c-
7502(a)(i) (tampering with rail car or property); 765 ILCS 835/1(a) to (b-5) (damaging human 
remains, burial ground, gravestone, or memorial site).
 135 Under the proposed definition of “damaging” in Section 2206(2), conduct that had 
been considered criminal defacement (e.g., spray-painting a building) is now covered by the 
general damage section.
 136 Section 2206 is not meant to cover any conduct in current 215/4 that constitutes theft, 
attempted theft, or attempted criminal damage, as such conduct is addressed by other offenses. 
See proposed Articles 800 (inchoate offenses) and 2100 (theft). Current 215/2, 215/3, 215/5(c), 
and 215/6 to /8, dealing with civil and regulatory issues involving animal research facilities, 
have been deleted as moot. If desired, those provisions may be transferred to other chapters 
outside the Criminal Code by means of “conforming amendments” legislation.
 137 The offense in current 360/1 is also addressed by other provisions within the 
proposed Code. See proposed Sections 802 (solicitation); 803 (conspiracy); 2207 (tampering 
with or damaging a public service); 2401 (interception of electronic or oral communication). 
In appropriate cases, liability could be imposed for such acts under both Section 2206 and 
another relevant provision. See proposed Section 254 and corresponding commentary.
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 Section 2206(1)(c) prohibits tampering with another’s property such 
that a person or property is placed in danger. This provision covers cases 
where the offender has not directly destroyed or even “damaged” property, 
but has tampered with or altered the property, thereby creating a risk of harm 
— such as by placing a foreign substance in an automobile gas tank, moving 
a railroad switch, or infecting a computer hard drive with a virus. Subsection 
(1)(c) covers some or all of the conduct in current 5/16D-3(a)(4) (tampering 
with computers or programs), 5/21-1(1)(c),(g) (starting a fire, or shooting a 
firearm at a train); 5/21-1.5 (tampering with anhydrous ammonia equipment); 
and 360/1 (tampering with phone lines). An offender who tampers with 
property is punished based on the amount of damage or loss he causes or, 
where the risk does not lead to actual damage or loss, would be subject to 
Class B misdemeanor liability. See infra commentary for proposed Section 
2206(3). 
 Section 2206(1)(d) prohibits indirectly causing property damage 
by means of a deception or threat. This provision, which has no directly 
corresponding current provision, covers cases where the offender causes a 
loss, but has not personally damaged (or stolen) the property. For example, 
a person who falsely tells another that the other’s winning lottery ticket has 
no value, leading the owner to tear up the ticket, has caused a loss and merits 
criminal liability just as if he had torn or stolen the ticket himself.
 Section 2206(2), defining “damaging,” has no corresponding provision 
in current Chapter 720, which frequently uses, but never defines, the term 
“damage.” The proposed provision defines damage broadly as “impairing 
[property’s] usefulness or value by any means.” Under this standard, acts 
such as defacing, altering, or tampering may constitute damage if they impair 
the usefulness or value of the property. Moreover, the definition specifically 
includes deleting or altering computer programs and recorded data to cover 
conduct criminalized by current 5/16D-3(a)(3).
 Section 2206(3) grades the offense according to the value of the 
property loss. The proposed formulation is similar to current 5/21-1(2),138 
except that the proposed provision also alters the penalty according to the 
offender’s culpability level with respect to the damage that results from his 
conduct. In addition, Section 2206(3) adds a grading distinction for cases 
involving losses in excess of $1,000 (current 5/21-1(2) alters the grade at 
$300, $10,000, and $100,000). This has the effect of elevating the penalties 
one grade level for cases involving losses in excess of $1,000, $10,000, 
and $100,000 so that they become Class 3, Class 2, and Class 1 felonies, 
respectively. Section 2206(3)(e) and (f) also add a grading distinction for 
cases involving losses of less than $50, which would now be Class B rather 
than Class A misdemeanors.
 138 Section 2206(3) is intended to replace both current 5/21-1(2) and the grading 
provisions for the specific criminal damage offenses discussed above. See supra commentary 
for proposed Section 2206(1).
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  As under current law, the value of the property damaged is an element 
of the proposed offense that must be proved by the State beyond a reasonable 
doubt.139 In addition, the proposed Code requires the State to prove that the 
defendant was at least reckless as to the amount of property damaged. See 
proposed Section 205 and corresponding commentary; see also commentary 
for proposed Section 2109.
 Section 2206(3)(f) provides a “residual” grade of Class B misdemeanor 
for offenses not otherwise covered in Section 2206(3). This would include 
cases where the offender knowingly or recklessly causes less than $50 in 
damage; negligently causes damage to property (regardless of the extent of 
the loss); or tampers with property, thereby placing persons or property in 
danger, but causes no actual loss or damage. (Current 5/21-1 does not provide 
for negligence liability.)
 Section 2206(3)(g) reduces the penalty one grade at each value level 
for damage that is caused recklessly. Current 5/21-1 makes no grading 
distinction between knowing and reckless conduct.
 Current law provides enhanced penalties for criminal damage to 
various institutions in both current 5/21-1(2) (criminal damage) and 5/21-
1.2 (institutional vandalism). Section 2206(3)(h) eliminates the current 
institutional vandalism offense (5/21-1.2). Instead of that offense’s grading 
scheme, under which institutional vandalism is either a Class 3 or Class 
2 felony, Section 2206(3)(h) provides for an across-the-board increase 
that aggravates liability by doubling, for grading purposes, the value of 
the property lost or damaged. See also proposed Section 2109(8) and 
corresponding commentary.
Section 2207. Tampering With or Damaging a Public Service
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/16-14(b); 5/16D-4; 
  360/1
Comment:
 Generally. This provision creates a separate offense for interruption or 
impairment of public services. Such conduct merits treatment in a separate 
offense, because impairment or interruption of a public service potentially 
 139 See 720 ILCS 5/21-1(1). Under current law, the State is not required to prove the 
exact amount of damage, but need only prove the minimum amount necessary to justify 
conviction under the relevant offense grade. People v. Carraro, 394 N.E.2d 1194, 1196 (Ill. 
1979). Evidence of the cost of repairs is sufficient to prove the value of the damage, unless the 
defendant raises the issue by presenting evidence of an alternative measure of damage. Id. The 
same rules would apply under the structure of the proposed Code. 
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harms every member of the general public who depends on the service, 
regardless of the amount of tangible property damage or loss (if any).140
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 2207(1) generally corresponds 
to current 5/16-14(1). Under Section 2207(1), however, the impairment or 
interruption must be “substantial.” The culpability requirement has also been 
reduced from knowledge to recklessness or, in cases involving inherently 
dangerous means, negligence. Section 2207(1) does not include 5/16-14’s 
prohibition of “diversion,” as the proposed Code punishes theft or diversion 
of services in the theft article. See proposed Section 2106 and corresponding 
commentary. 
 Section 2207(1) also corresponds to and replaces current 5/16D-4(a)(1) 
(computer tampering that causes interference with vital public services or 
operations) and 360/1 (willful injury to telephone wires and property).
 Section 2207(2), defining “public service,” is substantively similar 
to current 5/16-14(b), but adds “telecommunications service” and 
“transportation service” to the enumerated services.
 Section 2207(3) grades the offense according to the offender’s culpability 
level. Interference or impairment is a Class 3 felony if caused intentionally; 
a Class 4 felony if caused knowingly; and a Class A misdemeanor if caused 
recklessly or negligently. In most cases, the proposed formulation would 
raise the penalty from current law, which grades the offense as a Class A 
misdemeanor or, for a second offense or offense committed for payment, 
a Class 4 felony. The proposed grading scheme seeks to calibrate the 
offense grade to the blameworthiness of the offender and to impose liability 
proportionate to other offenses, given the harm this offense seeks to prevent.
 
Section 2208. Definitions
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/2-6; 5/2-15b; 5/2-
19; 5/15-1; 5/15-2; 5/16-14(b); 
5/16G-25; 5/20-1(b); 5/20.5-5(b)
Comment:
 Generally. This provision collects defined terms used in Article 2200 
and provides cross-references to the provisions in which they are defined.
 Relation to current Illinois law. For discussion of the relationship 
between Article 2200’s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary 
for the provision in which the term in question is initially defined.
 140 An offender who causes interruption to a public service by damaging or tampering 
with property may be liable both under this provision and under proposed Section 2206 for the 
underlying property damage. (For a discussion of the propriety of multiple convictions where 
the defendant satisfies the requirements of more than one offense, see proposed Section 254 
and corresponding commentary.)
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ARTICLE 2300. BURGLARY AND OTHER 
CRIMINAL INTRUSION PROVISIONS
Section 2301. Home or Car Invasion
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/2-6; 5/12-11; 5/12-11.1
Comment:
 Generally. This provision defines and grades home invasion and vehicle 
invasion, two offenses that are similar in objective and scope: both prohibit 
the use or threat of force in connection with an invasion made with unlawful 
intent.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 2301(1), defining home 
invasion, corresponds to current 5/12-11(a), but changes the offense’s 
formulation in two ways. First, Section 2301(1) defines home invasion with 
specific reference to burglary, thereby explicitly incorporating that offense’s 
elements. Current 5/12-11(a), by contrast, fairly closely tracks the objective 
elements of current 5/19-3’s offense of “residential burglary” by requiring 
an unauthorized entry of a dwelling, but departs from residential burglary’s 
culpability requirements by requiring that the offender “know[] or ha[ve] 
reason to know that one or more persons is present” upon entry, rather than 
that he intend to commit an offense. Section 2301(1)’s approach both saves 
verbiage and makes clear that the offenses of burglary and home invasion 
are related: both penalize the danger, intrusion, and possible physical harm 
inflicted by one who invades another’s home with unlawful intent.141 (See 
also proposed Section 2302 and corresponding commentary.) Section 
2301(1) also clarifies that the requisite use or threat of force may occur 
“during commission of or flight from” the underlying burglary.
 Second, Section 2301(1) combines the specific offense elements of 
current 5/12-11(a)(1) to (6) into a general prohibition of the use or threat 
of force.142 The variations in current law, as 5/12-11(c) makes evident, 
 141 In defining home invasion by reference to proposed Section 2302(1)’s definition 
of burglary, Section 2301(1) also reflects that provision’s rejection of the “limited authority” 
doctrine. See proposed Section 2302 and corresponding commentary; see also People v. Bush, 
623 N.E.2d 1361, 1364 (Ill. 1993) (applying “limited authority” doctrine to home invasion); 
People v. Peeples, 616 N.E.2d 294, 325 (Ill. 1993) (same).
 142 Section 2301(1)’s requirement of using or threatening “force” covers the vast 
majority of conduct criminalized by current 5/12-11(a)(6), which addresses an intruder’s 
commission of sexual assault or sexual abuse. See proposed Section 108 (defining force to 
include “confinement or restraint”). Current Illinois law would likely bar convictions for both 
home invasion and the predicate sexual offense, however, based on the view that sexual assault 
or sexual abuse is an “included offense” of 5/12-11(a)(6). The proposed Code, by contrast, 
would allow liability for both offenses, insofar as Section 2301 does not entirely account for 
the harm of any sexual assault or sexual abuse committed by an intruder. See proposed Section 
254 and corresponding commentary.
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are set out solely for the purpose of making grading distinctions. Section 
2301(1) articulates the offense in a way that makes its purpose and scope 
more transparent.143 Section 2301(1)’s definition eliminates the need for the 
affirmative defense set out in 5/12-11(b),144 which exempts from liability 
those persons who do not actually use or attempt force against anyone, and 
also eliminates the need for 5/12-11(a)’s requirement that the offender “knows 
or has reason to know that one or more persons is present.” Like proposed 
Section 1501, Section 2301(1) also eliminates the current requirement that 
the threat of force be “imminent.” A burglar who invades someone’s home 
and threatens violence merits liability even though the threatened injury may 
not occur at that immediate moment.
 Section 2301(2), defining vehicle invasion, is substantively similar to 
current 5/12-11.1(a), with a few modifications. First, Section 2301(2) requires 
that the invader have the intent to commit a felony, whereas 5/12-11.1(a) also 
covers intent to commit theft. Section 2301(2)’s requirement of an intent to 
commit a felony parallels Section 2301(1)’s incorporation of the felony of 
burglary. Entering or reaching into a vehicle is less intrusive than entering 
a dwelling, and may also be consistent with a lawful purpose. Requiring 
an intent to commit a felony thus ensures that the defendant’s conduct is 
sufficiently serious to warrant punishment on a par with the punishment for 
home invasion. 
 Second, Section 2301(2) replaces 5/12-11.1(a)’s requirement that 
the offender’s entry be by force with a requirement that the offender use 
or threaten force toward “an occupant of the vehicle.” By paralleling the 
definition of home invasion set forth in Section 2301(1), this language 
makes clear that the seriousness of vehicle invasion consists in the threat or 
occurrence of harm to persons rather than property.145 Because of this shift in 
focus, Section 2301(2) also specifies that the use or threat of force may occur 
“while or after” entering or reaching into the vehicle.
 Finally, Section 2301(2)’s culpability requirements for vehicle invasion 
track those of the home invasion offense, thereby requiring only recklessness, 
whereas 5/12-11.1(a) requires that one act knowingly. Cf. proposed Section 
205(3) (imposing “read-in” culpability requirement of recklessness where 
none is otherwise stated).
 143 Three of current 5/12-11(a)’s subsections prohibit a threat of imminent force by 
an armed intruder. See 720 ILCS 5/12-1(a)(1) (offender armed with “dangerous weapon[] 
other than a firearm”); 5/12-11(a)(3) (offender armed with firearm); 5/12-11(a)(4) (offender 
discharged firearm). None of these provisions, however, prohibit an unarmed intruder’s threat 
of imminent force, which proposed Section 2301(1) would cover.
 144 Section 2301(1) also omits current 5/12-11(a)’s exception for “a peace officer 
acting in the line of duty.” This exception is covered by the justifications for law enforcement 
activity in the General Part. See proposed Sections 413, 414(1) and (3) and corresponding 
commentary.
 145 Section 2301(2) also omits as unnecessary 5/12-11.1(a)’s requirement that the entry 
be “without lawful justification.” Even without this language, a lawful justification will bar 
liability despite the fact that all elements of the offense are satisfied. See proposed Section 400 
and corresponding commentary.
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 Section 2301(3)(a) presents a single definition of “dwelling” that is 
substantively similar to and blends elements of current 5/2-6(a)’s general 
definition of the term and 5/2-6(b)’s special definition for residential 
burglary. Section 2301(3)(a) uses the phrase “building or structure, though 
movable or temporary,” rather than 5/2-6(a)’s examples of “enclosed spaces” 
and 5/2-6(b)’s examples of “living quarters”; generalizes 5/2-6(a)’s rule 
that a “portion” of a building may be a dwelling, so that it also applies to 
structures; includes, like 5/2-6(a), places “used as a human habitation, home, 
or residence,” but excludes places merely “intended” for such use; and 
incorporates 5/2-6(b)’s rule that a place must have been a dwelling “at the 
time of the alleged offense.”
 Section 2301(3)(b)’s definition of “dwelling of another” is the same as 
current 5/12-11(d).
 Under Section 2301(4), home and vehicle invasion are Class 1 felonies. 
While current law similarly grades vehicle invasion as a Class 1 felony, 
current 5/12-11(c) grades a home invasion not involving a firearm as a Class 
X felony.146 The current grading for home invasion essentially equates the 
offense, which requires no resulting physical injury at all, with second-
degree murder. The proposed offense, and grading structure, more carefully 
disaggregate the various harms and risks at stake in the burglary situation 
and allow for separate, appropriate punishment for each such harm or risk. 
Under the proposed scheme, the fear and risk of injury specifically imposed 
by the use or threat of force aggravate the offense of residential burglary from 
a Class 2 to a Class 1 felony. Any other, independent aggravating factors — 
such as sexual assault, the risk of harm created by use of a dangerous weapon, 
or any physical injury or death resulting from the use of force — may be 
punished as distinct offenses under Articles 1100, 1200, 1300, and/or 7100. 
Significantly, under the proposed system of liability for multiple offenses, 
there would be no concurrent sentencing for such multiple convictions, so 
each independent harm or risk would be sure to result in additional liability 
for the offender. See proposed Section 906.
 146 Current 5/12-11(c) also grades home invasion as a Class X felony where a firearm 
is involved, and requires an additional 15, 20, or 25 years of imprisonment, depending on 
whether the defendant used, discharged, or injured another with a firearm. Rather than adding 
a certain number of years to an offender’s term of imprisonment for home invasion, the 
proposed Code imposes liability for an additional offense where the offender uses a firearm 
or other dangerous weapon in the commission of a felony. See proposed Section 7101. The 
proposed homicide and assault offenses would address any injury or death caused by the use 
of such weapons. See proposed Articles 1100 and 1200. Significantly, each additional offense 
of conviction would increase an offender’s total liability. See proposed Section 906.
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Section 2302. Burglary
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/19-1; 5/19-3; 
  see also 720 ILCS 215/4(4),(6)
Comment:
 Generally. This provision defines the offense of burglary, which 
punishes trespasses where the trespasser has an additional criminal intent. 
The distinct offense of burglary recognizes the independent harm caused by 
the fear and intrusion that may be created by a stealthy intruder who invades 
another’s property to commit a crime.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 2302(1) consolidates the 
prohibitions of current 5/19-1 and 5/19-3.147 Current 5/19-3’s principal 
purpose is to aggravate the grade of residential burglaries; Section 2302 
accomplishes this by aggravating the grade for such burglaries in Section 
2302(2)(a).
 Section 2302(1) requires only the intent to commit an offense, while 
5/19-1 and 5/19-3 require intent to commit a felony or theft. Section 2302’s 
broader formulation follows the understanding that the intended crime is not 
of central importance to the distinct offense of burglary. The provocation of 
fear and the invasion of one’s sense of security that the offense is meant to 
punish exist irrespective of the crime the burglar intends to commit — which, 
after all, need not occur for burglary liability to exist. For similar reasons, 
Section 2302(1) requires that one must “surreptitiously” remain on another’s 
property to be liable for burglary. Without the specific harms that clandestine 
intrusion creates, the actor is guilty only of trespass and attempt to commit 
the other intended crime (and can be charged with both of those offenses).
 Section 2302(1) prohibits entering or remaining in a “building or 
habitable structure,” rather than using 5/19-1’s list of a “building, housetrailer, 
watercraft, aircraft, motor vehicle[,] . . . railroad car, or any part thereof,”148 
for brevity and to limit the offense’s application according to its purpose. The 
 147 Section 2302(1) also covers current 215/4(4) and (6), which criminalize entering 
or remaining in an animal research or production facility with the intent to commit an 
offense. Section 2302(2), like current 215/5(a)(1), would grade such a burglary as a Class 
4 felony. Other offenses set forth in current 215/4 are covered by the proposed offenses for 
theft, property damage, and trespassing. See proposed Sections 2102, 2206, and 2303 and 
corresponding commentary. It is anticipated that current 215/2, 215/3, 215/5(c), and 215/6 to 
/8, dealing with civil and regulatory issues involving animal research and production facilities, 
will be preserved outside Chapter 720 through the “conforming amendments” bill to be 
presented to the General Assembly. 
 148 Both current 5/19-1(a) and 5/19-3(a) criminalize entering or remaining in a place 
“or any part thereof.” Section 2302(1) omits the phrase “or any part thereof” as superfluous; 
one who enters or remains in a part of a place necessarily enters or remains in the place itself. 
Because one typically does not enter or remain within an entire place at once, but only a “part 
thereof” at any given time, adding a distinction between being in a “place” and being in a 
“part” of a place is only likely to introduce confusion.
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independent harms of intrusion and provocation of fear are less likely to exist 
where the property is a vehicle rather than a building (and where they do exist, 
the offender would probably be liable for vehicle invasion under proposed 
Section 2301(2)). Section 2302(1)’s use of “habitable structure” also renders 
unnecessary current 5/19-1(a)’s exception for the vehicle offenses set out in 
625 ILCS 5/4-102 (which defines misdemeanor offenses involving removing 
parts of, tampering with, and damaging vehicles). In most cases, a vehicle is 
not a “habitable structure” (although a houseboat or motor home would be).
 Section 2302(1) requires a culpability level of recklessness with respect 
to each offense element, other than requiring the burglar’s intent to commit 
another offense. Cf. proposed Section 205(3) (imposing “read-in” culpability 
requirement of recklessness where none is otherwise stated). Current 5/19-1 
and 5/19-3 specify “knowingly” for the element of entering, and for remaining 
in a dwelling, but recklessness as to remaining in a place other than a dwelling 
and burglary’s other elements. Cf. 720 ILCS 5/4-3(b) (imposing “read-in” 
culpability requirement of recklessness where none is otherwise stated). 
Section 2302(1) imposes a uniform culpability requirement of recklessness 
because a trespasser who intends to commit a crime on another’s property 
merits punishment, even in the highly unlikely situation that he is not certain 
that he is entering or remaining in a building or habitable structure.
 Section 2302(1) imposes liability only if one enters or remains with 
neither license nor authority, and “at a time when the premises are not open 
to the public,” whereas current 5/19-1 and 5/19-3 merely require that one 
enter or remain “without authority.” Illinois courts currently hold, under the 
“limited authority” doctrine, that one who enters a building or vehicle with 
the intent to commit a felony or theft — even if the person has permission or 
the property is open to the public — does so “without authority,” insofar as the 
“authority to enter . . . [a] building open to the public . . . extends only to those 
who enter with a purpose consistent with the reason the building is open.”149 
The “limited authority” doctrine is undesirable, for it renders the “without 
authority” requirement a nullity. In doing so, it eliminates the distinction 
between burglary and the underlying intended crime (usually theft), and 
often punishes conduct that amounts only to an attempt, or even less than 
an attempt, more severely than the completed offense would be punished. 
Section 2302(1) does not incorporate the “limited authority” doctrine and 
 149 People v. Weaver, 243 N.E.2d 245, 248 (Ill. 1968) (upholding burglary conviction 
where defendant entered laundromat with intent to commit theft); see also People v. Blair, 
288 N.E.2d 443, 445 (Ill. 1972) (upholding burglary conviction where defendants entered car 
wash stall with intent to commit theft); People v. Bailey, 543 N.E.2d 1338, 1343 (Ill. App. 
1989) (“We think it contrary to reason and ordinary human understanding to suppose that the 
permission extended to the instant defendant by his brother to enter and use the van included 
authority to enter it in order to steal part of its contents.”); People v. Fisher, 404 N.E.2d 859, 
862-63 (Ill. App. 1980) (“Because defendants were given authority to enter the apartment for 
the purpose of a social visit only, the criminal actions they planned were inconsistent with this 
limited authority, and served to vitiate the consent given for their entry.”).
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further requires that a burglary occur “at a time when the premises are not 
open to the public” to emphasize its rejection of the rule.150
 Section 2302(2) grades burglary as a Class 4 felony and residential 
burglary as a Class 2 felony, whereas 5/19-1(b) grades burglary as a Class 
2 felony and 5/19-3(b) grades residential burglary as a Class 1 felony. This 
adjustment reflects the fact that home invasion, an inherently more serious 
form of residential burglary, is graded as a Class 1 felony. It also reflects the 
fact that the proposed grading and liability scheme enables additional liability 
for any additional harms or risks involved in the burglary, such as use of a 
weapon or infliction of physical injury. See supra commentary discussing 
proposed Section 2301(4). 
 Section 2302(2) does not recognize 5/19-1(b)’s aggravation for burglary 
in schools and places of worship, as there is no additional likelihood in those 
cases of causing fear and invading security. Those aggravating factors appear 
to reflect a concern as to the other crime the burglar intends, but the attempt 
to commit that crime may be punished separately.
Section 2303. Criminal Trespass
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/19-4; 5/21-2; 5/21-3; 
5/21-5; 5/21-7; see also 720 ILCS 
215/4(3)
Comment:
 Generally. This provision defines, grades, and provides special defenses 
to the offense of criminal trespass, which prohibits a person’s unlawful 
presence on another’s property. Section 2303(1) defines the offense; Section 
2303(2) provides offense grades; and Section 2303(3) defines two defenses.
 150 Section 2302(1) also rejects a closely related doctrine under which the Illinois courts 
have held that one who enters a place with permission to commit a crime therein may still do 
so “without authority,” because the person giving permission may himself lack authority to 
permit an offense. See, e.g., People v. Martin, 449 N.E.2d 1039, 1041 (Ill. App. 1983) (“The 
younger Layoff, as an unemancipated minor living in a house which his father rented and 
controlled, may have the ability to authorize entries into his parents’ house for lawful purposes. 
We hold, however, that he could not authorize the defendant’s entry into his parents’ house 
for the unlawful purpose of stealing his parents’ jewelry.”); People v. Castile, 339 N.E.2d 366, 
370 (Ill. App. 1975) (“John Price, as assistant manager, had no more authority to consent to an 
entry for the purpose of theft than he did to steal merchandise himself. The fact that Price had 
access to keys to the premises did not confer upon him the ability to authorize entry for the 
purpose of theft. In the absence of such authority, the defendants’ argument that their entry was 
authorized must fail.”). Under Section 2302(1), the relevant inquiry in such cases is whether 
the person giving permission is authorized to permit entry, rather than the intended offense. If 
entry is authorized, the person entering would be liable for any subsequent offense, but not for 
burglary; the person allowing entry may also be accountable for the other person’s subsequent 
offense. See proposed Section 301.
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 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 2303(1) merges the prohibitions 
of five current trespass offenses151 into a single offense definition by 
prohibiting entering or remaining in any “place” generally, whereas each 
of the current provisions prohibits entering or remaining152 in a particular 
kind of place.153 Section 2303(1)’s general language covers all the types of 
property protected by current law and eliminates any need for additional 
specialized trespass offenses. 
 Section 2303(1) requires that one enter or remain in a place that he 
“knows he has no license or authority154 to be.” Current Chapter 720 implicitly 
imposes such a knowledge requirement for several forms of trespass by 
defining the offenses as entering or remaining after having received notice 
that such presence is forbidden155 (5/21-3(a)(2)-(a)(4), 5/21-5, 5/21-7); 
other forms of trespass impose a requirement of recklessness as to lack of 
authority (5/19-4, 5/21-2, 5/21-3(a)(1)). By requiring knowledge as to one’s 
lack of license or authority, Section 2303(1) replaces the numerous notice 
specifications included in 5/21-3, 5/21-5, and 5/21-7, and obviates the need 
for 5/21-3(a)’s various exemptions for persons who lack such knowledge.
 Section 2303(1) requires recklessness with respect to entering or 
remaining in a place. Current Chapter 720 also requires recklessness as to this 
element for some forms of trespass (5/21-3(a)(2)-(a)(4), 5/21-5, and 5/21-7), 
but requires knowledge for other forms (5/19-4, 5/21-2, 5/21-3(a)(1)). Section 
2303(1) imposes a culpability level of recklessness under the view that one 
 151 Section 2303(2) also corresponds to current 215/4(3)’s prohibition of “obtaining 
access” to an animal research or production facility for the purpose of performing unauthorized 
acts. Current 215/4’s other offenses are addressed by the proposed offenses for theft, property 
damage, and burglary. See proposed Sections 2102, 2206, and 2302 and corresponding 
commentary. 
 Additionally, Section 2303 corresponds to the recently adopted offense of “criminal 
trespass to a nuclear facility,” effective on January 1, 2003. See 720 ILCS 5/21-8.
 152 Current 5/21-2, however, prohibits entering or operating a vehicle, but not remaining 
in a vehicle. Assuming that the offense’s other elements are satisfied, Section 2303(1) imposes 
liability upon one who remains in a vehicle, insofar as there is no apparent reason to treat 
vehicles differently from other places. Unlike 5/21-2, Section 2303(1) does not impose 
liability for operating a vehicle, insofar as such conduct is beyond the offense’s aim. Liability 
for operating another’s vehicle without consent is available, however, under the proposed 
“joyriding” offense. See proposed Section 2111(1)(a) and corresponding commentary. 
 153 See 720 ILCS 5/19-4 (residence); 5/21-2 (“vehicle, aircraft, watercraft or 
snowmobile”); 5/21-3 (real property); 5/21-5 (State-supported land); 5/21-7 (“restricted area” 
or “restricted landing area” at airport). 
 154 Section 2303(1) uses the phrase “license or authority” to make clear that either 
permission (“license”) or an independent privilege that exists regardless of permission 
(“authority”) to enter or remain in a place will bar conviction for criminal trespass.
 155 In some unusual situations, however, one who receives notice from an owner that 
entry is forbidden may not know that he lacks license or authority to enter a place. Cf. 
Williams v. Nagel, 643 N.E.2d 816, 822 (Ill. 1994) (denying plaintiffs’ claims that they 
enjoyed statutory right to enter premises under defense set forth in current 5/21-3(c) because 
“plaintiffs had been barred from the premises by management[,] . . . . [and] any attempt by 
tenants to invite the plaintiffs onto the premises would be invalid”). 
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who knows he lacks license or authority to be on certain property should bear 
the burden of avoiding an unlawful presence on that property, and should be 
liable when (as recklessness requires) he is consciously aware of a risk that 
he is on that property.
 Section 2303(2)(a) grades criminal trespass of a dwelling or highly 
secured premises as a Class 4 felony, in recognition of the special privacy 
and security interests at stake for such property. Current Chapter 720 
grades residential trespass as a Class A misdemeanor (5/19-4) and does not 
aggravate for trespass on highly secured premises. (Chapter 720 also grades 
as a Class A misdemeanor trespass in a dwelling, vehicle, State-supported 
property, or restricted area in an airport; all other trespass is graded as a Class 
B misdemeanor.)
 Section 2303(2)(b) grades trespass as a Class A misdemeanor when it 
occurs in buildings, structures, and places where the owner has shown a clear 
intent to bar entry.156 This reflects the understanding such violations involve 
lower levels of intrusiveness than those covered by (2)(a), but greater levels 
of intrusiveness than ordinary trespass, which Section 2303(2)(c) grades as a 
Class C misdemeanor.
 Section 2303(3) defines the terms “highly secured premises” and 
“storage structure,” which are not used in current Chapter 720.
 Section 2303(4) defines two defenses to criminal trespass. Section 
2303(4)(a) is similar to the first clause of 5/21-3(a)’s last paragraph, but 
does not provide an absolute defense where one enters or remains “while 
the building is open to the public.” Rather, Section 2303(4)(a) notes that one 
may not enjoy a license if he fails to comply with any “lawful conditions 
imposed on access to or remaining in the premises.” The use of the modifier 
“lawful” ensures that one may not be convicted of trespass on the basis of an 
unlawfully discriminatory exclusion.
 Section 2303(4)(b) provides a defense for those who enter or remain in 
a place under a reasonable belief that another “would have licensed” them to 
do so. Such persons may know their presence is formally unauthorized, but if 
they believe it would be condoned and the circumstances indicate that such a 
belief is objectively reasonable, they lack the blameworthiness of those who 
are fully aware that their presence is prohibited. This defense would cover 
those currently covered by 5/21-3(d)’s exemption for those who beautify 
certain “unoccupied and abandoned residential and industrial properties.”
 Section 2303(4) omits current 5/21-3(e), which provides that persons 
enjoying a defense under 5/21-3(d) are not civilly liable. Section 5/21-3(f)’s 
defense for persons entering real property for “emergency purposes” is 
covered by proposed Section 412’s lesser evils defense (q.v.).
 156 Section 2303(2)(b) grades trespass as a Class A misdemeanor if the offense is 
committed “in any place so enclosed as manifestly to exclude intruders.” Where a property 
owner has gone out of his way to exclude intruders — for example, by erecting a wall 
around his property — an intruder’s clear defiance of that effort represents a greater level of 
intrusiveness than, for example, where a person wanders onto someone else’s open field.
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Section 2304. Residential Picketing
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/21.1-1 to 5/21.1-3
Comment:
 Generally. This provision defines and grades the offense of residential 
picketing. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 2304(1) is substantively similar 
to current 5/21.1-2, but translates the current provision’s two long sentences 
into a single sentence that is shorter than either of them. Section 2304(1) 
simply prohibits picketing the “dwelling of another,” rather than defining 
the offense as picketing the “residence or dwelling of any person” and then 
providing an exception for a “person peacefully picketing his own residence 
or dwelling,” as 5/21.1-2 does. Section 2304(1) also uses the phrase “place of 
. . . public assembly” rather than “place of holding a meeting or assembly on 
premises commonly used to discuss subjects of general public interest.”
 Section 2304(2), like current 5/21.1-3, provides that residential 
picketing is a Class B misdemeanor.
Section 2305. Definitions
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/2-6; 5/2-19; 
  5/12-11(d)
Comment:
 Generally. This provision collects defined terms used in Article 2300 
and provides cross-references to the provisions in which they are defined.
 Relation to current Illinois law. For discussion of the relationship 
between Article 2300’s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary 
for the provision in which the term in question is initially defined.
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ARTICLE 2400. INVASION OF PRIVACY PROVISIONS
General Note: 
 A number of provisions in current Article 14, though probably 
appropriate for administrative regulations, do not properly belong in the 
Criminal Code. See, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/14-3A; 5/14-3B; 5/14-5 to 5/14-9. It is 
expected that many of these provisions will be preserved elsewhere in state 
law via the “conforming amendments” bill to be proposed along with the 
Code in the General Assembly.
Section 2401. Interception of Electronic or Oral Communications
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/14-1 to 5/14-4; 145/1
Comment:
 Generally. This provision defines, provides defenses to, and grades the 
offense of intercepting a private electronic or oral communication. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 2401(1) is substantively 
similar to current 5/14-2(a)(1) in prohibiting intentional interceptions of both 
electronic and oral communications by use of an intercepting device, but with 
some modifications.157 First, Section 2401(1) omits current 5/14-2(a)(1)’s 
exceptions for interceptions made with consent or pursuant to Article 108A or 
Article 108B of the Code of Criminal Procedure; those defenses are covered 
by the defenses set forth in Section 2401(3)(a) and (3)(b), respectively.
 Second, Section 2401(1) alters 5/14-2(a)(1)’s prohibition against 
intercepting “any conversation” to prohibit intercepting a “private oral 
communication.” This language limits the offense’s application to cases 
where the harm with which the offense is concerned — invasion of 
privacy — actually occurs. There is no privacy violation when a speaker 
recognizes that third parties can hear him, or unreasonably expects that 
 157 Section 2401(1) omits current 5/14-2(a)(2) — which criminalizes manufacturing, 
assembling, distributing, and possessing eavesdropping devices — as unnecessary, as an 
offense in the General Part prohibits the possession of “any instrument of crime with intent to 
employ it criminally.” See proposed Section 808 and corresponding commentary.
 Section 2401 also omits as unnecessary current 5/14-2(c)’s special defenses for 
manufacturers, suppliers, and service providers who “manufacture, assemble, sell, or possess” 
devices “within the normal course of their business,” and for law enforcement officers and 
Department of Corrections employees who “manufacture, assemble, purchase, or possess” 
devices “within the course of their official duties.” Proposed Section 808 imposes liability only 
where the offender possesses a device “with intent to employ it criminally.”
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they cannot.158 Additionally, Section 2401(1)’s privacy requirement renders 
unnecessary current Illinois law’s numerous exemptions for intercepting oral 
communications that are not private.159 
 Third, Section 2401(1) applies the word “intercepts” to both oral 
and electronic communications, whereas 5/14-2(a)(1) uses “hearing or 
recording” for oral communications and “intercepts, retains, or transcribes” 
for electronic communications. As defined in proposed Section 2401(2)(d), 
“interception” covers the conduct prohibited by current 5/14-2(a)(1). 
 Fourth, Section 2401(1) generally requires that the offender use an 
“intercepting device.” Current 5/14-2(a)(1) explicitly requires use of a device 
for the interception of conversations, but not for the interception of electronic 
communications.
 Finally, Section 2401(1) specifies a culpability level of “knowledge” that 
applies to intercepting and the offense’s other objective elements, whereas 
current 5/14-2(a)(1) effectively prescribes a more demanding culpability 
requirement by confusingly requiring that one act both “[k]nowingly and 
intentionally.” Section 2401(1)’s clearer culpability requirement reflects 
the view that one who knowingly invades another’s privacy is sufficiently 
blameworthy to warrant liability.
 Section 2401(2) provides definitions for terms that are initially used in 
Section 2401.160 Section 2401(2)(a) defines the term “contents,” a term that 
current Chapter 720 uses but does not define.
 Section 2401(2)(b) and (e), defining “electronic communication” and 
“private electronic communication,” respectively, are substantively similar to 
current 5/14-1(e)’s definition of “electronic communication,” with two minor 
modifications. First, Section 2401(2)(b) omits some of 5/14-1(e)’s examples 
of electronic communication technologies, and instead simply requires that 
the communication be made by use of a “connection” furnished or operated 
by a common carrier. This language eliminates any need to amend the 
definition as new communication technologies are invented or popularized.
 158 Although current 5/14-2(a)(1) broadly prohibits intercepting “any conversation,” the 
provision recognizes the importance of expectations of privacy with respect to interceptions 
of electronic communications. Current 5/14-1(e) defines “electronic communication” to 
include only communications “where the sending and receiving parties intend the electronic 
communication to be private,” and requires that interception occur “in a surreptitious manner.” 
Unlike 5/14-2(a)(1), Section 2401(1)(a) treats electronic and oral communications alike and, 
as to both, criminalizes interceptions of private communications only.
 159 See 720 ILCS 5/14-3(a) (listening to publicly-made radio, wireless, and television 
communications); 5/14-3(c) (any radio, television, or other broadcast); 5/14-3(d) (recording 
or listening to emergency communications); 5/14-3(e) (recording proceedings of open 
meetings).
  Section 2401(1)’s offense definition also incorporates current 5/14-3(b)’s exemption 
for interceptions of oral communications made by common carriers in the ordinary course of 
business, and extends the exemption to apply to interceptions of electronic communications.
 160 Section 2401(2) omits as unnecessary current 5/14-1’s definitions of “eavesdropper” 
and “principal,” which current Chapter 720 uses solely for the purpose of determining civil 
remedies available to persons whose communications have been intercepted. See 720 ILCS 
5/14-6(1).
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 Second, Section 2401(2)(e) requires that the sending party have “an 
expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under 
circumstances justifying such expectation” whereas current 5/14-1(e) 
requires that the parties “intend” the communication to be private and 
that any interception be “surreptitious.” Section 2401(2)(e)’s definition of 
“private electronic communication” parallels Section 2401(2)(f)’s definition 
of “private oral communication” and, like that provision, reflects the 
view that one’s privacy is not invaded when he either recognizes that his 
communication is subject to interception or unreasonably expects that it is 
not.
 Section 2401(2)(c)’s definition of “intercepting device” is substantively 
similar to current 5/14-1(a)’s definition of “eavesdropping device,” but 
substitutes “electronic, mechanical, [and] other device” for “any device”; 
uses “intercept” rather than “hearing or recording” and “intercept, retain, or 
transcribe”; and omits as unnecessary the phrase “whether such conversation 
or electronic communication is conducted in person, by telephone, or by any 
other means.”
 Section 2401(2)(c)(i)’s exception is substantively similar to Illinois 
courts’ construction of current 5/14-1(a)’s definition of “eavesdropping 
device” as excluding telephones that have not been functionally altered,161 
but also provides a defense for other communication devices furnished or 
authorized by common carriers.
 Section 2401(2)(c)(ii)’s exception for hearing aids and similar devices 
is substantively similar to current 5/14-1(a)’s last clause.
 Section 2401(2)(d) provides a definition for “interception,” a term that 
current Chapter 720 uses but does not define. See 720 ILCS 5/14-1; 5/14-2; 
5/14-3A; 5/14-3B; 5/14-5.
 Section 2401(2)(f) provides a definition for “private oral 
communication,” a term that current Chapter 720 uses but does not define. 
See 720 ILCS 5/14-3A(a); 5/14-3B(a)(2).
 Section 2401(3) sets forth three defenses to Section 2401(1)’s 
offense of interception of electronic or oral communications and Section 
2405(1)’s offense of unlawful disclosure of information. Section 2401(3) 
clearly denominates its contents as “defenses,” whereas current 5/14-2 
and 5/14-3 create a byzantine collection of offenses, exceptions, defenses, 
and exemptions. In Chapter 720, some acceptable conduct is noted within 
the offense definitions (see, e.g., 5/14-2(a)(1) (“unless he does so . . .”); 
5/14-2(a)(3) (“except as authorized . . .”)); some activity is protected by 
an “affirmative defense” (5/14-2(b)); some is “not unlawful” (5/14-2(c)); 
some is “not prohibited” (5/14-2(d)); and some is “exempt” (5/14-3). These 
various exclusions frequently overlap one another, overlap excuses in the 
 161 See People v. Shinkle, 539 N.E.2d 1238, 1242 (Ill. 1989) (unaltered extension 
telephone not rendered “eavesdropping device” by police officer’s act of placing hand over 
mouthpiece); People v. Gervasi, 434 N.E.2d 1112, 1114 (Ill. 1982) (extension telephone with 
speaking element removed from mouthpiece was “eavesdropping device”).
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General Part, or both. Section 2401(3)’s three defenses, in conjunction with 
Section 2401(1)’s requirement that intercepted communications be “private,” 
cover substantially the same ground as current law’s numerous exceptions, 
defenses, not-offenses, and exemptions.
 Section 2401(3)(a) is substantively similar to current 5/14-2(a)(1)(A) 
in providing a defense where all the parties to a communication consent to 
an interception, but also provides a defense where the parties consent to the 
use or disclosure of unlawfully obtained information. Section 2401(3)(a)’s 
broader defense ensures that Section 2401(1) and Section 2405(1)’s offenses 
parallel one another, and complements the General Part rule that a victim’s 
consent provides a defense if it “precludes the infliction of the harm or wrong 
sought to be prohibited” by the offense. See proposed Section 251(1) and 
corresponding commentary.
 Section 2401(3)(b) provides a defense where one is “authorized by 
law” to intercept a communication or use or disclose information. This 
language is in harmony with the General Part’s public duty justification 
(see proposed Section 413 and corresponding commentary) and covers the 
law-enforcement-related exceptions in current 5/14-2(a)(1)(B) and 5/14-
2(a)(3).162 Section 2401(3)(b)’s defense also covers the authority conveyed 
by several other provisions in current 5/14-2 and 5/14-3.163 It is anticipated 
that those current provisions will be preserved elsewhere in state law via the 
“conforming amendments” bill to be presented with the Code in the General 
Assembly.
 Section 2401(3)(c) provides a defense for interceptions made by or at 
the request of parties who reasonably believe that a communication will bear 
evidence of a criminal offense against them or their families. Section 2401(3)(c) 
is substantively similar to current 5/14-3(i), but applies to interceptions of 
electronic communications in addition to oral communications, and clarifies 
that the defense protects subsequent disclosure or use for the purpose of 
prosecuting an offense for which evidence is obtained.
 Section 2401(3)(d) is substantively similar to current Illinois law in 
providing that a party consents to interception by continuing a communication 
after being informed that it is subject to interception. See In re Estate 
of Stevenson, 256 N.E.2d 766, 770 (Ill. 1970) (holding that defendant 
informed that conversations were being recorded acquiesced in recordings 
and that “such acquiescence constitutes consent”). Section 2401(3)(d) also 
 162 Because it captures the rules and procedures for law-enforcement-related interception, 
use, and disclosure set forth in Articles 108A and 108B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 
Section 2401(3)(b) does not result in any substantive amendments to those provisions. See 
725 5/108A-1 et seq.; 5/108B-1 et seq. Section 2401(3)(b)’s defense incorporates, rather than 
displaces, Articles 108A and 108B. 
 163 See 720 ILCS 5/14-2(b) (law enforcement officer’s interception of privileged 
communications); 5/14-2(d) (Department of Corrections employee’s interception of 
electronic communications); 5/14-3(f) (interception of calls to consumer “hotlines”); 5/14-
3(g) (interception necessary for protection of person investigating certain offenses); 5/14-3(h) 
(law enforcement officer’s video recording of person stopped for traffic violation). 
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covers, and renders unnecessary, current 5/14-3(j)’s exemption and complex 
regulations for business monitoring of telemarketers. 
 Section 2401(4) grades interception as a Class 3 felony, whereas current 
5/14-4(a) grades it as a Class 4 felony. Section 2401(4) omits current 5/14-
4(a)’s aggravation for repeat offenders as unnecessary, as the General Part 
has a provision addressing repeat offenders. See proposed Section 905(1) 
and corresponding commentary. Section 2401(4) also omits current 5/14-
4(b)’s aggravation to a Class 1 felony where the offender intercepts the 
communications of certain government officers. This modification reflects 
the views that grading the offense as a Class 3 felony results in sufficiently 
serious punishment for all offenders and that other Class 1 felonies — such as 
first-degree manslaughter, sexual assault of a child under 13, and recklessly 
causing a catastrophe — are significantly more serious.
Section 2402. Interception of Private Written Correspondence
Corresponding Current Provision(s): None
Comment:
 Generally. This provision defines, and grades as a Class A 
misdemeanor, the offense of interception of private written correspondence, 
and complements proposed Section 2401’s offense for intercepting private 
electronic or oral communications. The offense prohibits damaging, 
destroying, opening, or reading the contents of letters and other private 
written correspondence. Section 2402 recognizes the State’s authority to 
prosecute offenses of this type, which it may increasingly choose to exercise 
as such conduct no longer implicates exclusive federal control. Due to the 
proliferation of modern private courier services, the federal government no 
longer enjoys a monopoly with respect to private written correspondence. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 2402 has no corresponding 
provision in Chapter 720.
Section 2403. Unlawful Eavesdropping or Surveillance
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(1); 5/14-4; 
  5/26-1(a)(5), (b); 5/26-4; 110/3
Comment:
 Generally. This provision defines the offense of unlawful eavesdropping 
or surveillance, prohibiting improper intrusions made for the purpose of 
hearing or seeing things within private places. Section 2403 is similar to 
proposed Section 2401, but covers improper intrusions into private physical 
spaces rather than improper interceptions of private communications. Where 
conduct simultaneously constitutes a violation of both Section 2403 and 
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Section 2401 — that is, if it included physical intrusion, use of a device, and 
interception of one or more private oral communications — the prosecutor 
would be entitled to charge either offense. See proposed Section 253(1) and 
corresponding commentary. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 2403(1)(a) is substantively 
similar to current 5/26-1(a)(5) in covering the common “peeping Tom” case, 
but protects the privacy of those in any “private place” rather than only those 
in “dwellings,” and requires that one “trespass” with the intent to subject 
another to any kind of surveillance, rather than “enter” and subsequently look 
into a place “for a lewd or unlawful purpose.” With respect to eavesdropping, 
Section 2403(1)(a) has no directly corresponding provision in current 
Chapter 720. Although current 5/14-2(a)(1) covers some cases within 
Section 2403(1)(a)’s scope, that provision addresses only surveillance of 
conversations by use of an “eavesdropping device.” 
 Section 2403(1)(b) prohibits installing or using a device in a private 
place for hearing or seeing occurrences therein. Section 2403(1)(c) prohibits 
installing or using a device outside a private place to hear sounds that 
ordinarily cannot be heard or understood. With respect to visual surveillance, 
Section 2403(1)(b) expands the reach of current 5/26-4(a) (which applies only 
to restrooms, tanning beds, tanning salons, locker rooms, changing rooms, 
and hotel bedrooms) and 110/3(a)(1) (which applies only to communications 
companies that observe what is occurring in a subscriber’s household).
 With respect to audio surveillance, Section 2403(1)(b) and (1)(c) are 
similar to current 5/14-2(a)(1), but address intrusions into private places 
rather than interceptions of communications, and hence also “sounds” rather 
than “conversations.”164 Section 2403(1)(b) and (1)(c) are similar to current 
110/3(a)(1), but apply to any person’s use or installation of a device to hear 
what is occurring in a “private place,” rather than only to a communication 
company’s use of a device to listen to what is occurring in a subscriber’s 
home.165
 Section 2403(2) defines the term “private place,” which is not used in 
Chapter 720.
 Section 2403(3) grades the offense as a Class A misdemeanor, the same 
grade that 5/26-1(b) provides for visual surveillance into dwellings and that 
5/26-4(d) provides for visual surveillance of certain private places. Current 
110/3(b), in contrast, grades a communication company’s surveillance of 
 164 Section 2403(1)(b) and (1)(c) use the term “private place,” which Section 2403(2) 
defines as a place where a person reasonably expects privacy. Current 5/14-2(a)(1), by 
contrast, prohibits intercepting “any conversation.” Section 2403(2)’s definition of “private 
place” limits the offense’s application to cases in which another’s privacy interests are actually 
implicated. 
 165 Section 2403(1)(b) might also cover some of the conduct criminalized by current 
110/3(a)(4)’s offense for unauthorized installation of a “home-protection scanning device in 
a dwelling as part of a communication service.” Other provisions in the Communications 
Consumer Privacy Act, including 110/3(a)(2) and (a)(3)’s regulatory offenses, are expected to 
be preserved elsewhere in Illinois law through “conforming amendments” legislation.
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a subscriber’s household as a business offense. Section 2403(3) grades the 
offense as a Class A misdemeanor rather than as a petty or business offense 
in recognition of its relative seriousness. Because of its particular threat to 
privacy interests, this offense merits a more serious grade than ordinary 
trespassing, which the proposed Code grades as a Class C misdemeanor. See 
proposed Section 2303(2).
Section 2404. Unlawful Access to Information
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/16D-3(a)(1); 5/16D-
  3(b)(1); 215 ILCS 5/1023
 Comment:
 Generally. This provision defines and grades the offense of unlawful 
access to information. The offense prohibits a person from gaining access 
to information, electronic programs, or data without privilege. Section 
2404 covers instances of tampering or intrusion in which neither property 
damage nor theft occurs — that is, instances where the central harm is a 
privacy violation. Section 2404 is similar to proposed Section 2401(1) in 
prohibiting invasions of others’ privacy interests in electronic information, 
but more broadly applies to “gain[ing] access” to information, programs, 
and data regardless of whether they are parts of “communications” between 
two points. Section 2404(1) is designed to protect, among other things, the 
privacy of electronic information that can be accessed through the Internet 
— through which one may acquire information that is not necessarily being 
“communicated” from one place to another.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 2404(1)’s offense definition 
is substantively similar to that in current 5/16D-3(a)(1),166 with three 
modifications. First, Section 2404(1) prohibits accessing any information 
without privilege, rather than merely electronic programs, data, and other 
information that may be stored in or accessed by means of computers. 
Section 2404(1)’s broader scope reflects the view that accessing information 
without privilege results in harm regardless of whether one uses a computer 
to invade another’s privacy. Section 2404(1) is similar to current 215 ILCS 
5/1023 in this respect, but prohibits gaining access to any information rather 
than only obtaining insurance information. 
 166 Section 2404(1) does not incorporate current Article 16D’s other offenses, which are 
covered by other provisions in the proposed Code governing endangerment (Article 1200), 
theft (Article 2100), property damage (Article 2200), fraud (Article 3100), and possessing 
instruments of crime (Section 808). It is anticipated that current 5/16D-6’s forfeiture provision 
will be preserved elsewhere in the Illinois statutes through “conforming amendments” 
legislation.
ILL Code  V II Spc Part_b   235 7/2/03, 1:00:29 PM
236
Proposed Criminal Code Offi cial Commentary — Volume 2
 Second, Section 2404(1) prohibits accessing without “privilege,” 
whereas current 5/16D-3(a)(1) prohibits accessing “without the authorization 
of a computer’s owner . . . or in excess of the authority granted to him.” 
Section 2404(1) omits 5/16D-3(a)(1)’s requirement of using another’s 
computer to access information, recognizing that as information networks 
are currently structured, one may use his own computer to violate another’s 
privacy. Section 2404(1) thus applies regardless of whether one uses his own 
computer or another’s to improperly access information, programs, or data.
 Third, Section 2404(1) requires that the offender know he lacks 
privilege to access the information, whereas current 5/16D-3(a)(1) imposes 
a culpability requirement of recklessness as to the lack of authority. Cf. 5/4-
3(b) (imposing “read-in” culpability requirement of recklessness where none 
is otherwise specified). Section 2404(1)’s heightened culpability requirement 
limits the offense’s reach in light of the increasing ease with which one may 
unwittingly gain access to electronic information.
 Section 2404(2) grades the offense as a Class A misdemeanor, whereas 
current 5/16D-3(b)(1) grades computer tampering as a Class B misdemeanor, 
and 215 ILCS 5/1023 grades obtaining insurance information under false 
pretenses as a Class 4 felony.
 Section 2405. Unlawful Disclosure of Information
Corresponding Current Provision(s):  720 ILCS 5/14-2(a)(3); 5/14-4 
Comment:
 Generally. Section 2405 complements Sections 2401 to 2404 by 
prohibiting anyone who knows that information was obtained in violation 
of those provisions from using or disclosing that information. One who 
uses or discloses the acquired information knowing that it was unlawfully 
obtained causes additional harm, as such use or disclosure further invades 
the privacy of the information. At the same time, Section 2405’s requirement 
of knowledge as to the unlawfulness of initially acquiring the information 
ensures that only the truly blameworthy — and not mere gossipmongers — 
are within the offense’s reach. 
 Relation to current law. Section 2405(1) is substantively similar to 
current 5/14-2(a)(3), with three important modifications to the offense 
definition. First, Section 2405(1)’s offense applies to the use or disclosure 
of information obtained in a manner prohibited by any of Article 2400’s 
offenses, whereas current 5/14-2(a)(3) applies only to information obtained 
by “eavesdropping devices.” Section 2405(1)’s broader scope reflects 
the view that the seriousness of using or disclosing information that has 
been unlawfully acquired does not depend on the particular means of 
ILL Code  V II Spc Part_b   236 7/2/03, 1:00:30 PM
237
Part II: Defi nition of Specifi c Offenses
acquisition — and serves to more generally punish the invasion of privacy 
caused by such use and disclosure.167
 Second, Section 2405(1) explicitly requires that the information used or 
disclosed have been initially obtained in an unlawful manner. Current 5/14-
2(a)(3), in contrast, states that it applies where the information was merely 
“obtained through the use of an eavesdropping device.” Although presumably 
meant to apply only to unlawfully acquired information, by its terms, the 
current use or disclosure offense is so broad that it might criminalize merely 
discussing an item from a broadcast of the evening news.168 
 Third, Section 2405(1) makes a modification to 5/14-2(a)(3)’s 
culpability requirements.169 (As to the general culpability requirement, 
Section 2405, like current 5/14-2(a)(3), requires only recklessness as to use or 
disclosure. Cf. 720 ILS 5/4-3(b) (imposing “read-in” culpability requirement 
of recklessness where none is otherwise specified).) Under Section 2405(1), 
the offender must know the information was unlawfully obtained, whereas 
current 5/14-2(a)(3) would impose liability where one “knows or reasonably 
should know” that information was “obtained through the use of an 
eavesdropping device.” Section 2405(1)’s heightened requirement reflects 
the view that mere negligence with respect to the offense’s gravamen — the 
invasion of privacy — is insufficient to warrant criminal liability.
 Section 2405(2) incorporates the defenses set out in proposed Section 
2401(3), whose relation to the defenses allowed under current law is 
discussed supra in the commentary for that provision.
  Section 2405(3) grades the offense as a Class A misdemeanor. 
Current 5/14-4(a) grades the 5/14-2(a)(3) offense as a Class 4 felony. It 
seems appropriate, however, to impose reduced liability on one who uses 
improperly obtained information relative to the person who deliberately 
and unlawfully obtained the information in the first place. At the same 
time, where the same person both intercepts and later uses or discloses the 
information, that person could be found liable for both offenses. Cf. proposed 
Sections 254 and 906 (discussing rules for imposition of, and sentencing on, 
multiple convictions). Current 5/14-2 and 5/14-4 are unclear as to whether 
multiple convictions would be allowed in this situation. Moreover, a grade 
 167 Current 140/1 criminalizes the disclosure of information that was lawfully obtained 
by businesses assisting taxpayers in preparing tax returns. It is anticipated that current 140/1’s 
offense, and the other provisions in the Taxpreparer Disclosure of Information Act, will be 
preserved elsewhere in Illinois law through “conforming amendments” legislation.
 168 Because current 5/14-2’s eavesdropping offense does not require that an intercepted 
conversation be “private,” current 5/14-3(a) sets forth an exemption for public “radio, wireless 
and television communications.” As a technical matter, however, that exemption applies 
only to “listening” to such communications, and does not protect the disclosure or use of 
information obtained through public broadcasts. 
 169 Section 2405(1) also omits 5/14-2(a)(3)’s exception for use or disclosure authorized 
by Article 108A or Article 108B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which is covered by 
proposed Section 2401(3)(b)’s defense for persons “authorized by law” to disclose or use 
intercepted communications.
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of Class A misdemeanor reflects the extension of this offense to use or 
disclosure of other forms of unlawfully obtained information than are 
covered by current 5/14-2. The offenses defined in Sections 2402 to 2404 
are Class A misdemeanors, and it does not make sense to impose higher 
liability for using information obtained through such an offense than for the 
underlying offense itself. Finally, the grade imposed in Section 2405(3) is 
consistent with the current grading for other offenses relating to improper 
disclosure of private information. Cf., e.g., 20 ILCS 301/30-5 (disclosing 
contents of medical records; Class A misdemeanor); 210 ILCS 85/6.17 
(disclosing hospital or medical record information; Class A misdemeanor); 
325 ILCS 5/11, 5/11.1 (disclosing certain records relating to abused children; 
Class A misdemeanor); 325 ILCS 15/5 (disclosing certain records relating 
to sexual abuse; Class A misdemeanor); 705 ILCS 405/5-145 (disclosing 
certain records relating to juvenile offenders; Class A misdemeanor); 750 
ILCS 50/18.1, 18.8 (disclosing certain confidential information relating to 
adoption; Class A misdemeanor).
Section 2406. Definitions
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/2-19; 5/12-7.3(h); 
  5/14-1; 725 ILCS 5/112A-3(3)
Comment:
 Generally. This provision collects defined terms used in Article 2400 
and provides cross-references to the provisions in which they are defined.
 Relation to current Illinois law. For discussion of the relationship 
between Article 2400’s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary 
for the provision in which the term in question is initially defined.
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ARTICLE 3100. FORGERY AND FRAUDULENT PRACTICES
General Comment Regarding Article 3100:
 Several of Article 3100’s offenses criminalize deceptive conduct that 
is usually undertaken as part of an effort to wrongfully obtain property or 
services — that is, to steal. There is therefore a close relationship between 
Article 3100 and Article 2100. In many, perhaps most, cases, a single act or 
course of conduct will satisfy the requirements of both a fraud offense (or 
attempt) and a theft offense (or attempt). In such situations, the propriety of 
multiple convictions would be governed by the rules set forth in proposed 
Section 254, and their consequences in terms of overall liability would be 
governed by proposed Section 906.
Section 3101. Forgery and Counterfeiting
Corresponding Current Provision(s):  720 ILCS 5/17-3; see also, e.g., 
720 ILCS 5/16D-3(a)(5); 5/17-
1(A)(iii),(B); 5/17-17; 5/17-18; 
5/17-23; 5/17B-5(ii); 250/2.07; 
250/14 to /16; 5 ILCS 175/10-
140(b); 15 ILCS 335/14A(b)(3); 
20 ILCS 1605/14.2; 35 ILCS 130/
22; 625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(2),(4); 
625 ILCS 5/4-105; 625 ILCS 
5/6-301.1(b)(2); 625 ILCS 5/6-
301.2(b)(2) 
Comment:
 Generally. Section 3101 criminalizes forgery, an offense which aims to 
protect the authenticity of documents and other writings.170 Like other offenses 
 170 There is some Illinois authority suggesting that liability for forgery is appropriate 
where one makes a genuine document containing false information. See People v. East-West 
University, 516 N.E.2d 482 (Ill. App. 1987) (indictment sufficiently stated offense of forgery 
in alleging that documents “‘contained the names and credit hours of students . . . who 
were entitled’ to the named funds ‘when, in fact, [defendants] knew that the documentation 
contained the names of persons who were not entitled to said funds’”); cf. People v. Mau, 36 
N.E.2d 235, 239 (Ill. 1941) (holding, under repealed forgery statute, that “anyone authorized 
to make up the record or to execute the authentic matter of a public nature[] will be guilty of 
forgery if he makes such record or executes such authentic matter, knowing that its contents 
are false and untrue, and if by so doing he intends to defraud”). Section 3101, however, is 
concerned with the authenticity of writings themselves, and not with the truth or accuracy of 
information contained in genuine documents, so no liability would obtain under Section 3101 
for deceptions of this kind (although liability would very likely lie under one or more of the 
other provisions in Article 3100).
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prohibited in Article 3100, forgery is typically performed for the purpose of 
consummating a theft. Section 3101 treats forgery as an independent offense, 
however, recognizing that (1) forged writings are often used to accomplish 
especially far-reaching fraudulent activities, and (2) beyond the specific 
theft achieved or attempted, forgery imposes the additional discrete harm of 
reducing public confidence in the forged item (for example, counterfeiting, 
which is one form of the Section 3101 offense, tends to undermine trust in 
paper currency and the monetary system).
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 3101 corresponds to current 
5/17-3, but reflects several organizational and substantive changes. Section 
3101(1)’s introductory clause sets forth a common culpability requirement 
for the offense. Section 3101(1) is substantively similar to current 5/17-3(a) 
in imposing liability where one acts with an “intent to defraud,” but also 
allows for liability where the defendant intends to “injure” another. Section 
3101(1)’s broader language covers offenders who intend to inflict harm (such 
as harming another’s reputation) that may not be pecuniary in nature, and 
serves more generally to guard against the undermining of public confidence 
in signed or authenticated documents.
 Section 3101(1)(a) through (1)(c) correspond to current 5/17-3(a)(1) 
and (a)(2),171 but more broadly apply to “writings” rather than merely 
“documents apparently capable of defrauding” others. Section 3101(1)’s 
use of the broader term “writing” serves, as do its culpability requirements, 
to reach deceptions undertaken to inflict harm other than pecuniary loss 
and legal obligation.172 Section 3101(1)’s term is also clearer, as it is easier 
to define and identify “writings” than the vague category of “documents 
apparently capable of defrauding” others, and its broader scope renders 
unnecessary numerous current offenses that prohibit forging specific types 
of writings, such as electronic mail (5/16D-3(a)(5)); checks (5/17-1(B)(d), 
(e)); record of charge forms (250/12); corporate stock (5/17-17, 5/17-18); 
Universal Price Code labels (5/17-23); food stamps and authorizations (5/
17B-5(ii)); credit and debit cards (250/14 to 250/16); electronic signature 
devices (5 ILCS 175/10-140(b)); government-issued identification cards 
(15 ILCS 335/14A(b)(3)); lottery tickets (20 ILCS 1605/14.2); cigarette tax 
stamps and imprints (35 ILCS 130/22); vehicle identification numbers (625 
ILCS 5/4-103(a)(2),(4)); and vehicle title and registration documents (625 
ILCS 5/4-105). The use of the broader term “writing” allows for uniform 
 171 A culpability requirement of recklessness will be “read in” with respect to those 
objective elements in Section 3101(1)(a) through (1)(c) for which a culpability requirement 
is not stated, cf. proposed Section 205(3), whereas current 5/17-3(a) requires that one act 
knowingly. Section 3101(1) lowers this culpability requirement in recognition that the 
culpability requirement stated at the beginning of the provision — which requires intent to 
defraud or injure — ensures that only truly blameworthy persons are within the offense’s 
reach.
 172 Nevertheless, Section 3101(3)(b) continues to recognize the legal significance of the 
fact that a writing is a “document apparently capable of defrauding another” by grading the 
forgery of such a writing as a Class 3 felony. 
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offense requirements and a rational grading scheme by making it clear that 
such items fall within Section 3101(1).
 Section 3101(1)(a) is substantively similar to current 5/17-3(a)(1) in 
covering one who alters a writing, but is much clearer in simply requiring 
that the writing be “of another without his authority” rather than altered “in 
such manner that it purports to have been made by another or at another time, 
or with different provisions, or by authority of one who did not give such 
authority.”173
 Section 3101(1)(b) is substantively similar to current 5/17-3(a)(1) in 
covering one who “makes” unauthentic writings, but also applies to one who 
“completes, executes, authenticates, issues, or transfers” to make clear that 
wholesale manufacture (i.e., counterfeiting) is not required.
 Section 3101(1)(b)(i) applies where one forges a writing so that it 
purports “to be the act of another who did not authorize that act” and covers 
current 5/17-3(a)(1)’s prohibition against making a document so that it 
appears “to have been made by another . . . or by authority of one who did not 
give such authority.”174 
 Section 3101(1)(b)(ii) is substantively similar to current 5/17-3(a)(1) 
in prohibiting one from executing a writing so that it purports to have been 
made at a different time, but also covers executions that purport to have been 
made in a different “place” in recognition that the place of execution is often 
relevant to the effect given to certain writings (for example, the place of 
execution of a contract may affect the governing law).
 Section 3101(1)(b)(iii), covering writings that purport to be “copies” 
of originals that do not truly exist, has no corresponding provision in 
 173 Consistent with current Illinois law, Section 3101(1)(a) covers an agent who, in 
altering another’s writing, exceeds his authority. See People v. Kubanek, 19 N.E.2d 573, 
574 (Ill. 1939) (“The general rule is that where authority is given to one to fill in blanks in 
an instrument, a filling in of such blanks other than as authorized constitutes forgery, where 
the other elements of forgery are present.”); People v. Murrah, 627 N.E.2d 1138, 1142 (Ill. 
App. 1993) (“When defendant filled out his name as an employee to receive an additional 
card on the corporate account, he did so other than as authorized inasmuch as [his employer] 
had repeatedly stated he had never authorized . . . the issuance of an additional card on the 
corporate account.”).
 174 Section 3101(1)(b)(i)’s language applies to a defendant’s use of a fictitious name 
by which he is not ordinarily known. For example, executing a negotiable instrument using a 
fictitious name purports to be the act of “another” — of someone other than the signer — who, 
because he does not exist, clearly could not have authorized the act. Illinois courts have 
similarly construed the phrase “purports to have been made by another” to prohibit one’s use 
of a fictitious name. See People v. Bell, 318 N.E.2d 526 (Ill. App. 1974); People v. Lanners, 
258 N.E.2d 390 (Ill. App. 1970). 
 Section 3101(1)(b)(i) is also consistent with current Illinois law in covering one who 
exceeds his authority to act on another’s behalf in issuing a genuine instrument that purports 
to have been issued by that person. See People v. Young, 311 N.E.2d 609, 613 (Ill. App. 1974) 
(“[T]he fact that defendant was president of the corporation authorized to sign the certificate in 
question . . . does not negate a basis for a conviction for forgery . . . if such was done without 
authority being given — here by the corporation. . . . [I]t was apparent that the certificate which 
was the subject matter of the indictment[] was issued without authority of the corporation.”). 
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current Illinois law. Section 3101(1)(b)(iii) fills a technical gap in proposed 
3101(1)(b)(i), and is necessary because copies commonly do not purport to 
have been made by the original’s author.
 Section 3101(1)(c) is substantively similar to current 5/17-3(a)(2), but 
uses the broader “puts forward” in place of the phrase “issues or delivers.” 
As it is defined in Section 3102(2), the phrase “puts forward” covers the case 
where one uses a forged writing but does not necessarily dispose of it, such as 
by displaying it.175 Section 3101(1)(c)’s broader scope renders unnecessary 
several current offenses prohibiting putting forward certain kinds of forged 
writings with the intent to defraud. See, e.g., 20 ILCS 1605/14.2 (“uttering” 
forged lottery ticket); 35 ILCS 130/22 (“uttering” forged cigarette tax 
stamps and imprints); 625 ILCS 5/6-301.1(b)(2) (displaying “unlawfully 
altered” driver’s license or permit); 625 ILCS 5/6-301.2(b)(2) (displaying 
“fraudulent” driver’s license or permit). 
 Section 3101(2)(a) defines the term “defraud” to uniformly mean “to 
obtain anything of value through deception.” Current Illinois law, by contrast, 
variously defines “intent to defraud” to mean acting either “wilfully, and with 
the specific intent to deceive or cheat, for the purpose of causing financial 
loss to another, or to bring some financial gain” (see 5/17-1(A)(iii)) or with 
the intent to “cause another to assume, create, transfer, alter or terminate any 
right, obligation or power” (see 5/17-3(b); 250/2.07). Section 3101(2)(a)’s 
definition includes only deception designed to result in gain to the defendant 
or another.176 Where the actor deceives solely for the purpose of causing 
pecuniary loss — and not to obtain or assist another in obtaining something 
of value — liability for property damage is appropriate. See proposed Section 
2206(1)(d) and corresponding commentary.
 Section 3101(2)(b) defines the term “writing,” which is not used in 
current Chapter 720, to include “any . . . method of recording information 
. . . and . . . symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification.” Section 
3101(2)’s comprehensive definition covers current 5/17-3(c)’s definition of 
a “document apparently capable of defrauding another,” current 5/17-3(a)(4) 
 175 The offense defined in current 5/17-3(a)(3), which criminalizes knowingly 
possessing a forged document with the intent to issue or deliver it, covers conduct that is more 
preliminary than actual forgery and would therefore be treated as attempted forgery under the 
proposed Code. See also proposed Section 801 and corresponding commentary.
 176 The Illinois courts have occasionally held that current 5/17-3(b)’s definition of 
“intent to defraud” and 5/17-3(c)’s definition of “document apparently capable defrauding 
another” are “broad enough to include an intent to deceive for reasons other than pecuniary 
gain.” See People v. Muzzarelli, 770 N.E.2d 1232, 1235 (Ill. App. 2002) (upholding forgery 
conviction based on counterfeit letter asking court for leniency in sentencing). The courts’ 
construction of the current statutory definitions appears to be at least partially premised on 
a misreading of current 5/17-3(b)’s use of the term “assume.” Cf. People v. Merchant, 283 
N.E.2d 724, 725 (Ill. App. 1972) (“[W]hen defendant presented the forged prescription it was 
clearly with the intention to cause another to assume a right or power with respect to a person 
or property. Paraphrased, the presentation of the prescription caused the druggist to assume he 
had the right to dispense a prescriptive drug (property) to the defendant (a person).”). 
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and (a)(5)’s offenses for forging digital and electronic signatures, and various 
other offenses for forging particular kinds of writings, as noted above.
 Section 3101(3) grades the offense according to the importance and 
extent of reliance upon the genuineness of the type of writing involved. 
Section 3101(3)(a) grades the offense as a Class 2 felony where the writing 
purports to be an instrument issued by the government or representing 
interests in or claims against property and businesses. Current Illinois law, 
by contrast, variously grades forging such writings as a Class 2 felony (e.g., 
35 ILCS 130/22 (cigarette tax stamps and imprints)), Class 3 felony (e.g., 
5/17-17 (corporate stock)), or Class 4 felony (e.g., 20 ILCS 1605/14.2 
(lottery tickets)). 
 Section 3101(3)(b) is substantively the same as current 5/17-3(d) in 
grading the offense as a Class 3 felony where the writing is a document 
purporting to affect legal relations.
 Section 3101(3)(c) grades the offense as a Class A misdemeanor where 
the writing does not purport to affect legal relations. Although current Illinois 
law contains no single offense generally covering writings not purporting to 
affect legal relations, current Chapter 720 sometimes grades forging particular 
types of such writings as a Class 4 felony. See, e.g., 5/17-3(a)(4), (5) (digital 
signature and electronic signature); 5/17-23 (Universal Price Code label).
Section 3102. Tampering with Writing, Record, or Device
Corresponding Current Provision(s): Various; see, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/17-
11; 5/17-11.1; 5/17-20; 5/17-21; 
10 ILCS 5/29-6; 10 ILCS 5/29-
20(4); 15 ILCS 335/14A(b)(1); 
410 ILCS 535/27(1)(b),(c); 420 
ILCS 40/39(b)(2); 625 ILCS 5/4-
103(a)(2),(4); 755 ILCS 5/6-1(b)
Comment:
 Generally. This offense criminalizes both tampering with a writing, 
record, or device and inviting reliance on writings, records, and devices that 
one knows to have been tampered with. Section 3102 supplements proposed 
Section 5203, and applies to tampering with writings, records, and devices 
that may not qualify as “public records” or “public notices.” As applied to 
“writings,” Section 3102 also complements proposed Section 3101, and 
reaches conduct that is not forgery because the defendant either tampers with 
a writing in a manner not affecting its genuineness or deceives for a purpose 
other than defrauding or injuring another.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 3102(1)(a) criminalizes 
tampering with, falsifying, destroying, removing, or concealing a writing, 
record, or device for the purpose of covering up a misdeed or deceiving or 
injuring another. Section 3102(1)(a) has no directly corresponding provision 
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under current Illinois law, which instead prohibits tampering with specific 
kinds of writings, records, and devices, such as odometers of used motor 
vehicles (5/17-11); hour meters of used farm implements (5/17-11.1); 
utility meters (5/17-20); service meters (5/17-21); election materials (10 
ILCS 5/29-6); absentee ballots (10 ILCS 5/29-20(4)); grain records (240 
ILCS 40/15-45(c)(3)); vital records (410 ILCS 535/27(1)(b)); writings 
relevant to radiation protection regulations (420 ILCS 40/39(b)(2)); vehicle 
identification numbers (625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(2)); and wills (755 ILCS 5/6-
1(b)). 
 Section 3102(1)(b) provides that the offense is also committed if one 
puts forward a writing, record, or device “knowing that it has been altered 
in a manner prohibited by Subsection (1)(a).” Section 3102(1)(b) has no 
directly corresponding provision under current Illinois law, which instead 
criminalizes putting forward assorted types of writings that have been 
tampered with, such as identification cards (15 ILCS 335/14A(b)(1)); vital 
records (410 ILCS 535/27(1)(c)); and vehicle identification numbers (625 
ILCS 5/4-103(a)(4)). 
 Section 3102(2) provides a definition for the phrase “puts forward” that 
appears consistent with current Illinois law’s occasional use of the undefined 
term “utter.” See, e.g., 20 ILCS 1605/14.2; 35 ILCS 130/22; 35 ILCS 135/
28.
  Section 3102(3) grades the basic offense as a Class A misdemeanor, 
and aggravates to a Class 3 felony where it involves a writing for which 
the law provides public recording. Current Illinois law, by contrast, grades 
the offense as anything from Class B misdemeanor (see 5/17-20, 5/17-
21) to a Class 2 felony (see 625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(2),(4)). Current Illinois 
law’s grading appears to reflect concerns as to other crimes the defendant 
intends to commit by means of writings, records, and devices that have been 
tampered with; preliminary efforts toward committing those offenses may 
be punished separately, however, as attempts. See proposed Section 801 and 
corresponding commentary.
Section 3103. Securing Execution of Documents by Deception
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/17-1(B)(a); see also, 
e.g., 720 ILCS 5/17-13; 35 ILCS 
200/21-306(a)(3); 50 ILCS 105/
4.5(2); 815 ILCS 515/3; 815 ILCS 
602/5-95
Comment:
 Generally. This offense applies to one whose deception causes another 
to execute an instrument affecting, or purporting or likely to affect, that or 
another person’s pecuniary interest. Section 3103 complements Section 
2103’s prohibition of theft by deception. In most cases where the defendant’s 
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deception causes another to execute an instrument actually affecting a 
pecuniary interest, the defendant will obtain property and be liable under 
Section 2103; in such cases, the General Part’s multiple-conviction provision 
would preclude liability for both theft by deception and Section 3103’s 
offense. See proposed Section 254 and corresponding commentary. Section 
3103 is principally designed to cover the case where the defendant creates a 
risk of pecuniary harm to another without really “obtaining” something of 
value by his deception — and would apply to one who tricks another into 
executing such diverse instruments as trusts, licenses, releases, guaranties, 
employment contracts, and partnership agreements.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 3103(1) is substantively 
similar to current 5/17-1(B)(a), with three modifications. First, Section 
3103(1) applies only where one causes another to execute an instrument “by 
deception,” and does not apply where one secures execution “by threat.” The 
intimidation aspects of current 5/17-1(B)(a) are covered by the proposed 
criminal coercion provision (see proposed Section 1404).
 Second, Section 3103(1) requires the execution of an instrument 
“affecting or purporting to affect or likely to affect” a pecuniary interest, 
whereas current 5/17-1(B)(a) applies only to documents177 actually disposing 
of property or otherwise incurring a pecuniary obligation. Section 3103(1)’s 
broader language better assures that litigation will focus on issues regarding 
the defendant’s blameworthiness rather than on technical issues of contract 
law, and covers the case where an instrument does not actually incur a 
pecuniary obligation because the defendant’s deception renders it void 
ab initio. Section 3103(1)’s language also covers, in conjunction with 
proposed Section 801’s rules for attempt liability, numerous current offenses 
prohibiting misrepresentations used to induce others to enter into specific 
kinds of contracts. See, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/17-13 (real estate contracts); 35 
ILCS 200/21-306(a)(3) (contracts involving indemnity judgment proceeds); 
50 ILCS 105/4.5(2) (certain government contracts); 815 ILCS 515/3 (home 
repair contracts); 815 ILCS 602/5-95 (business opportunity contracts).
 Finally, Section 3103(1) modifies current 5/17-1(B)(a)’s culpability 
requirements. Like 5/17-1(B), Section 3103(1) provides no explicit 
culpability term for its objective elements, thus imposing a recklessness 
standard under the “read-in” culpability level provision. See 5/4-3(b); 
proposed Section 205(3). Section 3103(1) differs from current law, however, 
in omitting 5/17-1(B)’s additional requirement that the defendant have an 
 177 Section 3103(1)’s use of the term “instrument” rather than “document” is not 
intended to substantively amend current law.
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“intent to defraud.”178 The “intent to defraud” requirement causes needless 
confusion by demanding intent with respect to elements for which 5/17-
1(B)(a) also requires recklessness.179
 Section 3103(2), like current 5/17-1(B), grades the offense as a Class A 
misdemeanor.
Section 3104. Simulating Objects of Special Value
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/17-4
Comment:
 Generally. This offense prohibits making, altering, or putting forward 
objects of special value with an intent to defraud. Section 3104 complements 
proposed Section 3101’s forgery prohibition by criminalizing making, 
altering, or putting forward objects that are not “writings,” such as artwork, 
antiques, and jewels. The simulation of such objects presents concerns 
similar to those that forgery presents; false objects of special value may also 
be used to accomplish major and far-reaching fraud and similarly undermine 
public confidence in that which is genuine. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 3104 has no directly 
corresponding provision under current Illinois law. Section 3104(1) is 
similar to current 5/17-4(a) and 5/17-4(b), which criminalize altering “any 
coin to increase the value of the coin to coin collectors” and putting forward 
such a coin, but the proposed provision explicitly requires that the defendant 
act with an “intent to defraud” to parallel the culpability requirement for 
forgery.
 Section 3104(2) grades the offense as a Class A misdemeanor, the 
same grade current 5/17-4(c) prescribes for deceptively altering or offering 
collectible coins.
 178 The original 1961 Code also did not require an “intent to defraud.” See ILL. ANN. 
STAT. ch. 38 ¶ 17-1(a) (Smith-Hurd 1964). Nevertheless, subsequent judicial decisions 
imposed the culpability requirement for the offense of issuing or delivering bad checks, 
under the theory that its omission was inadvertent. See, e.g., People v. Samples, 224 N.E.2d 
284, 286-87 (Ill. App. 1967); People v. Billingsley, 213 N.E.2d 765, 768 (Ill. App. 1966). In 
apparent response to those decisions, the legislature inexplicably amended Section 17-1 (now 
5/17-1(B)) to require an “intent to defraud” not only for the bad checks offense, but for all the 
offenses defined therein.
 179 Current 5/17-1(A)(iii)’s definition of “intent to defraud” is at tension with 5/17-
1(B)(a)’s offense definition in requiring that one “act wilfully” rather than recklessly, have 
a “specific intent to deceive” rather than recklessly deceive another, and have a “purpose of 
causing financial loss . . . or to bring . . . financial gain” rather than be reckless as to incurring 
a pecuniary obligation.
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Section 3105. Unauthorized Impersonation
Corresponding Current Provision(s): Various; see, e.g., 720 ILCS 
5/16G-15; 5/16G-20; 5/17-2; 
5/17-6; 5/17B-5(i); 5/17B-20; 15 
ILCS 335/14(a)(2) to (a)(4); 15 
ILCS 335/14A(b)(1); 15 ILCS 
335/14B(b)(1); 225 ILCS 25/40; 
225 ILCS 110/30; 625 ILCS 
5/6-301(a)(2),(3); 625 ILCS 
5/6-301.1(b)(1); 625 ILCS 5/6-
301.2(b)(1)
Comment:
 Generally. This offense criminalizes the unauthorized impersonation of 
others. Impersonation, like other conduct prohibited in Article 3100, is often 
used to achieve theft. Section 3105 serves three functions that complement 
Article 2100’s prohibitions against theft. First, Section 3105(1)(a) serves to 
punish harm to impersonated persons, such as injury to reputation, that theft 
offenses do not address. Second, Section 3105(1)(b) criminalizes conduct 
that may not constitute theft, such as an underage person’s pretending to be 
of age (by claiming to be either a real or fictitious adult) for the purpose 
of purchasing alcohol. Finally, where one impersonates another to steal 
property whose value is low or difficult to determine, Section 3105(2) grades 
the offense as a Class A misdemeanor; where more serious violations can be 
proven, more severe sanctions will be available under Article 2100.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 3105(1)(a) has no directly 
corresponding provision in current Illinois law, but most closely resembles 
current 5/16G-15’s financial-identity-theft offense.180 Section 3105(1)(a) 
differs from 5/16G-15, however, by requiring recklessness as to either 
depriving the impersonated person of something of value or harming that 
person’s reputation; Section 3105(1)(a) does not require that the defendant 
actually “obtain” something of value “in the name of the other person.” 
Where one impersonates another to accomplish theft — whether by using 
“personal identifying information,” a “personal identification document,” or 
 180 In addition to current 5/16G-15, current Illinois law also contains numerous offenses 
criminalizing specific kinds of impersonation that may deprive the impersonated person of 
something of value or injure his reputation. See, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/17-6(a) (impersonating to 
receive state benefits); 5/17B-5(i) (impersonating to receive WIC benefits); 225 ILCS 25/40 
(impersonating to practice dentistry); 225 ILCS 110/30 (impersonating to practice speech-
language pathology). Most of these offenses appear, however, to be more concerned with 
another offense committed by means of impersonation — most commonly theft or practicing 
a profession without a license — than with any independent harm caused by impersonation 
itself.
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other means — liability will be appropriate under Article 2100.181 Section 
3105(1)(a)’s requirements serve to punish the additional harm caused by 
impersonation — such as harming another’s credit rating — and to ensure 
that the offense does not merely restate Article 2100’s prohibitions against 
theft (or attempted theft).
 Section 3105(1)(b) also has no directly corresponding provision 
in current Illinois law, and most closely corresponds to several offenses 
criminalizing possessing or displaying identification cards and drivers’ 
licenses that belong to another, contain false information, or are forged.182 
See 15 ILCS 335/14(a)(2) to (a)(4); 335/14A(b)(1); 335/14B(b)(1); 625 ILCS 
5/6-301(a)(2),(3); 625 ILCS 5/6-301.1(b)(1); 625 ILCS 5/6-301.2(b)(1). 
Section 3105(1)(b) differs from these provisions, however, in allowing 
liability for any means of misrepresentation as to identity or a characteristic 
of legal significance rather than merely for misrepresentations achieved by 
using false identification.183 Section 3105(1)(b) also requires that one act with 
an “intent to obtain service or property to which he is not entitled” to limit the 
offense’s application to inappropriate and wrongful deceptions.184
 181 Current 5/16G-20 also sets forth an offense of “aggravated financial identity theft” 
for cases involving elderly and disabled persons. Although Section 3105 does not recognize a 
similar aggravation, the proposed grading provision for theft imposes additional punishment 
for committing that offense against an elderly person. See proposed Section 2109(8) and 
corresponding commentary.
 182 Section 3105(1)(b) would also cover some of the conduct prohibited by current 5/17-
2(a), which criminalizes impersonating a member of a “public safety personnel organization.” 
Some of 5/17-2(a)’s conduct would also be covered by Section 5205(1)(b). For the most part, 
however, current 5/17-2 sets forth a regulatory offense, and it is anticipated that the offense 
will be preserved elsewhere in Illinois law through the “conforming amendments” bill to be 
presented to the General Assembly.
 The proposed Code, however, eliminates current 5/17-2(b), which criminalizes using 
words like “Chicago Police” or “Chicago Sergeant” in the name of an “organization, magazine, 
or other publication” without the Chicago Police Board’s permission. The unauthorized use 
of an organization’s name — whether it is “Chicago Police,” “Peoria Police,” or another 
governmental institution — is better addressed by the availability of civil liability for such 
conduct. Moreover, any such conduct truly meriting criminal liability would amount to forgery 
(Section 3101), false personation (Section 5205), or attempted theft (Article 2100) under the 
proposed Code.
 183 Section 3105(1)(b) only punishes one who falsely “represents” his identity or a 
characteristic of legal significance. Unlike the current offenses, Section 3105(1)(b) does not 
itself criminalize merely possessing a false identification card. Liability for possession and 
other preliminary efforts toward committing Section 3105(1)(b)’s offense is to be determined 
under the standards for inchoate liability established in Article 800. See proposed Sections 
801(1) and 808 and corresponding commentary. Liability for tampering with a writing, or an 
attempt to do so, will also often be available for those who possess or use false identification 
cards. See proposed Section 3102 and corresponding commentary. 
 184 Although Section 3105(1)(b)’s additional culpability requirement does not 
correspond to any language in current law’s offense definitions for using false identification 
cards, those offenses’ grading provisions strongly suggest that the offenses are principally 
aimed at attempted underage drinking, which the proposed culpability requirement would 
cover. See, e.g., 15 ILCS 335/14(b)(1) (stating that community service sentence is to be served 
“preferably at an alcohol abuse prevention program”). 
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 Section 3105(2) grades the offense as a Class A misdemeanor. By 
contrast, current 5/16G-15(d) closely tracks current 5/16-1(b)’s grading for 
theft and grades financial identity theft according to the value of property 
obtained. Under the proposed Code’s multiple-conviction provision, 
however, additional liability may be imposed where the defendant achieves 
theft by means of impersonating another. See proposed Section 254 and 
corresponding commentary. Current law grades possessing or displaying a 
false identification card as a Class A misdemeanor where the card belongs 
to another and as a Class 4 felony where it contains false information or is 
forged. The mere possession of false identification would at most constitute 
an attempt of Section 3105’s offense, and therefore would be graded as a 
Class B misdemeanor. See proposed Section 807 (grading inchoate offense 
one grade lower than target offense). Liability might alternatively be available 
under the proposed general inchoate possession offense. See proposed Section 
808 (offense for possessing “instruments of crime”; Class A misdemeanor). 
Moreover, where the offender has more serious criminal objectives, inchoate 
liability under Section 3101 or Section 3102 may be imposed. See proposed 
Sections 3101 and 3102.
Section 3106. Deceptive Practices
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/17-1(B)(c); 225 ILCS 
470/56; 815 ILCS 5/12; see also, 
e.g., 720 ILCS 5/17-1(C)(1); 5/
17-6(a); 5/17-12; 5/33C-2; 5/33E-
14; 5/33E-15 250/3; 290/1 to /3; 
295/1a, 1b; 390/0.01 to /2; 565/
0.1 to /4 20 ILCS 3520/45(c); 20 
ILCS 4020/22; 35 ILCS 105/14; 
220 ILCS 5/6-106; 225 ILCS 305/
36(a); 225 ILCS 325/39(b)(5); 
225 ILCS 330/43(f); 225 ILCS 
410/4-20(2); 305 ILCS 5/8A-2(a); 
305 ILCS 5/8A-3(a); 305 ILCS 
5/8A-16; 410 ILCS 620/3.1; 765 
ILCS 86/10-25; 815 ILCS 602/5-
110; 815 ILCS 705/25
Comment:
 Generally. This provision criminalizes several common deceptive 
practices that operate to cheat others. Section 3106 supplements Article 
2100’s theft offenses by prohibiting inherently deceptive conduct that, even 
under proposed Section 801’s “substantial step” test, may not constitute 
attempted theft. Cf. proposed Section 801 and corresponding commentary. 
Section 3106 removes any doubt that these practices are criminal, and 
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addresses them in a single provision to ensure that they are defined and 
graded consistently.185  
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 3106(1)(a) criminalizes making 
a “false or misleading written statement” for the purpose of obtaining 
property or credit. Section 3106(1)(a) has no single directly corresponding 
provision in current Illinois law, which instead contains dozens of offenses 
prohibiting making or giving “false or misleading statements” (815 ILCS 
705/25); “false statements” (e.g., 5/17-1(C)(1); 5/33C-2; 250/3); “false 
statements or reports” (e.g., 5/33E-14); “false statements or representations” 
(305 ILCS 5/8A-3(a)); “false statements or willful misrepresentations” 
(305 ILCS 5/8A-2(a)); “false or fraudulent representations” (e.g., 20 ILCS 
4020/22); “fraudulent misrepresentations” (e.g., 225 ILCS 410/4-20(2)); 
“misrepresentations” (e.g., 5/17-6(a)); “false entries” (e.g., 5/33E-15); and 
“false information” (e.g., 35 ILCS 105/14) for the purpose of obtaining 
property or credit.
 Section 3106(1)(b) criminalizes making false or misleading statements 
in advertisements. Section 3106(1)(b) is substantively similar to current 
5/17-1(B)(c),186 with a few modifications. First, Section 3106(1)(b) requires 
recklessness, rather than knowledge, as to making a false or misleading 
statement in an advertisement, cf. proposed Section 205(3) (imposing “read-
in” culpability requirement of recklessness where none is otherwise stated), 
and omits current 5/17-1(B)’s requirement that the defendant act with an 
“intent to defraud.” Section 3106(1)(b)’s culpability requirements reflect the 
view that one who chooses to ignore a substantial and unjustifiable risk that 
 185 Note that Section 3106 does not purport to affect the scope of proposed Section 801. 
Section 3106’s explicit prohibition of certain practices is not meant to reflect, or suggest, any 
judgment as to the appropriateness of liability — as attempted theft or under another theory 
— for other deceptive practices.
 186 In addition to 5/17-1(B)(c), current 295/1a provides that it is a Class A misdemeanor 
to make an advertisement containing “any assertion, representation or statement of fact which 
is untrue, misleading or deceptive.” Moreover, there are numerous other corresponding 
current offenses applying to particular kinds of misrepresentations and advertisements. 
See, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/17-12 (fraudulent use of corporate name); 295/1b (misrepresentation 
of intent to sell at advertised price); 390/0.01 to /2 (use of university stationery or seal for 
“private promotional scheme”); 225 ILCS 305/36(a) (misrepresentation as to being licensed 
architect); 225 ILCS 325/39(b)(5) (misrepresentation as to being licensed engineer); 225 ILCS 
330/43(f) (misrepresentation as to being licensed land surveyor); 305 ILCS 5/8A-16 (health 
care advertisements); 765 ILCS 86/10-25 (real estate advertisements); 815 ILCS 602/5-110 
(business opportunity advertisements). Such overlap causes unnecessary and undesirable 
confusion. Section 3106(1)(b) introduces uniformity by criminalizing any “false or misleading 
statement” — including a false statement concerning the seller’s intent to sell an item at a 
certain price — in any advertisement addressed to a substantial portion of the public.
 Section 3106(1)(b) also indirectly relates to, but does not cover, other regulatory 
provisions related to advertising in Chapter 720 that are expected to be preserved elsewhere in 
Illinois law through “conforming amendments” legislation: current 720 ILCS 5/17-12 (rules 
relating to use of trade name, partnership name, etc.); 295/1c (regulatory offense and injunctive 
relief relating to deceptive advertisements of out-of-state real estate); 295/1d (exemption for 
good-faith conduct).
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his advertisement is deceptive is sufficiently blameworthy to warrant criminal 
liability. Current Illinois law implicitly recognizes this by including current 
295/1a, which similarly requires recklessness under the “read-in” culpability 
provision (5/4-3(b)) without proof that the defendant acted with an “intent to 
defraud.” 
 Section 3106(1)(b) also clarifies that it applies to advertisements 
addressed to a “substantial segment” of the public and those that promote 
the “purchase” of property or services, omits “deceptive” as redundant of 
“misleading,” and omits 5/17-1(B)(c)’s reference to “directing another,” in 
recognition that complicity liability is provided for under proposed Section 
301(1) (q.v.). 
 Section 3106(1)(c) contains two prohibitions relating to sales of 
securities that correspond to various provisions in current 815 ILCS 5/12.187 
Section 3106(1)(c)’s first prohibition is substantively similar to 5/12(E) 
and (H) in addressing false or misleading written statements, but makes 
three modifications so that the offense definition parallels the treatment of 
misrepresentations in Section 3106(1)(a) and (1)(b). First, Section 3106(1)(c) 
criminalizes making a false or misleading written statement in any document, 
whereas current 5/12(E) and (H) apply only to documents required to be 
filed or circulated under the Illinois Securities Law of 1953. Second, Section 
3106(1)(c) does not require that a false or misleading statement relate to a 
“material” fact, and instead requires that such a statement be made “with 
intent to promote the sale of securities.” Third, Section 3106(1)(c) prescribes 
a culpability level of recklessness regardless of the type of document in 
which a misrepresentation is made, whereas 5/12(E) requires recklessness 
for documents required to be “filed” and 5/12(H) requires negligence for 
documents required to be “circulated.”
 Section 3106(1)(c)’s second prohibition is substantively similar to 
current 815 ILCS 5/12(B) in criminalizing omitting information that the law 
requires be disclosed, but applies more generally to any “written document 
relating to securities,” rather than only prospectuses.
 Section 3106(1)(d) is substantively similar to current 225 ILCS 
470/56(1)(A)188 in prohibiting the use or possession of false weights and 
measures, with two differences. First, Section 3106(1)(d) requires that the 
device be used to record the quality or quantity “of a commodity to be sold,” 
whereas the current provision requires that it be used for a “commercial 
purpose.” Section 3106(1)(d)’s broader applicability reflects the fact that 
the conduct constituting the offense is inherently deceptive, regardless of 
whether it is performed by merchants. Second, Section 3106(1)(d) omits 
 187 Section 3106(1)(c) also covers language in current 295/1a and 220 ILCS 5/6-106 
criminalizing making false or misleading written statements to promote sales of securities.
 188 Section 3106(1)(d) also covers current 225 ILCS 470/56(2)(A), which defines a 
Class 3 felony for one who “[a]dds to or modifies a commercial weight or measure by the 
addition of a device or instrument that would allow the sale . . . of less than the quantity 
represented . . . or falsification of the weight or measure.” 
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current 470/56(1)(A)’s references to “selling” and “hiring” in recognition 
that liability for merchants who sell false weights and measures themselves 
is more appropriately determined under the standards for complicity liability 
set forth in proposed Section 301(1).
 Section 3106(1)(e) is the same as current 225 ILCS 470/56(1)(E), but 
clarifies that liability is appropriate for one who “delivers” less than the 
represented quantity of a commodity or service and omits 470/56(1)(E)’s 
reference to “things” as redundant.
 Section 3106(1)(f) is substantively identical to current 225 ILCS 
470/56(1)(F), but omits the phrase “by means of which the amount . . . is 
determined” and the current reference to “things” as redundant.
 Section 3106(1)(g) has no directly corresponding provision in current 
Illinois law, which only prohibits selling, offering, or exposing for sale 
certain kinds of adulterated or mislabeled commodities, such as articles that 
purport to be made of gold or silver (see 720 ILCS 290/1 to /3),189 goods with 
obliterated or used containers (see 720 ILCS 565/0.1 to /4), and foods, drugs, 
and cosmetics (see 410 ILCS 620/3.1). Section 3106(1)(g)’s broader scope 
permits liability for those who ignore a substantial and unjustifiable risk that 
their wares do not comply with established standards, regardless of the type 
of commodity involved.
 Section 3106(2)(a) and (b) define “adulterated” and “mislabeled” 
to incorporate by reference standards established by criminal statutes 
and commercial usage. Section 3106(2)’s definitions therefore preserve 
current Illinois regulations regarding the purity and branding of various 
commodities, such as foods (see 410 ILCS 620/10, 620/11), drugs (see 410 
ILCS 620/14, 620/15), and cosmetics (see 410 ILCS 620/18, 620/19). Section 
3106(2)(c) incorporates current 815 ILCS 5/2.1’s definition of “securities” 
by reference. 
 Section 3106(3) uniformly grades the proscribed deceptive practices as 
Class A misdemeanors. Current Illinois law, by contrast, grades the conduct 
prohibited by Section 3106 as anything from a business offense to a Class 2 
felony. See, e.g., 20 ILCS 3520/45(c) (grading false statement in document 
furnished to Department of Commerce and Community Affairs as Class 2 
felony); 225 ILCS 470/56(1) (grading offenses corresponding to 3106(1)(d) 
to (1)(f) as business offenses). Section 3106(3)’s grading reflects the view that 
the criminalized conduct is sufficiently harmful to warrant imprisonment, but 
not serious enough to merit felony sanctions. Felony sanctions are available, 
however, where the defendant satisfies the requirements of theft or attempted 
theft. 
 189 Current 290/2 and 290/3, which criminalize selling, offering, or exposing for sale 
items that falsely purport to be made of “silver,” “sterling silver,” or “coin silver,” contain some 
regulatory content concerning the required purity of such products that, it is anticipated, will 
be preserved elsewhere in Illinois law through “conforming amendments” legislation.
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Section 3107. Bad Checks
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/17-1(B)(d)-(e); see
also, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/17-1(C) 
(2),(3); 35 ILCS 105/14; 35 ILCS 
143/10-50; 35 ILCS 145/8
Comment:
 Generally. This offense criminalizes passing bad checks. Although 
they are often used as a means of avoiding paying for property or services, 
bad checks cause additional harm not addressed by Article 2100’s theft 
offenses: they disrupt ordinary commerce by being negotiated by the payee 
and subsequent holders for value, and undermine the public’s confidence in 
checks and the checking system generally.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 3107(1) is substantively 
similar to current 5/17-1(B)(d)’s first sentence and current 5/17-1(B)(e).190 
In addition to making some minor modifications to the current provisions’ 
language,191 Section 3107(1) differs from current Illinois law in two 
substantive respects. First, Section 3107(1) omits current 5/17-1(B)’s “intent 
to defraud” requirement as unnecessary in light of the requirement that the 
defendant issue a check “knowing that it will not be honored by the drawee.” 
The original 1961 Code also did not require an “intent to defraud,” see ILL. 
ANN. STAT. ch. 38 ¶ 17-1(d) (Smith-Hurd 1964), but subsequent judicial 
decisions nevertheless imposed the requirement under the theory that its 
omission was inadvertent. See, e.g., People v. Samples, 224 N.E.2d 284, 
286-87 (Ill. App. 1967); People v. Billingsley, 213 N.E.2d 765, 768 (Ill. App. 
 190 Section 3107 also corresponds to current 5/17-1(C)(2) and (C)(3), which criminalize 
the possession of, respectively, stolen or forged checks and “implements of check fraud.” 
Liability for an attempted Section 3107 violation would be appropriate for many cases 
covered by 5/17-1(C)(2) and (C)(3). In most cases, offenses under current 5/17-1(C)(2) and 
(C)(3) would also be subject to liability (or attempt liability) under proposed Sections 808 
(possessing instruments of crime), 2103, and 2106 (theft by deception and theft of services), 
and/or 3101 (forgery). (A recent amendment to 5/17-1(C)(2), effective January 1, 2003, also 
criminalizes other efforts to “obtain access to funds of another person,” including making false 
statements to a financial institution or presenting a check for payment without the account 
holder’s authorization. Under the proposed Code, most such conduct would constitute theft 
(or its attempt), forgery, and/or deceptive practices. The last sentence of the amended version 
of 5/17-1(C)(2)’s first paragraph, which provides a civil rule for certain disputes between 
financial institutions and account holders, may be preserved elsewhere in Illinois law through 
a “conforming amendment.”)
 Acts in violation of current 5/17-1(C)(4) (possessing cash machine cards) would lead to 
potential attempt liability under proposed Article 2100 (theft), Section 3101 (forgery), and/or 
Section 3108 (fraudulent use of a debit card).
 191 Section 3107(1) uses “passes” rather than “delivers,” “similar sight order” rather 
than “other order upon a real or fictitious depository,” and “honored by the drawee” rather 
than “paid by the depository.” Section 3107(1)’s use of these terms and phrases does not 
substantively amend current law. 
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1966). In apparent response to those decisions, the legislature later amended 
Section 17-1 (now 5/17-1(B)) to require an “intent to defraud” for the bad 
checks offense.
  Section 3107(1)’s requirement that the defendant issue a draft 
“knowing that it will not be honored by the drawee” fully addresses the 
concerns underlying current 5/17-1(B)’s “intent to defraud” requirement. The 
Illinois Supreme Court has stated that the additional culpability requirement 
is necessary to prevent liability where one “writes a check for more than the 
balance in one’s account, intending to deposit funds to cover it, or agreeing 
with the payee that the latter not present it immediately but hold it as a note.” 
See People v. Ogunsola, 429 N.E.2d 861, 864 (Ill. 1981). Section 3107(1) 
would not impose liability in either case, as such defendants would lack the 
requisite knowledge that their checks would not be paid. 
 Section 3107(1) also differs from current law in omitting 5/17-1(B)(d) 
and 5/17-1(B)(e)’s requirement that the defendant’s check be used to obtain 
property,192 to pay for property or services, or to satisfy a tax obligation.193 
Section 3107(1)’s broader scope is consistent with the offense’s purposes. 
Although most prosecutions will undoubtedly relate to drafts used to pay 
for goods and services, Section 3107(1) reflects the view that bad checks are 
harmful even when they are issued without consideration; a check issued as a 
gift, for example, may not “cheat” the payee of anything, but may cause harm 
later by being negotiated to others for value.194 
 Section 3107(2) establishes two permissive inferences with respect to 
the defendant’s knowledge that the drawee would not honor a draft that was 
not postdated. Section 3107(2)(a), allowing for an inference of knowledge 
where the defendant did not have an account with the depository when he 
issued the draft, has no corresponding provision in current Chapter 720. 
Section 3107(2)(a)’s permissive inference applies in a situation where it is 
extremely unlikely that the defendant issued a bad check due to an innocent 
mistake.
 192 Because Section 3107(1) does not require that the defendant intend to obtain 
“property” by use of a bad check, the proposed offense definition also omits the recent 
amendment to 5/17-1(B)(d), effective January 1, 2003, clarifying that “‘property’ includes 
rental property (real or personal).”
 193 Section 3107(1) also covers various current tax offenses’ language criminalizing 
passing a check to the Department of Revenue “knowing that it will not be paid by the 
depository.” See, e.g., 35 ILCS 105/14 (Use Tax Act); 143/10-50 (Tobacco Products Tax Act 
of 1995); 145/8 (Hotel Operators’ Occupation Tax Act). 
 194 Because it reflects the view that bad checks are harmful even where they are not 
used to cheat another, Section 3107(1) omits current 5/17-1(B)(e)’s additional requirements 
that a bad check issued in a credit transaction be for a certain amount and that the defendant 
fail to promptly make it good after learning of its dishonor. Nevertheless, Section 3107(2)(b) 
continues to recognize the legal significance of one’s failure to promptly make a dishonored 
draft good — but uses that fact in establishing a permissive inference as to the defendant’s 
knowledge, rather than as an additional offense requirement. 
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 Section 3107(2)(b) is functionally similar to 5/17-1(B)(d)’s last 
sentence, but amends current law to make its evidentiary significance clearer 
and to better assure that knowledge is not inappropriately inferred. Section 
3107(2)(b) denominates its presumption as a “permissive inference,” making 
it clear that proposed Section 107(4)’s jury instruction standards apply and 
that an unconstitutional categorical presumption is not being established. 
Current 5/17-1(B)(d)’s use of the ambiguous term “prima facie evidence,” by 
contrast, has resulted in the exclusion of the current presumption from pattern 
jury instructions. See IPI (CRIMINAL) 13.38A (4th ed. 2000) (“The term is a 
legal one which . . . might be read by a jury as creating a type of presumption 
that is constitutionally impermissible in criminal cases.”) (citing People v. 
Gray, 426 N.E.2d 290 (Ill. App. 1981)). 
 Section 3107(2)(b)’s permissive inference operates where the payee 
promptly presents the draft, the drawee dishonors it due to insufficient funds, 
and the defendant fails to promptly make good after learning of the refusal. 
Current 5/17-1(B)(d)’s last sentence, by contrast, provides that either the fact 
that the defendant had insufficient funds to cover a check when he issued it 
or the fact that the check was subsequently dishonored twice within one week 
constitutes “prima facie evidence” that the defendant knew that it would be 
dishonored and had an intent to defraud.195 Section 3107(2)(b)’s requirements 
better assure that knowledge is not inferred where the defendant makes a 
simple miscalculation or “kites” a check with the intent to promptly cover it.
 Section 3107(3) is substantively similar to current Illinois law in 
grading the offense as a Class A misdemeanor, but does not aggravate it to 
a Class 4 felony where one uses a bad check to obtain property worth more 
than $150. The value of property obtained by means of bad checks will be 
used to determine the grading for theft where the requirements of that offense 
are satisfied. See proposed Section 2109. 
Section 3108. Fraudulent Use of Credit or Debit Card
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 250/2.03; 250/2.15; 
250/8; see also, e.g., 720 ILCS 
250/7; 250/9; 250/10; 250/14 to /17
Comment:
 Generally. This offense criminalizes the fraudulent use of a credit or 
debit card. Credit and debit cards are often fraudulently used for the purpose 
 195 Current 5/17-1(B)(d)’s presumption of an intent to defraud where one issues a 
check for an amount exceeding his current account balance is at tension with the rationale 
underlying current law’s “intent to defraud” requirement: the presumption encourages, rather 
than prevents, liability where one “writes a check for more than the balance in one’s account, 
intending to deposit funds to cover it, or agreeing with the payee that the latter not present it 
immediately but hold it as a note.” See People v. Ogunsola, 429 N.E.2d 861, 864 (Ill. 1981).
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of wrongfully acquiring property. Nevertheless, credit and debit card fraud 
create harm not addressed by Article 2100’s prohibitions against theft. As 
is the case with passing bad checks, credit and debit card fraud undermine 
confidence in payment systems and are harmful to the ordinary operation of 
commerce.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 3108(1) prohibits using a credit 
or debit card to obtain something of value with knowledge that the card is 
stolen, forged, revoked, or cancelled, or that such use is unauthorized for any 
other reason. Section 3108(1)’s offense definition is substantively similar to 
current 250/8(i),196 with three modifications.197 First, Section 3108(1) omits 
current 250/8(i)’s “intent to defraud” requirement, which is instead reflected 
in Section 3108(3)’s defense for good-faith use. 
 Second, Section 3108(1)(c) applies where one’s “use” of a credit or 
debit card is not authorized by the issuer or cardholder, whereas current 250/
8(i)’s catchall provision applies where the card was “obtained or retained” in 
violation of the Credit Card and Debit Card Act or without the cardholder’s 
consent. Section 3108(1)(c)’s language allows for liability for one, such as an 
agent, who obtains another’s card with consent, but knowingly exceeds his 
authority in using it. Unlike current 250/8(i), however, Section 3108(1)(c)’s 
language would not impose liability where one uses a card that was initially 
procured based on an inaccurate or exaggerated statement of the cardholder’s 
 196 Section 3108(1) also relates to, but does not incorporate, current 250/7, 250/9, 250/
10, and 250/14 to /17. Current 250/7 criminalizes obtaining or transferring a credit or debit 
card as security for a debt with the intent to defraud; it is unclear what conduct current 250/7 
is intended to criminalize that is not already covered by theft or current 250/8. Current 250/9 
and 250/10 cover persons who, with the intent to defraud, assist others in fraudulent use by 
either allowing others to use their credit or debit cards or furnishing property or services. 
Under the proposed Code, liability for such conduct would be determined according to Section 
3108(1) and the standards for complicity liability set forth in proposed Section 301(1). Current 
250/14 to 250/17 prohibit forgery and counterfeiting of credit and debit cards. The proposed 
Code would treat such conduct as forgery in violation of Section 3101, an attempt of Section 
3108(1)’s offense, and, in some cases, possession of an instrument of crime in violation of 
Section 808.
 Section 3108 omits other provisions in the Credit Card and Debit Card Act because they 
are covered by other provisions in the proposed Code, such as Section 107(4)’s rules governing 
permissive inferences (250/18); Section 905(1)’s grade adjustment for repeat offenders (250/
19); Section 2103 and Section 2106’s prohibitions of theft of property or services by deception 
(e.g., 250/11; 250/12); Section 2105’s offense for receiving stolen property (e.g., 250/4, 250/6, 
250/13); Section 2108’s prohibition of theft of property lost, mislaid, or delivered by mistake 
(e.g., 250/5); and Section 3106(1)(a)’s deceptive practices offense (250/3). It is anticipated, 
however, that current 250/17.03’s regulatory offense will be preserved elsewhere in the Illinois 
statutes by the “conforming amendments” bill to be presented to the General Assembly. 
 197 Section 3108(1) also makes some minor modifications to current 250/8(i)’s language, 
such as replacing “purpose of obtaining money, goods, property, services or anything else of 
value” with the clearer phrase “intent of obtaining property or services,” clarifying that the 
offense applies to the use of “stolen” and “cancelled” cards, and omitting the reference to 
“counterfeited” cards as redundant of “forged” cards. These alterations do not substantively 
amend current law. 
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financial security or ability to meet payment obligations, insofar as the 
cardholder’s use in such a situation is authorized by the issuer.198
 Finally, Section 3108(1) imposes a uniform culpability requirement 
of knowledge with respect to the wrongfulness of use. Current 250/8(i), by 
contrast, requires knowledge that a credit or debit card is forged, revoked,199 or 
expired, but only recklessness as to whether a card is wrongfully “obtained or 
retained.” Cf. 720 ILCS 5/4-3(b) (imposing “read-in” culpability requirement 
of recklessness where none is otherwise stated). There is no identifiable 
policy reason for imposing different culpability requirements for different 
types of fraudulent use. 
 Section 3108(2) defines the terms “credit card” and “debit card.”200 
Section 3108(2)(a)’s definition of “credit card” is substantively the same 
as current 250/2.03. Section 3108(2)(b)’s definition of “debit card” is 
substantively the same as current 250/2.15’s first sentence.201 (Section 
3108(2)(b) omits 250/2.15’s second sentence regarding dual-purpose cards, 
however, because neither the fact nor extent of liability depends on whether 
such an instrument was used as one kind of card rather than the other under 
Section 3108.) 
 Section 3108(3) provides a defense where one knows that his use 
of a credit or debit card is unauthorized, but intends and is able to meet 
his obligations to the issuer arising from such use. Section 3108(3) is 
substantively similar to current 250/8(i)’s “intent to defraud” requirement, but 
does not apply where one uses a card he knows to be stolen, forged, revoked, 
or cancelled. The knowing use of such instruments differs materially from 
the conduct Section 3108(3) is designed to protect, such as using an expired 
 198 Proposed Section 3108(1)(c) could, however, support liability for someone who 
uses a card that he knows was issued to a fictitious person. A “cardholder” who does not exist 
cannot possibly authorize the card’s use.
  In addition, proposed Section 3106(1)(a) would support liability for one who makes a 
false or misleading written statement to obtain a credit card. In such a case, the credit issuer 
may also have civil remedies against the cardholder for misrepresentations in the credit 
application. 
 199 Section omits current 250/8’s statements that “[k]nowledge of revocation” and “notice 
of revocation” “shall be presumed to have been received” under certain circumstances insofar 
as they appear to create mandatory conclusive presumptions, which are unconstitutional. See 
People v. Watts, 692 N.E.2d 315, 321 (Ill. 1998) (“The United States Supreme Court has 
long held that mandatory irrebuttable presumptions are unconstitutional.”) (citing People v. 
Sandstrom, 442 U.S. 510, 521-23 (1979)). 
 200 Section 3108(2)’s definitions are not intended to limit the offense’s application to only 
the wrongful use of a physical card in a face-to-face transaction. Section 3108(1)’s prohibition 
against wrongful “use” of a card includes wrongful use of the card’s identifying information 
— such as an account number — in a mail-order, telephone, or Internet transaction. Section 
3108(1) therefore covers current 250/8(ii)’s language regarding one who uses a card “by 
representing . . . that he is the holder.” 
 201 Section 3108 omits as unnecessary current law’s definitions for other terms used in 
the Credit Card and Debit Card Act. See 720 ILCS 250/2 to /2.02; 250/2.04 to /2.06; 250/2.08 
to /2.14; 250/2.16.
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card or exceeding a credit limit. Section 3108(3) treats good-faith use as a 
defense for which the defendant bears the burden of persuasion — rather 
than treating its absence as an offense requirement — in recognition that the 
defendant will be uniquely in possession of evidence regarding his intent and 
ability to settle the matter with the issuer.
 Section 3108(4) grades the offense as a Class A misdemeanor. Current 
250/8, by contrast, grades the offense as either a Class 3 or Class 4 felony, 
depending on whether the value of things obtained or sought over a six-month 
period exceeds $300. Section 3108(4) abandons current 250/8’s two-tiered 
grading scheme in recognition that the value of property or services obtained 
or sought will be used to determine the grading for theft and attempted theft 
where those offenses are committed. See proposed Section 2109. Section 
3108(4)’s grading serves to punish the independent harm that occurs where 
one fraudulently uses a credit or debit card.
Section 3109. Commercial Bribery and Breach of Duty to Act 
 Disinterestedly
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/29A-1 to 5/29A-3; 
see also 230 ILCS 10/18(d)(1),(2); 
305 ILCS 5/8A-14(b); 305 ILCS 
5/8A-16(b)(5)
Comment:
 Generally. This offense criminalizes bribes designed to induce breaches 
of professional duties owed by persons in positions of special trust. Section 
3109(1) applies to bribes accepted or sought by persons, such as agents, 
fiduciaries, and professional advisers, owing a duty of fidelity to others. 
Section 3109(2) applies to bribes accepted or sought by professionals 
who pretend to the public to be disinterested in recommending, valuing, 
or reviewing commodities or services. Section 3109(3) criminalizes the 
conferring or offering of bribes prohibited by Section 3109(1) and (2).
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 3109(1) is substantively 
similar to current 5/29A-2, but makes three modifications to enhance clarity 
and limit the offense’s reach to truly blameworthy conduct. First, Section 
3109(1) explicitly prescribes a culpability requirement of knowledge as to all 
the offense’s objective elements. Current 5/29A-2, by contrast, confusingly 
first requires recklessness as to soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept a 
benefit under the “read-in” culpability provision (5/4-3(b)), but then indicates 
that knowledge is required by demanding that there be an “agreement or 
understanding” with respect to the benefit’s purpose. Section 3109(1)’s 
phrasing makes the offense’s scope much clearer.
 Second, Section 3109(1) requires that one solicit, accept, or agree to 
accept the benefit “as consideration for violating or agreeing to violate a 
duty of fidelity” rather than “upon an agreement or understanding that such 
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benefit will influence his conduct in relation to his employer’s or principal’s 
affairs.” This language makes it clearer that the offense does not require an 
actual agreement,202 renders unnecessary 5/29A-2’s requirement that the 
defendant act “without consent of his employer or principal,” and ensures 
that the offense does not punish those — such as purchasing agents who 
conform with trade usages in accepting free promotional products from sales 
representatives — who do not knowingly betray an obligation of loyalty. 
 Third, Section 3109(1) requires that the defendant be subject to a duty of 
fidelity in one of several specified professional capacities. Section 3109(1)’s 
list makes it clear that partners, agents, employees, fiduciaries, professional 
advisers, officers and directors, and arbitrators are subject to liability for 
commercial bribery. Under current 5/29A-2, by contrast, only employees, 
agents, and fiduciaries are subject to liability. It is unclear whether 5/29A-
2 uses the term “fiduciary” in its narrow sense — as Section 3109(1) does 
— to refer to a person who holds property on behalf of or in trust for others, 
or in its broader sense to refer to any “person who accepts the responsibility 
of acting on behalf of another.” See Graham v. Mimms, 444 N.E.2d 549, 
555 (Ill. App. 1982) (treating trustees, guardians, executors, administrators, 
agents, attorneys, partners, joint venturers, and officers and directors as 
“[c]ommon examples of fiduciaries”).
 Section 3109(2) has no corresponding provision in current Illinois 
law. Section 3109(2) covers one who pretends to act disinterestedly in 
selecting, valuing, or reviewing something, but seeks or accepts a benefit to 
influence his selection, valuation, or review. This sort of dishonesty — such 
as accepting money to overestimate the value of an antique or to write a 
favorable movie review — deceives the public and undermines its confidence 
in honest recommendations, appraisals, and criticisms. Section 3109(2)’s 
offense is limited to those who purport to be “engaged in the business of 
making” disinterested selections, appraisals, and criticisms to make clear that 
it does not apply to endorsements — such as those in advertisements — that 
are obviously financially motivated. 
 Section 3109(3) criminalizes conferring, offering, or agreeing to confer 
a bribe prohibited by Section 3109(1) or (2). Section 3109(3) is structurally 
similar to current 5/29A-1203 in tracking the elements of accepting a 
 202 Current Illinois law’s use of the phrase “upon an agreement or understanding” 
suggests that there must be an actual agreement, which is at tension with other language 
suggesting otherwise in current 5/29A-2 (“solicits . . . or agrees to accept”). 
 203 In addition to current 5/29A-1 and 5/29A-2, Section 3109(1) and (3) also cover 
several current provisions criminalizing offering and accepting particular kinds of commercial 
bribes. See, e.g., 230 ILCS 10/18(d)(1),(2) (bribe to “person . . . connected with” riverboat 
casino); 305 ILCS 5/8A-14(b) (bribe to health care official); 5/8A-16(b)(5) (bribe to “select or 
to refrain from selecting any health care service, health plan, or health care provider”). 
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commercial bribe, and therefore differs from the current provision in the 
same respects that Section 3109(1) differs from current 5/29A-2.204 
 Section 3109(4) grades the offense as a Class 4 felony, whereas current 
5/29A-3 grades commercial bribery as a mere business offense. Section 
3109(4)’s enhanced grading reflects the offense’s resemblance to bribery of 
public officials, which both current 5/33-1 and proposed Section 5101 grade 
as a Class 2 felony. Although not as harmful as the bribery of public officials, 
the conduct prohibited by Section 3109 is sufficiently serious to warrant 
felony status.
Section 3110. Bid Rigging
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/33E-3; 5/33E-4; 5/
33E-11; 5/33E-14; 5/33E-18; 30 
ILCS 500/50-25
Comment:
 Generally. This provision criminalizes conduct that interferes with, and 
impairs confidence in, the system of bidding for and executing public contracts. 
Although the evasion of bidding and other contracting regulations may not 
ordinarily constitute theft, or even its attempt — because the winning bidder 
may actually satisfy the contract under terms agreed to by the government, 
and thus may not clearly deprive the government of any property — such 
conduct is inherently deceptive and may lead to higher costs, poorer work 
in execution of contracts, or both. As current 5/33E-1 recognizes, “the cost 
to the public is increased and the quality of goods, services and construction 
paid for by public monies is decreased when contracts . . . are obtained by 
any means other than through independent noncollusive submission of bids 
or offers by individual contractors and suppliers.”
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 3110(1) defines the offense 
to incorporate, by reference, conduct prohibited by the offenses currently 
codified at 720 ILCS 5/33E-3, 5/33E-4, 5/33E-11, 5/33E-14, 5/33E-18, 
and 30 ILCS 500/50-25. It is anticipated that the regulatory content of the 
current provisions will be preserved elsewhere in Illinois law through the 
“conforming amendments” bill to be presented to the General Assembly. 
(Article 33E’s other offenses are addressed by the proposed Code’s bribery 
 204 Section 3109(3) tracks Section 3109(1)’s culpability requirements, and requires that 
the defendant know that the recipient is violating a duty of fidelity. Current Illinois law, by 
contrast, appears to elevate the required culpability as to influencing the recipient’s conduct 
from knowledge in 5/29A-2 (“upon an agreement or understanding that such benefit will 
influence”) to intent in 5/29A-1 (“with intent to influence”). 
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and official misconduct offenses. See proposed Sections 5101 and 5103 and 
corresponding commentary.205) 
 Section 3110(2) grades the offense as a Class 3 felony, which is the 
same grade current Illinois law prescribes for 5/33E-3’s bid-rigging offense, 
5/33E-11’s offense for false statements in certifications, and 5/33E-14’s 
offense for false statements in vendor applications. The conduct covered 
by current 5/33E-4’s offense of “bid rotating” (currently a Class 2 felony), 
current 5/33E-18’s offense of “unlawful stringing of bids” (currently a Class 
4 felony), and current 30 ILCS 500/50-25’s offense of “inducement” does not 
differ significantly enough from that in the other incorporated provisions to 
warrant different grading.
Section 3111. Rigging Publicly Exhibited Contest
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/29-1 to 5/29-3; see 
also 230 ILCS 5/36(a); 230 ILCS 
5/37(a); 230 ILCS 5/39(a)(1); 230 
ILCS 10/18(d)(1),(2)
Comment:
 Generally. This provision criminalizes corruption in sporting events 
and other publicly exhibited contests. Section 3111 is designed to discourage 
gambling fraud and to generally protect the integrity of legitimate contests. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 3111(1) is substantively similar 
to current 5/29-1(a),206 but more generally protects the integrity of contests. 
First, Section 3111(1) differs from current 5/29-1(a) in applying to any 
“publicly exhibited contest”207 rather than only athletic and sporting contests, 
and thus criminalizes rigging a broader range of exhibitions that includes 
television quiz shows, art competitions, beauty contests, and dog shows. 
Although the threat of gambling fraud is not as great as for athletic and 
sporting events, rigging such contests deceives the public and undermines its 
confidence in legitimate entertainment. 
 205 It is anticipated that, with the exceptions of current 5/33E-7 and 5/33E-8 (which 
are fully covered by the proposed Code’s bribery offense, see proposed Section 5101 and 
corresponding commentary), the regulatory content of current Article 33E’s other offenses 
and provisions will also be preserved outside Chapter 720 through “conforming amendments” 
legislation. 
 206 Section 3111 also covers current offenses outside Chapter 720 criminalizing 
efforts to rig casino games and horse races by bribing a person associated with a contest or 
tampering with a racehorse. See 230 ILCS 5/36(a) (administering drug or chemical substance 
to racehorse); 230 ILCS 5/37(a) (attempting to affect racehorse’s speed by using battery 
or buzzer, or by sponging horse’s nostrils); 230 ILCS 5/39(a)(1) (bribe to person involved 
in horse race); 230 ILCS 10/18(d)(1),(2) (bribe to “person . . . connected with” riverboat 
casino). 
 207 Section 3111(1) does not apply, however, to public exhibitions — such as 
professional wrestling matches — that are contests merely in form. 
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 Second, Section 3111(1) prohibits bribing, threatening bodily harm, or 
tampering with a person, animal, or thing with the intent to prevent a contest 
“from being conducted in accordance with the rules and usages purporting to 
govern,” whereas current 5/29-1(a) merely prohibits bribing with the intent to 
influence another “not to use his best efforts.”208 Section 3111(1) thus covers 
current 5/29-1(a)’s prohibition against inducements to lose, “shave” points, 
or officiate unfairly, but also imposes liability for other blameworthy means 
of affecting a contest’s outcome.
 Section 3111(2) criminalizes accepting a bribe prohibited by Section 
3111(1)(a). Section 3111(2) is structurally similar to current 5/29-2 in 
tracking the elements of offering a bribe, and differs from the current 
provision in the same respects that Section 3111(1) differs from current 5/29-
1(a).209 Additionally, Section 3111 clarifies that, as with commercial bribery 
under proposed Section 3109(1) and current 5/29A-2, liability is appropriate 
for one who “solicits” a prohibited bribe.
 Section 3111(3) allows for liability for those who, although their efforts 
may not support liability as accomplices under proposed Section 301(1), 
assist others in deceiving the public by knowingly participating in a rigged 
contest.210 Section 3111(3) has no corresponding provision in current Chapter 
720. 
 Section 3111 does not incorporate current 5/29-1(b) and (c), which 
criminalize, respectively, a bribe used to influence an athlete’s decision to 
attend a school and a bribe by an agent who seeks to represent a college 
athlete “in future negotiations for employment with any professional sports 
team.” It is anticipated that current 5/29-1(b) and (c)’s regulatory offenses will 
be preserved elsewhere in Illinois law through “conforming amendments” 
legislation. Section 3111 also omits current 5/29-3’s offense for failing to 
report a bribe, making the offense consistent with commercial bribery, for 
which current Illinois law does not criminalize the failure to report. 
 Section 3111(4)(a) tracks current 5/29-1(a) and 5/29-2 in grading 
3111(1) and 3111(2)’s offenses as Class 4 felonies.
 Section 3111(4)(b) grades Section 3111(3)’s offense as a Class A 
misdemeanor.
 208 Section 3111(1)(a) tracks the offense definitions for offering commercial bribes in 
current 5/29A-1 and proposed Section 3109(3) by punishing one who “confers, offers, or 
agrees to confer any benefit.” Current 5/29-1(a), by contrast, modifies the language to reach 
one who “gives, offers or promises any . . . thing of value or advantage.” Such phraseological 
inconsistency may cause unnecessary confusion. 
 209 Section 3111(2) requires that one know that a benefit is being given to prevent a 
contest from being conducted in accordance with its purported rules and usages, and is similar 
to current 5/29-2, which appears to less clearly impose a culpability requirement of knowledge 
by requiring that the defendant act “with the intent, understanding or agreement that he will 
not use his best efforts.”
 210 Section 3111(3) applies only to direct and active participation in rigged portions 
of publicly exhibited contests — and does not reach either inactive “participants,” such as 
spectators, or those that actively participate in only unrigged portions of contests.
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Section 3112. Defrauding Secured Creditors
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 810 ILCS 5/9-315.01, 5/9-315.02; 
see also 720 ILCS 5/17-14; 240/1
Comment:
 Generally. This offense criminalizes dealing with property for the 
purpose of hindering a secured creditor’s interest therein. Section 3112 will 
often apply to debtors who fraudulently deal with collateral in their rightful 
possession. Section 3112 complements proposed Articles 2100 and 2200; 
under Section 2102(2)’s definition of “property of another,” an actor’s own 
interest in property that is subject to a security interest will not preclude 
liability for theft or property damage. Section 3112 independently addresses 
security interests for those cases in which the debtor does not appropriate or 
damage the collateral, or another requirement of theft or property damage is 
not satisfied.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 3112(1) corresponds to current 
810 ILCS 5/9-315.01 and 5/9-315.02’s offenses for wrongfully disposing 
of collateral subject to a security interest, but more comprehensively 
criminalizes efforts to defraud secured creditors.211 First, Section 3112(1) 
differs from current 5/9-315.01 and 5/9-315.02 in prohibiting fraudulently 
dealing with any property that is subject to a security interest, and covers 
those who seek to impair security interests, such as real property mortgages, 
that are not within the scope of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
 Second, Section 3112(1) criminalizes “dealing with” collateral for the 
purpose of hindering enforcement of a security interest, whereas current 5/9-
315.01 and 5/9-315.02’s prohibitions relate only to dispositions that violate 
 211 Section 3112(1) also corresponds to current 5/17-14 and 240/1. Section 3112(1) 
is similar to current 5/17-14 in criminalizing dealing with property with the intent to hinder 
creditors, but applies only to property “subject to a security interest.” This requirement ensures 
that the offense does not criminalize “mere thoughts.” See proposed Section 3113(1) and 
corresponding commentary.
 Current 240/1 criminalizes dealing with personalty obtained under a conditional sales 
contract “without the written consent of the title holder.” As Illinois law otherwise recognizes, 
however, the seller’s “reservation of title” in a sales contract merely creates a security interest. 
See 810 ILCS 5/2-401(1) (“Any retention or reservation by the seller of the title (property) 
in goods shipped or delivered to the buyer is limited in effect to a reservation of a security 
interest.”). Section 3112(1) therefore does not treat the seller’s lack of consent as a sufficient 
condition for liability, and imposes the same requirements with respect to security interests 
created by conditional sales contracts as for those created by other security devices.
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security agreements.212 Section 3112(1) allows for liability for those who 
seek to impair security interests by means other than transferring collateral to 
another, such as by destroying, removing, concealing, or encumbering it. 
 Section 3112(2) grades the offense as a Class A misdemeanor, whereas 
current law grades 5/9-315.01’s offense as a Class 3 felony and 5/9-315.02’s 
offense as a Class A misdemeanor. Section 3112(2)’s grading reflects the 
availability of more severe sanctions for more serious violations where the 
defendant satisfies the requirements for theft or property damage.
Section 3113. Fraud in Insolvency
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/17-14
Comment:
 Generally. This offense criminalizes fraudulent conduct by one 
who knows that certain proceedings for the benefit of creditors, such as a 
liquidation proceeding or a proceeding seeking the appointment of a receiver, 
have been or are about to be instituted. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 3113(1)(a) criminalizes dealing 
with property with the intent to adversely affect creditors’ claims or otherwise 
interfere with the administration of a receivership. Section 3113(1)(a) is 
substantively similar to current 5/17-14 in protecting creditors’ interests 
by prohibiting a debtor’s fraudulent conveyance of even unencumbered 
property, but requires that proceedings for the benefit of creditors be pending 
or imminent.213 By further requiring the defendant’s knowledge as to this 
objective element, Section 3113(1)(a) ensures that the defendant’s conduct 
is sufficiently blameworthy to warrant criminal sanctions. Criminalizing the 
ordinarily legal act of alienating one’s own unencumbered property simply 
because one engages in that act based on what is considered a bad motivation 
(i.e., to avoid creditors’ claims), as current 5/17-14 does, comes perilously 
close to punishing “mere thoughts.”
 212 Section 3112(1)’s requirement that one act “with intent to hinder enforcement” 
is functionally similar to current 5/9-315.01’s requirement that the debtor “willfully and 
wrongfully” fail to pay proceeds and current 5/9-315.02’s affirmative defense for prompt 
payment of the proceeds. Section 3112(1)’s culpability requirement differs from current law, 
however, by declining to attribute special significance to the fact that the debtor fails to pay 
proceeds within ten days. See 5/9-315.01(1) (failure to pay proceeds within 10 days “prima 
facie evidence” that was “willful and wanton”); 5/9-315.02(5) (affirmative defense only 
available if proceeds paid within 10 days). Such evidence might — indeed, it is rather likely 
to — be relevant as to the issue of the defendant’s intent, but does not establish a per se rule 
under the proposed Code.
 213 Where one deals with or damages property to which an appointed receiver has taken 
title, liability for theft or property damage may be appropriate under proposed Articles 2100 
and 2200.
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 Section 3113(1)(b) and (1)(c) have no corresponding provisions 
in current Chapter 720. Section 3113(1)(b) prohibits falsifying writings 
relating to property that one knows is, or is about to be, subject to insolvency 
proceedings. Section 3113(1)(c) criminalizes misrepresenting or refusing to 
disclose information legally required to be given to a receiver. The conduct 
covered by Section 3113(1)(b) and (1)(c) is harmful in that it interferes with 
the expeditious and fair administration of an insolvent estate. 
 Section 3113(2) grades the offense as a Class A misdemeanor, whereas 
current law grades 5/17-14’s offense as a business offense. Section 3113(2)’s 
enhanced grading is appropriate in light of 3113(1)’s additional requirement 
of knowledge that insolvency proceedings are pending or imminent. 
Section 3114. Receiving Deposits in a Failing Financial Institution
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/17-1(B)(b)
Comment:
 Generally. This offense criminalizes receiving deposits and other 
investments in failing financial institutions. Section 3114’s offense is 
closely related to theft by deception, insofar as receiving a deposit with 
knowledge that insolvency is imminent will ordinarily amount to an implicit 
misrepresentation as to the institution’s ability to pay the depositor on 
demand. Unlike Section 2103, however, Section 3114 does not require proof 
that the offender obtained the property “by” such deception.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 3114(1) is substantively similar 
to current 5/17-1(B)(b), but breaks the offense definition down into subsections 
for greater clarity and makes two changes to the offense requirements. First, 
Section 3114(1)(c)(i) requires the defendant know that “the institution is 
about to suspend operations or go into receivership or reorganization” rather 
than that it is “insolvent.” Section 3114(1)(c)(i) avoids current 5/17-1(B)(b)’s 
use of the term “insolvent” for clarity; as Illinois law reveals, there is some 
ambiguity as to whether insolvency means that liabilities exceed current assets 
at their current value or rather at some hypothetical future value. Compare 
740 ILCS 160/3(a) (“A debtor is insolvent if the sum of the debtor’s debts 
is greater than all of the debtor’s assets at a fair valuation.”), with People v. 
Clark, 160 N.E.233, 237 (Ill. 1928) (“[A] bank is insolvent . . . when the cash 
value of its assets realizable in a reasonable time, in case of liquidation by 
its proprietors, as ordinarily prudent persons would generally close up their 
business, is not equal to its liabilities, exclusive of stock liabilities.”).
 Second, Section 3114(1)(c)(ii) requires that the defendant know that 
the person making a deposit or other investment is unaware of the prospect 
of financial ruin. Section 3114(1)(c)(ii)’s additional requirement addresses 
the same concerns that current 5/17-1(B)’s “intent to defraud” requirement 
appears to address. Section 3114(1)(c)(ii) recognizes that there is no implicit 
ILL Code  V II Spc Part_b   265 7/2/03, 1:00:47 PM
266
Proposed Criminal Code Offi cial Commentary — Volume 2
misrepresentation as to the institution’s ability to meet its deposit obligation 
where the depositor also knows that insolvency is imminent, and precludes 
liability where one accepts deposits made for the very purpose of preventing 
financial ruin. 
 Section 3114(2), like current 5/17-1(B), grades the offense as a Class A 
misdemeanor.
Section 3115. Selling Participation in a Pyramid Sales Scheme
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/17-17
Comment:
 Generally. This offense criminalizes selling the right to participate in a 
pyramid sales scheme. As Illinois courts have recognized, such schemes are 
“inherently deceptive . . . . because the market eventually becomes saturated 
and the seemingly endless chain must end; consequently, many participants 
cannot even recoup their investments, let alone make a profit.” People ex rel. 
Fahner v. Walsh, 461 N.E.2d 78, 82-83 (Ill. App. 1984). 
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 3115(1) is substantively the 
same as current 5/17-7(b), but defines the offense to prohibit only actually 
selling the right to participate in a pyramid sales scheme; offers and other 
attempts to sell such rights are governed by proposed Section 801.
 Section 3115(2) is nearly identical to current 5/17-7(a), but eliminates 
a few redundancies — for example, by replacing “money or other thing of 
value” with “anything of value.”
 Section 3115(3), like current 5/17-7(b), grades the offense as a Class A 
misdemeanor.
Section 3116. Definitions
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/15-1; 5/15-4; 5/15-6; 
5/17-1(A)(iii); 5/17-3(b); 5/17-
7(a); 250/2.03; 250/2.07; 250/
2.15; 815 ILCS 5/2.1
Comment:
 Generally. This provision collects defined terms used in Article 3100 
and provides cross-references to the provisions in which they are defined.
 Relation to current Illinois law. For discussion of the relationship 
between Article 3100’s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary 
for the provision in which the term in question is initially defined.
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General Comment Regarding Current Law:
 Current Illinois law describes numerous offenses, including many of the 
provisions noted above, as “fraud,” and criminalizes various specific kinds of 
misrepresentations made for the purpose of obtaining property, as well as 
performing certain conduct “fraudulently,” with an “intent to defraud,” or as 
part of a “scheme,” “design,” or “artifice to defraud.” See, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/
16D-5(a) (“computer fraud”); 5/17-6 (“state benefits fraud”); 5/17-8 (“health 
care benefits fraud”); 5/17-9 (“public aid wire fraud”); 5/17-10 (“public 
aid mail fraud”); 5/17-13 (“fraudulent land sales”); 5/17-16 (“fraudulent 
production of infant”); 5/17-23 (“fraudulent schemes and artifices”); 5/17B-
0.05 et seq. (“WIC fraud”); 5/46-1 (“insurance fraud”); 5/46-1.1 (“fraud on 
a governmental entity”); 5/46-2 (“aggravated fraud”); 5/46-3 (“conspiracy 
to commit fraud”); 5/46-4 (“organizer of an aggravated fraud conspiracy”); 
365/0.01, /1 (Telephone Charge Fraud Act). 
 Under the proposed Code, liability for theft, or its attempt, would be 
appropriate for most of the conduct criminalized by these current “fraud” 
offenses. See proposed Section 2103 (theft by deception), Section 2106 
(theft of services), and corresponding commentary. For example, the current 
offenses of “insurance fraud” (5/46-1) and “fraud on a governmental entity” 
(5/46-2) are aimed at the very specific conduct of attempting to obtain 
property by making a false insurance claim. Such conduct would be properly 
characterized as attempted theft by deception under the proposed Code.214 
Additional liability would be available, however, if the particular means 
by which one attempts to achieve such “insurance fraud” or “fraud on a 
governmental entity” involves an independent harm. For example, forgery 
liability would be appropriate where one submits a forged police report to an 
insurance company in support of a false claim. See proposed Section 3101 
and corresponding commentary.
 Similarly, 5/17B-5 and 5/17B-10’s offenses criminalizing “WIC 
fraud”215 are aimed at efforts to accomplish theft through the Special 
 214 The proposed Code also omits other provisions in current Article 46. The proposed 
Code does not incorporate current 5/46-2’s aggravation for filing three or more false claims 
within an 18-month period, but the proposed grading provision for theft would allow for 
aggregation of amounts of “thefts committed pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct.” 
See proposed Section 2109(7) and corresponding commentary. Current 5/46-3’s offense for 
“conspiracy to commit fraud” is addressed by Article 800’s inchoate offense for conspiracy. 
See proposed Section 803 and corresponding commentary. Current 5/46-4’s additional 
offense for being an “organizer of an aggravated fraud conspiracy” is addressed by Section 
905(4)’s grade adjustment for leaders of criminal organizations. Current 5/46-5, authorizing 
civil damages, is expected to be preserved elsewhere in Illinois law through “conforming 
amendments” legislation.
 215 Current 5/17B-15 also sets forth an offense criminalizing possessing another’s 
WIC identification card “for an unlawful purpose.” Under the proposed Code, such inchoate 
conduct would be probably be treated as attempted impersonation, see proposed Section 3105; 
an attempt of the crime intended to be committed with the identification card; or perhaps a 
violation of the proposed offense for possession of an “instrument of crime,” see proposed 
Section 808.
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Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants and Children, whether 
by stealing commodities that would be used by program participants or by 
stealing public funds used for the program. This objective is made clear 
by current 5/17B-20, which grades the offense, like theft, according to the 
value of the property involved in the violation.216 Where one attempts or 
accomplishes theft by means that cause independent harm, however, the 
proposed Code’s multiple-conviction provision will allow liability for both 
theft (or attempted theft) and another offense.217 For example, liability for 
both theft by deception and forgery — rather than a single offense of “WIC 
fraud,” as under current 5/17B-5(i) — would be appropriate where one 
obtains groceries by using a counterfeit food instrument. 
 In addition to the current provisions noted above, Chapter 720 contains 
a variety of offenses that have not been incorporated because they address 
narrow regulatory issues that properly belong outside the Criminal Code: 
305/0.01 to /2 (Gasoline Price Advertising Act); 320/0.01 to /4 (Horse Racing 
False Entries Act); 325/1 to /5 (Insurance Claims for Excessive Charges Act); 
330/0.01 to /2 (Loan Advertising to Bankrupts Act); 350/1 to /4 (Sale Price 
Ad Act); 720 ILCS 355/0.01, /1 (the Stallion and Jack Pedigree Act); 625/
0.01 to /3 (Grain Coloring Act).
 Finally, the proposed Code omits current law’s provision of criminal 
liability in 5/17A-1 and 5/17A-3 for former Nazis who receive state benefits 
 216 Another aim of the current “WIC fraud” provisions is to impose corporate liability. 
See 720 ILCS 5/17B-20 (grading offense for violation by “firm, corporation, association, 
agency, institution, or other legal entity”). The proposed Code’s provision governing corporate 
liability would not allow for felony liability for corporations, insofar as the proposed theft 
provisions do not “indicate[] a legislative purpose to provide liability for a corporation.” 
See proposed Section 701 and corresponding commentary. Nevertheless, serious fines will 
be available for corporations under proposed Article 900, which, in addition to authorizing 
fines for corporations that are twice as much as those for individuals, authorizes fines in the 
amount of “twice the harm caused or gain derived” by an offense. See proposed Section 904 
and corresponding commentary. 
 Additionally, it is anticipated that 5/17B-25’s forfeiture rules and 5/17B-30’s civil 
provision regarding future participation in the WIC program will be preserved elsewhere in 
the Illinois statutes through the “conforming amendments” bill to be presented to the General 
Assembly.
 217 Another example is current 5/33C-1’s offense of “fraudulently” obtaining or retaining 
certification as a minority- or female-owned business. Under the proposed Code, theft liability 
would be appropriate for acquiring such a certification, which is certainly “property,” by 
deception. Additionally, although 5/33C-1 does not explicitly require making a false written 
statement, “fraudulently” obtaining a certification as a minority- or female-owned business 
will almost invariably involve a violation of at least proposed Section 5202’s offense for 
unsworn falsification, if not Section 5201’s perjury offense for sworn falsification. (It is 
anticipated, however, that the portion of current 5/33C-1 criminalizing fraudulently retaining 
a certification will be preserved elsewhere in Illinois law through a “conforming amendment,” 
as would current 5/33C-5’s definitions if that offense were moved somewhere other than the 
Business Enterprise for Minorities, Females and Persons with Disabilities Act, 30 ILCS 575/1 
et seq.)
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despite being subject to deportation orders for acts committed abroad several 
decades ago. Although it is unlikely that these offenses would apply to 
many people, the conduct covered by current 5/17A-1 and 5/17A-3 would 
seem to almost invariably involve a falsification offense of some sort, and, 
if benefits are actually acquired through deception as to one’s Nazi past, 
theft by deception. See proposed Section 2103 (theft by deception), Section 
5202 (unsworn falsification), and corresponding commentary. Moreover, 
the regulatory content of current Article 17A, including 5/17A-3.1’s rule 
regarding restoration of benefits, may be preserved elsewhere in the Illinois 
statutes if desired.
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ARTICLE 4100. OFFENSES AGAINST THE FAMILY
Note:
 Article 4100 eliminates the current offenses of adultery and fornication. 
See 720 ILCS 5/11-7, 5/11-8. All indications are that these provisions are 
currently unenforced, despite the fact that they present no special difficulty 
in terms of identifying offenders. Such non-enforcement can only reflect 
a conscious decision that imposition of liability for these offenses is 
improper, or at least a waste of State resources. Maintenance of dead-letter 
statutes of this kind provides no benefit, but imposes significant costs, as 
it tends to invite abuse and to undermine the criminal law’s authority as a 
comprehensive and accurate reflection of the governed community’s sense 
of what behavior is sufficiently serious to merit imposition of the criminal 
sanction. Accordingly, the proposed Code abolishes these criminal offenses. 
Any civil-law consequences of the underlying conduct, however, would 
remain in force. See proposed Section 104.
Section 4101. Incest
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/11-11
Comment:
 Generally. This provision prohibits sexual relations between certain 
family members.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 4101 is substantively similar to 
current 5/11-11, with three differences. First, the term “sexual penetration” has 
been replaced with “sexual intercourse” to keep this provision’s terminology 
consistent with other offenses in the proposed Code. Cf. proposed Section 
1301(3) (defining “sexual intercourse”). Second, and more importantly, 
the offense has been expanded to include “sexual conduct” between family 
members. Such conduct merits inclusion because it addresses significant 
sexual acts not encompassed within the definition of sexual intercourse, 
such as the touching or fondling of genitalia. See proposed Section 1302(2) 
(defining “sexual conduct”); 720 ILCS 5/12-12(e) (same).
 Third, Section 4101 eliminates the requirement in current law that 
the child of an offending parent or step-parent must be over the age of 18 
for the sexual act to constitute incest. Presumably, current law includes 
the minimum-age requirement to distinguish this offense from sexual 
assault offenses that are specifically defined to prohibit sexual intercourse 
with minor family members. See, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/12-13(a)(3). Under the 
proposed Code, the independent harms from sexual relations between family 
members and sexual relations with minors are addressed separately, under 
Section 4101 and the Article 1300 offenses. In cases where both harms are 
involved, the offender could be charged, and convicted, of both incest and 
ILL Code  V II Spc Part_b   270 7/2/03, 1:00:50 PM
271
Part II: Defi nition of Specifi c Offenses
the relevant sexual assault offense. (Cf. proposed Sections 253 and 254 
and corresponding commentary.) Under the proposed scheme for multiple 
convictions, each such conviction would contribute to the offender’s total 
sentence, so neither would be irrelevant. (See proposed Section 906 and 
corresponding commentary.)
Section 4102. Bigamy
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/11-12; 5/11-13
Comment:
 Generally. This provision prohibits marriage by persons already 
married.
 Relation to current Illinois Law. Section 4102(1) and (2) cover the 
offenses in current 5/11-12 and 5/11-13, with one minor difference. Section 
4102 includes any bigamist (or person who marries a bigamist) who resides 
in Illinois following an unlawful second marriage, while current 5/11-12(a) 
reaches only one who “cohabits” in Illinois following such a marriage. There 
seems to be no reason to limit the reach of bigamy as current law does, as 
the harms of bigamy — desertion, and possible injury to the spousal property 
interests, of the lawful spouse; deception of civil and possibly religious 
authorities and, in all likelihood, the second spouse — exist whether the 
bigamist lives with the second spouse or not.
 Section 4102(3) retains the absent-spouse defense in current 5/11-
12(b)(3), but eliminates the other defenses in 5/11-12(b) as unnecessary. 
Current 5/11-12(b)(1), which provides an affirmative defense in cases where 
the prior marriage was dissolved or declared invalid, is redundant of the 
offense requirement that the defendant “hav[e] a spouse” at the time of the 
second marriage. The defenses in current 5/11-12(b)(2) and (b)(4) for one 
who reasonably believes his spouse to be dead, or that he is legally eligible 
to remarry, are also unnecessary, as the offense requires that the offender 
be at least reckless as to the fact that he still has a spouse. See proposed 
Section 205(3) (providing that culpability level of recklessness is to be 
“read in” where none otherwise stated). A reasonable mistake as to the prior 
spouse’s death or the offender’s ability to remarry would negate the offense’s 
culpability requirement, precluding liability. See proposed Section 207 and 
corresponding commentary. 
 Section 4102(4) imposes the same offense grade (Class A misdemeanor) 
for both bigamy and marrying a bigamist. Under current law, bigamy (5/11-
12) is a Class 4 felony, while marrying a bigamist (5/11-13) is a Class A 
misdemeanor. There appears to be little reason to punish a person who 
knowingly marries a bigamist any less severely than the bigamist, as each 
person causes the same harm. Moreover, a person who knowingly marries a 
bigamist would be subject to the same penalty under normal accountability 
rules. (See proposed Section 301 and corresponding commentary.) 
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Section 4103. Child Abandonment
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/12-21.5; 5/12-21.6; 
130/1 to 130/2; 150/1; 150/2; 150/
4.1; 150/5
Comment:
 Generally. This provision defines an offense penalizing parents or legal 
guardians who leave a child without adequate supervision for an extended 
period of time, thereby jeopardizing the child’s welfare.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 4103 is nearly identical 
to current 5/12-21.5,218 except that Section 4103(1) breaks down the 
corresponding language in 5/12-21.5(a) into subsections to enhance clarity, 
and 4103(2)(m) merges into one subsection the factors in current 5/12-
21.5(b)(13) and (15). Additionally, Section 4103 eliminates as unnecessary 
the grade enhancement in current 5/12-21.5(d) for subsequent offenses, as 
the proposed Code contains a general enhancement provision for recidivism. 
(See proposed Section 905(1) and corresponding commentary.)
  Section 4103 (along with some other proposed provisions, as noted 
below) replaces or supersedes several specific child-safety provisions in 
current law. First, current 5/12-21.6 (endangering the life or health of a child) 
has been eliminated, as the conduct prohibited in that section is covered 
by the general endangerment offense (proposed Section 1202). (Current 
5/12-22, covering special sentencing and disposition issues related to child 
abandonment, has also been removed, as those issues are properly addressed 
in the Code of Corrections.)
 Second, Sections 4103 to 4105 (and proposed Section 1202) also 
replace the Neglected Children Offense Act (720 ILCS 130/1 et seq.), which 
prohibits parents and guardians from causing minors to become dependent 
or neglected children. The special sentencing rules in current 130/2 and 
130/2a have been removed, as they are properly addressed in the Code of 
Corrections. Current 130/3 addresses an evidentiary issue that properly 
belongs in the Code of Criminal Procedure.
 Finally, the proposed Code replaces the Wrongs to Children Act (720 
ILCS 150/1 et seq.). Within that act, current 150/1 and 150/2 impose liability 
for allowing or encouraging children under age 14 to be employed as street 
or circus entertainers. Such conduct falls within proposed Section 4103 and 
proposed Section 1202 (endangerment). Current 150/3 and 150/3.1 address 
family law matters that are properly dealt with outside the Criminal Code. 
Current 150/4.1, prohibiting abandonment by school bus drivers, is covered 
by the general endangerment offense (proposed Section 1202). Current 150/
5.1, which punishes parents or guardians who permit children to be sexually 
 218 Like the current offense, Section 4103 is not intended to apply to one who 
“relinquishes a child in accordance with the Abandoned Newborn Infant Protection Act [325 
ILCS 2/1 et seq.].” 720 ILCS 5/12-21.5(a).
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abused, was recently ruled unconstitutional on its face. See People v. Maness, 
732 N.E.2d 545 (Ill. 2000). The conduct prohibited in that section is covered 
by proposed Sections 1301(2) and 6203(1)(d) (q.v.).
Section 4104. Harboring or Assisting a Runaway
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/10-6; cf. 5/10-8; see 
also 225 ILCS 10/2.21; 705 ILCS 
405/3-5; 750 ILCS 30/1 et seq.
 
Comment:
 Generally. This provision creates an offense to penalize adults who 
harbor or assist a child in running away from home without parental consent.
 Relation to current Illinois Law. Section 4104 is substantively similar 
to current 5/10-6. The proposed provision does not incorporate the offense 
contained in current 5/10-8 (defining a Class C misdemeanor for unlawful 
sale of public conveyance travel ticket to minor), for two reasons: (1) that 
offense seems too trivial to warrant criminal condemnation, and (2) that 
offense imposes liability for negligence, and the criminal law is usually 
reluctant to impose such liability. The conduct 5/10-8 seeks to prevent is 
more properly addressed by means of civil business regulations.
Section 4105. Contributing to the Delinquency of a Minor
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/33D-1; 130/1 to /3; 
  150/1; 150/5; 640/1; 640/2 
Comment:
 Generally. This provision covers conduct by adults that contributes to 
the delinquency of a minor by exposing the minor to, or inducing the minor 
to participate in, criminal activity.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 4105(1) is nearly identical to 
current 5/33D-1(a).
 Section 4105(2) is substantively similar to current 640/1 to /2 and is 
intended to cover the same conduct as the current offense. However, the 
proposed provision replaces several of the prohibited associations in current 
law with the more general and inclusive phrase “persons engaged in criminal 
activity.” 
 Section 4105(3)(a) grades the offense under Section 4105(1) as a 
Class A misdemeanor, regardless of the severity of the underlying crime. 
Current 5/33D-1(b), by contrast, punishes the offense at one grade higher 
than the underlying crime committed by the juvenile. Section 4105(3)(a) 
rejects that grading method based on the recognition that the offending 
adult’s responsibility for the underlying crime is already addressed by 
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standard rules governing accountability or inchoate liability for solicitation. 
(See proposed Sections 301 and 802 and corresponding commentary.) If 
accountable for the juvenile’s crime, the defendant would be eligible to 
receive a total sentence for the multiple offenses similar to the sentence for 
which current 5/33D-1(b) provides. (See proposed Sections 254 and 906 and 
corresponding commentary.) Section 4105(3)(a) thus disaggregates the harm 
from the adult’s solicitation of, or participation in, the underlying crime from 
the distinct harm of contributing to the minor’s delinquency, and imposes 
a sanction that addresses only the latter harm, with which this provision is 
specifically concerned.
 Section 4105(3)(b), like current 640/2, grades improper supervision as 
a petty offense.
Section 4106. Persistent Non-Support
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 750 ILCS 16/15
 
Comment:
 Generally. This provision creates liability for persons who habitually 
fail to provide financial support for their children or spouse.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 4106 is substantively similar 
to current 750 ILCS 16/15, with four minor changes. First, Section 4106(1) 
eliminates the “willfully” requirement from current 16/15(a), as that word 
no longer reflects a culpability term used in the Code. (See proposed 
Section 206 and corresponding commentary.) The proposed provision 
states no culpability term, thus requiring recklessness as to the refusal or 
failure to provide support. (See proposed Section 205(3) and corresponding 
commentary.) Second, Section 4106(2) formally changes the presumption in 
current 16/15(a-5) to a permissive inference, as is already required under the 
Constitution. (See proposed Section 107 and corresponding commentary.) 
Third, the aggravation provided for in 16/15(a)(3) and (4) and (b) has been 
changed so that either flight from the State, or failure to pay for six months or 
in an amount totaling $5,000, will aggravate the offense to a Class 4 felony, 
rather than both being required. Finally, the grade enhancement in current 
16/15(b) for subsequent offenses has been removed as unnecessary, as the 
proposed Code contains a general enhancement provision for recidivism. 
(See proposed Section 905(1) and corresponding commentary.)
 Section 4106 also removes from 750 ILCS 16/15 two subsections (16/
15(c) and (d)) that belong outside the Code, as they address sentencing issues 
that are more properly addressed in the Code of Corrections.
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Section 4107. Abortion
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 510/1 to /15
Comment:
 Generally. This provision covers conduct related to early termination of 
pregnancies.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 4107 incorporates current 510/
1 to 510/15 of the Illinois Abortion Law of 1975 (720 ILCS 510/1 et seq.). 
 Current 513/1 to 513/99 of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act (720 
ILCS 513/1 et seq.) have not been incorporated, as that act has recently been 
declared unconstitutional. See Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 249 F.3d. 603 (7th Cir. 
2001).
Section 4108. Charging Unlawful Fee for Adoption
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 525/0.01 to /5
Comment:
 Generally. This provision covers the payment of fees related to the 
adoption of children.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 4108 incorporates current 
525/0.01 to 525/5 of the Adoption Compensation Prohibition Act (720 ILCS 
525/0.01 et seq.).
 
Section 4109. Definitions
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/2-15a; 5/2-19; 5/12-
12; 510/2(4); see also 225 ILCS 
10/2.21; 750 ILCS 30/1 et seq.
Comment:
 Generally. This provision collects defined terms used in Article 4100 
and provides cross-references to the provisions in which they are defined.
 Relation to current Illinois law. For a discussion of the relationship 
between Article 4100’s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary 
for the provision in which the term in question is initially defined.
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ARTICLE 5100. BRIBERY AND OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT
Section 5101. Bribery
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/33-1; see also 720 
ILCS 5/32-4b; 5/33E-7; 5/33E-8; 
645/1; 645/2; 10 ILCS 5/29-1 to 
-3; 225 ILCS 650/19; 230 ILCS 
5/39; 230 ILCS 10/18; 305 ILCS 
5/8A-3; 305 5/8A-6; 305 ILCS 
5/8-14; 305 ILCS 5/8A-16
Comment:
 Generally. This provision creates an offense covering the use of property 
or personal advantage to influence a public servant in the performance of his 
duties.
 Relation to current Illinois Law. Section 5101 is similar to current 
5/33-1, but has been reorganized and expanded to incorporate numerous 
other bribery offenses in current law. Section 5101(1) covers the conduct in 
current 5/33-1(d) and (e) by prohibiting a person from knowingly soliciting, 
accepting, or agreeing to accept a bribe. Section 5101(2) covers the conduct 
in current 5/33-1(a) to (c) by prohibiting a person from knowingly conferring, 
offering, or agreeing to confer any benefit that would constitute a bribe under 
Section 5101(1).
 The proposed formulation alters current 5/33-1 in four minor respects. 
First, Section 5101 requires that the offender act knowingly in soliciting or 
offering the bribe, but requires only recklessness as to whether he or the other 
person is “authorized by law” to accept the benefit. See proposed Section 
205(3) (providing that culpability level of recklessness is to be “read in” where 
none otherwise stated). The current offense is similar, but sometimes requires 
an additional “intent to influence” an official, or knowledge of another’s 
intent to influence an official. Section 5101 requires only that the person be 
“knowing” as to the benefit’s serving as “consideration for influencing or 
agreeing to influence” an official’s performance. This formulation captures 
all cases in which the offender understands the improper nature of the 
transaction, and avoids a potentially complex requirement of knowledge of 
another person’s “intent.”
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 Second, Section 5101 defines a single offense that includes bribes, 
offers, or solicitations made to any person.219 The current provision, on the 
other hand, rather clumsily defines several different offenses for bribes to 
actual public servants, people thought to be public servants, and people 
meant to influence public servants — even though all the offenses have the 
same grade.
 Third, Section 5101(2) changes the conduct element of “promises or 
tenders” in current 5/33-1(a) to (c) to “confers, offers, or agrees to offer.” The 
new language is not meant to effect a substantive change, but is considered 
plainer and easier to understand than the somewhat legalistic term “tenders.” 
Moreover, the proposed provision is worded to be consistent with the 
commercial bribery provision in Section 3109.
 Fourth, Section 5101 has been broadened to include public contractors 
and voters in addition to public servants,220 jurors, and witnesses. By 
expanding the scope of the offense beyond the groups covered by current 
5/33-1, Section 5101 is able to cover the many specific bribery offenses in 
current law.221
 219 It might be contended that someone who is not a public servant is “authorized by 
law to accept” an offered bribe, so that such an offer would fall outside the scope of Section 
5101(1)(b). The proposed Code, however, is not meant to contemplate any such result. A 
recipient of a bribe offer is not “authorized by law” to obtain anything of value either as 
consideration for trying to influence official conduct, or by deceiving the offeror into thinking 
that he intends to do so. In the first case, the person would himself be violating Section 
5101(1), and in the second case, he may be guilty of theft by deception under proposed Section 
2103. In any case, any residual conduct that 5/33-1 covers, but that would not be a substantive 
offense under Section 5101(1), would constitute an attempt to violate Section 5101(1) under 
proposed Section 801.
 220 The proposed Code replaces the terms “public officer” and “public employee” 
with the more inclusive term “public servant.” See proposed Section 108 and corresponding 
commentary.
 221 Two related offenses, current 5/32-4c (covering payments to witnesses and potential 
witnesses for their testimony) and 5/32-4d (covering payments to jurors following a legal 
proceeding), are not incorporated within the proposed Code. Section 5101 does not cover 
current 5/32-4c, as the current provision does not require any objective of improperly 
influencing the proceeding, and appears aimed only at the appearance of impropriety. 
Likewise, 5/32-4d’s prohibition against payments to jurors after a proceeding falls outside 
Section 5101, as the payments would not relate to the “function” of a juror. It is expected that 
current 5/32-4c and -4d will be preserved and moved outside the Criminal Code by means of 
“conforming amendments” legislation. 
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 Section 5101 replaces four bribery offenses in Chapter 720.222 The first 
of these is current 5/32-4b, which defines a Class 3 felony prohibiting bribery 
to excuse persons from jury duty. Section 5101 includes bribes to jurors and 
grades them as a Class 2 felony — that is, the same offense grade as any other 
form of bribery. See also proposed Section 5310 (improperly influencing 
juror by threat; Class 2 felony).223
 Second, Section 5101 replaces current 5/33E-7(a),224 which creates a 
separate Class 3 felony for “kickbacks.” Although not defined in current law, 
kickbacks appear to be a specific type of bribe involving a payment of money 
to influence the awarding of public contracts. Section 5101(1) covers this 
conduct by prohibiting bribery with the intent to influence any “independent 
contractor working on a public project.” Again, Section 5101 grades this type 
of bribery the same as other forms of bribery, as a Class 2 felony.
 The third specific current offense, 5/33E-8, relates to bribery of 
inspectors employed by public contractors. The provision defines a Class 
4 felony for offering such a bribe and a Class 3 felony for any person 
employed by a public contractor to accept such a bribe in return for wrongful 
certification. Section 5101 replaces this offense and grades such conduct — 
as an attempt to influence an “act related to the employment or function of 
. . . an independent contractor working on a public project” — as a Class 2 
felony, the same as all other forms of bribery, regardless of whether the person 
is offering or accepting the bribe or whether any wrongful certification is in 
fact provided.225
 222 Section 5101 also replaces a number of specific bribery provisions outside current 
Chapter 720. See, e.g., 10 ILCS 5/29-1 to -3 (buying, promising, or selling of votes; Class 4 
felony); 225 ILCS 650/19(B) (bribe to influence meat and poultry inspector; Class 4 felony); 
230 ILCS 5/39(a)(1) (bribe to horse racing official or jockey; Class 4 felony); 230 ILCS 10/
18(d)(1) (bribe to influence Gaming Board member or outcome of game; Class 4 felony); 
305 ILCS 5/8A-3, -6 (public assistance kickbacks; Class A misdemeanor to Class 1 felony, 
depending on amount of funds affected); 305 ILCS 5/8A-14 (bribery relating to government-
funded health plan; Class A misdemeanor to Class 1 felony, depending on amount of funds 
affected); 305 ILCS 5/8A-16(b)(5) (“kickback, bribe, reward, or benefit” to influence selection 
of health plan; Class A misdemeanor). Each of these sections imposes an offense grade that 
differs from current law’s general bribery offense. As there appears to be no logical reason for 
these grading distinctions, Section 5101 grades all forms of bribery the same.
 223 Section 5101 does not incorporate the procedural rules in current 5/32-4b regarding 
jury commissioners convicted of bribery, as those are more properly addressed outside the 
Code in the Jury Commission Act (705 ILCS 310/1 et seq.).
 224 Current 5/33E-7(b) is covered by proposed Section 5102. Section 5101 also does 
not incorporate current 5/33E-7(d), as that provision addresses civil matters more properly 
addressed outside the Code.
 225 As with current law, Section 5101 generally does not require the actual performance 
of an illegal or unauthorized act in return for the offer or payment of a bribe. See, e.g., People 
v. Wright, 434 N.E.2d 26, 28 (Ill. App. 1982).
ILL Code  V II Spc Part_b   278 7/2/03, 1:00:55 PM
279
Part II: Defi nition of Specifi c Offenses
 Finally, Section 5101 replaces current 645/1 and 645/2, which define a 
separate Class 3 felony covering bribery involving members of the General 
Assembly. There appears no rational reason to punish this specific type of 
bribery less severely than other forms of bribery.
 Section 5101(3)(b) makes an exception to the uniform grading scheme 
in the case of bribery involving voters. Unlike the other classifications in 
5101(1)(a), bribery in the voting context usually involves, and likely would 
require, numerous instances of the offense in order to substantially affect the 
public process involved (e.g., a statewide election or primary). As such, the 
harmful impact of each instance of the offense is somewhat diluted relative 
to bribery of, for example, a single juror, which may profoundly affect the 
outcome of a proceeding. Further, an offender may be subject to multiple-
offense liability for multiple counts of bribing voters, thus raising his total 
sentence beyond that authorized for a single Class 4 offense. See proposed 
Sections 254 and 906 and corresponding commentaries. Current 10 ILCS 
5/29-1 to -3 and -20 similarly grade buying or selling of votes as a Class 4 
felony.
Section 5102. Failure to Report a Bribe
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/33-2; see also 720 
  ILCS 5/33E-7(b); 5/33E-8(b)
Comment:
 Generally. Section 5102 criminalizes the failure of a public official, 
employee, contractor, juror, or witness to report a bribery offer to the proper 
authorities.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 5102(1) is similar to the first 
paragraph of current 5/33-2,226 but has been reorganized to enhance clarity. 
Section 5102 also covers the same conduct as two other, more specific current 
failure-to-report offenses, 5/33E-7(b) and 5/33E-8(b).
 Because the offense may apply to private citizens, such as public-
contract bidders, and not only to public servants (who are more likely to be 
aware of a more specific duty), the proposed Code follows 5/33E-7(b) and 
5/33E-8(b) rather than 5/33-2, imposing a general obligation to report a bribe 
offer to “law enforcement authorities” (a defined term under the proposed 
Code, see proposed Section 108), rather than a more specific duty to report to 
particular officials.
 Section 5102(2) grades the offense as a Class 4 felony when the party 
failing to report is someone generally bound by a public duty — for example, 
a public servant — and as a Class A misdemeanor for others. Liability for this 
 226 The second paragraph of 5/33-2, requiring the police to relay a report of a bribe offer 
to the State’s Attorney, has not been incorporated, as such matters may be addressed outside 
the Criminal Code.
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omission offense is thus more limited for members of the general public, who 
are less likely to know they are bound by an official duty to report misconduct 
of this sort. By contrast, current law grades the failure to report kickbacks (5/
33E-7) and bribes (5/33E-8) involving public contractors as Class 4 felonies, 
whereas the 5/33-2 offense for an official’s failure to report a bribe offer is a 
Class A misdemeanor. No logical basis for this grading scheme is apparent; 
if anything, it would make sense for public servants to be held to a higher 
standard of affirmative duty than private contractors.
Section 5103. Official Misconduct
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/33-3; see also, e.g., 
720 ILCS 5/25-2; 5/33E-5, -6, -9, 
-16, -17; 310/1; 310/2; 15 ILCS 
520/21 to /23; 30 ILCS 230/2b; 40 
ILCS 5/15-189; 50 ILCS 705/6.1; 
55 ILCS 5/3-11019; 210 ILCS 
45/3-212; 225 ILCS 705/4.20 to 
/4.22; 305 ILCS 5/8A-5 to -6
Comment:
 Generally. This provision creates a general offense covering situations 
where public employees or officials abuse their positions by acting outside 
their lawful authority.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 5103 is nearly identical to 
current 5/33-3, except that the culpability term “intentionally” has been 
eliminated from current 5/33-3(a) as superfluous and potentially confusing. 
Under the proposed General Part, proof of an intentional act would satisfy 
Section 5103(1)’s “knowingly” requirement. (See proposed Section 205(6) 
and corresponding commentary.) Section 5103, like current 5/33-3, prohibits 
public officials and employees from engaging in a broad range of unlawful 
activities.227
 227 Official misconduct may be predicated upon a defendant’s violation of another 
statute, a Supreme Court rule, or an administrative rule or regulation, regardless of whether 
the underlying rule prescribes a penalty for its violation. See People v. Samel, 451 N.E.2d 892, 
896-97 (Ill. App. 1983).
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 Section 5103 addresses conduct prohibited by six specific misconduct 
offenses in current Chapter 720.228 Current 5/33E-5 and 5/33E-6 prohibit 
the wrongful acquisition, disclosure, interference, or awarding of bidding 
information by public officials or employees, while current 5/33E-9 prohibits 
public officials and employees from approving change orders in violation of 
specified procedures.229 Depending on the type of violation, current 5/33E-
5 and 5/33E-6 grade such conduct as either a Class 3 or Class 4 felony, 
and current 5/33E-9 defines a Class 4 felony. Section 5103 grades all such 
offenses as Class 3 felonies.230 
 228 Section 5103 also addresses some of the conduct prohibited in current 5/12-7 
(compelling confession or information by force or threat); 5/25-2 (police misconduct in 
allowing lynchings of suspected criminals); 5/32-4 (prohibiting peace officers and correctional 
officers from committing acts in furtherance of gang-related activities); and 5/32-5 (intentional 
failure to comply with criminal procedure rules regarding the chain of custody of evidence). 
 Moreover, current law contains a number of specific official misconduct offenses 
outside the Code that overlap with the general misconduct offense. See, e.g., 15 ILCS 520/21 
to /23 (profiting from public monies or misappropriating state securities; Class 3 felony); 30 
ILCS 230/2b (failure to keep proper books, participating in trust fund of money received due 
to office, or any other violation of Act; Class 4 felony); 40 ILCS 5/15-189 (member of board of 
State Universities Retirement System having direct interest in investments); 50 ILCS 705/6.1 
(failure of convicted police officer to report conviction; Class 4 felony); 55 ILCS 5/3-11019 
(county officer using county money for profit, Class 3 felony; any other violation of Act, Class 
4 felony); 210 ILCS 45/3-212 (nursing home inspector profiting from confidentiality violation, 
Class 4 felony, or giving prior notice of inspection, Class A misdemeanor); 225 ILCS 705/4.20 
to /4.22 (state mine inspector or Department of Natural Resources employee accepting or 
soliciting contribution or gratuity; Class 4 felony); 305 ILCS 5/8A-5 to -6 (misappropriation 
of public assistance funds; Class A misdemeanor to Class 1 felony, depending on amount).
 Many specific provisions outside Chapter 720 define Class 4 felonies prohibiting 
specific types of officials from taking a financial interest in any contract with the government 
entity to which they belong. See, e.g., 20 ILCS 1705/44 (Department of Human Services 
employee); 50 ILCS 105/3 to /4 (any person holding office under state law); 60 ILCS 1/85-
45 (township official); 65 ILCS 5/3.1-55-10 (municipal official); 65 ILCS 5/4-8-6 (officer 
in commission form of government); 70 ILCS 210/25.3 (Metropolitan Pier and Exposition 
Authority member); 70 ILCS 705/4 (fire protection district officer); 70 ILCS 2605/11.18 
(sanitary district officer); 105 ILCS 5/10-9 (school board member); 110 ILCS 805/3-48 
(community college board member); 605 ILCS 5/6-411.1 (road district officer).
 229 Note that Section 5103 is intended to cover conduct distinct from that prohibited 
by proposed Section 3110, which generally applies to public contract bidders, rather than the 
officials who deal with their bids. Where a person’s conduct violates both Section 5103 and the 
bid-rigging offense in Section 3110, however, liability for both offenses would be governed by 
proposed Section 254.
 230 With respect to State officials and employees, the conduct forbidden in current 
5/33E-5 and 5/33E-6 is likely also covered by current sections 500/20-10, 20-35, 50-1, 50-
45, and 50-50 of the Illinois Procurement Code (30 ILCS 500/1-1 et seq.), as well as by 
various administrative rules and regulations. There appears to be no existing statute outside 
the Criminal Code that specifically proscribes the conduct covered in current 5/33E-9. To the 
extent it would remain necessary or desirable for Illinois law to point out that the specific 
underlying conduct described in 5/33E-5, -6, and -9 is “forbidden by law” or “in excess 
of . . . lawful authority,” such prohibitions should be codified in a proper place outside the 
Criminal Code (e.g., in the specific regulations governing relevant officials or employees) 
through “conforming amendments” legislation. It is also anticipated that the related provisions 
in current 5/33E-1, -2, -10, and -13 will be preserved outside the Criminal Code through 
conforming amendments.
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 Current 5/33E-16 and 5/33E-17 prohibit officials or employees of a 
local government or school district from misapplying funds or participating 
in a public contract with the intent to defraud. The conduct covered in those 
sections would clearly count as “forbidden by law” — in fact, it is explicitly 
criminal under the proposed theft and fraud sections, and therefore would 
violate those provisions in addition to proposed Section 5103(1)(b) and 
(c). Like the current provisions, Section 5103 grades these acts as Class 3 
felonies.
 Current 310/1, which forbids certain sales between governments and 
their officials and employees, has not been incorporated by the proposed 
provision, as it properly belongs outside the Criminal Code.
 Section 5103(2) retains the special grading provision in current 5/33-
3(d) requiring a public servant to forfeit his employment, but clarifies that the 
provision only applies to public servants of this State or any of its political 
subdivisions, as opposed to federal public servants.
Section 5104. Definitions
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/2-17, 5/2-18; 5/15-1
Comment:
 General. This provision collects defined terms used in Article 5100 and 
provides cross-references to the provisions in which they are defined.
 Relation to current Illinois law. For a discussion of the relationship 
between Article 5100’s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary 
for the provision in which the term in question is initially defined.
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ARTICLE 5200. PERJURY AND
OTHER OFFICIAL FALSIFICATION OFFENSES
Section 5201. Perjury
Corresponding Current Provision(s):  720 ILCS 5/32-2; 5/32-3; see 
also, e.g., 720 ILCS 540/0.01, /1; 
10 ILCS 5/29-10(a); 15 ILCS 335/
14C(a)(3); 55 ILCS 5/1-5013; 110 
ILCS 1010/8; 205 ILCS 657/
90(h); 220 ILCS 5/6-106; 225 
ILCS 41/15-75(a)(6); 225 ILCS 
60/58; 225 ILCS 203/90(a); 225 
ILCS 305/36(b); 225 ILCS 410/
4-20(4); 225 ILCS 446/190(a); 
235 ILCS 5/10-1(c); 415 ILCS 
5/44(h)(1)
 
Comment:
 Generally. This provision defines the offense of perjury, which, like other 
offenses in Article 5200, aims to protect the integrity of information relied on 
by the government. Section 5201 treats perjury as especially serious because 
the offense involves falsification under an oath or equivalent affirmation. As 
the Illinois Supreme Court has recognized, “[t]he law attaches superior effect 
to statements made under oath, and [the offense] is designed to insure that 
all such statements merit the trustworthiness which the law assigns to them.” 
Loraitis v. Kukulka, 116 N.E.2d 329, 331 (Ill. 1953).
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 5201(1) is substantively the 
same as current 5/32-2(a),231 but removes from the offense definition the 
 231 In addition to current 5/32-2(a), current Illinois law contains numerous offenses 
criminalizing making false statements under oath or affirmation about particular matters, 
in particular documents, and in particular proceedings. See, e.g., 720 ILCS 540/0.01, /1 
(swearing, affirming, or testifying “wilfully, corruptly and falsely” on application to become 
surety or bail); 10 ILCS 5/29-10(a) (perjury under Election Code); 15 ILCS 335/14C(a)(3) 
(perjury under Identification Card Act); 205 ILCS 657/90(h) (making false statement in 
document required to be maintained or filed under Transmitters of Money Act); 220 ILCS 
5/6-106 (false statement in Illinois Commerce Commission proceeding regarding issuance 
of stocks or bonds by public utility); 415 ILCS 5/44(h)(1) (false statement in application for 
permit or license required to deal with hazardous waste). These overlapping offenses create 
unnecessary and undesirable confusion.
 For example, several provisions prohibit the making of a “false oath or affirmation,” 
rather than the making of a “false statement” under that oath or affirmation. See, e.g., 225 
ILCS 41/15-75(a)(6) (“making false oath or affidavit required by” Funeral Directors and 
Embalmers Licensing Code); 225 ILCS 305/36(b) (“making of any wilfully false oath or 
(continued…)
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current provision’s requirements that the false statement be “material to the 
issue or point in question” and made under an oath or affirmation that was 
legally required. Those requirements are instead addressed by Section 5201(3) 
and (4).232 Section 5201(1) also codifies the Illinois courts’ construction of 
current 5/32-2(a) by explicitly requiring that one make a false statement “of 
fact.”233 See People v. White, 322 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ill. 1974) (false statement must 
be “a statement of fact and not a conclusion, opinion or deduction drawn 
from given facts”). 
 Section 5201(2) is substantively similar to current 5/32-2(c)’s rule 
governing admissions of falsity, with two modifications. First, Section 
5201(2) applies more generally to admissions of falsity made in the same 
“proceeding” rather than in the same “trial.” Section 5201(2)’s broader scope 
reflects the view that providing an incentive to “come clean” is as desirable 
in pre- and post-trial proceedings as it is at trial. There is no identifiable 
policy reason for providing a defense for one who admits the falsity of a 
contradictory statement he made earlier in the same trial, but not for one 
who corrects a misrepresentation made earlier in the same grand jury 
investigation, bond hearing, or hearing on a post-trial motion. (The defense 
affirmation in any matter or proceeding where an oath or affirmation is required by” Illinois 
Architecture Practice Act); 225 ILCS 410/4-20(4) (“wilfully making any false oath or 
affirmation whenever an oath or affirmation is required by” Barber, Cosmetology, Esthetics, 
and Nail Technology Act). This phrasing suggests, contrary to current 5/32-2(a), that only one 
conviction is appropriate for one who tells several lies under a single oath.
 Moreover, some offenses do not explicitly impose 5/32-2(a)’s requirement that a false 
statement be material, but proceed to state that those who commit them are liable for “perjury.” 
See, e.g., 110 ILCS 1010/8 (“making any false statement in any notice or amendment thereto 
filed pursuant to Section 4 of [the Academic Degree] Act is . . . perjury”); 225 ILCS 60/58 
(person “wilfully swear[ing] or affirm[ing] falsely, or mak[ing] or fil[ing] any affidavit 
wilfully and corruptly,” in submission under the Medical Practice Act, “shall be sentenced . . . 
for perjury”); 225 ILCS 203/90(a) (“If any person in making any oath or affidavit required by 
[the Boiler and Pressure Vessel Repairer Regulation] Act swears falsely, such person is guilty 
of perjury[.]”); 225 ILCS 446/190(a) (“If any person in making any oath or affidavit required 
by [the Private Detective, Private Alarm, Private Security, and Locksmith] Act swears falsely, 
the person is guilty of perjury[.]”).
 Finally, whereas current 5/32-2(e) grades perjury as a Class 3 felony, current Illinois 
law provides for various grades for other overlapping offenses. See, e.g., 55 ILCS 5/1-5013 
(swearing falsely concerning right to vote; Class 4 felony); 225 ILCS 41/15-75(a)(6), noted 
supra (Class A misdemeanor); 225 ILCS 410/4-20(4), noted supra (Class B misdemeanor); 
235 ILCS 5/10-1(c) (making false statement in obtaining liquor license; petty offense).
 232 If the materiality and “legally required” issues continued to be defined as offense 
elements, it is unlikely that, under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), it would still 
be possible to shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant for the first, or to treat the second 
(as both current law and Section 5201 contemplate) as an issue for the court to resolve, rather 
than an offense element to be proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 233 Section 5201(1)’s requirement that one make a false statement “of fact” does 
not preclude liability, however, for one who makes a false statement of fact concerning a 
subjective matter. This is consistent with Illinois case law holding that “a statement of belief 
or opinion may constitute perjury when, as a matter of fact, the witness had no such belief or 
opinion.” People v. Drake, 380 N.E.2d 522, 524 (Ill. App. 1978). 
 231 (…continued)
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is unavailable, however, where one admits the falsity of a statement made in 
an earlier “proceeding,” even though it remains the same litigation. One may 
not avoid liability, for example, by admitting in a post-trial proceeding that 
he lied at trial.)
 Second, Section 5201(2)(c) introduces two limitations to ensure that the 
exception is not abused. Section 5201(2)(c)’s rules make it clear that perjury 
liability remains appropriate where one admits a false statement only after 
its damage is done, or only after learning that his deceit has been, or will be, 
discovered.
 Section 5201(3)(a) provides a defense where the false statement 
involved is “not material to the issue or point in question.” Section 5201(3)(a) 
uses the same language as current 5/32-2(a), but treats materiality as a matter 
of defense, rather as an offense requirement, for two reasons. First, this 
makes clear that culpability as to materiality is not required.234 Second, 
treating materiality as a defense enables Section 5201(3)(b) to place the 
burden of persuasion on the defendant to prove that his false statement was 
not material by a preponderance of the evidence. Section 5201(3)(b)’s burden 
of persuasion recognizes the defense’s similarity to Article 250’s de minimis 
defense, for which the defendant also bears the burden of persuasion by a 
preponderance of the evidence. See proposed Section 252 and corresponding 
commentary. As with the de minimis defense, the defense of materiality is 
concerned more with the extent — rather than the existence — of the offense’s 
harm. If the State can establish that the defendant engaged in improper and 
culpable conduct by lying in a legal proceeding, it is sensible to require the 
defendant to demonstrate that the lie worked no harm or prejudice.
 Section 5201(3) does not remove the issue of materiality from the 
jury, however. Current Illinois law, on the other hand, withholds the issue of 
materiality from the jury — although it is clearly an element of the offense 
under current 5/32-2(a) — under the theory that it is a “question of law for 
the court.”235 United States Supreme Court precedent makes it clear that this 
 234 A culpability requirement of recklessness is not to be “read in” under Section 205(3) 
as to either Section 5201(3) or Section 5201(4). Section 205(3) only operates to prescribe 
recklessness as to an “objective element” for which a culpability requirement is not specified. 
See proposed Section 205(3) and corresponding commentary. As Section 202(1) and (2)(d) 
make clear, “objective elements” are found only in “the offense definition or the provisions 
establishing the offense grade or the severity of the punishment.” See proposed Section 202 
and corresponding commentary. Because Section 5201(3) and (4) are defenses, rather than 
offense definitions or grading provisions, no culpability is required with respect to either 
materiality or the legal authorization of the oath or affirmation.
 235 People v. Olinger, 615 N.E.2d 794, 797 (Ill. App. 1993); see also People v. Powell, 
513 N.E.2d 1162, 1166 (Ill. App. 1987) (“[T]he determination of materiality involves the 
relationship between an allegedly false statement and the nature of the proceeding at which 
it was made. We conclude that this determination is one best suited for a court with its 
legal expertise and is therefore a question of law.”); cf. IPI (CRIMINAL) 22.01 (4th ed. 2000) 
(excluding requirement from offense definition in jury instruction).
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current Illinois practice is unconstitutional.236 Under proposed Section 5201, 
because materiality is not an offense element, it would be constitutional to 
allow the court to determine the issue (as Section 5201(4)(b) provides for the 
provision’s other defense). It is thought, however, that the issue of materiality 
is significant enough, and relates closely enough to the seriousness of the 
defendant’s wrongdoing, to be an appropriate jury issue. Moreover, placing 
the burden on the defendant to establish immateriality, as Section 5201(3)(b) 
does, should address any possibility of abuse or jury confusion leading to 
improper acquittals.
 Section 5201(4)(a) treats as a defense the current requirement that the 
oath or affirmation be legally authorized. As with Section 5201(3)’s non-
materiality defense, this makes clear that the legal authorization issue does 
not require either culpability or submission to the jury. Section 5201(4)(a) 
differs from current 5/32-2(a) in requiring proof that the oath or affirmation 
was “authorized,” rather than “required,” by law. This modification is 
consistent with the Illinois courts’ construction of current 5/32-2(a), which 
has “seemingly broadened this statute so that an oath that is ‘authorized,’ not 
just ‘required,’ by law . . . will also support a perjury conviction.” People v. 
Doss, 426 N.E.2d 324, 326 (Ill. App. 1981) (citing Loraitis v. Kukulka, 116 
N.E.2d 329, 331 (Ill. 1953)); see also People v. House, 560 N.E.2d 1224, 
1234 (Ill. App. 1990).
 Section 5201(4)(b) tracks current Illinois law by providing that the 
legal authorization of the oath or affirmation under which the statement was 
made is “to be determined by the court.” See People v. Dyer, 366 N.E.2d 572, 
574 (Ill. App. 1977) (whether oath or affirmation was required “present[s] 
question[] of law for the court to decide”); cf. IPI (CRIMINAL) 22.01 (4th ed. 
2000) (excluding requirement from offense definition in jury instruction).
 Section 5201(5) sets forth two special evidentiary rules relating to the 
offense of perjury. Section 5201(5)(a) is substantively the same as current 
5/32-2(b), but generally states that the “prosecution need not specify” which 
of two contradictory statements is false rather than specifically addressing 
that rule’s application to charging instruments and trials. 
 Section 5201(5)(b) has no corresponding provision in current Chapter 
720, but is substantively similar to the Illinois courts’ modified “two-witness” 
rule, under which the direct testimony of a single witness “is sufficient . . . if 
it is confirmed or corroborated by other evidence of material circumstances 
tending to establish the falsity of the alleged perjured statement.” People v. 
Harrod, 488 N.E.2d 316, 321 (Ill. App. 1986); see also People v. Alkire, 151 
N.E.2d 518, 519 (Ill. 1926); People v. Beaston, 371 N.E.2d 131, 133-34 (Ill. 
App. 1977). Like the Illinois courts’ current rule, Section 5201(5)(b) “requires 
 236 See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 511 (1996) (“The Constitution gives 
a criminal defendant the right to demand that a jury find him guilty of all the elements of 
the crime with which he is charged; one of the elements in the present case is materiality; 
respondent therefore had a right to have the jury decide materiality.”).
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only corroboration which tends to establish the falsity of the statement alleged 
to be perjurious.” Harrod, 488 N.E.2d at 322. Section 5201(5)(b)’s modified 
phrasing makes it clearer, however, that the rule does not require that falsity 
be proved by direct contradicting testimony in every case; liability is not 
precluded, for example, where proof of falsity rests solely upon a defendant’s 
written out-of-court admission. 
 Section 5201(6), like current 5/32-2(e), grades the offense as a Class 3 
felony.
 Section 5201 does not explicitly preserve current 5/32-2(d) and 5/32-3, 
as their content is addressed elsewhere under the proposed Code. Proposed 
Section 413’s general justification defense for conduct authorized by laws 
imposing public duties covers current 5/32-2(d)’s exemption for peace 
officers who are authorized by law to use fictitious names. It is anticipated 
that current 5/32-2(d)’s last sentence, which provides an exception to the 
exemption, will be preserved through a “conforming amendments” bill in 
those statutes outside the Criminal Code that authorize the use of fictitious 
names.
 Current 5/32-3(a) defines a separate offense for subornation of perjury 
and grades it as a Class 4 felony. The proposed Code, in contrast, reaches 
those who solicit others to commit perjury under the general principles of 
complicity and inchoate liability that apply to other offenses. Section 301(1) 
allows for full perjury liability for one who, acting with “the culpability 
required by the offense,”237 successfully solicits another to commit the 
offense. See proposed Section 301(1) and corresponding commentary. 
In cases of unsuccessful solicitation, liability for the inchoate offense of 
solicitation is appropriate, and the offense will be graded as a Class 4 felony. 
See proposed Sections 802(1) and 807 and corresponding commentary. 
 237 Section 5201(1)(b), like current 5/32-2(a), requires that one make a false statement 
that he “does not believe to be true.” This language clearly falls short of requiring that the 
defendant actually know or believe that the statement is false. Cf. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 ¶ 
32-3 Committee Comments (Smith-Hurd 1964) (observing that “‘knows to be false’ involves 
a stricter requirement of proof in subornation than ‘does not believe to be true’ in perjury”). 
Nevertheless, several Appellate Court decisions state that “[k]nowledge of the falsity of the 
statement made at the time it was made is an essential element of the crime of perjury.” People 
v. Kang, 646 N.E.2d 279, 382 (Ill. App. 1995); see also People v. Penn, 533 N.E.2d 383, 384 
(Ill. App. 1988); People v. Boyd, 401 N.E.2d 304, 306 (Ill. App. 1980); People v. Drake, 380 
N.E.2d 522, 524 (Ill. App. 1978); People v. Taylor, 286 N.E.2d 122, 124 (Ill. App. 1972). 
Similarly, the pattern jury instructions define perjury to require that one make a false statement 
and “at the time he makes the statement believes it is not true.” See IPI (CRIMINAL) 22.01 
(4th ed. 2000). Under the proposed Code, one’s knowledge or belief that a statement is false, 
although sufficient, is not necessary to prove that he “does not believe it to be true.”
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Section 5202. Unsworn Falsification to Authorities
Corresponding Current Provision(s): Various; see, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/17-
6(a); 5/17-15; 5/17A-1; 5/17A-3; 
5/33C-1; 5/33C-2; 5/33E-14; 
10 ILCS 5/29-8; 20 ILCS 3520/
45(b); 30 ILCS 500/50-5(d); 35 
ILCS 130/22(f); 35 ILCS 200/
21-290(d); 205 ILCS 657/90(h); 
205 ILCS 690/36; 220 ILCS 5/6-
106; 225 ILCS 25/40; 225 ILCS 
330/43(c); 235 ILCS 5/10-1(c); 
240 ILCS 40/15-45(c); 305 ILCS 
5/8A-2; 305 ILCS 5/8A-15; 410 
ILCS 535/27(1)(c); 415 ILCS 5/
44(h)(6), (j)(4)(A),(C); 625 ILCS 
5/4-105(a)(5); 625 ILCS 5/6-
302(a)(1); 820 ILCS 220/2(i)  
Comment:
 Generally. This provision complements Section 5201 by defining 
several offenses involving unsworn falsification to authorities. In place of 
perjury’s oath or affirmation requirement, Section 5202 requires that unsworn 
falsification be either accompanied by an “intent to mislead a public servant 
in performing his official function” or “on or pursuant to a form bearing 
notice . . . to the effect that false statements therein are punishable.”  
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 5202(1) defines four 
offenses each requiring that the defendant act “with intent to mislead a 
public servant in performing his official function.” Section 5202(1) has 
no directly corresponding provision in current Illinois law, which instead 
contains a variety of regulatory offenses criminalizing efforts to mislead the 
government. By prohibiting such conduct generally, Section 5202(1) allows 
for uniform offense requirements and consistent grading, and eliminates the 
need to criminalize very specific types of deception. 
 Section 5202(1)(a) criminalizes making false written statements for the 
purpose of misleading a public servant, and covers an assortment of current 
Illinois offenses prohibiting making false written statements in documents 
for the purpose of deceiving particular governmental entities and officials.238 
See, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/17-6(a) (false statement to obtain state benefits); 5/33C-
2 (false statement to influence certification of minority- and female-owned 
business); 5/33E-14 (false statement to influence consideration of vendor 
 238 Other current offenses, while not explicitly requiring a false written statement, will 
almost invariably involve a violation of Section 5202. See, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/17A-1, 5/17A-3 
(former Nazi subject to deportation order receiving state benefits); 5/33C-1 (“fraudulently” 
obtaining or retaining certification as minority- or female-owned business).
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applications); 20 ILCS 3520/45(b) (false statement to influence bonding-
assistance action of Department of Commerce and Community Affairs); 205 
ILCS 690/36 (false statement on registration to sell certain kinds of checks 
with intent to deceive Commission of Banks and Real Estate); 220 ILCS 5/6-
106 (false statement to influence Illinois Commerce Commission to make 
order authorizing issuance of stock by public utility); 225 ILCS 330/43(c) 
(false statement to obtain license or registration to practice as professional 
land surveyor).
 Section 5202(1)(b) criminalizes efforts to mislead public servants 
by intentionally omitting information from written statements. Section 
5202(1)(b) has no directly corresponding provision in current Illinois law, 
which instead contains several regulatory offenses criminalizing making 
misleading statements in, or omitting information from, documents 
submitted to particular governmental entities. See, e.g., 205 ILCS 657/90(h) 
(knowingly omitting material entry from document filed under Transmitters 
of Money Act); 240 ILCS 40/15-45(c) (knowingly filing misleading grain 
records with Department of Agriculture); 305 ILCS 5/8A-15 (“knowingly 
and willfully” omitting material fact “by any trick, scheme, artifice or device” 
from document related to government-funded or -mandated health plan). 
Section 5202(1)(b) is substantively similar to some of the current offenses in 
recognizing that liability based on insignificant omissions is inappropriate, 
but does so by requiring that the omitted information be “necessary to prevent 
[the] written statement from being misleading” rather than “material.” 
 Section 5202(1)(c) criminalizes submitting, or inviting reliance on, a 
writing or object one knows to be lacking in authenticity. Section 5202(1)(c) 
complements proposed Section 3101(1)(c) and 3104(1)’s offenses by 
allowing for liability where one puts forward an inauthentic writing or object 
for the purpose of misleading a public servant, rather than to defraud or injure 
another. See proposed Sections 3101(1)(c) and 3104(1) and corresponding 
commentary. Section 5202(1)(c) covers, and renders unnecessary, several 
current prohibitions against submitting or inviting reliance on particular 
kinds of unauthentic writings. See, e.g., 10 ILCS 5/29-8 (adding or mixing 
forged ballots and applications to vote with authentic ones); 35 ILCS 130/
22(f) (uttering forged cigarette tax imprint to evade tax); 225 ILCS 25/40 
(filing forged affidavit of identification or qualification to practice dentistry); 
410 ILCS 535/27(1)(c) (using forged certificate, record, or report “for any 
purpose of deception”); 625 ILCS 5/4-105(a)(5) (using forged manufacturer’s 
identification number in vehicle title or registration application); 625 ILCS 
5/6-302(a)(1) (displaying or presenting false identification in making 
application for driver’s license or permit).
 Section 5202(2) criminalizes making a false written statement on or 
pursuant to a form bearing legally authorized notice that the false statement 
is punishable. Section 5202(2) has no directly corresponding provision 
in current Illinois law, which is inconsistent in its treatment of such false 
statements “under penalty.” Some current provisions appear to recognize that 
the offense is less serious than perjury by grading it as a Class A misdemeanor 
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rather than a Class 3 felony. See, e.g., 35 ILCS 200/21-290(d) (false statement 
in application required to be “executed under penalty of perjury as though 
under oath or affirmation” under 35 ILCS 200/21-270). Other provisions, 
however, provide that making a false statement under penalty is itself perjury 
under current 5/32-2(a) — even though that offense’s oath or affirmation 
requirement is not satisfied.239 See, e.g., 305 ILCS 5/8A-2(b) (false statement 
in application required to contain “a written declaration that it is made under 
penalties of perjury” under 305 ILCS 5/11-15(3)). 
 Adding to the confusion, the Illinois courts have applied current 5/32-
2(a)’s perjury offense not only to false statements made under penalty, see 
People v. Coleson, 322 N.E.2d 600, 602 (Ill. App. 1975), but also to false 
statements in forms apparently bearing no notice that misrepresentations 
contained therein are punishable.240 Section 5202(2)’s simple offense 
definition introduces clarity and uniformity to an area of law that is currently 
unclear and inconsistent.
 Section 5202(3), providing that the prosecution need not prove which 
of two contradictory written statements is false in a prosecution under 
5202(1)(a) or (2), has no corresponding provision in current Illinois law. 
Section 5202(3) recognizes that the policies underlying Section 5201(5)(a), 
to which it bears substantial similarity, are as compelling in the context of 
unsworn falsification as they are in the context of perjury.
 Section 5202(4) grades unsworn falsification as a Class A misdemeanor. 
Illinois grades current offenses corresponding to Section 5202(1), in contrast, 
as anything from petty offenses (e.g., 235 ILCS 5/10-1(c)) to Class 1 felonies 
(e.g., 305 ILCS 5/8A-2(b)). Current Illinois law’s grading for these offenses 
appears to reflect concerns as to other crimes the defendant intends to commit 
by means of unsworn falsification; the defendant’s efforts toward committing 
another offense may be punished separately, however, as that offense or as 
 239 Current Illinois law’s confusion concerning false statements made under penalty may 
be attributable to a misunderstanding of the phrase “oath or affirmation” in current 5/32-2(a)’s 
definition of perjury. Section 5201(1) does not use the term “affirmation” to dispense with 
the ordinary requirement that an oath be “administered to the defendant by a duly authorized 
officer,” People v. Beacham, 365 N.E.2d 737, 741 (Ill. App. 1977), but rather to make clear that 
the offense applies to one who makes the nonreligious equivalent of an oath. Cf. 5 ILCS 255/4 
(authorizing affirmation where person has “conscientious scruples against taking an oath”). 
 240 See People v. Barrios, 500 N.E.2d 415, 419 (Ill. 1986) (affirming perjury conviction 
based on false statement in application containing signed declaration “that the information I 
have furnished is true to the best of my knowledge or belief”). Section 5202(2) also corresponds 
to current offenses that, although not requiring that a false statement be made “under penalty,” 
similarly criminalize making false “certifications.” See, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/17-15 (falsely 
certifying that proof and acknowledgment of property conveyance was duly proven); 30 
ILCS 500/50-5(d) (false certification that state contractor not barred from being awarded 
contract); 415 ILCS 5/44(h)(6), (j)(4)(A),(C) (false certifications regarding environmental 
waste and pollution permits); 820 ILCS 220/2(i) (false certifications under Safety Inspection 
and Education Act). Although Section 5202(2) would not reach false “certifications” unless 
they are made on or pursuant to a form giving notice of possible criminal liability, Section 
5202(1)(a) would impose liability where one makes a false certification with the intent to 
mislead a public servant.
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an attempt.241 See proposed Section 801 and corresponding commentary. 
Section 5202(4)’s grading for Section 5202(2)’s offense recognizes that false 
statements under penalty are less serious than perjury insofar as they do not 
amount to sworn falsification. Illinois law often tracks this grading scheme. 
See supra discussion of Section 5202(2).
Section 5203. Tampering with Public Record or Notice
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/32-8; 5/32-9; see also, 
e.g., 720 ILCS 5/33E-15; 10 ILCS 
5/29-6; 10 ILCS 5/29-20(4); 35 
ILCS 5/1301; 35 ILCS 130/14; 
35 ILCS 505/15(3.5); 205 ILCS 
657/90(h); 240 ILCS 40/15-45(c); 
410 ILCS 535/27(1)(b); 415 ILCS 
5/44(h)(2) to (h)(5); 420 ILCS 40/
39(b)(2); 625 ILCS 5/5-402.1(f)
Comment:
 Generally. This provision defines several offenses criminalizing 
impairing the integrity of writings that the government relies on for 
information or record and tampering with public records and notices.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 5203(1)(a), defining two 
offenses involving false entries in or false alterations of documents, has no 
directly corresponding provision in current Chapter 720. Section 5203(1)(a)(i) 
criminalizes knowingly falsifying a writing “belonging to, or received or kept 
by, the government for information or record.” Section 5203(1)(a)(i) replaces 
numerous current prohibitions against making false entries in particular 
kinds of documents for the information or record of particular governmental 
entities. See, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/33E-15 (making false entry in document of 
local government or local school district); 10 ILCS 5/29-6 (falsifying voting 
materials); 35 ILCS 5/1301 (entering false information on tax return); 240 
ILCS 40/15-45(c) (filing false record with Department of Agriculture); 415 
ILCS 5/44(h)(2),(4) (making false statement or representation in document 
submitted under Environmental Protection Act).
 Section 5203(1)(a)(ii) criminalizes knowingly making a false entry in 
or a false alteration of a writing “required by law to be kept by others for 
information of the government,” and covers numerous current prohibitions 
against falsifying documents required to be maintained for inspection or 
information under particular regulatory schemes. See, e.g., 35 ILCS 130/14 
 241 Moreover, under Section 906’s rule for determining cumulative authorized sentences, 
multiple counts of unsworn falsification (such as where one attempts to “vote” with multiple 
forged ballots) would be subject to additional punishment for each offense of conviction. See 
proposed Section 906 and corresponding commentary. 
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(falsifying records required to be kept under Cigarette Tax Act); 35 ILCS 
505/15(3.5) (entering false information on documentation required to be kept 
under Motor Fuel Tax law); 205 ILCS 657/90(h) (false entry in documented 
maintained under Transmitters of Money Act); 420 ILCS 40/39(b)(2) 
(altering credential, certificate, license, or registration issued by Department 
of Nuclear Safety); 625 ILCS 5/5-402.1(f) (false entries in required invoice 
for essential automobile parts).
 Section 5203(1)(b)(i) and (1)(b)(ii) are substantively similar to current 
5/32-8 and 5/32-9, respectively,242 but clarify that liability is appropriate for 
tampering with a public “device” (such as a voting machine), and omit the 
current provisions’ requirements that one act “without lawful authority” 
as unnecessary in light of Section 413’s general justification defense. See 
proposed Section 413 and corresponding commentary.
 Section 5203(2) increases current 5/32-8’s grade for tampering with 
a public notice from a petty offense to a Class C misdemeanor, and tracks 
current 5/32-8 in grading tampering with a public record and Section 
5203(1)(a)’s offenses as Class 4 felonies.
Section 5204. False Reports to Law Enforcement Authorities
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/26-1(a)(4), (b); see 
also 720 ILCS 5/16-3.1; 5/26-
1(a)(7), (a)(8), (a)(10), (a)(11); 5/
31-4(a); 625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(6)
Comment:
 Generally. This provision defines two offenses prohibiting making false 
reports to law enforcement authorities. Such false reports harmfully interfere 
with governmental operations and often result in the unavailability of law 
enforcement resources to address genuine reports. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 5204(1)(a) has no directly 
corresponding provision in current Chapter 720. Section 5204(1)(a) is similar 
to proposed Section 5301(1)(a) and current 5/31-4(a)’s prohibitions against 
obstructing justice by furnishing false information, but does not require that 
one give false information to “prevent the apprehension of or to obstruct 
the prosecution or defense” of another. Section 5204(1)(a)’s language 
makes it clear that the offense applies to giving any false information to law 
 242 In addition to current 5/32-8’s general offense for tampering with a public record, 
Section 5203(1)(b) would also cover several current offenses criminalizing tampering with 
particular kinds of public records, such as election materials (10 ILCS 5/29-6), absentee 
ballots (10 ILCS 5/29-20(4)), vital records (410 ILCS 535/27(1)(b)), and records required to 
be made or maintained under the Environmental Protection Act (415 ILCS 5/44(h)(3),(5)).
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enforcement authorities regarding matters within their concern243 — and that 
liability does not depend on whether a person has been formally charged.
 Section 5204(1)(b) is substantively similar to current 5/26-1(a)(4), with 
a few modifications.244 First, Section 5204(1)(b) differs from current 5/26-
1(a)(4) in applying to one who falsely reports an offense “or other incident” 
to law enforcement authorities. This language ensures that the offense 
reaches false reports that are likely to induce reliance by governmental 
entities responsible for enforcing laws that are not necessarily criminal in 
nature. Both false reports of offenses and false reports of such incidents often 
cause governmental resources to be wasted and unavailable to address real 
incidents. Section 5204(1)(b)’s broader language also covers current 5/26-
1(a)(7), (a)(8), and (a)(10)’s offenses for falsely reporting abuse or neglect of 
children and the elderly to the Department of Children and Family Services, 
the Department on Aging,245 and the Department of Public Health.246
 Second, Section 5204(1)(b) differs from current 5/26-1(a)(4) in 
prescribing a culpability requirement of recklessness rather than knowledge 
as to reporting. Cf. proposed Section 205(3) (imposing “read-in” culpability 
requirement of recklessness where none is otherwise stated). Section 
5204(1)(b)’s lowered culpability requirement ensures that the offense reaches 
one who knows his report of an event is false even if he does not “know” 
specifically that the event counts as an “offense” or “other incident” within 
the concern of law enforcement authorities.
 Finally, Section 5204(1)(b) defines the offense more succinctly by 
substituting “reports . . . a past, present, or imminent offense” for “[t]ransmits 
 243 Section 5204(1)(a) also complements Section 5204(1)(b)’s offense by criminalizing 
falsely reporting “information . . . relating to” an offense or incident rather than the occurrence 
of the offense or incident itself. Section 5204(1)(a) is intended to allow liability for one who 
impedes an investigation of an actual offense or incident by furnishing a fictitious lead. 
 244 Section 5204(1)(b) also corresponds to current 5/16-3.1(a) and 625 ILCS 5/4-
103(a)(6). Current 5/16-3.1 criminalizes falsely reporting a theft or other loss to the 
government for the purpose of defrauding insurers. Current 625 ILCS 5/4-103(a)(6) similarly 
prohibits making a false report of a theft or conversion of a motor vehicle to law enforcement 
authorities. Assuming that the requirements of Articles 800 and 2100 are also satisfied, one 
who makes such a false report may be convicted of both Section 5204(1)(b)’s offense and 
attempted theft. Cf. proposed Section 254(1) (providing limitations on multiple convictions 
for related offenses).
 245 Current 5/26-1(a) criminalizes falsely reporting abuse or neglect of the elderly to 
the Department on Aging only where the report is made pursuant to a special information-
gathering project established by the Elder Abuse Demonstration Project Act. See 720 ILCS 5/
26-1(a)(10); 320 ILCS 15/4.1. Current Illinois law does not criminalize false reports of abuse 
or neglect that the Department on Aging receives pursuant to the Elder Abuse and Neglect Act. 
See 320 ILCS 20/1 et seq. Section 5204(1)(b), in contrast, would reach false reports of such 
abuse regardless of the particular statute governing the report.
 246 Section 5204(1)(b) also corresponds to current 5/26-1(a)(11), which imposes liability 
on one who makes a false report to a “public safety agency without the reasonable grounds 
necessary to believe that transmitting such a report is necessary for the safety and welfare of 
the public.” Although the scope of this language is not entirely clear, Section 5204(1)(b), in 
conjunction with proposed Sections 5208 and 6104, should criminalize any conduct prohibited 
by current 5/26-1(a)(11) that genuinely merits criminal liability.
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or causes to be transmitted in any manner . . . a report to the effect that an 
offense will be committed, is being committed, or has been committed,” 
“law enforcement authorities” for “peace officer, public officer or public 
employee,” and “knowing that it did not or will not occur” for “knowing . . . 
that there is no reasonable ground for believing that such an offense will be 
committed, is being committed, or has been committed.” 
 Section 5204(2)(a) tracks current 5/31-4(d)(1) in providing that the 
offense is a Class 4 felony where the offender acts with the intent to implicate 
another. Section 5204(2)(a)’s grading recognizes that making a false report 
with the intent to implicate another is less serious than perjury, but more 
serious than acting without such a motive in light of the harm that the offense 
causes to the person implicated. 
 Section 5204(2)(b) grades the offense as a Class A misdemeanor where 
the offender did not intend to implicate another in an offense, whereas current 
5/26-1(b) grades 5/26-1(a)(4)’s offense as a Class 4 felony.
Section 5205. False Personation
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/32-5; 5/32-5.1; 5/32-
5.2; 5/32-5.3; see also 720 ILCS 
5/17-2; 5/17-5; 815 ILCS 515/
3(b)(2)
Comment:
 Generally. This provision defines four false personation offenses. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 5205(1) consolidates the false 
personation offenses in current 5/32-5, 5/32-5.1, and 5/32-5.3.247 Section 
5205(1)(a) is substantively similar to current 5/32-5(a), with two differences. 
First, Section 5205(1)(a) uses “intent” rather than “purposes” to make the 
culpability requirement with respect to compensation or consideration clear. 
Cf. proposed Section 206(1) (defining intent). Second, Section 5205(1)(a) 
omits current 5/32-5(a)’s exception for an attorney “who unintentionally 
fails to pay attorney registration fees established by Supreme Court Rule,” 
which is covered by imposing a culpability requirement of recklessness as 
 247 Section 5205(1) omits current 5/32-5.2, which aggravates false personation of a 
peace officer from a Class 4 felony to a Class 3 felony where it is committed “in attempting or 
committing a felony.” Because the other offense is necessarily an included offense of current 
5/32-5.2, such “aggravated false personation” only aggravates where the defendant attempts 
a Class 3 or Class 4 felony or completes a Class 4 felony. (Current Illinois law bars liability 
for both a greater and an included offense. See commentary for proposed Section 254.) Under 
Section 906’s rule for determining cumulative authorized sentences, in contrast, any offense 
of conviction in addition to false personation will — regardless of its grade — increase 
the defendant’s total authorized sentence. See proposed Section 906 and corresponding 
commentary. 
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to the falsity of a representation that one is authorized to practice law.248 Cf. 
proposed Section 205(3) (imposing “read-in” culpability requirement of 
recklessness where none is otherwise stated).
 Section 5205(1)(b) is substantively similar to current 5/32-5.1,249 but 
omits “of any jurisdiction” as superfluous, and requires recklessness rather 
than knowledge as to representing oneself to be a peace officer. Cf. proposed 
Section 205(3). Section 5205(1)(b) reduces this culpability requirement so 
that the offense of impersonating a peace officer is defined consistently with 
Section 5205(1)’s other false personation offenses. One is no more likely to 
represent himself to be a peace officer without being aware that he is doing 
so than to unwittingly represent himself to be an attorney, parent, or public 
servant. 
 Section 5205(1)(c) and (1)(d) are substantively the same as current 
5/32-5.3 and 5/32-5(b),250 respectively.
 Section 5205(2)(a) tracks current 5/32-5(a) and 5/32-5.1 in grading 
impersonating an attorney or peace officer as a Class 4 felony.
 Section 5205(2)(b) grades both 5205(1)(c) and (1)(d)’s offenses as 
Class A misdemeanors, whereas current Illinois law grades current 5/32-
5.3’s offense as a Class A misdemeanor and 5/32-5(b)’s offense as a Class B 
misdemeanor. Section 5205(2)(b)’s enhanced grading for Section 5205(1)(d)’s 
offense reflects the view that one who impersonates a public servant is as 
blameworthy as one who impersonates a parent or legal guardian. 
 248 Current 5/32-5(a), like Section 5205(1)(a), requires recklessness as to the falsity 
of a representation that one is authorized to practice law. Cf. 720 ILCS 5/4-3(b) (imposing 
“read-in” culpability requirement of recklessness where none is otherwise stated). The 
Illinois Appellate Court has held, however, that current 5/32-5(a) requires knowledge as to 
falsity. See People v. Abdul-Mutakabbir, 692 N.E.2d 756, 759 (Ill. App. 1998). This holding 
follows a misreading of current 5/4-3(b) by the Illinois Supreme Court that the proposed Code 
deliberately rejects. See commentary for proposed Section 205(3).
 249 Section 5205(1)(b) would also cover some of the conduct prohibited by current 
5/17-2(a) and 5/17-5(a), which criminalize, respectively, impersonating a member of a 
“public safety personnel organization” and impersonating a peace officer to collect a debt. 
Some of 5/17-2(a)’s conduct would also be covered by Section 3105(1)(b). Moreover, Section 
5205(1)(d)’s offense for impersonating a “public servant” would cover 5/17-5(a)’s prohibitions 
of impersonating public employees other than peace officers with the intent to collect a debt, 
and proposed Section 6105 would also reach any collection practices amounting to serious 
harassment. See proposed Section 6105 and corresponding commentary. For the most part, 
however, 5/17-2 and 5/17-5 set forth regulatory offenses, and it is anticipated that they will 
be preserved elsewhere in Illinois law by the “conforming amendments” bill to be presented 
to the General Assembly. See also commentary for proposed Section 3105(1)(b) at note [182] 
(discussing 5/17-2(a) in context of “unauthorized impersonation” offense).
 250 Section 5205(1)(d) also corresponds to current 815 ILCS 515/3(b)(2), which 
criminalizes impersonating a public servant to achieve “home repair fraud.” Under the 
proposed Code, one who impersonates a public servant for the purpose of cheating another 
will ordinarily be liable for both Section 5205’s offense and attempted theft. Cf. proposed 
Section 254(1) (providing limitations on multiple convictions for related offenses).
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Section 5206. Exercising False Authority
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/32-6
Comment:
 Generally. This provision criminalizes performing certain official acts 
that one lacks authority to perform. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 5206(1)’s offense definition is 
substantively the same as current 5/32-6. Section 5206(2) tracks the current 
provision by grading the offense as a Class 4 felony. 
Section 5207. Simulating Legal Process
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/32-7
Comment:
 Generally. This provision criminalizes issuing or delivering a document 
that one knows falsely purports to be a legal process. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 5207(1) is substantively the 
same as current 5/32-7, but omits the term “simulates” as redundant of 
“purports to be.” 
 Section 5207(2), like current 5/32-7, grades the offense as a Class B 
misdemeanor.
Section 5208. False Alarms to Agencies of Public Safety
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/261(a)(2),(3),(9),(12) 
Comment:
 Generally. This provision criminalizes transmitting false alarms of 
emergencies to public safety organizations. Section 5208 is similar to 
proposed Section 6104, but addresses a different aspect of the harmfulness of 
false alarms. Whereas Section 6104 addresses the inconvenience and fear that 
false alarms cause to members of the public, Section 5208 is concerned with 
the adverse effects of false alarms on the operation and resources of public 
safety organizations. Unlike Section 6104, Section 5208 therefore requires that 
the false alarm be knowingly “transmitted to or within any organization . . . 
for dealing with emergencies involving danger to life or property.” 
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 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 5208(1)’s offense definition 
corresponds to current 5/26-1(a)(2), (a)(3), and (a)(9).251 Section 5208(1) is 
similar to current Illinois law, but criminalizes transmitting false alarms of 
emergencies to public safety organizations generally, rather than separately 
prohibiting false alarms of specific types of emergencies to specific types 
of organizations. Section 5208(1) also defines the offense more succinctly 
by substituting “causes . . . to be transmitted” for “transmits or causes to be 
transmitted in any manner” and “knowing” for “knowing . . . that there is no 
reasonable ground for believing.”
 Section 5208(2) grades the offense as a Class A misdemeanor, whereas 
current 5/26-1(b) grades (a)(2) and (a)(9)’s offenses as Class 4 felonies and 
(a)(3)’s offense as a Class 3 felony.252 Current 5/26-1(b)’s grading scheme 
appears to reflect the relative probability that the particular kind of false 
alarm will inconvenience or frighten members of the public. To the extent 
that one commits the offense while being reckless as to causing such public 
inconvenience or alarm, liability under both Section 5208 and proposed 
Section 6104 may be appropriate.
Section 5209. Definitions
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/2-13; 5/2-17; 5/2-18
 
Comment:
 Generally. This provision collects defined terms used in Article 5200 
and provides cross-references to the provisions in which they are defined.
 Relation to current Illinois law. For discussion of the relationship 
between Article 5200’s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary 
for the provision in which the term in question is initially defined.
 251 Section 5208(1) also corresponds to current 5/26-1(a)(12), which criminalizes calling 
“the number ‘911’ for the purpose of making or transmitting a false alarm or complaint and 
reporting information” where the defendant “knows that the call or transmission could result 
in the emergency response of any public safety agency.” Under the proposed Code, attempt 
liability under Section 5204(1)(b) or 5208(1) would be appropriate for such conduct. The 
culpability requirement for both proposed offenses differs from 5/26-1(a)(12)’s requirement 
by requiring only the defendant’s knowledge of the falsity of the report, rather than additional 
“knowledge” of the possibility of (which is more properly seen as recklessness as to) an 
emergency response — a more speculative issue, and one that has less direct bearing on the 
defendant’s blameworthiness.
 252 Section 5208(2) omits 5/26-1(b)’s language requiring that a fine between $3,000 
and $10,000 be imposed for violations of 5/26-1(a)(3). There is no obvious policy reason for 
requiring that a fine be imposed for causing a false alarm of one kind of emergency but not for 
others. 
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ARTICLE 5300. INTERFERENCE WITH GOVERNMENTAL 
OPERATIONS; ESCAPE
Section 5301. Obstructing Justice 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/31-4 
Comment:
 Generally. This provision defines the offense of obstructing justice.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 5301(1) is substantively the 
same as current 5/31-4(a) through (c).253
 Section 5301(2), like current 5/31-4(d), grades the offense as a Class 
4 felony. Section 5301(2) differs from the current provision, however, in 
aggravating the offense to a Class 3 felony where it is committed in furtherance 
of the “activities of a criminal organization” rather than “streetgang related or 
gang-related activity.” Cf. commentary for proposed Section 905(5) 
(comparing “criminal organization” and “organized gang”).
Section 5302. Resisting or Obstructing a Peace Officer or Custodial Officer
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/31-1; 5/31-1a; see 
also 720 ILCS 5/19-5; 625 ILCS 
5/11-204, 5/11-204.1
Comment:
 Generally. This provision criminalizes resisting, obstructing, or 
interfering with a peace officer or custodial officer.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 5302(1) is substantively similar 
to current 5/31-1(a), but reaches one who “interferes with” as well as one 
who “resists” or “obstructs” a peace officer or custodial officer.254 Section 
 253 Section 5301 is not meant to displace, or otherwise affect, the Illinois courts’ holdings 
concerning the “exculpatory no” doctrine, which some jurisdictions have recognized as an 
exception to liability for obstructing justice and other offenses that criminalize making false 
statements. Cf. People v. Ellis, 765 N.E.2d 991 (Ill. 2002) (declining to recognize doctrine as 
exception to liability under current 5/31-4(a)).
 254 Section 5302(1) also covers current 625 ILCS 5/11-204’s Class A misdemeanor for 
a driver who “flees or attempts to elude” a peace officer after having been directed to bring 
his vehicle to a stop. Current 625 ILCS 5/11-204.1’s aggravation to a Class 4 felony where the 
offender exceeds the speed limit by at least 21 miles per hour, causes bodily injury to another, 
or causes property damage is addressed by proposed Section 1202’s offenses for reckless 
endangerment and reckless injuring and Section 2206’s offense for property damage (q.v.).
 Current 5302(1) also corresponds to current 5/19-5’s offense of “criminal fortification 
of a residence or building,” which criminalizes fortifying property that is used for drug offenses 
with the intent to prevent lawful entry by law enforcement authorities. The appropriateness of 
liability for such inchoate conduct is to be determined under the standards set forth in the 
General Part’s attempt provision. See proposed Section 801 and corresponding commentary.
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5302(1)’s language is in keeping with the Illinois courts’ application of 
current 5/31-1(a) to conduct other than merely physically counteracting or 
creating a physical obstacle to the performance of an authorized act.255 See 
People v. Gibbs, 253 N.E.2d 117, 120 (Ill. 1969) (holding that defendant 
who caused police to lose control of arrests by directing arrestees to private 
property did not “merely argue” with officers, but rather obstructed them 
“as completely and as effectively as if he physically touched or otherwise 
physically interfered with the officers”). Section 5302(1) also divides current 
5/31-1(a)’s offense definition into subsections for greater clarity. 
 Section 5302(2)’s definition of “custodial officer” includes “correctional 
officers,” which proposed Section 414(4)(a) defines in a manner similar to 
current 5/31-1(b)’s definition of “correctional institution employee.” The 
broader term “custodial officer,” however, also includes those who supervise 
civil detainees, thus incorporating the provisions of current 5/31-1(b), which 
apply to persons employed to supervise and control civilly committed 
“sexually dangerous” and “sexually violent” persons.
 Section 5302(3)(a) grades the offense as a Class 2 felony where one 
disarms a “peace officer of his firearm while he is engaged in his official 
duties.” Section 5302(3)(a) is functionally the same as current 5/31-1a’s 
separate offense for such conduct, but omits as redundant of “disarming” the 
current provision’s requirement that the firearm be taken “from the person 
of the peace officer or from an area within the peace officer’s immediate 
presence without the peace officer’s consent.”
 Section 5302(3)(b), like current 5/31-1(a), grades the offense as a Class 
A misdemeanor where it does not include disarming a peace officer. 
 Section 5302(3) omits current 5/31-1(a-5) and (a-7). It is anticipated 
that current 5/31-1(a-5), which sets forth a sentencing rule requiring either 
“48 consecutive hours of imprisonment” or community service, will be 
preserved elsewhere in Illinois law through the “conforming amendments” 
bill to be presented to the General Assembly. The proposed Code’s assault 
offense addresses current 5/31-1(a-7)’s aggravation for cases of resistance 
or obstruction causing bodily harm to a peace officer. See proposed Section 
1201(2)(d) (aggravating grade of assault where victim is peace officer or 
custodial officer).
 255 Section 5302(1) does not displace, however, the Illinois courts’ construction of 
current 5/31-1(a) as not prohibiting “‘mere argument with a policeman about the validity 
of an arrest or other police action, but . . . only some physical act[,] . . . such as going limp, 
forcefully resisting arrest or physically aiding a third party to avoid an arrest.’” People v. Raby, 
240 N.E.2d 595, 599 (Ill. 1968) (quoting Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938, 959 (N.D. Ill. 
1968)) (emphasis added); see also People v. Weathington, 411 N.E.2d 862, 863-64 (Ill. 1980) 
(holding that defendant’s “mere argument” with officer as to when he would answer booking 
questions did not constitute violation).
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Section 5303. Obstructing Administration of Law or Other Government 
 Function
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): Various; see, e.g., 720 ILCS 
5/33C-3; 225 ILCS 650/19(A); 
225 ILCS 735/5(g); 240 ILCS 
40/15-45 (d),(e); 415 ILCS 60/
15(7); 505 ILCS 90/22; 510 ILCS 
5/26(a); 815 ILCS 370/6 
Comment:
 Generally. This provision criminalizes intentionally interfering with 
governmental functions by physical means, breach of an official duty, or an 
unlawful act.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 5303(1) defines the offense 
to cover one who “obstructs, impairs, or perverts the administration of 
law or other governmental function by physical interference or obstacle, 
breach of official duty, or any unlawful act.” Section 5303(1) has no directly 
corresponding provision in current Illinois law, which instead contains 
numerous offenses that variously criminalize “obstructing,” “impeding,” 
“resisting,” “opposing,” “interfering with,” “hindering,” “preventing,” 
“attempting to prevent,” and “refusing to permit” specific governmental 
activities. See, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/33C-3 (investigation of qualifications of 
business requesting certification as minority- or female-owned business); 
225 ILCS 650/19(A) (performance of duties under Meat Poultry and 
Inspection Act); 225 ILCS 735/5(g) (performance of duties under Timber 
Buyers Licensing Act); 240 ILCS 40/15-45(d),(e) (performance of duties 
under Grain Code); 415 ILCS 60/15(7) (performance of duties under 
Pesticide Act); 505 ILCS 90/22 (performance of duties under Insect Pest 
and Plant Disease Act); 510 ILCS 5/26(a) (impeding enforcement of Animal 
Control Act); 815 ILCS 370/6 (performance of duties under Motor Fuel and 
Petroleum Standards Act). By prohibiting such conduct generally, Section 
5303(1) ensures that the offense is defined consistently and eliminates any 
need to define offenses of such limited scope. 
 Section 5303(2) uniformly grades the offense as a Class A misdemeanor. 
Current Illinois law, in contrast, is inconsistent in its grading of corresponding 
current offenses, and variously grades the prohibited conduct as a petty 
offense (e.g., 510 ILCS 5/26(a), noted supra), Class B misdemeanor (e.g., 
505 ILCS 90/22, noted supra), Class A misdemeanor (e.g., 225 ILCS 650/
19, noted supra), or Class 2 felony (e.g., 720 ILCS 5/33C-3, noted supra). 
Current Illinois law’s grading appears to reflect the relative seriousness of 
other offenses that may motivate obstruction; those offenses may be punished 
separately, however, where they are also committed. See proposed Section 
906 and corresponding commentary (increasing defendant’s total authorized 
sentence for each additional offense of conviction).
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 Section 5304. Obstructing Service of Process
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/31-3 
 
Comment:
 Generally. This provision criminalizes resisting or obstructing the 
service and execution of legal processes and court orders. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 5304 is nearly identical to 
current 5/31-3, but has been rephrased to parallel the form of other provisions 
in the proposed Code.
Section 5305. Refusing to Aid an Officer
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/31-8
 
Comment:
 Generally. This provision criminalizes knowingly failing to provide 
reasonable assistance to a peace officer in apprehending a person or 
preventing an offense.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 5305(1) is substantively 
the same as current 5/31-8, but substitutes “when requested” for “upon 
command” and omits “refuses” as redundant of “knowingly fails.” 
 Section 5305(2) increases the offense grade from a petty offense to 
a Class C misdemeanor. Section 5305(2)’s grading reflects the view that 
one who declines to provide assistance that he knows to be reasonable is 
sufficiently blameworthy to warrant a minor jail sentence in appropriate 
cases.
Section 5306. Concealing or Aiding a Fugitive
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/31-5
 
Comment:
 Generally. This provision defines an offense criminalizing harboring, 
aiding, or concealing a fugitive for the purpose of preventing apprehension.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 5306(1)’s offense definition 
is substantively similar to current 5/31-5, but does not impose liability on 
one who “conceals his knowledge that an offense has been committed.” 
Although the meaning of the omitted language is unclear, it appears to 
duplicate proposed Section 5301(1) and current 5/31-4’s offenses for those 
who either furnish false information or, having knowledge material to the 
subject at issue, leave the state or conceal themselves. To the extent that 
current 5/31-5’s omitted language criminalizes conduct that does not amount 
to obstructing justice, however, one who “conceals his knowledge that an 
offense has been committed” is certainly far less blameworthy than one 
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who affirmatively harbors, aids, or conceals an offender for the purpose of 
preventing his apprehension. Section 5306(1) also breaks current 5/31-5’s 
offense definition down into subsections for greater clarity.
 Section 5306(2) grades the offense as a Class 3 felony, whereas current 
5/31-5 grades it as a Class 4 felony. Section 5306(2)’s higher grading 
reflects both the relative blameworthiness of one who harbors, aids, or 
conceals a fugitive for the purpose of preventing his apprehension and the 
relative importance of the governmental operations with which such conduct 
interferes.
Section 5307. Escape; Failure to Report to a Correctional Institution or 
 to Report for Periodic Imprisonment
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/31-6; 730 ILCS 
  5/3-6-4; 730 ILCS 5/5-8A-4.1
 
Comment:
 Generally. This provision criminalizes escaping from custody, failing 
to report to a place of detention or for periodic detention, failing to return 
from release to a place of detention, and failing to abide by the terms of home 
confinement. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 5307(1) consolidates the 
provisions of current 5/31-6(a) through (c-6).256 Section 5307(1)(a) sets out 
three categories of persons who are subject to liability. Section 5307(1)(a)(i) 
 256 Section 5307 also corresponds to current 730 ILCS 5/3-6-4(a) and 5/5-8A-4.1. 
Current 730 ILCS 5/3-6-4(a) defines an “escape” offense applicable only to persons in the 
custody of a correctional institution of the Adult Division. Like Section 5307 and current 5/
31-6(a), current 5/3-6-4(a) provides that “escaping” from such a correctional institution, or an 
employee thereof, is a Class 2 felony, and that failing to return from furlough or work or day 
release is a Class 3 felony.
 Section 5307 differs from current 5/3-6-4(a), however, in four important respects. 
First, Section 5307(1) does not define the offense to prohibit “attempting” escape, as a 
separate General Part provision addresses attempted offenses. See proposed Section 801 and 
corresponding commentary. Second, Section 5307(2) follows current 5/31-6 in recognizing 
whether the offender’s underlying offense was a felony as a relevant grading factor, whereas 
current 5/3-6-4(a)’s silence as to that factor implies that it is irrelevant to persons in the 
custody of the Adult Division. Third, Section 5307(1)(b) and (2), like current 5/31-6(a) and 
(b), specifically address the liability of persons who fail to report to correctional institutions 
or for periodic imprisonment, and grade such failure on a par with failing to return from 
furlough or work or day release; current 5/3-6-4(a), in contrast, is silent as to these matters, and 
presumably (although not definitely) treats failures to report as “escaping.” Finally, Section 
5307(1) omits from the offense definition current 5/3-6-4(a)’s references to holding hostages 
and damaging property during riots. Such conduct is criminalized elsewhere in the proposed 
Code, in Articles 1200, 1400, 2200, and 6100.
 Current 5/5-8A-4.1 merely restates current 5/31-6(a) and (b)’s rules for persons who 
fail to abide by the terms of home confinement.
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provides that the offense applies to one “in penal custody pursuant to a 
conviction or charge for an offense,” and, like current 5/31-6(a) and (b), 
covers persons in correctional institutions, persons required to report to 
correctional institutions or for periodic imprisonment, persons on release 
through furlough or work or day release, and persons subject to home 
confinement.
 Section 5307(1)(a)(ii) is similar to current 5/31-6(c) through (c-6) in 
providing that the offense applies to one in the lawful custody of a peace 
officer, but uses the defined term “penal custody” in lieu of listing the 
particular reasons for such custody.
 Finally, Section 5307(1)(a)(iii) provides that the offense applies to 
one “civilly committed, or detained awaiting civil commitment.” Section 
5307(1)(a)(iii) is substantively similar to current 5/31-6(b-1), but reaches 
persons civilly committed or detained awaiting civil commitment under 
statutes other than the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act. Section 
5307(1)(a)(iii) thus also allows for liability for persons civilly committed 
or detained awaiting civil commitment under the Mental Health and 
Developmental Disabilities Code (405 ILCS 5/1-100 et seq.), Article 104 
of the Code of Criminal Procedure (725 ILCS 5/104-10 et seq.), and the 
Sexually Dangerous Persons Commitment Act (725 ILCS 205/1 et seq.).
 Section 5307(1)(b) specifies four alternative means by which persons 
subject to liability under Section 5307(1)(a) may commit the offense. Section 
5307(1)(b) is substantively similar to current 5/31-6(a) through (c-6), with 
two differences. First, Section 5307(1)(b) uniformly prescribes a culpability 
requirement of knowledge as to its objective elements, whereas the current 
provisions require intent as to “escaping” from a place or person, and 
knowledge as to failing to report, failing to return, and failing to abide by 
the terms of home confinement. Section 5307(1)(b)’s lowered culpability 
requirement with respect to escaping, however, is of little substantive import. 
It would be highly unusual for one to know that he was escaping from a place 
or person, yet not intend to do so.
 Second, Section 5307(1)(b)(ii) differs from current 5/31-6(a) and (b) 
in clarifying that a person required to report to a place of detention or for 
periodic imprisonment is liable only if he fails to report “at the time required” 
rather than “at any time.”
 Section 5307(2)(a) and (b) grade the offense where the underlying 
offense257 is a felony. Section 5307(2)(a) and (b), like current 5/31-6(a), (b-
1), (c), and (c-5), grade the offense as a Class 2 felony where the offender 
“escapes” from a place or person, and as a Class 3 felony where the 
offender fails to report, fails to return, or fails to abide by the terms of home 
confinement.
 257 Section 5307(2) uses the term “underlying offense” to refer to the offense pursuant 
to which the offender was in custody. With respect to persons in the lawful custody of a peace 
officer for an alleged violation of a term or condition of probation, conditional discharge, 
parole, or mandatory supervised release, the “underlying offense” would be the offense 
pursuant to which the term or condition was imposed, rather than the violation itself. 
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 Section 5307(2)(c) grades the offense as a Class 4 felony where the 
underlying offense is a misdemeanor. Current 5/31-6(b), (c), and (c-6), in 
contrast, grade the offense as a Class A misdemeanor where the offender 
“escapes” from a place or person, and as a mere Class B misdemeanor where 
the offender fails to report, fails to return, or fails to abide by the terms of 
home confinement. Section 5307(2)(c)’s higher grading reflects the view that 
the offense — regardless of the means by which it is committed — is more 
serious than other Class A misdemeanors, such as resisting or obstructing 
a peace officer or correctional officer (proposed Section 5302) and theft of 
under $300 (proposed Section 2109(5)).
 Section 5307 omits current 5/31-6(d), which aggravates the offense 
to a Class 1 felony where the offender is armed with a dangerous weapon, 
in recognition of the availability of Section 5309’s offense for possession 
of contraband in a correctional institution as well as anticipated weapons 
offenses in Article 7100.
Section 5308. Permitting Escape
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s):     720 ILCS 5/31-7(f); 5/31A-1.2(d)(2)
 
Comment:
 Generally. This provision defines an offense for correctional employees 
who recklessly permit prisoners in their custody to escape. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 5308 is nearly identical to current 
5/31-7(f), but has been rephrased to parallel the form of other provisions in 
the proposed Code. Section 5308(2)’s definition of “correctional employee” 
is nearly identical to current 5/31A-1.2(d)(2)’s definition of “employee,” but 
clarifies that the term “includes a correctional officer.”258 Section 5308(3), 
like current Illinois law, grades the offense as a Class A misdemeanor.
 Article 5300 omits current 5/31-7’s other provisions, which are covered 
elsewhere in the proposed Code. Proposed Section 301 performs the same 
function as current 5/31-7(a) through (e), (f-5), and (f-6) in imposing liability 
on one who aids or attempts to aid another in escaping, with two differences. 
First, Section 301 requires intent as to the conduct requirement of “aiding” 
another for complicity liability, but makes clear that the substantive offense’s 
culpability requirements are not to be altered by requiring that one aid with 
the “culpability required by the offense.” The omitted provisions in current 5/
31-7, in contrast, impose inconsistent culpability requirements for accomplice 
liability. With respect to the required culpability as to “aiding,” some of the 
current offenses require intent (see 5/31-7(a),(f-5),(f-6)), while others require 
 258 Section 5308(2)’s definition of “correctional employee” would include parole 
and probation officers, insofar as such persons are employees of the governing authority of 
correctional institutions.
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knowledge (see 5/31-7(b)-(e)). Similarly, some of the omitted offenses track 
the culpability requirements of the corresponding substantive offenses in 
current 5/31-6 (see 5/31-6(a); (b) (second clause), (c) (second clause), (f-5) & 
(f-6)), but others lower the corresponding offenses’ culpability requirements 
(see 5/31-6(b) (first clause), (c) (first clause), (d), (e)). 
 Second, Section 301 covers current 5/31-7(a)’s offense for one who 
attempts to aid a prisoner in escaping by giving him something to use 
in escaping, but grades the offense one grade lower than the substantive 
offense for which complicity was attempted, rather than simply as a Class A 
misdemeanor. See proposed Section 301(6) and corresponding commentary. 
This approach enables Section 301 to track Section 5307(2)’s grading 
distinctions in determining the appropriate grade for attempted complicity.
 Section 5308 omits current 5/31-7(g), which aggravates the offense 
to a Class 2 felony where the offender is armed with a dangerous weapon, 
in recognition of the availability of Section 5309’s offense for bringing 
contraband into a correctional institution as well as anticipated weapons 
offenses in Article 7100.
Section 5309. Bringing or Allowing Contraband into a Correctional
 Institution; Possessing Contraband in a Correctional Institution
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/2-14; 5/31A-1.1; 
  5/31A-1.2
Comment:
 Generally. This provision protects the safety and order of correctional 
institutions by criminalizing bringing contraband into a correctional 
institution, placing contraband close enough to a correctional institution that 
an inmate may access it, or possessing contraband. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 5309(1)’s offense definition 
consolidates the prohibitions of current 5/31A-1.1 and 5/31A-1.2. Section 
5309(1) is substantively similar to current 5/31A-1.1 and 5/31A-1.2 in 
requiring that one act “without authority,” with two differences. First, 
Section 5309(1) omits as superfluous the current provisions’ requirements 
that the authority be from “any person designated or authorized to grant 
such authority.” Second, Section 5309(1) uniformly imposes the “without 
authority” requirement as an offense element; current Illinois law, in contrast, 
requires the absence of authority for every means of committing the offense 
except possession of contraband under 5/31A-1.1(b), but provides a special 
affirmative defense for authorized possession under 5/31A-1.1(k).
 Section 5309(1) sets forth three means of committing the offense. 
Section 5309(1)(a) is substantively the same as current 5/31A-1.1(a)(1) in 
criminalizing bringing an item of contraband into a correctional institution, 
but omits current 5/31A-1.2(a)(2)’s offense in light of the availability of 
ILL Code  V II Spc Part_b   305 7/2/03, 1:01:13 PM
306
Proposed Criminal Code Offi cial Commentary — Volume 2
complicity liability under proposed Section 301 for one who “causes another” 
to commit the offense. See proposed Section 301(1)(a) and corresponding 
commentary.
 Section 5309(1)(b) is substantively the same as current 5/31A-1.1(a)(3) 
in providing that the offense is committed where one places contraband “in 
such proximity to a correctional institution as to give an inmate access” 
thereto.
 Section 5309(1)(c) is substantively similar to current 5/31A-1.1(b) and 
5/31A-1.2(b) in allowing for liability for possession of contraband, with 
two modifications. First, Section 5309(1)(c) requires that the defendant 
“knowingly” possess contraband, whereas the current provisions require 
recklessness as to possession and the nature of the item possessed. Cf. 720 
ILCS 5/4-3(b) (imposing “read-in” culpability requirement of recklessness 
where none is otherwise stated).259 Section 5309(1)(c) raises the culpability 
requirement so that possessing contraband is treated the same as other means 
of committing the offense. There is no reason to require knowledge, as 
current law does, as to “bringing” and “placing” contraband, but not as to 
“possessing” it.
 Second, Section 5309(1)(c) omits as unnecessary current 5/31A-1.1(b) 
and 5/31A-1.2(b)’s language stating that liability is appropriate “regardless 
of the intent with which” one possesses contraband.260
 Section 5309(2)(a)’s definition of “correctional institution” is 
substantively the same as current 5/31A-1.1(c)(1)’s definition of “penal 
institution,”261 but omits as unnecessary the current provision’s language 
stating that the term does not include parts of public buildings that are 
unrelated to incarceration or custody. 
 Section 5309(2)(b)’s definitions of the term “item of contraband” and 
of the various types of contraband are substantively similar to current 5/31A-
 259 The Illinois Supreme Court has held, however, that current 5/31A-1.1(b) requires 
knowledge as to possessing contraband. See People v. Farmer, 650 N.E.2d 1006, 1112 (Ill. 
1995) (concluding that provision does not clearly indicate legislative purpose to impose 
absolute liability and holding that “knowledge is the appropriate mental state”). The Court’s 
construction of current 5/31A-1.1(b) in Farmer is premised on a misreading of current 5/4-3(b) 
that the proposed Code deliberately rejects. See commentary for proposed Section 205(3).
 260 The current provisions’ language appears designed to clarify that the offense does 
not require that the defendant possess contraband with the intent to do something with it, such 
as committing a criminal act or delivering it to another. Section 5309(1)(c)’s omission of this 
language, of course, does not imply an invitation to read such a requirement into the offense 
definition.
 261 Section 5309(2)(a)’s definition of “correctional institution” also corresponds to, and 
substantively similar to, current 5/2-14’s definition of “penal institution.” The definition used 
in Section 5309(2)(a) and current 5/31A-1.1(c)(1) covers all the institutions in 5/2-14, but uses 
broader catch-all language. 
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1.1(c)(2) and 5/31A-1.2(d)(4)’s definitions,262 but 5309(2)(b)(iii) uses the 
defined term “catastrophic agent” in place of the narrower “explosive” and 
5309(2)(b)(vi) uses the defined term “dangerous weapon” in place of “knife, 
dagger, dirk, billy, razor, [or] stiletto.” See proposed Section 1501(4)(a) 
(defining “dangerous weapon”); proposed Section 2204(1)(b) (defining 
“catastrophic agent”).
 Section 5309(3)(a) separates the offense under 5309(1)(a) through (c) 
into four offense grades ranging from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class 2 
felony. Current 5/31A-1.1(d) through (j), in contrast, separate the offense 
into five offense grades ranging from a Class 4 felony to a Class X felony. 
Section 5309(3)(a)(i) is structurally similar to current 5/31A-1.1(j), but 
grades the offense as a Class 2 felony rather than a Class X felony where the 
contraband involved is a firearm,263 stun gun, or taser;264 firearm ammunition; 
or an explosive.265 Section 5309(3)(a)(i)’s grading recognizes that, although 
the presence of such deadly weapons in correctional institutions is harmful, 
the criminalized conduct is inherently much less serious than other Class X 
 262 Current Chapter 720 provides two different definitions of “firearm ammunition.” 
Section 5309(2)(b)(ii) tracks current law’s special definition for the offense of contraband 
appearing in current 5/31A-1.1(c)(vii), but omits that definition’s explicit inclusion of 
particular kinds of firearm ammunition as superfluous. Section 5309(2)(b)(ii) declines to track 
current 5/2-7.1’s general definition — which, by incorporating 430 ILCS 65/1.1’s definition by 
reference, explicitly excludes the types of “firearm ammunition” included by 5/31A-1.1(c)(vii) 
— which current Illinois law uses only to define offenses not included in the proposed Code.
 263 Because Section 5309(2)(b)(i) includes only a “firearm, stun gun, or taser,” this 
grading provision would not include any “gun not ordinarily used as a weapon,” as defined 
in Section 1501(4)(d). Current 5/31A-1.1(c)(2)(vi) and 5/31A-1.2(d)(4)(vi), on the other 
hand, include such guns within their definitions of “firearm.” Those definitions, however, are 
unique to the contraband offenses and differ from the standard definitions of “firearm” used 
everywhere else in the current Criminal Code. See 720 ILCS 5/2-7.1, -7.5.
 Section 5309 declines to create a different and unique definition of “firearm” solely 
for the contraband provision, or to provide for enhanced punishment for possession of a non-
“firearm” gun relative to other weapons. It would be extremely rare that such a gun — that is, 
one falling only within the more expansive definition, such as a rivet gun or pneumatic gun 
— would be found as contraband in a prison. And in any event, under the definition in Section 
1501(4)(a), any such gun would constitute a “dangerous weapon” and would therefore fall 
within Section 5309(2)(b)(vi). The corresponding grade, Class 3 felony, for possession or 
introduction of such a gun reflects its somewhat diminished level of dangerousness relative to 
a typical firearm.
 264 Although “stun guns” and “tasers” also fit within the general definition of 
“dangerous weapon,” see proposed Section 1501(4)(d), and would accordingly otherwise fall 
under Section 5309(2)(b)(vi), their specific inclusion within Section 5309(2)(b)(i) is meant to 
make clear that the aggravated penalty applies to those specific dangerous weapons. Unlike 
other non-firearm guns, these weapons are likely to appear as contraband and present a serious 
danger if placed in inmates’ hands.
 265 Section 5309(2)(b)(iii) uses the term “catastrophic agent” in place of “explosive,” 
which is a particular type of “catastrophic agent” under Section 2204(1)(b)’s definition. 
Section 5309(3)(a)(i)’s grading category is therefore broader than that in current 5/31A-
1.1(j), insofar as it includes catastrophic agents that are not explosives. See proposed Section 
2204(1)(b) and corresponding commentary. 
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offenses, such as second-degree murder and knowingly causing a catastrophe. 
By grading the most serious violations of Section 5309(1)(a) through (1)(c) 
as Class 2 felonies, Section 5309(3)(a)(i) ensures that the offense is never 
graded higher than a Class 1 felony after Section 5309(3)(b)’s aggravation 
for correctional employees. This “ceiling” for contraband offenses reflects 
the view that Class X grading should be reserved for only the most serious 
offenses.
 Section 5309(3)(a)(ii) applies where the contraband involved is defined 
in Section 5309(2)(b)(iv) through (b)(ix). Section 5309(3)(a)(ii) corresponds 
to current 5/31A-1.1(f) through (i), but does not track the current grading 
distinction between the various schedules of controlled substances and 
grades the offense as a Class 3 felony rather than a Class 1 or Class 2 felony. 
Section 5309(3)(a)(ii)’s grading follows the current provisions in recognizing 
that such contraband is less harmful than the items governed by (3)(a)(i), 
but also recognizes that one who brings in a tool that a felon may eventually 
use to escape from a correctional institution should not be punished more 
severely than a felon who actually escapes. Cf. proposed Section 5307(2)(a) 
(grading escape of felon as Class 2 felony); current 5/31-6 (same).
 Section 5309(3)(a)(iii) applies where the contraband involved is 
cannabis. Section 5309(3)(a)(iii) is functionally similar to current 5/31A-
1.1(e) in recognizing that this form of the offense is less serious than 
violations subject to 5309(3)(a)(ii), but grades it as a Class 4 felony rather 
than a Class 3 felony.
 Section 5309(3)(a)(iv) provides that the offense is a Class A 
misdemeanor where alcohol is involved, whereas current 5/31A-1.1(d) 
grades such a violation as a Class 4 felony. 
 Section 5309(3)(b) requires a one-grade aggravation for a correctional 
employee who commits a Section 5309 offense. Current 5/31A-1.2(e), in 
contrast, attempts to aggravate the grade of the offense where an employee is 
either responsible for contraband being brought into a correctional institution 
under 5/31A-1.2(a) or possesses contraband in violation of 5/31A-1.2(b). 
Because both current 5/31A-1.2(a) and (b) impose liability only with respect 
to alcohol, drugs, and hypodermic syringes, however,266 the effect of current 
5/31A-1.2(e)’s grading rules for “violations” of those provisions involving 
other types of contraband is questionable; Section 5309(3)(b) makes clear 
that aggravation is appropriate for an employee responsible for any kind of 
contraband being brought into a correctional institution. 
 266 Because its provisions apply generally to employees as well as non-employees, 
Section 5309 provides for employee liability regardless of the type of contraband involved, 
whereas current 5/31A-1.2(a) imposes liability only with respect to alcohol, drugs, and 
hypodermic syringes. Section 5309(1)(d)’s broader scope recognizes that bringing other types 
of contraband — especially weapons, explosives, and tools to defeat security mechanisms — 
inherently presents risks to the maintenance of security and order in correctional institutions. 
Section 5309(1) nevertheless ensures that only blameworthy persons are within the offense’s 
reach by requiring that the defendant act “without authority.”
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 Section 5309(3)(b) does not track current 5/31A-1.2(f)’s further 
aggravation where an employee is culpable with respect to the delivery of 
contraband to an inmate. The omission of this additional grading distinction 
(which current 5/31A-1.1 also declines to recognize with respect to non-
employees) reflects the view that Section 5309(3)(b) provides sufficient 
punishment in grading the most serious form of the offense as a Class 1 
felony. 
 Finally, Section 5309 omits current 5/31A-1.1(l), 5/31A-1.1(m), and 
5/31A-1.2(g). Current 5/31A-1.1(l)’s affirmative defense for a person who 
brings contraband into a correctional institution “as a direct and immediate 
result of his arrest” is covered by the proposed Code’s general rule governing 
when possession may be deemed an act. See proposed Section 204(3) and 
corresponding commentary. Current 5/31A-1.1(m) and 5/31A-1.2(g) merely 
reiterate regulatory rules stated elsewhere regarding the retention and 
disposition of confiscated items.
Section 5310. Intimidating, Improperly Influencing, or Retaliating
 Against a Public Servant, Witness, Juror, or Voter
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/12-9; 5/32-4; 5/32-4a; 
10 ILCS 5/29-4; 10 ILCS 5/29-20; 
see also 720 ILCS 5/32-4d
 
Comment:
 Generally. This offense criminalizes performing certain conduct that 
harmfully interferes with the duties of public servants, witnesses, jurors, and 
voters. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 5310 consolidates several 
current offenses criminalizing efforts to intimidate, influence, or retaliate 
against particular persons performing public functions. Section 5310(1)(a) 
requires that the defendant act with intent to (i) influence a juror or public 
servant; (ii) deter a party or witness from testifying freely, fully, or truthfully; 
or (iii) annoy, harass, intimidate, or victimize a current or former public 
servant, witness, juror, or voter because of conduct related to the performance 
of the victim’s duties. Section 5310(1)(a)’s alternative culpability 
requirements together cover the improper motives addressed by the current 
offenses in 5/12-9 (threatening public officials), 5/32-4 (communicating with 
jurors and witnesses), 5/32-4a (harassing jurors and witnesses), 10 ILCS 5/
29-4 (prevention of voting), and 10 ILCS 5/29-20 (intimidation of voter by 
absentee ballot).267
 267 A related offense, current 5/32-4d, covers payments to jurors “[a]fter a verdict has 
been rendered.” Section 5310 does not cover current 5/32-4d, as the current provision does not 
require any objective of improperly influencing the proceeding, and appears aimed only at the 
appearance of impropriety. It is expected that current 5/32-4d will be preserved and moved 
outside the Code by means of a conforming amendment.
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 Section 5310(1)(b) sets forth three alternative means by which the 
offense’s objective elements may be committed: (1) committing, or threatening, 
an offense “likely to cause great bodily harm, unlawful confinement or 
restraint, or substantial property damage to another”; (2) committing or 
threatening any other offense; or (3) improperly communicating with the 
public servant, witness, juror, or voter. Section 5310(1)(b) is substantively 
similar to the current offenses’ requirements, with two minor differences.
 First, Section 5310(1)(b) omits some less serious, or very particular, 
conduct covered by the current provisions. Section 5310(1)(b) does not 
incorporate current 5/32-4(b)’s language allowing for liability where the 
defendant merely communicates “false information” to a party or witness. 
The omission of this language reflects the view that communicating false 
information is not as serious, even if the person doing so acts with the 
intent required by 5310(1)(a), as performing the other conduct covered by 
Section 5310(1)(b).268 Section 5310(1)(b) also does not incorporate current 
5/32-4a(b)’s language criminalizing communicating with certain legal 
representatives of children “in such manner as to produce mental anguish or 
emotional distress,” as nearly any significantly harmful communication of 
this type would fall under Section 5310(1)(b)(i) or (ii).
 Second, Section 5310(1)(b) does not cover particular means of 
influencing the performance of public duties that are already addressed by 
other provisions. For example, Section 5310(1)(b) omits current 5/32-4(b)’s 
reference to one who “offers or delivers or threatens to withhold . . . [a] thing 
of value” with the intent to influence testimony, as such conduct is covered by 
the proposed bribery offense. See proposed Section 5101 and corresponding 
commentary. 
 Section 5310(2) grades the offense as a Class 2, Class 3, or Class 4 
felony, depending on the means by which it is committed. Section 5310(2)’s 
grading is generally in keeping with the corresponding current provisions, 
which grade threatening jurors as a Class 2 felony (5/32-4a(a)), threatening 
public officials as a Class 3 felony (5/12-9), and communicating with a juror 
as a Class 4 felony (5/32-4(a)). Section 5310(2) also grades the most serious 
form of the offense as a Class 2 felony in recognition of its close resemblance 
to bribing a witness — which both proposed Section 5101(3) and current 
5/33-1 grade as a Class 2 felony. 
 268 Where the defendant engages in the more serious conduct of communicating false 
information with the objective of causing another to commit perjury, however, liability for 
perjury or attempted perjury may be appropriate. See proposed Sections 301(5), 801, and 5201 
and corresponding commentary. 
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Section 5311. Failure to Appear
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/32-10; 725 ILCS 
  5/110-2
 
Comment:
 Generally. This offense applies to a defendant who has been released 
from custody and later fails to appear in court as required or violates a 
condition of his release. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 5311 consolidates the 
prohibitions of current 5/32-10 and 725 ILCS 5/110-2, which contain 
separate failure-to-appear offenses for persons admitted to bail and persons 
released on personal recognizance. Section 5311(1)’s offense definition is 
substantively similar to the current provisions, with three differences. 
 First, Section 5311(1) imposes a culpability requirement of 
recklessness as to the objective elements set forth in (1)(a) and (1)(b). 
See proposed Section 205(3) (imposing “read-in” culpability requirement 
of recklessness where none is otherwise stated). Current Illinois law, in 
contrast, inconsistently requires recklessness as to failing appear on the date 
directed under 5/32-10(a) and 5/110-2, and as to violating the conditions 
of release under 5/32-10(a-5) (cf. 720 ILCS 5/4-3(b) (imposing “read-in” 
culpability requirement of recklessness where none is otherwise stated)), but 
knowledge as to violating the terms of a release under current 5/32-10(b). 
Section 5311(1)’s culpability requirement reduces the risk of liability being 
precluded by prefabricated excuses for failure to appear (such as “forgetting” 
the time or date), while avoiding liability for those who have failed to appear 
for legitimate reasons (such as not being notified of a change to the time or 
date).
 Second, Section 5311(1)(a) is substantively the same as current 5/110-
2 in providing that the offense is committed where the defendant fails to 
appear when required, and omits current 5/32-10(a)’s additional requirement 
that the defendant subsequently “fail[] to surrender himself within 30 days” 
of forfeiting his bail. Section 5311(1)(a) tracks current 5/110-2’s definition 
of the offense rather than 5/32-10(a)’s in recognition of the harmfulness 
of failing to make a required appearance, and reflects the view that the 
defendant’s forfeiture of his bail does not make him any less blameworthy. 
 Third, Section 5311(1)(b) is substantively similar to current 5/32-10(a-
5) and (c), but allows for liability for any violation of a condition of release, 
regardless of whether the defendant is released upon payment of bail security 
or on his own recognizance. Current 5/32-10(a-5) and (c), in contrast, apply 
only to specific violations committed by persons admitted to bail. Section 
5311(1)(b)’s broader scope ensures that those admitted to bail and those 
released on personal recognizance are treated the same, and also serves to 
more generally protect the integrity of the release system.
 Section 5311(2) is similar to current 5/32-10(a) and 5/110-2 in grading 
the offense one grade lower than the defendant’s underlying offense. Section 
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5311(2) differs from the current provisions, however, in limiting the offense 
to a Class A misdemeanor. Although the seriousness of the defendant’s 
underlying offense is relevant to the seriousness of his failure to appear or 
violation of another term of his release, Section 5311(2)’s lower grading 
reflects the view that a maximum term of one year in prison sufficiently 
punishes the harm of this independent offense.
 Section 5311 omits current 5/32-10(c) and (d). Current 5/32-10(c)’s 
procedural rule requiring the appearance of certain persons before bail is 
set belongs elsewhere, and it is anticipated that it will be preserved through 
a “conforming amendments” bill to be presented with the proposed Code. 
Section 5311 omits current 5/32-10(d)’s first sentence, clarifying that the 
offense does not affect the courts’ power to punish contempt, as unnecessary 
in light of proposed Section 104’s preservation of civil remedies. Section 
5311 omits current 5/32-10(d)’s second sentence, under which sentences 
for violations of the current provision are to be served consecutively to 
the underlying offense, insofar the proposed Code deliberately rejects the 
usual version of consecutive sentencing for multiple offenses. See proposed 
Section 906 and corresponding commentary.
Section 5312. Definitions
 
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 235 ILCS 5/1-3.05; 720 ILCS 5/
2-7.1; 5/2-7.5; 5/2-13; 5/2-14; 5/
15-1; 5/31-1(b); 5/31A-1.1(c); 5/
31A-1.2(d); 550/3(a); 570/102(f); 
740 ILCS 147/10
 
Comment:
 Generally. This provision collects defined terms used in Article 5300 
and provides cross-references to the provisions in which they are defined. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. For discussion of the relationship 
between Article 5300’s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary 
for the provision in which the term in question is initially defined.
General Comment Regarding Current Law:
 In addition to the current provisions noted above, Chapter 720 includes 
four offenses — treason (5/30-1), misprision of treason (5/30-2), advocating 
the overthrow of government (5/30-3), and compounding a crime (5/32-1) 
— that the proposed Code omits for policy reasons. Current 5/30-1 to 5/30-3 
apply where one “[l]evies war” against Illinois, “[a]dheres to the enemies” 
of Illinois, or advocates violently overthrowing or reforming the government 
of Illinois. Any truly blameworthy conduct covered by such offenses would 
merit liability under the nearly identical offenses included in the Federal 
ILL Code  V II Spc Part_b   312 7/2/03, 1:01:18 PM
313
Part II: Defi nition of Specifi c Offenses
Criminal Code. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2381 (treason), 2382 (misprision of 
treason), 2385 (advocating overthrow of government. 
 Article 5300 omits current 5/32-1’s petty offense of “compounding 
a crime” because it is inconsistent with policy judgments reflected in the 
criminal law generally. The offense of compounding a crime is thought to 
have utility, if at all, to the extent that it encourages victims to report crimes. 
As a general matter, however, Illinois — like the overwhelming majority 
of other jurisdictions — does not criminalize a victim’s failure to report an 
offense. The fact that the victim has received or been offered consideration 
does not necessarily make his failure to prosecute any more harmful, 
insofar as the consideration involved may constitute a good-faith attempt 
to compensate the victim for the harm of the offense. Any sensible effort 
to criminalize compounding a crime would therefore provide an affirmative 
defense for restitution or indemnification. Article 5300 opts to omit the 
offense and avoid the considerable complexity that would be introduced by 
having an affirmative defense to a mere petty offense.
 Article 5300 also omits the Aircraft Crash Parts Act, which addresses 
narrow regulatory issues that properly belong outside the Criminal Code. See 
720 ILCS 205/0.01 et seq.
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ARTICLE 6100. PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY OFFENSES
Section 6101. Riot
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/25-1; see also 720 
  ILCS 5/21.2-1 to -6
Commentary:
 Generally. This provision defines an offense to prevent groups of 
people from assembling for an unlawful purpose in a way that threatens the 
public peace. Although the offenses of conspiracy, attempt, and disorderly 
conduct limit the need to define a distinct offense to cover the riot offense’s 
elements of creating a public disturbance and collaboration toward a criminal 
end, the separate offense of riot is included to reflect the greater threat or 
danger posed by disorderly conduct on the part of a larger group. In addition 
to creating greater public alarm, mob behavior (as opposed to individual 
disorderly conduct) poses special problems for law enforcement officials.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 6101 is similar to current 5/25-
1, with several important differences. Section 6101 specifically incorporates 
by reference the elements of the offense of disorderly conduct. To be liable 
for the offense of riot, the defendant and others must have engaged in some 
form of conduct prohibited in proposed Section 6103(1). The specific conduct 
elements incorporated from Section 6103 replace the vague requirement in 
current 5/25-1(a)(1) that the defendant disturb the “public peace.” (See 
proposed Section 6103 and corresponding commentary.)
 Section 6101 requires the participation of three persons before a course 
of disorderly conduct elevates to the offense of riot, while current 5/25-1 
requires the involvement of only two persons. Although either number 
requirement is somewhat arbitrary, the requirement of three persons better 
distinguishes between group and individual behavior and establishes a more 
likely point at which behavior by multiple actors would increase potential 
risks and become difficult to control.
 In addition, Section 6101 modifies the circumstances under which 
group disorderly conduct will rise to the level of a riot. Section 6101(1)(a) 
requires that the actor intend to commit, or facilitate the commission of, a 
felony or misdemeanor. This subsection covers the conduct prohibited in 
current 5/25-1(a)(1) to (3), but without raising the constitutional concerns 
raised by current 5/25-1(a)(2).269 Section 6101(1)(b) requires that the actor 
 269 In Landry v. Daley, 280 F. Supp. 938, 955 (N.D. Ill. 1968), a three-judge panel held 
5/25-1(a)(2) facially invalid as vague and overbroad under the First Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. The court perpetually enjoined and restrained the State and the City 
of Chicago from bringing or enforcing prosecutions under the law. Id. In People v. Nance, 
724 N.E.2d 889, 891 (Ill. 2000), the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that the injunction was 
(continued…)
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intend to prevent or coerce official action. This subsection provides a basis 
for liability in cases where the participants may not intend to commit any 
crime, but intend to turn an otherwise lawful protest into a riot through the 
use of forbidden means (e.g., fighting, threatening, or unreasonable noise).
 Section 6101(2) removes the grading distinction in current 5/25-1, 
which grades the offense as a Class 4 felony if it involves “use of force or 
violence disturbing the public peace” and a Class C misdemeanor otherwise, 
and punishes any case of riot as a Class 4 felony. All situations falling within 
the proposed offense create a significant disturbance of the peace and threat 
of mayhem or injury.
 Section 6101 does not cover current 5/25-1(e), as the conduct that 
provision prohibits is now defined as a separate offense in proposed Section 
6102. Section 6101 eliminates current 5/25-1(f), as that provision addresses 
matters that more properly belong in the Code of Corrections.270
Section 6102. Failure to Disperse
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/25-1(e)
 Generally. This provision establishes an offense in situations where a 
group of three or more persons engaged in a course of disorderly conduct 
likely to cause substantial harm, inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm fail to 
disperse upon order by law enforcement authorities.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 6102 corresponds to current 
5/25-1(e). The proposed provision is somewhat more expansive than the 
current provision in that it might warrant liability even when it cannot be 
proven that the offenders were particpating in a “mob action” or “riot” 
before being ordered to disperse. Section 6102 instead requires a “course of 
disorderly conduct likely to cause substantial harm or serious inconvenience,” 
thereby eliminating the unlawful-intent requirements of the mob action or 
riot offense. 
 Moreover, Section 6102(1) covers orders to disperse given by any 
law enforcement authority, and not just peace officers, as under current 
5/25-1. The proposed change recognizes that State’s Attorneys, the Attorney 
General’s office, and other such authorities may be involved in the process of 
controlling a crowd.
still in effect and refused to overturn the federal court’s ruling stating that the federal courts 
were the proper forum to challenge the injunction. The Landry court had found the section 
invalid because it could apply to persons who merely intended to commit a civil or regulatory 
offense and was not limited to criminal ordinances. Section 6101(1)(a) avoids this concern by 
requiring an intent to commit a felony or misdemeanor. 
 270 Current 5/25-1.1, creating an offense of unlawful contact with streetgang members, 
also has not been incorporated into Section 6101, as it addresses parole violation issues that 
are more properly addressed in the Code of Corrections.
 269 (…continued)
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 As under current 5/25-1(e), the proposed offense is graded as a Class A 
misdemeanor.
 Section 6103. Disorderly Conduct
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/26-1(a)(1)
Comment:
 Generally. This provision creates an offense to cover situations where 
people recklessly engage in public conduct that is likely to cause public 
inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 6103 corresponds to current 
5/26-1, but differs in four significant ways. First, Section 6103(1) specifically 
expands the offense to cases where the defendant “recklessly creat[es] a risk” 
of public disorder. The commentary for the 1961 Code reveals a similar 
intention on the part of the drafters, stating that the offense was meant to 
reach unreasonable conduct that the defendant “knew or should have known 
would tend to disturb, alarm or provoke others.” 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/
26-1, Committee Comments — 1961, at 337 (West 1993). However, because 
that intention was not specifically stated in the text of that statute, the Illinois 
courts have refused to find defendants guilty of the offense unless their acts 
actually caused a public disturbance. See, e.g., People v. Trester, 421 N.E.2d 
959, 960 (Ill. App. 1981) (finding “the prohibited conduct must actually bring 
about a breach of the peace and not merely tend to do so as the comments 
indicate”); cf. People v. Albert, 611 N.E.2d 567, 569 (Ill. App. 1993) (finding 
defendant guilty where defendant “knew or should have known” that her 
shouting in the street at 2 a.m. on a workday would disturb the public).
 Second, Section 6103(1) eliminates the phrase “breach of the peace,” an 
early common-law term that Illinois courts have acknowledged “defies easy 
definition.” People v. Allen, 680 N.E.2d 795, 798 (Ill. App. 1997). Section 
6103(1) replaces “breach of the peace” with the more specific requirement 
that the person cause, or create a risk of, “public inconvenience, annoyance, 
or alarm.”
 Third, Section 6103(1) sets out specific types of conduct prohibited by 
the offense. Current 5/26-1 prohibits a person from performing “any act in 
such unreasonable manner” as to provoke a breach of the peace. Such a broad 
definition of the prohibited conduct leaves the offense susceptible to differing 
interpretations by the courts. Compare City of Chicago v. Morris, 264 N.E.2d 
1, 3-4 (Ill. 1970) (finding defendant violated the City’s disorderly conduct 
statute, which was identical to current 5/26-1, when he got into an argument 
with police officers in a “loud,” but “reasonable,” tone of voice as a crowd 
of people gathered), with People v. Douglas, 331 N.E.2d 359, 363 (Ill. App. 
1975) (finding defendant not guilty of disorderly conduct where defendant 
screamed obscenities loudly at police officers as a crowd looked on). In 
contrast, Section 6103(1) requires that the offender: (a) engage in fighting, 
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threatening, or violent or tumultuous behavior; (b) make unreasonable noise, 
an offensively coarse utterance, gesture, or display, or address abusive 
language to any person present; or (c) create any hazardous or physically 
offensive condition that fails to serve a legitimate purpose.271
 Fourth, Section 6103 clarifies current law by requiring that the 
prohibited conduct cause a “public” disturbance. Section 6103(2) defines 
a “public” disturbance as one that is “likely to affect persons in a place to 
which the general populace or a substantial group has access,” including 
“highways, transport facilities, schools, prisons, apartment houses, places of 
business or amusement, or any neighborhood.” Current law provides no such 
definition, and courts have sometimes applied the offense to disturbances 
that are not meaningfully “public.” See People v. Davis, 413 N.E.2d 413, 
415-16 (Ill. 1980) (finding that defendant committed disorderly conduct 
when he harassed an 81-year-old woman and another inside woman’s home). 
Such private conduct is more properly be covered by trespass or harassment 
offenses. See proposed Sections 2303 and 6105 and corresponding 
commentaries.
 Section 6103 further streamlines and clarifies the offense by removing 
eleven subsections of current 5/26-1 that cover cases involving false alarms, 
false reports, harassment, and peeping Toms. Each of those situations are 
covered under separate offenses in the proposed Code.272
 Finally, Section 6103(3) slightly alters the offense’s grading scheme to 
take into account the relative seriousness of the public disruption. Current 
5/26-1(b) grades all breaches of the peace as Class C misdemeanors. Section 
6103(3) provides a grade of Class B misdemeanor for the more serious cases 
where the actor intends to cause serious harm or inconvenience or creates 
a persistent disruption. Otherwise, disorderly conduct is graded as a petty 
offense.
 271 The proposed Code eliminates current Article 47, which covers various forms 
of public nuisance. Much of this conduct is covered by proposed Sections 2206 (criminal 
damage), 6103(1)(c) (disorderly conduct), 6105 (harassment), and 6109 (obstructing 
highways and other public passages). Beyond the conduct covered by the proposed offenses, 
current Article 47 appears to reach conduct that may be bothersome, but lacks the significant 
harm or blameworthy purpose normally associated with criminal liability. Accordingly, such 
conduct is more properly addressed through private tort remedies than criminal offenses.
 272 The false alarm and report offenses, subsections (a)(2) through (4) and (a)(7) through 
(12), are covered by proposed Sections 5204, 5208, and 6104. The peeping Tom offense, 
subsection (a)(5), is covered by proposed Section 2403. The collection agency harassment 
offense, subsection (a)(6), is covered by proposed Section 6105.
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Section 6104. False Public Alarms
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/26-1(a)(2) to (4), (7), 
  (9), (11), (12)
Comment:
 Generally. Section 6104 creates a general offense covering situations 
where a person spreads a false report of an impending bomb, crime, or 
catastrophe that is likely to cause major public inconvenience or alarm.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 6104 corresponds to current 
5/26-1(a)(2) to (4), (7), (9), (11), and (12). Current law addresses false public 
alarms with seven separate subsections — all defined within the general 
disorderly conduct offense — addressing various specific fact patterns, 
requiring different elements, and imposing different penalties. Section 6104 
replaces all those specific subsections with a general and separate offense 
covering any type of false public alarm.273
 Section 6104(2) grades the offense as a Class A misdemeanor. Penalties 
under current law for the various 5/26-1(a) offenses range from Class B 
misdemeanor to Class 3 felony. There appears to be no justification for 
distinguishing between, for example, a false public report of a fire (currently 
a Class 4 felony under (a)(2)), a false report of a bomb or deadly substance 
(currently a Class 3 felony under (a)(3)), or a different form of false report 
to a public safety agency (currently a Class A misdemeanor, under (a)(11)), 
as all are likely to cause similar levels of public inconvenience and alarm. 
Moreover, when compared to other Class 3 felony offenses in current law, 
such as aggravated battery (current 5/12-4) or involuntary manslaughter 
(current 5/9-3), a Class 3 felony grade for this offense seems disproportionate 
to the harm caused.274
 273 Although similar, Section 6104 addresses a different harm than proposed Sections 
5204 and 5208. Sections 5204 and 5208 address the disruption and interference with the 
ordinary operations of the government resulting from a false report to a law enforcement 
agency or public safety organization, regardless of whether such a report tends to cause public 
inconvenience or alarm. Section 6104 is concerned with the direct disruptive effect of false 
reports on the general public, rather than the harm to the government agencies themselves 
(which indirectly harms the people those agencies serve).
 274 Although, in some situations, Section 6104’s proposed penalty is lower than current 
law, an offender may also be liable for other offenses — under proposed Sections 5204 or 5208 
or other provisions — thus increasing his total criminal liability. (See proposed Section 906 
and corresponding commentary.) For example, a false report of a bomb that was transmitted 
to a public safety and/or law enforcement agency and also caused a public disturbance would 
constitute at least two offenses.
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Section 6105. Harassment
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 135/1 to /2 
Comment:
 Generally. Section 6105 addresses various forms of conduct that harass 
another but otherwise would not constitute any criminal offense.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 6105 corresponds to current 
135/1 to 135/2.275 Like current law, Section 6105 describes a variety of 
prohibited conduct that, when engaged in with the intent to harass, constitutes 
a criminal offense. Section 6105 differs from current law in that it defines one 
general offense to cover various forms of harassment, as opposed to the three 
specific offenses defined in current 135/1 to 135/1-2.
 Section 6105(1)(a), (b), and (c) cover the conduct prohibited by 
current 135/1 to 135/1-2.276 Section 6105(1)(a), covering a single phone 
call or communication made without the intent to engage in legitimate 
communication, addresses the typical obscene phone call. 
 Section 6105(1)(b) expands the harassment offense to include behavior 
often referred to as “fighting words.” Unlike the current harassment offenses, 
such insults, taunts, or challenges need not be communicated via the phone 
or other electronic means. However, the insult, taunt, or challenge must be 
directed to a particular person or group and must be sufficiently offensive to 
raise a probability of physical retaliation. 
 Section 6105(1)(c) prohibits repeated communications, made 
anonymously, at extremely inconvenient hours, or in offensively course 
language. Subsection (c) applies even if there is an ostensibly legitimate 
purpose for the communications. For example, a relentless debt collector 
would face liability if he repeatedly called during late hours or used 
offensively course language with the intent to harass a person into repaying 
a debt. 
 275 Current 5/17-5.5 defines a similar, but narrow, harassment-based regulatory offense 
of “unlawful attempt to collect compensated debt against a crime victim.” Section 6105 
does not directly correspond to that provision; rather, it is anticipated that, by means of the 
“conforming amendments” legislation to be enacted with the proposed Code, the 5/17-5.5 
offense would be preserved in Illinois law as part of the Crime Victims Compensation Act, 740 
ILCS 45/1 et seq.
 276 Several sections from the current provisions, which are not part of the offense 
definitions, have been eliminated. Current 135/1-1(5), providing for accomplice liability, 
has been eliminated because such liability is governed by the general accountability rules in 
proposed Section 301. The requirement at the end of current 135/1-1 that warnings be posted 
in all telephone directories has been removed, as it properly belongs outside the Code. Current 
135/1-3, which allows certain evidence of a person’s intent to harass, properly belongs in the 
Code of Criminal Procedure. Current 135/1-4, discussing psychiatric examinations, addresses 
an issue properly addressed in the Code of Corrections.
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 Section 6105(1)(d), which has no directly corresponding provision 
in current law,277 acts as a catchall provision covering a range of harassing 
conduct not already covered by the other subsections. The proposed 
provision covers any type of alarming conduct made with the intent to harass 
and serving no legitimate purpose of the actor. For example, the section 
might be used to impose liability for a cross burning, or leaving a carcass or 
foul-smelling trash on a neighbor’s front lawn, or repeatedly aiming a laser 
pointer at a peace officer, see 720 ILCS 5/24.6-20.
  Section 6105(2)(a) aggravates the offense to a Class A misdemeanor 
where the harassing conduct violates an order of protection. That aggravation, 
with proposed Sections 1201(2)(b)(iv) and 1204(2)(a) (q.v.), addresses the 
conduct prohibited in current 5/12-30. Section 6105(2)(b), like current 135/
2(a), grades the base harassment offense as a Class B misdemeanor.
 Section 6105 does not incorporate the specific grade adjustments for 
subsequent offenses found in current 135/2, because the proposed Code 
already provides a general aggravation for recidivism. See proposed Section 
905(1) and corresponding commentary.
Section 6106. Hate Crime Aggravation
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/12-7.1
Comment:
 Generally. This provision defines a distinct offense to cover the 
independent harm that results when an offense is committed with the intent 
to intimidate or otherwise harass a specific minority group.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 6106 is similar to current 5/12-
7.1, but defines the offense in terms of its resulting harm — the intimidation 
of the affected group — rather than the subjective mental state or motivation 
of the offender. 
 277 As discussed supra note 271, this provision covers some of the conduct prohibited in 
the current nuisance offenses in Article 47. However, unlike current law, the proposed provision 
only prohibits the conduct if the actor engages in the conduct with the intent to harass another 
and the conduct serves no legitimate purpose. Any conduct proscribed in current Article 47 
that would fall outside the proposed offenses because of the actor’s lack of culpability is more 
properly addressed outside the Criminal Code. Therefore, it is anticipated that these provisions 
will be moved elsewhere through “conforming amendments” legislation.
 Similarly, the provisions in current 5/17-5 (deceptive collection practices) mostly deal 
with conduct properly addressed outside the Criminal Code.
ILL Code  V II Spc Part_b   320 7/2/03, 1:01:24 PM
321
Part II: Defi nition of Specifi c Offenses
 Section 6106(2) grades the offense as a Class A misdemeanor, whereas 
5/12-7.1 grades the offense as a Class 4 felony. However, Section 6106(1) 
states that it defines “an additional offense” to make explicitly clear that an 
offender may be found liable for both the underlying offense and the Section 
6106 offense, which is likely to lead to greater total liability than would be 
available under the current provision. See proposed Sections 254 and 906 and 
corresponding commentary.
Section 6107. Public Drunkenness; Drug Incapacitation
Corresponding Current Provision(s): None
Comment:
 Generally. This provision addresses persons who appear in any public 
place in an obviously intoxicated state to the degree that they may endanger 
themselves, property, or others, or annoy persons in their vicinity.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 6107 has no directly 
corresponding provision in current law. Under current law, drunk and 
disorderly persons have been convicted under the disorderly conduct offense 
(current 5/26-1). See, e.g., People v. Duncan, 631 N.E.2d 2d 359, 363 (Ill. 
App. 1975) (finding defendant guilty of disorderly conduct where, while 
intoxicated, he urinated in public 30 feet from the outside eating area of a 
restaurant).
 Section 6107(2) defines the term “public place” as an area “to which 
the general populace or a substantial group has access.” Current 5/11-9(b) 
(public indecency) defines a “public place” as “any place where . . . conduct 
may reasonably be expected to be viewed by others” — a definition similar to 
that used in proposed Section 6201 (indecent exposure), for similar purposes, 
to define the term “place open to public view.” Section 6107(2) defines the 
term differently, because this offense is concerned less with the fact that the 
offender’s intoxication may be seen than with the fact that it occurs in a place 
where it may directly harm or irritate other persons in the area, creating a 
public nuisance.
 Section 6107(3) grades the offense as a petty offense.
Section 6108. Loitering or Prowling
Corresponding Current Provision(s):  720 ILCS 5/11-9.3(c)(5); 
  5/11-9.4(d)(6)
Comment:
 Generally. This provision covers persons who remain in one place at a 
time or in a manner not usual for law-abiding citizens, under circumstances 
that warrant alarm for the safety of persons or property in the area. Section 
6108(1) defines the offense and prohibits a person from loitering or prowling 
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in a manner not usual for law-abiding citizens under circumstances that 
warrant alarm for the safety or persons or property in the vicinity. Section 
6108(2) defines “loiter.”
 The proposed offense’s potentially wide scope is limited in three respects. 
First, Section 6108(3) lists several factors to be considered in determining 
whether the person’s conduct warrants alarm: flight upon appearance of a 
peace officer, refusal to identify oneself, or a manifest attempt to conceal 
oneself or an object. Second, Section 6108(4) requires, when practical, that 
peace officers ask the person to identify himself and explain his presence and 
conduct. Finally, Section 6108(5) prevents the person from being convicted 
where the officer did not comply with Section 6108(4) or it appears that the 
actor’s explanation was true and, if believed by the peace officer at the time, 
would have dispelled the alarm.
  Section 6108(6) grades the offense as a petty offense.
 Relation to current Illinois law. There is no corresponding provision 
in current Illinois law. (Section 6108(2)’s definition of “loiter” as “to stand 
or sit idly” is similar to current 5/11-9.3(c)(5) and -9.4(d)(6), however.) 
The City of Chicago enacted a loitering provision, but that provision was 
recently invalidated by the United States Supreme Court. In City of Chicago 
v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999), the Court found the city’s ordinance 
unconstitutionally vague for failing to provide fair notice to citizens of the 
conduct prohibited and for failing to provide minimal guidelines to govern 
law enforcement. The Court found that the ordinance’s definition of loitering 
as remaining “in any one place with no apparent purpose” failed to notify 
ordinary citizens what conduct was forbidden and gave police far too much 
discretion in determining whether a person was loitering. Morales, 527 U.S. 
at 56-64.
 The proposed provision suffers from neither of these constitutional 
infirmities. Section 6108 provides notice to citizens by requiring that the 
person loiter under circumstances that warrant alarm and by listing several 
factors that may be considered in determining whether such alarm is warranted. 
In addition, Section 6108 guides the police by requiring, where possible, that 
they inquire as to the person’s identity and conduct before an arrest.
 Section 6109. Obstructing Highways and Other Public Passages
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/47-5, -25
Comment:
 Generally. Section 6109 creates an offense covering persons who either 
(1) recklessly obstruct a highway without legal privilege to do so, or (2) 
while in a gathering, refuse to obey a reasonable official request to move. 
The provision is designed to prevent the danger and inconvenience that may 
result from unjustified obstruction of public passages, while at the same time 
protecting lawful assemblies from the threat of unreasonable legal sanction. 
The proposed provision balances the State’s right to protect the public interest 
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in unobstructed streets and citizens’ access to public places for free speech 
and assembly by providing clear guidelines on what conduct is prohibited 
and by limiting police discretion in enforcing the offense.
 Section 6109(1)(a) creates an offense covering persons who recklessly 
block passageways without legal privilege, thus exempting persons who 
obtain permits or official permission to block off streets. Section 6109(3) 
limits the scope of the offense by precluding liability based solely on the fact 
that a group of people gathers to hear the actor speak, or because the actor is 
a member of such a gathering.
 However, such persons may face liability under Section 6109(1)(b) 
if they fail to leave once the gathering becomes a significant obstacle. 
Section 6109(1)(b) creates an offense covering persons who refuse to obey a 
reasonable order to move. Such an order may only be given for the purpose 
of preventing obstruction of a public passage or to maintain public safety. 
Section 6109(4) narrowly defines when such orders are reasonable, to 
exclude cases where the police can readily handle the obstruction without 
stopping the assembly. 
 Section 6109(2) further limits the scope of both of these offenses 
by defining “obstructing” to require that the actor or actors render the 
passageway “impassable without unreasonable inconvenience or hazard.” 
Thus, otherwise lawful activity will not be precluded on the grounds of a 
trivial inconvenience. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 6109 is similar to current 5/
47-5(5), but expands the offense to impose liability on persons who refuse 
a reasonable official order or request to move. Moreover, Section 6109 
specifically excludes from liability persons who gather to speak or hear a 
person speak.
 Section 6109(5)(b) grades the base offense as a petty offense, as current 
5/47-25 does. Section 6109(5)(a), however, increases the grade to a Class A 
misdemeanor in cases where the person persists in obstructing after receiving 
an explicit warning from law enforcement authorities. Cf. 720 ILCS 5/25-
1(e) (failure to comply with police officer’s command to withdraw from mob 
action; Class A misdemeanor).
Section 6110. Disrupting Meetings and Processions
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/21.2-2; 26-1(a)(1)
Comment:
 Generally. Section 6110 creates an offense covering conduct designed 
to disrupt a lawful meeting, procession, or gathering. Although some of the 
proscribed conduct is already covered by proposed Section 6103, Section 
6110 has several unique features that seek to protect the rights and safety of 
persons engaged in lawful assemblies. Section 6110 does not require a risk of 
“public” alarm, as Section 6103 does. The disruptive efforts may be directed 
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toward, and have an effect on, only the assembling group, and need not be 
objectively offensive or unreasonable.
 Section 6110 grades the offense as a Class C misdemeanor, whereas 
many disorderly conduct cases under Section 6103 would be graded as petty 
offenses. The higher penalty reflects the importance of protecting lawful 
assembly, religious practice, and freedom of association.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 6110 roughly corresponds to 
current 5/21.2-2278 and 5/26-1(a)(1). However, unlike current 5/21.2-2, the 
proposed offense does not require the threat or use of force or violence. 
Moreover, the offense applies to any lawful meeting or gathering and is not 
limited to public institutions of higher learning. Section 6110 differs from 
current 5/26-1(a)(1) in that the actor need not act unreasonably in disrupting 
the meeting.
 Section 6110(2), like both 5/26-1(a)(1) and 5/21.2-4, grades the offense 
as a Class C misdemeanor.
Section 6111. Desecration of Venerated Objects
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 620/1
Comment:
 Generally. This provision creates an offense prohibiting the intentional 
desecration of venerated objects such as public monuments and places or 
worship or burial. Section 6111(1) requires that the desecrated objects be 
public or appear in a public place. Likewise, the offense definition requires 
that the actor know that his conduct will outrage the sensibilities of persons 
likely to observe or discover his action. These limitations exclude from 
liability persons who act in private or have innocent motives.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 6111 is similar to current 
620/1. The current offense prohibits any mistreatment of a flag, whether by 
public mutilation or by simple marking, drawing, picture, or advertisement.279 
 278 The proposed Code does not incorporate current 5/21.2-1, -3, -5 and -6, as those 
provisions relate specifically to the more particular terms of current 5/21.2-2 and are 
unnecessary in the context of Section 6110. To the extent their content remains necessary, it 
may be preserved elsewhere in the Illinois statutes by means of “conforming amendments” 
legislation.
 279 Both federal and state case law indicate that current 620/1 is unconstitutional. In 
People v. Lindsay, 282 N.E.2d 399, 406 (Ill. 1972), the Illinois Supreme Court found an almost 
identical prior version of the statute unconstitutional as applied to the defendant because 
there was no showing that the defendant’s conduct caused a breach of the peace. In United 
States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 315-16 (1990), the United States Supreme Court found that 
a similar statute violated the First Amendment because the statute was clearly “related to the 
suppression of free expression.” See also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Spence v. 
Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974). 
(continued…)
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Section 6111 broadens current 620/1 to include other venerated objects 
besides flags. At the same time, the proposed provision limits the scope of the 
offense to intentional acts of public desecration. 
 In some cases, Section 6111(3)’s grade for the offense, Class C 
misdemeanor, is the same as that imposed by current 620/1. Current law, 
however, increases the penalty to a Class 4 felony for public displays of 
desecration. Section 6111 recognizes that the offense generally is only meant 
to prohibit public displays and not private expressions.
Section 6112. Definitions
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/2-13; 5/11-9.3(c)(5); 
  5/11-9.4(d)(6); 5/14-1; 5/20.5-5(b)
Comment:
 Generally. This provision collects defined terms used in Article 6100 
and provides cross-references to the provisions in which they are defined.
 Relation to current Illinois law. For discussion of the relationship 
between Article 6100’s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary 
for the provision in which the term in question is initially defined.
General Comment Regarding Current Law:
 In addition to the current provisions noted above, Chapter 720 contains 
a variety of offenses that address very specific public safety or public order 
concerns. Some of these sections have been eliminated altogether from the 
proposed Code, because they address harms covered by other offenses or 
seem to serve no useful purpose: current 720 ILCS 5/17-19 (use of name of 
Pawner’s Society); 5/26-2 (interference with emergency communication over 
CB radio); 5/32-11 (barratry); 5/32-12 (maintenance); 5/32-13 (unlawful 
clouding of title); 5/44-1 to -3 (unlawful transfer of communications device to 
minor); 300/1 (Derogatory Statements About Banks Act); 505/1 (Abandoned 
Refrigerator Act); and 595/1 (Draft Card Mutilation Act).
 279 (…continued)
 Section 6111 is doubtless constitutional as applied to persons who destroy or deface 
any public object of veneration, including flags. However, the State may still face difficulty 
in applying the statute against, for example, a person burning his own flag during a political 
rally, as the government’s interest would likely be found related to the suppression of free 
expression. In cases where the person also satisfied the elements of trespass, disorderly 
conduct, or riot, the State should be able to prosecute those offenses without running afoul of 
the First Amendment. See, e.g., Johnson, 491 U.S. at 408 (noting that no breach of the peace 
occurred or threatened to occur); Spence, 418 U.S. at 409 (citing as significant the fact that 
the defendant had not engaged in any trespass or disorderly conduct, and that there was no 
evidence of any risk of breach of the peace).
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 Other sections have been removed because they address narrow 
regulatory issues that properly belong outside the Criminal Code: current 720 
ILCS 5/21.3-5 (solicitation on school property); 5/26-3 (use of a facsimile 
machine in unsolicited advertising or fundraising); 125/1 to /4 (Hunter 
Interference Prohibition Act); 220/1 to /4 (Appliance Tag Act); 225/1 to /2 
(Auction Sales Sign Act); 230/1 to /2 (Business Use of Military Terms Act); 
340/1 to /2 (Sale of Maps Act); 345/1 to /2 (Sale or Pledge of Goods by Minors 
Act); 375/1 to /4 (Ticket Scalping Act); 380/1 to /2 (Title Page Act); 395/1 to 
/4 (Video Movie Sales and Rentals Act); 400/1 to /2 (Wild Plant Conservation 
Act); 530/1 to /3 (Aerial Exhibitors Safety Act); 555/1 to /2 (Child Curfew 
Act); 560/1 to /4 (Illinois Clean Public Elevator Air Act); 585/1 to /4 (Illinois 
Dangerous Animals Act); 590/1 to /3 (Discrimination in Sale of Real Estate 
Act); 605/1 (Excavation Fence Act); 615/1 (Fire Extinguisher Service Act); 
630/1 (Guide Dog Access Act); 650/1 (Nitroglycerin Transportation Act); 
655/1 to /2 (Outdoor Lighting Installation Act); 660/1 to /4 (Party Line 
Emergency Act); 665/1 to /3 (Peephole Installation Act); 675/1 to /2 (Sale 
of Tobacco to Minors Act); and 680/1 to /4 (Smokeless Tobacco Limitation 
Act).
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ARTICLE 6200. PUBLIC INDECENCY OFFENSES
Section 6201. Indecent Exposure
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/11-9, -9.1
Comment:
 Generally. This provision defines an offense prohibiting sexual 
intercourse, sexual conduct, or other indecent exposures of the body in places 
open to public view or in the presence of a minor.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 6201 corresponds to current 5/
11-9 and 5/11-9.1 (aside from 5/11-9.1(a-5), which is addressed by proposed 
Section 1303). The proposed provision combines and reorganizes the current 
indecency offenses to enhance brevity and clarity. Section 6102(1) defines 
the offense in similar fashion to current 5/11-9(a) and 5/11-9.1(a).280 Section 
6201(1)(c) expands the offense to exposures performed with the intent to 
arouse the defendant “or another person,” thus covering the conduct related 
to sexually gratifying children in current 5/11-9.1(a)(2).
 Section 6201(2)’s definition of “place open to public view” is similar to 
current 5/11-9(b)’s definition of “public place,” but adds the phrase “without 
their prior knowledge or consent” to specifically exclude from liability 
private consensual acts not involving children, including commercial erotic 
displays. See People v. Haven, 618 N.E.2d 260, 262 (Ill. App. 1992) (finding 
that current 5/11-9 was not intended to apply to commercial erotic displays); 
see also 720 ILL. STAT. ANN. 5/11-9, Committee Comments — 1961, at 91-
92 (West 1993) (noting that the lewd exposure provision was purposely 
limited to “exposures which were shocking and disturbing to the immediate 
audience, leaving commercial erotic displays for separate consideration”).
 Section 6201(3) retains the exception in current 5/11-9(a)(2) for breast-
feeding of infants.
 Like both 5/11-9(c) and 5/11-9.1(c), Section 6201(4) grades the offense 
as a Class A misdemeanor. Section 6201 does not incorporate the current 
provisions’ grade aggravation for subsequent offenses, as the proposed 
General Part already contains a general recidivism aggravation. See proposed 
Section 905(1).
 280 Section 6201(1)(c)(i) replaces the terms “sexual penetration” and “sexual act” with 
“sexual intercourse” and “sexual conduct” in order to remain consistent with other provisions 
in the proposed Code. See, e.g., proposed Sections 1301(3) (defining “sexual intercourse”) and 
1302(2) (defining “sexual conduct”) and corresponding commentary.
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[Section 6202. Prostitution; Patronizing a Prostitute]281
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/11-14; 5/11-18
Comment:
 Generally. This provision criminalizes the act of providing sexual 
conduct or intercourse in return for anything of value.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 6202 corresponds to current 5/
11-14 and 5/11-18. Current law uses two offenses to prohibit the performance 
of sexual acts in return for anything of value:282 one offense for soliciting a sex 
act (5/11-14) and one for patronizing a prostitute (5/11-18). Current 5/11-14 
prohibits the prostitute from selling sexual intercourse283 or sexual conduct284 
for anything of value, while current 5/11-18 only prohibits the client from 
engaging in sexual penetration with the prostitute. Section 6202(1) combines 
the two current sections into one offense that assigns equal liability to the 
prostitute and the client for trading sexual conduct or intercourse for anything 
of value.285
  Current 5/11-14 and 5/11-18 both contain inchoate forms of the 
offense, which Section 6202 eliminates in favor of the general inchoate 
offenses in proposed Article 800. Current 5/11-14 punishes a prostitute who 
“agrees to perform” sexual acts. Such conduct would likely be covered by 
 281 This provision is bracketed because the proposed Code includes two formulations 
of the same offense. Most modern codes do not employ this formulation of the prostitution 
offense, which criminalizes the “selling” of a sexual act, in part because the dynamic at play 
with respect to any individual act may be complex — partners, even spouses, may “trade” 
sex for other things under a variety of circumstances. Instead, most modern codes define the 
offense as “making one’s living as a prostitute” or “soliciting a prostitute.” (See infra for 
discussion of the proposed alternative formulation of this provision.)
 282 Throughout Article 6200, the proposed provisions do not incorporate the current list 
of specific items that fall within the meaning of “anything of value” (“money, property, token, 
object, or article”), but merely use the general inclusive phrase “anything of value,” which 
includes all those specific items.
 283 The proposed Code replaces the term “sexual penetration” with “sexual intercourse” 
to remain consistent with language employed in other Code provisions. See proposed Section 
1301(3) (defining “sexual intercourse”).
 284 Section 6202(1) replaces the phrase “any touching or fondling of the sex organs of 
one person by another person” in current 5/11-14 with the defined term “sexual conduct.” See 
proposed Section 1302(2) (defining “sexual conduct”).
 285 The proposed Code eliminates the offense of patronizing a juvenile prostitute in 
current 5/11-18.1. A person who engages in sexual conduct or intercourse with a juvenile 
prostitute would be liable for both patronizing a prostitute under proposed Section 6202 and 
for sexual assault or sexual abuse under proposed Sections 1301 and 1302, respectively. Under 
the proposed sentencing rule for multiple offenses, the defendant would receive an additional 
sanction for each conviction. (See proposed Section 906 and corresponding commentary.)
 The affirmative defense in current 5/11-18.1(b) for defendants who reasonably believed 
the prostitute to be 17 years old or older is unnecessary because, under proposed Sections 1301 
and 1302, a culpability requirement of negligence as to the victim’s age is already required. 
See proposed Section 1306(1).
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the proposed attempt or conspiracy provisions.286 See proposed Sections 801 
and 803. Current 5/11-18 prohibits the inchoate act of entering a place of 
prostitution with the intent to engage in sexual penetration. Such conduct 
would be punishable, under proposed Section 801, as an attempt to patronize 
a prostitute.
 Section 6202(2) grades the offense a Class A misdemeanor, the same 
as current 5/11-14(b) and 5/11-18(b). However, Section 6202 eliminates 
the current provisions’ aggravation for subsequent offenses in favor of the 
general aggravation in proposed Section 905. Section 6202 also eliminates 
the aggravation for engaging in the prohibited conduct within 1,000 of a 
school found in current 5/11-14(c) and 5/11-18(c). Such an aggravation 
seems too trivial and arbitrary to warrant a full-grade aggravation. Moreover, 
public solicitations of prostitution may also violate proposed Section 6103 
(disorderly conduct), and sexual acts or solicitations that actually involve 
minors would be covered by proposed Sections 1301 to 1303, 4105(1), and 
6203(2)(a), thus exposing the actor to potential multiple convictions and 
additional liability.
[Section 6202. Solicitation of a Sexual Act]287
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/11-14; 5/11-14.1; 
  5/11-18
Comment:
 Generally. This provision creates an offense to prohibit solicitation of a 
person to perform sexual acts for anything of value.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 6202 is similar to current 5/11-
14.1. Section 6202(1) simplifies the offense definition by replacing current 
language with the terms “anything of value,” “sexual intercourse,” and 
“sexual conduct.” See supra notes 282 to 284.
 Section 6202(2) grades the offense as a Class A misdemeanor. Current 
5/11-14.1 grades solicitation as a Class B misdmeanor. The proposed 
provision grades soliciting a sexual act the same as current law grades the act 
of engaging in prostitution and patronizing a prostitute, under the assumption 
that the general prostitution offense will be eliminated.
 286 Such conduct would constitute a criminal attempt under proposed Section 801 or a 
conspiracy under proposed Section 803, provided the prostitute took a substantial step towards 
the commission of the offense (e.g., accepting money) or committed an overt act in pursuance 
of the conspiracy (e.g., obtaining a hotel room).
 287 This alternative formulation of the offense is necessary only if the other, more 
general prostitution offense is not used. See supra note 281. If the general prostitution offense 
is used, there is no need for a separate offense of soliciting a sexual act, as that conduct would 
be covered by the general inchoate offenses in proposed Section 802. If this alternative is 
preferred, the definitional references currently in the first provision should be transferred to 
this one.
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Section 6203. Promoting, Supporting, or Living Off the Proceeds of 
 Prostitution
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/11-15 to -17.1; 
  5/11-19; 5/11-19.1
Comment:
 Generally. This provision defines an offense to create liability for 
persons who promote, support, or live off the proceeds of prostitution.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 6203 creates one offense to 
replace seven different current provisions.288 Proposed Section 6203(1)(a) 
and (b) are identical to current 5/11-16(a)(1) and (2), but would also cover 
the conduct in current 5/11-15.289 See People v. Wiler, 545 N.E.2d 1014, 1016 
(Ill. App. 1989) (noting that conduct which violated current 5/11-15 may also 
violate 5/11-16).
 Section 6203(1)(c) corresponds to current 5/11-17. The proposed 
provision replaces the three alternative forms of keeping a place of 
prostitution in current 5/11-17(a) with a single offense definition that covers 
the same conduct.
 Section 6203(1)(d), imposing liability for parents and guardians who 
allow their children to engage in prostitution, has no directly corresponding 
provision in current Chapter 720, although it is similar to current 5/11-
20.1(a)(5) (prohibiting parent from allowing child “to appear in any stage 
play, live performance, film, videotape, photograph or other similar visual 
presentation, portrayal or simulation or depiction by computer” of a sex 
act).
 Section 6203(1)(e) is nearly identical to current 5/11-19(a), but 
eliminates the current list in favor of the general phrase “anything of value.” 
See supra note 282.
 Section 6203(2)(a) aggravates the offense to a Class 2 felony for any 
violation where the actor was negligent as to the prostitute being under 16 
years old or severely or profoundly mentally retarded.290 This is one grade 
lower than current 5/11-15.1, 5/11-17.1,291 and 5/11-19.1 provide. The 
offense is graded as a Class 2 felony because it seems less serious than 
 288 Current law’s use of these distinct but similar offenses has caused confusion for 
prosecutors in charging defendants and, in at least one case, has led the court to invalidate the 
defendant’s conviction because the State charged the defendant under the wrong section. See, 
e.g., People v. Anderson, 493 N.E.2d 410, 413 (Ill. App. 1986).
 289 To the extent that current 5/11-15 and 5/11-16 reach inchoate conduct not covered 
by Section 6203 (such as soliciting for a prostitute or offering to arrange a meeting with a 
prostitute), such conduct would be covered by the general inchoate offenses in Article 800.
 290 This formulation eliminates the need for the affirmative defense in current 5/11-
15.1(b), 5/11-17.1(b), and 5/11-19.1(b) for defendants who reasonably believed the prostitute 
was 16 or older or that the prostitute was not severely or profoundly mentally retarded.
 291 Section 6203 removes the forfeiture provision in 5/11-17.1(d), as that issue is more 
properly addressed in the Code of Corrections.
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other offenses, graded as Class 1 felonies, that actually involve direct sexual 
relations with a juvenile. See proposed Sections 1301 and 1302. Additional 
liability may be imposed for such offenses if they occur, or are attempted. See 
proposed Sections 254 and 906 and corresponding commentary.
  Section 6203(2)(b) grades offenses under Section 6203(1)(a) through 
(d)292 as Class 4 felonies, while similar violations are Class A misdemeanors 
under current 5/11-15(b), 5/11-16(b), and 5/11-17(b). Section 6203(2)(c) 
lowers the grade to Class A misdemeanor — the same as under current 5/11-
19(b) — when the person violates Section 6203(1)(e), as receiving proceeds 
from prostitution is less serious than the conduct described in Subsections 
(1)(a) to (1)(d). 
 Section 6203(2) does not incorporate the grade aggravation for 
subsequent convictions in current 5/11-15, 5/11-17, and 5/11-19, as there is a 
general aggravation for subsequent convictions in proposed Section 905(1). 
Section 6203 also eliminates the aggravation in current 5/11-15(c), 5/11-
16(c), and 5/11-19(c) for offenses committed within 1,000 feet of a school, as 
the grade of the base offense has already been raised. See supra commentary 
for proposed Section 6202 (first version).
Section 6204. Disseminating Obscene Material
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/11-20 to -21; see also 
  720 ILCS 670/1 to /3
Comment:
 Generally. This provision covers a wide range of conduct related to the 
dissemination of obscene material.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 6204 replaces current 5/11-
20, 5/11-20.1, 5/11-21, and 670/1 to /3 with one offense covering the 
dissemination of obscene material. 
 Section 6204(1)(a) to (f) prohibit various forms of prohibited conduct 
in nearly identical fashion to current 5/11-20(a)(1) to (6).293 The proposed 
provision also covers conduct prohibited in current 5/11-21 and 670/1 to /3 to 
the extent those provisions apply to obscene material.294
 Section 6204(2) provides the same definition of “obscene” as current 
5/11-20(b), but divides the definition into subsections for enhanced clarity.
 292 Because the offense under Section 6203(1)(d) requires the child to be under 16, and 
because a parent should always be at least negligent as to this fact, that offense will presumably 
always be graded as a Class 2 felony under Section 6203(2)(a).
 293 The inchoate offense of offering or agreeing to sell, deliver, or provide obscene 
material in current 5/11-20(a)(1) is covered by the general inchoate offenses in Article 800.
 294 To the extent these current sections apply to non-obscene material, the offenses are 
likely unconstitutional or do not warrant criminal sanction.
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 Section 6204(3) retains current 5/11-20(e)’s inference of intent to 
disseminate, but restates it as a permissive inference, rather than using the 
less clear term “prima facie evidence.”
 Section 6204(4) provides the same affirmative defense as current 5/11-
20(f).
 Section 6204(5)(a) grades the offense as a Class 2 felony where the 
obscene material or performance includes a victim the defendant reasonably 
should know is under 16 years of age or severely or profoundly mentally 
retarded. The proposed aggravation, in conjunction with the conduct 
prohibited in Section 6204(1), replaces, in part, the separate offense of child 
pornography defined in current 5/11-20.1(a).
 Specifically, Section 6204(5)(a) covers the conduct prohibited in 
current 5/11-20.1(a)(1) to (3) and (6). The inchoate conduct prohibited by 
current 5/11-20.1(a)(4) and (7) is covered by the general solicitation offense 
in proposed Section 802. Current 5/11-20.1(a)(5)’s offense for parents or 
guardians who allow or encourage minors to appear in child pornography is 
addressed by proposed Sections 1301(2) and 6203(1)(d).295 
 Section 6204(5)(a) grades the child pornography offense as a Class 2 
felony, whereas current law grades child pornography as either a Class 1 
or Class 3 felony, depending on the type of conduct. The proposed penalty 
is consistent with the penalty for promoting, supporting, or living off the 
proceeds of a juvenile prostitute in proposed Section 6203. In addition, in 
many cases, the defendant may be eligible for additional offenses related 
to child pornography, such as sexual assault, sexual abuse, and promoting 
prostitution. Under the proposed sentencing rules for multiple offenses, these 
child pornography defendants may be eligible for total sentences equal to, if 
 295 The proposed Code eliminates the remaining provisions in current 5/11-20.1. The 
affirmative defense in current 5/11-20.1(b)(1) is unnecessary because the proposed offense 
does not apply unless the defendant was negligent as to the material’s containing a victim 
who was underage or mentally retarded. Likewise, the defenses in 5/11-20.1(b)(3) and (5) are 
covered by the general justification and excuse defenses in proposed Articles 400 and 500. 
Proposed Section 6204(3) replaces the presumption in current 5/11-20.1(b)(4). Current 5/11-
20.1(d), (e), and (e-5) address procedural issues properly addressed outside the Code. The 
definitions in current 5/11-20(f) and the re-enactment findings in subsection (g) have also been 
deleted as unnecessary.
 The proposed Code also does not incorporate current 5/11-20.1A, 5/11-20.2, and 5/11-
22, as those provisions discuss procedural or regulatory matters properly addressed outside the 
Criminal Code. It is expected that these provisions will be retained outside the Criminal Code 
through “conforming amendments” legislation.
 Similarly, current 5/11-23 addresses mostly regulatory matters properly addressed 
outside the Criminal Code and should be preserved elsewhere. In moving that provision 
outside the Code, however, its Class 3 felony aggravation for offenses involving victims under 
the age of 17 will be eliminated, as the proposed Code limits the grade for offenses outside the 
Criminal Code to a Class 4 felony. See proposed Section 902. To the extent 5/11-23 relates to 
preparatory conduct toward a sexual assault or sexual abuse offense, however, such conduct 
may constitute an attempt to commit one of those offenses under the proposed Code. See 
proposed Section 801 (attempt), Section 1301 (sexual assault), Section 1302 (sexual abuse), 
Section 1303 (sexual exploitation of a child), and corresponding commentary.
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not longer than, those under current law. See proposed Sections 254 and 906 
and corresponding commentary.
 Section 6204(5)(b) and current 5/11-20(d) both grade the offense as a 
Class A misdemeanor. Section 6204(5)(b) eliminates the grading aggravation 
for subsequent offenses, as proposed Section 905(1) already contains a 
general aggravation for subsequent convictions.
Section 6205. Abuse of Corpse
Corresponding Current Provision(s): see 720 ILCS 5/12-33(a)(7); cf. 
410 ILCS 5/1 et seq.; 410 ILCS 
18/1 et seq.; 410 ILCS 505/1 et 
seq.; 410 ILCS 510/1 et seq.
Comment:
 Generally. This provision creates an offense covering persons who 
treat a human corpse in a way that they know would outrage ordinary 
family sensibilities. The offense covers sexual indecency, physical abuse, 
mutilation, gross neglect, and other outrageous treatment. The exception for 
treatment authorized by law excludes from the offense all the lawful acts that 
may be done to a corpse, such as embalming, autopsy, scientific research, and 
medical examination. Likewise, the requirement that the person know their 
conduct would outrage family sensibilities excludes from liability persons 
who inadvertently offend a relative of the deceased. 
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 6205 has no directly 
corresponding provision in current Chapter 720. Current 5/12-33(a)(7) 
punishes the unlawful dissection, mutilation, or incineration of a human 
corpse, but only if the conduct is performed in the presence of a child and as 
part of a ceremony, rite, or other observance.
 In addition, current law contains a number of provisions addressing the 
lawful treatment of corpses during burial (410 ILCS 5/1 et seq.), cremation 
(410 ILCS 18/1 et seq.), autopsies (410 ILCS 505/1 et seq.), and research 
(410 ILCS 510/1 et seq.). Section 6205 addresses treatment of human 
corpses that falls outside of these provisions.
 Section 6205(2) grades the offense as a Class B misdemeanor.
Section 6206. Sale of Human Body Parts
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/12-20; see also 755 
  ILCS 50/8.1; 755 ILCS 55/1.1
Comment:
 Generally. This provision covers persons who unlawfully buy or sell 
human body parts. The offense excludes the lawful donation of organs, 
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blood, bodily fluids, and hair. The offense also does not apply to the payment 
or reimbursement of actual medical costs or costs associated with the lawful 
transportation of body parts.
 Relation to current Illinois law. Section 6206 is nearly identical to 
current 5/12-20,296 with two minor changes. Section 6206 removes the 
inchoate offense of offering to buy or sell body parts, as that offense is 
addressed by the general inchoate offenses in Article 800. Section 6206 
also removes the grading aggravation for subsequent convictions, as there is 
already a general recidivism aggravation in proposed Section 905(1).
Section 6207. Cruelty to Animals
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 510 ILCS 70/3.01 to .03; 70/16; 
720 ILCS 5/26-5; see also 510 
ILCS 70/4.01 to /7.15; 720 ILCS 
315/1; 720 ILCS 610/1 to /5
Comment:
 Generally. This provision punishes the unlawful killing of another’s 
animal and the cruel mistreatment or neglect of any animal, except in cases 
where the person followed accepted veterinary practices or carried on the 
activities for lawful scientific research.
 Relation to current Illinois law. There is no directly corresponding 
provision in current Chapter 720. Current law punishes animal cruelty 
outside the Criminal Code, in the Humane Care for Animals Act (510 ILCS 
70/1 et seq.) That act contains three basic animal cruelty provisions, 510 
ILCS 70/3.01 to 3.03, that are covered by Section 6207.297 The proposed 
provision replaces the current provisions with three concise forms of the 
offense covering the cruel mistreatment or neglect of any animal, and the 
killing or injuring of another’s animal.298
 296 Section 6206 also replaces two offenses outside the Code that cover the same 
conduct. See 755 ILCS 50/8.1; 755 ILCS 55/1.1.
 297 The Act also contains a number of other provisions that address more specific forms 
of animal cruelty and would largely be covered by the proposed provision — e.g., offenses 
covering the use of animals in entertainment (70/4.01), teasing, striking, or tampering with 
police dogs (70/4.03), injuring or killing police dogs (70/4.04), horse poling or tripping 
(70/5.01), poisoning dogs or other domestic animals (70/6), transportation of animals (70/7), 
confinement of animals in motor vehicles (70/7.1), and guide, hearing, and support dogs (70/
7.15).
 Section 6207 is not intended to eliminate any other provisions in the Act addressing 
regulatory or procedural matters properly belonging outside the Code.
 298 As under current law, the killing of another’s animal might also fall under the 
criminal damage offense. See proposed Section 2206 and corresponding commentary; 720 
ILCS 5/21-1(1)(d). In appropriate situations, a person who kills another’s animal could be held 
liable under both Section 2206 and Section 6207. See proposed Section 254 and corresponding 
commentary. The killing of one’s own animal would be an offense under Section 6207(1) only 
if the death were caused by cruel mistreatment or neglect.
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 Section 6207 also replaces the current Chapter 720 offense of “dog 
fighting,” which is graded from a Class A misdemeanor to a Class 3 felony. 
See 720 ILCS 5/26-5; see also 510 ILCS 70/4.01, 70/16. Section 6207, in 
conjunction with proposed Section 301, covers the conduct criminalized by 
5/26-5(a) to (i).299
 Section 6207(2) excepts from liability treatment of animals that is 
otherwise lawful under accepted veterinary practices or as part of scientific 
research. Cf. 510 ILCS 70/3.03(4) (defining exceptions to animal torture 
provision).
 Section 6207(3) grades the offense as a Class C misdemeanor in cases 
where the person acts recklessly, and as a Class A misdemeanor in cases where 
the person acts intentionally. Current 510 ILCS 70/16(e) grades intentional 
animal cruelty as a Class A misdemeanor. Section 6207(3) eliminates the 
grade aggravation in current 70/16(g) for animal torture and the aggravation 
for subsequent offenses. See proposed Section 906. The proposed grading is 
lower than the grade for some forms of the current 5/26-5 offense, but tracks 
current 510 ILCS 70/16(a)(6), which grades “cruel treatment” not involving 
dog-fighting as a Class A misdemeanor. Moreover, in most of the situations 
that current 5/26-5 addresses, an offender will have committed multiple 
offenses under Section 6207, each of which will increase his total liability. 
See proposed Section 906.
Section 6208. Definitions
Corresponding Current Provision(s): 720 ILCS 5/2-10.1; 5/11-9(b), 
  5/11-20(b); 5/12-12(e) and (f)
Comment:
 Generally. This provision collects defined terms used in Article 6200 
and provides cross-references to the provisions in which they are defined.
 Relation to current Illinois law. For discussion of the relationship 
between Article 6200’s defined terms and current law, refer to the commentary 
for the provision in which the term in question is initially defined.
 299 Current 5/26-5(j) to (m) set forth sentencing and regulatory rules that would be 
preserved elsewhere in Illinois law by means of the “conforming amendments” legislation to 
be enacted with the proposed Criminal Code.
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ARTICLE 7100. WEAPONS OFFENSES
Section 7101.  Possession or Use of a Dangerous Weapon During a Felony
Corresponding Current Provision(s): various; see 720 ILCS 5/33A-1
  et seq.; see also, e.g., 5/10-4; 5/12-4; 
  5/12-4.2; 5/12-4.2-5; 5/12-11; 
  5/12-14; 5/18-2; 5/18-4; 5/24-1.2; 
  5/24-1.2-5; 5/24-3.2
Comment:
 Generally. Section 7101 defines a separate offense to aggravate 
punishment where another underlying offense involves a weapon.  The 
precise contours of the offense, and its grading, remain tentative; proposed 
Section 7101 is included to give a sense of one possible framework for such 
an offense and, by means of explication through the commentary for other 
offenses, to suggest one means by which a single offense could replace the 
numerous weapons aggravations in current law and to indicate how such a 
distinct weapons offense might interact with other offenses in the proposed 
Code.
 Relation to current Illinois law.  Because proposed Section 7101 is 
included largely for purposes of explaining how a separate weapons offense 
would relate to the other, underlying offenses whose corresponding liability 
it would aggravate, discussion of proposed Section 7101 appears in the 
commentary for relevant underlying offenses.  See, e.g., commentary for 
proposed Sections 1103; 1202; 1501; 2301.
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Conversion Table: Translation From Current Law to Draft
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
Draft
Provision
[Note: An entry of “CA” means that although the proposed Code does not itself incorporate the provision in question, 
it is anticipated that the provision will be preserved in the Illinois Statutes by means of a conforming amendment.]
5 175/10-140(a) 3101
5 175/10-140(b) 3101 
3105
5 175/15-210 3101
5 175/15-215 3105
5 175/15-220 3101
5 312/3-103(d) 5103
5 312/3-103(d) 5202(1) (301)
10 5/29-1 5101
10 5/29-2 5101
10 5/29-3 5101
10 5/29-4 1404
5310
10 5/29-6 3102
5203
10 5/29-8 5202(1)
10 5/29-10(a) 5201(1)
10 5/29-20(1) 802
10 5/29-20(2) 802
10 5/29-20(3) 1404
5310
10 5/29-20(4) 3102
5203
15 335/14(a)(2) to 
(4)
3105(1)(a)
15 335/14A(b) 808
3101
3102
3105(1)(a)
3106(1)(a)
5202(1)
5203(1)(a)
15 335/14B(b) 808
3101
3105(1)(b)
15 335/14C(a)(1) 5202(1)
15 335/14C(a)(2) 5202(1) (301)
15 335/14C(a)(3) 5201(1)
15 520/21 2107
5103
15 520/22 2107
5103
15 520/23 5103
20 1605/10.3 & 
/10.4
2107(1)
20 1605/14.2 3101
5202(1)
20 1705/44 5103
20 1805/87 1201
1202
20 3520/45 3106(1)(a)
5202(1)
20 4020/22 2103(1)
3106(1)(a)
5202(1)
30 230/2b 5103
30 320/4 3101
30 500/50-5(d) 5202(2)
30 500/50-25 3110
35 5/1301 5202(1)
5203(1)(a)
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ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
Draft
Provision
[Note: An entry of “CA” means that although the proposed Code does not itself incorporate the provision in question, 
it is anticipated that the provision will be preserved in the Illinois Statutes by means of a conforming amendment.]
35 105/14 2103
2107
3106(1)(a)
3107
5202(1)
5203(1)(a)
35 130/14 5203(1)(a)
35 130/22 3101
5202(1)
35 130/23 3101
5202(1)
35 130/25 5202(1)
5203(1)(a)
35 135/22 5203(1)(a)
35 135/28 3101
5202(1)
35 135/29 3101
5202(1)
35 135/31 5202(1)
5203(1)(a)
35 143/10-50 2107
3107
5202(1)
5203(1)(a)
35 145/8 2103
2107
3107
5202(1)
5203(1)(a)
35 200/21-290(b) 5202(2)
35 200/21-290(d) 3106(1)(a)
5202(2)
35 200/21-306(a)(3) 3103
35 200/21-306(a)(4) 803
35 505/15(1) 2107
35 505/15(2) 2107
35 505/15(3.5) 5203(1)(a)
35 505/15(3.7) 801
35 505/15(6) 5202(1)
5203(1)(a)
35 505/15(8) 5202(1)
35 505/15(9) 5202(1)
35 505/15(11) -
35 630/19 2107
5202(1)
5203(1)(a)
40 5/15-189 5103
50 105/4 5103
50 105/4.5 5201(1)
50 105/4.5(1) 5202(1)
50 105/4.5(2) 3103
50 105/4.5(3) 301
50 705/6.1(e) 5103
55 5/1-5013 5201(1)
5202(1)
55 5/3-11019 5103
60 1/85-45 5103
65 5/3.1-55-10 5103
65 5/4-8-6 5103
70 210/25.3 5103
70 705/4 5103
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70 2605/11.18 5103
105 5/10-9 5103
105 425/26(2) 2107
110 805/3-48 5103
110 1010/4 & /8 5201(1)
205 5/49 5202(1)
5203(1)(a)
205 105/7-7(a) 5202(1)
5203(1)(a)
205 620/8-1 5202(1)
205 635/4-4(b) 5202(1)
205 657/90(h) 5201(1)
5202(1) & (2)
5203(1)(a)
205 690/36 5202(1)
210 45/3-212(a-1) & 
(a-2)
5103
215 5/131.24(4) 5202(1)
215 5/134 3106(1)(a)
5202(1)
5203(1)(a)
215 5/363a(9)(c) -
215 5/1023 2404
220 5/6-106 3106(1)(a) 
3106(1)(c)
5201
5202(1)
225 15/26 3106(1)(b)
225 25/40 3101
3105(1)(a)
5202(1)
225 41/15-75(a)(3) 2103
3106(1)(a)
225 41/15-75(a)(6) 5201(1)
5202(1)
225 60/49 & /59 3106(1)(b)
225 60/52 & /59 3106(1)(b)
225 60/53 & /59 2103
225 60/54 & /59 3105(1)(a)
225 60/56 & /59 5202(1)
225 60/57 & /59 3105(1)(a)
225 60/58 & /59 5201(1)
225 110/30 3101
3105(1)(a)
5202(1)
225 125/105(a)(1) 5202(1)
225 125/105(a)(4) 5202(1)
225 125/105(a)(11) 5202(1)
5203(1)(a)
225 125/220(a) 3106(1)(b)
225 203/90 5201(1)
225 203/90(a)(2) 2103
3106(1)(a)
5202(1)
225 305/36(a) 3106(1)(b)
225 305/36(b) 5201(1)
225 305/36(e) 3105(1)(a)
225 305/36(f) 5202(1)
225 305/36(g) 3106(1)(b)
225 310/27 3101
3105(1)(a)
5202(1)
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225 325/39(b)(2) 5201(1)
225 325/39(b)(3) 3105(1)(a)
225 325/39(b)(5) 3106(1)(b)
225 325/39(b)(6) 5202(1)
225 330/43(b) 5201
225 330/43(c) 5202(1)
225 330/43(d) 3105(1)(a)
225 330/43(f) 3106(1)(b)
225 340/34(a) 3106(1)(b)
225 340/34(b) 5201
225 340/34(e) 3105(1)(a)
225 340/34(f) 5202(1)
225 340/34(g) 3106(1)(b)
225 410/2A-4(b)(2) 2107
225 410/3B-4(2) 2107
225 410/4-20(2) 2103
3106(1)(a)
5202(1)
225 410/4-20(4) 5201
225 446/190(a) 5201
225 446/190(a)(3) 2103
3106(1)(a)
5202(1)
225 470/56(1)(A) & 
(2)(A)
3106(1)(d)
225 470/56(1)(E) & 
(2)(A)
3106(1)(e)
225 470/56(1)(F) 3106(1)(f)
225 470/56(2) -
225 650/19(A) 1201(2)
5303
225 650/19(B) & 
(B-5)
5101
225 650/19(D) 3106(g)
225 705/4.20 to /4.22 5103
225 735/5(a) 2102
225 735/5(b) 2102
2206(1)(a)
225 735/5(c) 5202(1)
225 735/5(g) 5303
225 745/160(b)(2) 5201(1)
225 745/160(b)(3) 3105(1)(a)
225 745/160(b)(5) 3106(1)(b)
225 745/160(b)(6) 5202(1)
230 5/36 & 5/37 3111(1)(b)
230 5/39(a)(1) 3111(1)(a)
5101
230 5/39(a)(2) 2103
3101
230 10/18(d)(1) & (2) 3109
3111(1)(a)
5101
230 10/18(d)(3) 3102
230 10/18(d)(5) 808
230 10/18(d)(6) 2103
230 10/18(d)(8) 2102
230 10/18(d)(9) 2103
3101
230 10/18(d)(10) 808
230 30/12 5202(1)
235 5/10-1(c) 5201(1)
5202(1)
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240 40/15-45(a) 2103
3106(1)(e)
240 40/15-45(b) 2102
3106(1)(e)
240 40/15-45(c) 5202(1)
5203(1)(a)
240 40/15-45(d) 5303
240 40/15-45(e) 5303
305 5/8A-2(a) & -6 2103
3106(1)(a)
5202(1)
305 5/8A-2(b) & -6 5202(2)
305 5/8A-2.5(a) & -6 2106
3101
305 5/8A-3 & -6 5101
305 5/8A-3(a) & -6 2103
2106
3106(1)(a)
5202(1)
305 5/8A-4 & -6 2103
3101
305 5/8A-4A & -6 2103
3101
305 5/8A-5(a) & -6 2107
5103
305 5/8A-5A & -6 3105(1)(a)
305 5/8A-13(b) & -6 2103(1)
2106(1)
5202(1)
305 5/8A-13(b)(2) 
& -6
3106(1)(a)
305 5/8A-14(b) & -6 3109
5101
305 5/8A-15 3101
3102
5202(1)
305 5/8A-16(b)(1) 3106(1)(b)
305 5/8A-16(b)(5) 3109
5101
320 25/9 2106 (801)
3106(1)(a)
5202(1)
325 5/4 5204
410 18/55(2) 5203(1)(a)
410 18/55(4) 3106(1)(b)
410 535/27(1)(a) 5202(1)
5203(1)(a)
410 535/27(1)(b) 5203(1)(b)
3102
410 535/27(1)(c) 3102
5202(1)
410 535/27(1)(d) 3105(1)(a)
410 620/3.1 3106(1)(g)
415 5/44(a) 5202(1)
415 5/44(b) 1202
415 5/44(c) 1202
415 5/44(e) 1202
415 5/44(f) 1202
415 5/44(g) 5301(a)
415 5/44(h)(1) 5201
415 5/44(h)(2) 5202(1)
5203(1)(a)
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415 5/44(h)(3) 5203(1)(b)
415 5/44(h)(4) 5202(1)
5203(1)(a)
415 5/44(h)(5) 5203(1)(b)
415 5/44(h)(6) 5202(2)
415 5/44(i) 5202(2)
415 5/44(j)(4)(A) 5202(1) & (2)
415 5/44(j)(4)(B) 5203
415 5/44(j)(4)(C) 5202(1) & (2)
415 5/44(j)(4)(D) 5203(1)
415 5/57.17 5202(1)
5203(1)(a)
415 60/15(7) 5303
420 40/39(b)(1) 5202(1)
420 40/39(b)(2) 3102
5203(1)(a)
505 90/22 1201(2)
3102
3105(1)(a)
5202
5203(1)(a)
5303
510 5/26(a) 5202(1)
5203(1)(a)
5303
510 5/26(b) 1202
510 70/3.01 & /16 6207
510 70/3.02 & /16 6207
510 70/ /3.03 & /16 6207
605 5/6-411.1(e) 5103
610 100/1 & /2 1202
625 5/4-103(a)(1) 2105
625 5/4-103(a)(2) 2105(4)(a)
3101
3102
625 5/4-103(a)(3) 2105(4)(a)
3102
625 5/4-103(a)(4) 2105(4)(a)
3101
3102
625 5/4-103(a)(5) 2105
625 5/4-103(a)(6) 5204(1)
625 5/4-103.1 2105 (803)
625 5/4-103.2(a)(1) 
to (7)
2105
625 5/4-103.3 905(4)
2105 (803)
625 5/4-104 -
625 5/4-105(a) 2105
3101
625 5/4-105(a)(1) 
to (4)
5203(1)(a)
625 5/4-105(a)(5) 5202(1)
625 5/4-105.1(a) 5203(1)(a)
625 5/5-402.1(f) 5202(1)
5203(1)(a)
625 5/6-301(a)(2) 
& (3)
3105(1)(a)
625 5/6-301.1(b) 808
3101
3102
3105(1)(a)
5203(1)(a)
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625 5/6-301.2 3105(1)(b)
625 5/6-301.2(b) 808
3101
625 5/6-302(a) 5203(1)(a)
5201
5202(1)
625 5/7-603 3102
5203(1)(a)
625 5/11-204(a) 5302(1)
625 5/11-204.1(a) 5302(1)
625 5/11-501 1202
625 5/11-503 1202
625 5/11-1301.6 808
625 5/18b-103.1 5302(1)
625 5/18b-106.1 & 
-108
1202
625 5/18b-108(c) 301
625 5/18c-7502(a)(i) 1202
2102
2206(1)(a) 
& (c)
625 5/18c-7502(a)(ii) 2102
2105
625 5/18c-7502(a)(iii) 2105
625 40/5-7 1104(2)
1202
625 45/3A-21 2105
3102
625 45/3A-21(a) 3101
5203(1)(a)
625 45/3A-21(b) 3101
5203(1)(a)
625 45/3A-21(c) 3101
625 45/3A-21(d) 5202(1)
625 45/3A-21(g) 5203(1)(a)
625 45/5-16 1104(2)
1202
720 5/1-1 101(1)
720 5/1-2 102(1)
720 5/1-3 103
720 5/1-4 104
720 5/1-5 105
720 5/1-6 106
720 5/1-8 CA
720 5/2-.5 108
720 5/2-1 605(1)
720 5/2-2 204(4)
720 5/2-3 108
720 5/2-3.5 1201(3)(a)
720 5/2-3.6 -
720 5/2-4 108
720 5/2-5 605(3)
720 5/2-6 2201(2)(a)
2301(3)(a)
720 5/2-6.5 -
720 5/2-7 -
720 5/2-7.1 1501(4)(b)
720 5/2-7.5 1501(4)(b)
720 5/2-8 108
720 5/2-9 605(5) (CA)
720 5/2-10 108
720 5/2-10.1 1401(4)
720 5/2-10.2 -
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720 5/2-10.3 -
720 5/2-11 -
720 5/2-12 -
720 5/2-13 108
720 5/2-14 5309(2)(a)
720 5/2-15 108
720 5/2-15.5 -
720 5/2-15a 108
720 5/2-15b 108
720 5/2-16 602(4) & (6)
720 5/2-17 108
720 5/2-18 108
720 5/2-19 108
720 5/2-19.5 108
720 5/2-20 -
720 5/2-21 108
720 5/2-22 108
720 5/3-1 107
720 5/3-2 107
720 5/3-3 253
606(1)(b)
720 5/3-4(a) 605
720 5/3-4(b) 606
720 5/3-4(c) 607
720 5/3-4(d) 608
720 5/3-5 602(1)
720 5/3-6 602(2)
720 5/3-7 602(5)
720 5/3-8 602(3)
720 5/4-1 204(1)
502
720 5/4-2 204(3)
720 5/4-3(a) 205(1)
720 5/4-3(b) 205(2) & (3)
720 5/4-3(c) 205(5)
720 5/4-4 206(1)
720 5/4-5 206(2)
720 5/4-6 206(3)
720 5/4-7 206(4)
720 5/4-8(a) 207(1)
720 5/4-8(b)(1) 508
720 5/4-8(b)(2) to (4) 509
720 5/4-8(c) 304
720 5/4-8(d) 107(3)(c)
720 5/4-9 205(4)
720 5/5-1 301(1)
720 5/5-2(a) 301(1)
720 5/5-2(b) 301(1)
720 5/5-2(c) 301(1); (2) 
& (6)
720 5/5-3 301(4)
720 5/5-4 701
720 5/5-5 702
720 5/6-1 505
720 5/6-2(a) & (b) 504
720 5/6-2(c) & (d) -
720 5/6-2(e) 501(6)
720 5/6-3(a) 302(1) & (2)
720 5/6-3(b) 506(1) & (2)
720 5/6-4 107(3)(c)
501(6)
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720 5/7-1 416(1)
419
511
720 5/7-2 417
419
511
720 5/7-3 417
419
511
720 5/7-4(a) 418(1)
720 5/7-4(b) 411(5) & (6)
720 5/7-4(c) 411(5) & (6)
418(1)
720 5/7-5 414(1)
419
511
720 5/7-6 414(2)
419
511
720 5/7-7 418(2)
720 5/7-8 414(4)
720 5/7-9 414(3)
511
720 5/7-10 413
720 5/7-11 507
720 5/7-12 603
720 5/7-13 411(5) & (6)
412
511
720 5/7-14 107(3)(c)
720 5/8-1(a) 802
720 5/8-1(b) 807
720 5/8-1.1(a) 802
720 5/8-1.1(b) 1101 (807)
720 5/8-1.2(a) 802
720 5/8-1.2(b) 1101 (807)
720 5/8-2(a) 803
720 5/8-2(b) 804
720 5/8-2(c) 807
720 5/8-3 802 & 803
720 5/8-4(a) 801
720 5/8-4(b) -
720 5/8-4(c) 807
1101 (807)
720 5/8-5 254
720 5/8-6 105(1)(d)
720 5/9-1(a)(1) 1101(1)
720 5/9-1(a)(2) 1102(1)(a)
720 5/9-1(a)(3) 1102(1)(b)
720 5/9-1(b) to (j) 1109
720 5/9-1(b)(14) 1201(3)(d)
720 5/9-1.2(a) 1106(1)
720 5/9-1.2(b) 1106(2)(a) & 
(3)(b)
720 5/9-1.2(c) 1106(2)(b) 
& (c)
720 5/9-1.2(d) 1106(4)
720 5/9-1.2(e) -
720 5/9-2(a)(1) 1103(1)
720 5/9-2(a)(2) 511
720 5/9-2(b) 1103(1)
720 5/9-2(c) 107
1103(2)
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720 5/9-2(d) 1103(3)
720 5/9-2.1(a) 1106(1)
720 5/9-2.1(b) 511
720 5/9-2.1(c) 1106(4)
720 5/9-2.1(d) 1106(2)(a) & 
(3)(b)
720 5/9-2.1(e) 1106(2)(b) 
& (c)
720 5/9-3(a) 1104(1)
720 5/9-3(b) 302
720 5/9-3(c) -
720 5/9-3(d) 1104(2)
720 5/9-3(e) to (f) -
720 5/9-3.1(a) 1108(1)
720 5/9-3.1(b) 254
720 5/9-3.1(c) 1108(2)
720 5/9-3.2(a) 1106(1)
720 5/9-3.2(b) 1106(4)
720 5/9-3.2(c) 1106(2)(a) & 
(3)(b)
720 5/9-3.2(d) 1106(2)(b) 
& (c)
720 5/9-3.2(e) -
720 5/9-3.3(a) 1102(2)
720 5/9-3.3(b) 1102(3)
720 5/10-1(a) 1401(1)
720 5/10-1(b) 1401(2)
720 5/10-1(c) 1401(3)(c)
720 5/10-2(a)(1) 1401(3)(a)(i)
720 5/10-2(a)(2) 1401(3)(b)(i)
720 5/10-2(a)(3) 1401(3)(a)(ii)
720 5/10-2(a)(4) -
720 5/10-2(a)(5) to 
(7)
1401 (and 
7101)
720 5/10-2(a)(8) 1401 (and 
7101)
[Art. 1100]
[Art. 1200]
720 5/10-2(b) 1401(3)(a)(i);
(a)(ii) & (b)(i)
[Art. 1100]
[Art. 1200]
[Art. 7100]
720 5/10-3(a) 1402(1)
720 5/10-3(b) 1402(2)(b)
720 5/10-3.1 1402 (and 
7101)
720 5/10-4(a)(1) 1402 (and 
7101)
720 5/10-4(a)(2) 1402(2)(a)
720 5/10-4(b) 1402(2)(a)
[Art. 7100]
720 5/10-5(a) -
720 5/10-5(b)(1) 1403(1)
720 5/10-5(b)(2) 1403(1)
720 5/10-5(b)(3) to 
(8)
-
720 5/10-5(b)(9) 1403(1)
720 5/10-5(b)(10) 1401(1)
720 5/10-5(c)(1) 1403(1)
720 5/10-5(c)(2) 1403(1)
720 5/10-5(c)(3) & 
(4)
-
720 5/10-5(d) 1403(2)(b)
720 5/10-5(d) -
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720 5/10-5(e) CA
720 5/10-5(f) 104
720 5/10-5(g) to (i) CA
720 5/10-5.5(a) -
720 5/10-5.5(b) 1403(1)
720 5/10-5.5(c) 1403(2)(a)
720 5/10-5.5(d) to (f) CA
720 5/10-5.5(g)(1) 412
720 5/10-5.5(g)(2) 251
720 5/10-5.5(g)(3) 413
720 5/10-5.5(h) -
720 5/10-6 4104
720 5/10-7(a)(i) 1401 & 1403 
(301)
720 5/10-7(a)(ii) 5301(1)
720 5/10-7(b) 1401(3)
1403(2)
5301(2)
720 5/10-8 -
720 5/11-6(a) 1301 & 1302 
(802)
720 5/11-6(b) -
720 5/11-6(c) 1301 & 1302 
(807)
720 5/11-6.5(a) 1301 & 1302 
(301)
720 5/11-6.5(b) 1301(4)
1302(3)
720 5/11-7 -
720 5/11-8 -
720 5/11-9 6201
720 5/11-9.1(a) 6201(1)
720 5/11-9.1(a-5) 1303(1)
720 5/11-9.1(b) 1301(3)
1302(2)
720 5/11-9.1(c) 1303(2)
6201(4)
720 5/11-9.2(a) 1304(1)
720 5/11-9.2(b) 1304(1)
720 5/11-9.2(c) 1304(3)
720 5/11-9.2(d) CA
720 5/11-9.2(e) -
720 5/11-9.2(f)(1) 1304(1)
720 5/11-9.2(f)(2) 1304(1)
720 5/11-9.2(g)(1) 1304(2)
720 5/11-9.2(g)(2) 
to (6)
-
720 5/11-9.3(a) to 
(b-5)
1305(1) & (2)
720 5/11-9.3(c)(1) 
to (3)
CA
720 5/11-9.3(c)(4) 108
720 5/11-9.3(c)(5) 6108(2)
720 5/11-9.3(c)(6) -
720 5/11-9.3(d) 1305(4)
720 5/11-9.4(a) to (c) 1305(1) & (2)
720 5/11-9.4(d)(1) 
to (3)
CA
720 5/11-9.4(d)(4) 1305(3)
720 5/11-9.4(d)(5) -
720 5/11-9.4(d)(6) 6108(2)
720 5/11-9.4(d)(7) -
720 5/11-9.4(e) 1305(4)
720 5/11-11 4101
720 5/11-12 4102
720 5/11-13 4102
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720 5/11-14(a) 6202(1)
720 5/11-14(b) 6202(2)
720 5/11-14(c) -
720 5/11-14.1 6202
720 5/11-15(a) 6203(1)(b)
720 5/11-15(b) 6203(2)(b)
720 5/11-15(c) -
720 5/11-15(d) CA
720 5/11-15.1 6203(2)(a)
720 5/11-16(a) 6203(1)(a)
720 5/11-16(b) 6203(2)(b)
720 5/11-16(c) -
720 5/11-17(a) 6203(1)(c)
720 5/11-17(b) 6203(2)(b)
720 5/11-17.1 6203(2)(a)
720 5/11-17.1(d) CA
720 5/11-18(a)(1) 6202(1)
720 5/11-18(a)(2) 6202 (801)
720 5/11-18(b) 6202(2) (807)
720 5/11-18(c) -
720 5/11-18.1(a) 1301(1)
1302(1)
6202(1)
720 5/11-18.1(b) 1306(1)
720 5/11-18.1(c) 1301(4)
1302(3)
6202(2)
720 5/11-19(a) 6203(1)(e)
720 5/11-19(b) 6203(2)(c)
720 5/11-19(c) -
720 5/11-19.1 6203(2)(a)
720 5/11-19.2 1401(1) & (3)
6203(2)(a)
720 5/11-19.2(D) CA
720 5/11-20(a) 6204(1)
720 5/11-20(b) 6204(2)
720 5/11-20(c) CA
720 5/11-20(d) 6204(5)(b)
720 5/11-20(e) 6204(3)
720 5/11-20(f) 6204(4)
720 5/11-20(g) CA
720 5/11-20.1(a)(1) 
to (3)
6204(5)(a)
720 5/11-20.1(a)(4) 6204(5)(a) 
(802)
720 5/11-20.1(a)(5) 1301(2)
1301 (802)
1302 (802)
6204(5)(a)
720 5/11-20.1(a)(6) 6204(5)(a)
720 5/11-20.1(a)(7) 6204(5)(a) 
(802)
720 5/11-20.1(b)(1) 6204(5)(a)
720 5/11-20.1(b)(3) 413
720 5/11-20.1(b)(4) 6204(3)
720 5/11-20.1(b)(5) 204(3)
502
720 5/11-20.1(c) 1301(4) (807)
1302(3) (807)
6204(5)(a) 
(807)
720 5/11-20.1(d) to 
(e-5)
CA
720 5/11-20.1(f) -
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720 5/11-20.1A CA
720 5/11-20.2 CA
720 5/11-21 6204
720 5/11-22 CA
720 5/11-23 6204 (CA)
720 5/12-1(a) 1201 (801)
1203(1)
720 5/12-1(b) 1201 (807)
1203(2)
720 5/12-1(c) -
720 5/12-2(a) & (a-5) 1201 (801)
1203(1)
720 5/12-2(b) 1201 (807)
1203(2)
720 5/12-2.5(a) 1202(1)
720 5/12-2.5(b) 1104(2)
1202(2)
720 5/12-2.5(c) -
720 5/12-3(a) 1201(1)
720 5/12-3(b) 1201(2)(c)
720 5/12-3.1 -
720 5/12-3.2(a) 1201(2)(b) 
(iii)
720 5/12-3.2(b) 1201(2)(b) 
(iii) (CA)
720 5/12-3.2(c) CA
720 5/12-3.3(a) 1201(2)(a)(i)
720 5/12-3.3(b) 1201(2)(a)(i) 
(CA)
720 5/12-4(a) 1201(2)(a)(i)
720 5/12-4(b)(1) 1201 (and 
7101)
720 5/12-4(b)(2) to 
(5)
-
720 5/12-4(b)(6) 1201(2)(d)(i)
720 5/12-4(b)(7) -
720 5/12-4(b)(8) 1201(2)(b)(ii)
720 5/12-4(b)(9) -
720 5/12-4(b)(10) 1201(2)(d) 
(iv)
720 5/12-4(b)(11) 1201(2)(d) 
(ii)
720 5/12-4(b)(12) & 
(13)
-
720 5/12-4(b)(14) 1201(2)(d) 
(iii)
720 5/12-4(b)(15) -
720 5/12-4(b)(16) 1201(2)(b) 
(iii) & (iv)
720 5/12-4(c) 1201(2)(b)(i)
720 5/12-4(d) 1201(2)(b)(i)
720 5/12-4(d-3) 1203 (and 
7101)
720 5/12-4(d-5) 1201(1)
720 5/12-4(e) 1201(2)
1203(2)
[Art. 7100]
720 5/12-4.1 1201(2)(a)(i)
2204
2205
720 5/12-4.2 1101 (801)
1201 (and 
7101)
720 5/12-4.2-5 1101 (801)
1201 (and 
7101)
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720 5/12-4.3(a) 1201(2)(d) 
(iv)
720 5/12-4.3(b) 1201(2)(d) 
(iv)
[Art. 1100]
[Art. 7100]
720 5/12-4.4 -
720 5/12-4.5 1202
720 5/12-4.6 1201(2)(d) 
(iv)
720 5/12-4.7 -
720 5/12-4.8 CA
720 5/12-4.9 1202
720 5/12-5(a) 1202(1)
2202(1)(a)
720 5/12-5(b) 1202(2)
2202(2)
720 5/12-5.1 1202
720 5/12-5.2 CA
720 5/12-5.5 1202
720 5/12-6(a) 1404(1)
720 5/12-6(b) 1404(2)(c)
720 5/12-6.1 1404(2)(a)
720 5/12-6.2(a)(1) 1404(2)(a)
720 5/12-6.2(a)(2) -
720 5/12-6.2(a)(3) 1404(2)(b)
720 5/12-6.2(b) 1404(2)(a) 
& (b)
720 5/12-6.3 -
720 5/12-7 1404
720 5/12-7.1(a) 6106(1)
720 5/12-7.1(b) 6106(2) (CA)
720 5/12-7.1(c) CA
720 5/12-7.1(d) -
720 5/12-7.2(a) 1404(1)
720 5/12-7.2(b) 413
720 5/12-7.2(c) 1404(2)
720 5/12-7.2(d) CA
720 5/12-7.3(a) 1204(1)
720 5/12-7.3(b) 1204(2)
720 5/12-7.3(c) to (g) -
720 5/12-7.3(h) 1201(3)(b) 
& (c)
720 5/12-7.4(a)(1) 1201(1)
1202(1)
1204(1)
720 5/12-7.4(a)(2) 1204(1)
1401(1)
1402(1)
720 5/12-7.4(a)(3) 1204(2)
720 5/12-7.4(b) 1201(2)
1202(2)
1204(2)
1401(3)
1402(3)
720 5/12-7.4(c) & (d) -
720 5/12-7.5 1203
6105
720 5/12-9(a) 1203(1)
5310(1)
720 5/12-9(b)(1) 108
720 5/12-9(b)(2) -
720 5/12-9(c) 1203(2)
5310(2)
720 5/12-10 -
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720 5/12-10.1 -
720 5/12-11(a)(1) 2301 (and 
7101)
720 5/12-11(a)(2) 1201(1)
2301(1)
720 5/12-11(a)(3) 2301 (and 
7101)
720 5/12-11(a)(4) 2301 (and 
7101)
720 5/12-11(a)(5) 2301 (and 
7101)
[Art. 1100]
[Art. 1200]
720 5/12-11(a)(6) [Art. 1300]
720 5/12-11(b) -
720 5/12-11(c) 2301(4)
[Art. 1100]
[Art. 1200]
[Art. 1300]
[Art. 7100]
720 5/12-11(d) 2301(3)(b)
720 5/12-11.1(a) 2301(2)
720 5/12-11.1(b) 2301(4)
720 5/12-12(a) -
720 5/12-12(b) 108
720 5/12-12(c) 1201(3)(b)
720 5/12-12(d) 108
720 5/12-12(e) 1302(2)
720 5/12-12(f) 1301(3)
720 5/12-12(g) -
720 5/12-13(a) 1301(1)
720 5/12-13(a)(1) 
& (2)
1301(4)(b) 
(iii)
720 5/12-13(a)(3) 4101(1)
720 5/12-13(a)(4) 1301(4)(b)(ii)
720 5/12-13(b) 1301(4)
4101(2)
720 5/12-14(a) 1301(1)
4101(1)
720 5/12-14(a)(1) 1301 (and 
7101)
720 5/12-14(a)(2) 1301(4)(a)(ii)
720 5/12-14(a)(3) 1301(4)(a) 
(iii)
720 5/12-14(a)(4) 906
720 5/12-14(a)(5) 
& (6)
-
720 5/12-14(a)(7) 1301(4)(a)(ii)
720 5/12-14(a)(8) 
& (9)
1301 (and 
7101)
720 5/12-14(a)(10) 1301 (and 
7101)
[Art. 1100]
[Art. 1200]
720 5/12-14(b)(i) 1301(1) & 
(4)(d)
720 5/12-14(b)(ii) 1301(1) & 
(4)(b)(iii)
720 5/12-14(c) 1301(1)
720 5/12-14(d) 1301(4)
4101(2)
[Art. 1100]
[Art. 1200]
[Art. 7100]
720 5/12-14.1(a) 1301(1)
720 5/12-14.1(a)(1) 1301(4)(b)(i)
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720 5/12-14.1(a)(1.1) 
& (1.2)
1301 (and 
7101)
720 5/12-14.1(a)(2) 1301(4)(a)(ii) 
& (iii)
720 5/12-14.1(a)(3) 1301(4)(a)(ii)
720 5/12-14.1(b) 1301(4)
[Art. 7100]
720 5/12-15(a) 1302(1) & 
(3)(b)(i)(A)
720 5/12-15(b) 1301(1); 
(4)(d) & 
(4)(e)
1302(1) & 
(3)(b)(ii)
720 5/12-15(c) 1301(1) & 
(4)(e)
1302(1) & 
(3)(b)(iii)
720 5/12-15(d) 1301(4)
1302(3)
720 5/12-16(a) 1302(1)
720 5/12-16(a)(1) 1302 (and 
7101)
720 5/12-16(a)(2) 1302(3)(a)(ii)
720 5/12-16(a)(3) 
& (4)
-
720 5/12-16(a)(5) 1302(3)(a) 
(iii)
720 5/12-16(a)(6) 906
720 5/12-16(a)(7) 1302(3)(a)(ii)
720 5/12-16(b) 1302(1)
4101(1)
720 5/12-16(c) 1302(1)
720 5/12-16(c)(1)(i) 1302(3)(a)(i)
720 5/12-16(c)(1)(ii) 1302(3)(b)(i) 
(A)
720 5/12-16(c)(2)(i) 1302(3)(a)(i)
720 5/12-16(c)(2)(ii) 1302(3)(b)(i) 
(A)
720 5/12-16(d) 1301(1) & (4) 
(c)
1302(3)(b)(i) 
(B)
720 5/12-16(e) 1302(1)
720 5/12-16(f) 1302(1)
1302(3)(b)(i) 
(C)
720 5/12-16(g) 1301(4)
1302(3)
4101(2)
[Art. 7100]
720 5/12-16.2(a) 1202(1)
720 5/12-16.2(b) to 
(d)
-
720 5/12-16.2(e) 1202(2)
720 5/12-17(a) 251
720 5/12-17(b) 1306(1)
720 5/12-18(a) -
720 5/12-18(b) 1306(2)
720 5/12-18(c) to (g) CA
720 5/12-18.1 CA
720 5/12-19(a) 1205
720 5/12-19(b) & (c) CA
720 5/12-19(d)(1) 
& (2)
1205
720 5/12-19(d)(3) 
to (e)
-
720 5/12-20 6206
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720 5/12-21(a) 1205
720 5/12-21(b)(1) -
720 5/12-21(b)(2) 108
720 5/12-21(b)(3) CA
720 5/12-21(b)(4) -
720 5/12-21(c) 104
720 5/12-21(d) to (f) -
720 5/12-21.5(a) 4103(1) 
720 5/12-21.5(b) 4103(2)
720 5/12-21.5(c) 4103(3)
720 5/12-21.6(a) 1202(1)
1205(1)
720 5/12-21.6(b) 1202(2)
1205(2)
[Art. 1100]
720 5/12-22 CA
720 5/12-30(a) 1201(2)(b) 
(iv)
1204(2)(a)
6105(2)(a)
720 5/12-30(b) & (c) -
720 5/12-30(d) 1201(2)(b) 
(iv)
1204(2)(a)
6105(2)(a) 
(CA)
720 5/12-30(e) -
720 5/12-31(a)(1) 1107(1)
720 5/12-31(a)(2) 1107(2)
720 5/12-31(b) 1107(5)
720 5/12-31(c) 1107(3)
720 5/12-32 1201(2)(a)(i) 
& (ii)
720 5/12-33(a) 1205(1)
720 5/12-33(a)(1) 1201(1)
6207(1)
720 5/12-33(a)(2) 
& (3)
1201(1)
720 5/12-33(a)(4) [Art. 1300]
720 5/12-33(a)(5) -
720 5/12-33(a)(6) 1203(1)
720 5/12-33(a)(7) 6205(1)
720 5/12-33(b) -
720 5/12-33(c) 1201(2)
1203(2)
1205(2)
6205(2)
6207(2)
[Art. 1300]
720 5/12-33(d) -
720 5/12-34(a) 1201(2)(a) 
(iii)
720 5/12-34(b) 415(2)
720 5/12-34(a) 1201(2)(a) 
(iii)
720 5/14-1(a) 2401(2)(c) 
(CA)
720 5/14-1(b) to (d) CA
720 5/14-1(e) 2401(2)(b) & 
(e) (CA)
720 5/14-2(a)(1) 2401(1); 
(3)(a) & 
(3)(b)
2403(1)(c)
720 5/14-2(a)(2) 808
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720 5/14-2(a)(3) 2401(3)(b)
2405(1)
720 5/14-2(b) 2401(3)(b) 
(CA)
720 5/14-2(c) 808
720 5/14-2(d) 2401(3)(b) 
(CA)
720 5/14-3(a) to (e) 2401(1)
720 5/14-3(f) to (h) 2401(3)(b) 
(CA)
720 5/14-3(i) 2401(3)(c)
720 5/14-3(j) 2401(3)(d)
720 5/14-3A CA
720 5/14-3B CA
720 5/14-4(a) 2401(4)
2403(3)
2405(3)
720 5/14-4(b) -
720 5/14-5 CA
720 5/14-6 CA
720 5/14-7 CA
720 5/14-8 CA
720 5/14-9 CA
720 5/15-1 108
720 5/15-2 2102(2)(c)
720 5/15-3 2102(2)(a)
720 5/15-4 2103(2)
720 5/15-5 2104(1)(a) 
to (g)
720 5/15-6 2105(3)(b)
720 5/15-7 2102(2)(b)
720 5/15-8 -
720 5/15-9 2109(7)
720 5/16-1(a)(1) 2102
720 5/16-1(a)(2) 2103
720 5/16-1(a)(3) 2104
720 5/16-1(a)(4) 2105
720 5/16-1(a)(5) 2105
720 5/16-1(b) 2109
720 5/16-1(c) 202(1)
720 5/16-1.1 2102(3)(a)
720 5/16-1.2 2103(4)
720 5/16-1.3(a) 2103(1)
2104(1)
2109(8)
720 5/16-1.3(b)(1) 
to (3)
-
720 5/16-1.3(b)(4) 2103(2)
720 5/16-1.3(c) to (f) -
720 5/16-1.3(g) CA
720 5/16-2(a) to (c) 2108(1)
720 5/16-2(d) 2108(2)
720 5/16-3(a) 2106(1)
720 5/16-3(b) 2102(3)(a)
2106(1)
2111(1)(b)
720 5/16-3(c) 2109
2111(3)
720 5/16-3.1(a) 2103 (801)
5204(1)
720 5/16-3.1(b) 2109 (807)
5204(2)
720 5/16-4 2102(2)(d)
720 5/16-5(a) 2102
2206
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720 5/16-5(b) -
720 5/16-5(c) 2109
2206(3)
720 5/16-6(a) 808
2206
720 5/16-6(b) CA
720 5/16-6(c) -
720 5/16-7(a) 2106
720 5/16-7(b) -
720 5/16-7(c) 2109
720 5/16-7(d) to (g) -
720 5/16-7(h) CA
720 5/16-7(i) -
720 5/16-8(a) 2106
720 5/16-8(b) 2109
720 5/16-8(c) & (d) -
720 5/16-8(e) CA
720 5/16-10(a)(1) -
720 5/16-10(a)(2) 2106
720 5/16-10(a)(3) 
& (4)
2106 (301)
720 5/16-10(b) 2109
720 5/16-11(a) 2106
720 5/16-11(b) to (d) -
720 5/16-11(e) 2109
720 5/16-12(a) 808
2106 (301)
720 5/16-12(b) to (d) -
720 5/16-12(e) 808
2109
720 5/16-13 CA
720 5/16-14(a) 2106
2207(1)(a)
720 5/16-14(b) 2207(2)
720 5/16-14(c) -
720 5/16-14(d) 2109
2207(3)
720 5/16-15 808
720 5/16-16(a) 2105(1) & 
(4)(a)
720 5/16-16(b) 2109(2)(b)
720 5/16-16.1(a) 2105
720 5/16-16.1(b) 2105(4)(a)
720 5/16-16.1(c) 2109
720 5/16A-1 -
720 5/16A-2 to 2.5 -
720 5/16A-2.6 & 
-2.7
108
720 5/16A-2.8 to 
2.13
-
720 5/16A-3(a) 2102
720 5/16A-3(b) 2103 (801)
720 5/16A-3(c) 2102 (801)
720 5/16A-3(d) & (e) 2102(1)
720 5/16A-3(f) 2103(1)
720 5/16A-3(g) 808
720 5/16A-3(h) 2102(3)(a)
720 5/16A-4(a) 2102(3)(b)
720 5/16A-4(b) -
720 5/16A-5 -
720 5/16A-6 -
720 5/16A-7 CA
720 5/16A-8 -
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720 5/16A-9 -
720 5/16A-10 807
2109
720 5/16B-1 -
720 5/16B-2(a) 2102
720 5/16B-2(b) 2102 (801)
720 5/16B-2(c) 2103
720 5/16B-2(d) 2102(3)(a) 
(CA)
720 5/16B-2.1 2206(1)(a)
720 5/16B-3 CA
720 5/16B-4 -
720 5/16B-5(a) to (c) 807
2109
720 5/16B-5(d) & (e) 2206(3)
720 5/16C-1 -
720 5/16C-2(a) 2103 (801)
2105(4)(a)
720 5/16C-2(b) 807
2109
720 5/16C-2(c) -
720 5/16C-3 -
720 5/16D-1 -
720 5/16D-2 CA
720 5/16D-3(a)(1) 2404
720 5/16D-3(a)(2) 2102
2106
2404
720 5/16D-3(a)(3) 2206(1)(a)
2404
720 5/16D-3(a)(4) 2206(1)(c)
720 5/16D-3(a)(5) 3101(1)
720 5/16D-3(a-5) 3101 (301)
808
720 5/16D-3(b)(1) 
to (3)
808
2109
2206(3)
2404(2)
3101(3)
720 5/16D-3(b)(4) 
to (c)
CA
720 5/16D-4(a) 2206(1)(a)
2404(1)
720 5/16D-4(a)(1) 2206(1)(c)
2207(1)(a)
720 5/16D-4(a)(2) 1202(1)
720 5/16D-4(b) 1202(2)
2206(3)
2207(3)
2404(2)
720 5/16D-5(a) 2404(1)
720 5/16D-5(a)(1) 2103 (801)
2106 (801)
720 5/16D-5(a)(2) 2102
2206(1)(a)
720 5/16D-5(a)(3) 2102
2103
2106
720 5/16D-5(b) 807
2109
2206(3)
2404(2)
720 5/16D-6 CA
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720 5/16D-7 -
720 5/16E-1 -
720 5/16E-2 -
720 5/16E-3(a)(1) 2102
720 5/16E-3(a)(2) 2102(1)
720 5/16E-3(a)(3) 2105(4)(a)
2206(1)
720 5/16E-3(a)(4) 2102(1)
720 5/16E-3(b) -
720 5/16E-4 2109
2206(3)
720 5/16F-1 -
720 5/16F-2 -
720 5/16F-3(a) 2106
720 5/16F-3(b) 2109
720 5/16F-4(a) 808
2106 (301)
720 5/16F-4(b) 808
2109
720 5/16F-5 -
720 5/16F-6 CA
720 5/16G-1 -
720 5/16G-5 -
720 5/16G-10 -
720 5/16G-15(a) 2103
2106
3105(1)(a)
720 5/16G-15(b) -
720 5/16G-15(c) 202(1)
720 5/16G-15(d) 2109
3105(2)
720 5/16G-20(a) 2103
2106
3105(1)(a)
720 5/16G-20(b) -
720 5/16G-20(c) 202(1)
720 5/16G-20(d) -
720 5/16G-20(e) 2109
3105(2)
720 5/16G-21 CA
720 5/16G-25 2102(2)(d)
720 5/17-1(A)(i) 2107(4)
720 5/17-1(A)(ii) -
720 5/17-1(A)(iii) 3101(2)(a)
720 5/17-1(B) 2109 (807)
3101(3)
3103(2)
3106(3)
3107(3)
3114(2)
720 5/17-1(B)(a) 3103(1)
720 5/17-1(B)(b) 3114(1)
720 5/17-1(B)(c) 3106(1)(b)
720 5/17-1(B)(d) 2103 (801)
2106 (801)
3107(1) & (2)
720 5/17-1(B)(e) 2103 (801)
2106 (801)
3101(1)
3107(1)
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720 5/17-1(C)(1) 2103 (801)
3105(1)
3106(1)(a)
720 5/17-1(C)(2) 808
2103 (801)
3101 (801)
3107  (801)
720 5/17-1(C)(3) 808
2103 (801)
3101 (801)
3107  (801)
720 5/17-1(C)(4) 808
2103 (801)
3107  (801)
3108  (801)
720 5/17-1a CA
720 5/17-2(a) 3105(1)(b)
5205(1)
(CA)
720 5/17-2(a-5) 3105(1)(b) 
(CA)
720 5/17-2(b) -
720 5/17-2(c-1) to 
(c-5)
CA
720 5/17-2(d) 3105(2)
5205(2)
720 5/17-3(a)(1) 3101(1)(a)
720 5/17-3(a)(2) 3101(1)(c)
720 5/17-3(a)(3) 3101 (801)
720 5/17-3(a)(4) 3101(1)
3105(1)
720 5/17-3(a)(5) 3101(1)
3105(1)
720 5/17-3(b) 3101(2)(a)
720 5/17-3(c) 3101(2)(b)
720 5/17-3(d) 807
3101(3)
3105(2)
720 5/17-4 3104
720 5/17-5(a) 5205 (CA)
720 5/17-5(b) to (d) CA
720 5/17-5.5 CA
720 5/17-6(a) 2103
2106
3105(1)(a)
3106(1)(a)
5202(1)
720 5/17-6(b) & (c) CA
720 5/17-6(d) 2109
3105(2)
3106(3)
5202(4)
720 5/17-7(a) 3115(2)
720 5/17-7(b) 3115(1) & (3)
720 5/17-8(a) 2106
720 5/17-8(b) 2109
720 5/17-9(a) 2103 (801)
2106 (801)
720 5/17-9(b) 2103 (301)
2106 (301)
720 5/17-9(c) 2109 (807)
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720 5/17-10(a) 2103 (801)
2106 (801)
720 5/17-10(b) 2103 (301)
2106 (301)
720 5/17-10(c) 2109 (807)
720 5/17-11 2103 (801)
2109 (807)
3102
720 5/17-11.1 2103 (801)
2109 (807)
3102
720 5/17-12 CA
720 5/17-13 2103
2109
3103
720 5/17-14 3112
3113
720 5/17-15 2103 (301)
2103 (801)
2109 (807)
5202(2)
720 5/17-16 2103 (801)
2109 (807)
720 5/17-17 2103
2109
3101
720 5/17-18 3101
720 5/17-19 -
720 5/17-20 2106 (801)
2109 (807)
2206
3102
720 5/17-21 2106 (801)
2109 (807)
2206
3102
720 5/17-22 CA
720 5/17-23(a) 808
2103 (801)
2109 (807)
3101
720 5/17-23(b) 808
2103 (801)
2109 (807)
3101
720 5/17-23(d) -
720 5/17-24 2103 (801)
2106 (801)
2109 (807)
720 5/17A-1 CA
720 5/17A-2 -
720 5/17A-3 2103 & 2109
5202
720 5/17A-3.1 CA
720 5/17A-4 -
720 5/17B-0.05 -
720 5/17B-1 -
720 5/17B-5(i) 2102
3105(1)(b)
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720 5/17B-5(ii) 2103
3101
720 5/17B-10(a) 2102
2107
5103
720 5/17B-10(b) -
720 5/17B-15 808
3105 (801)
720 5/17B-20(a) 808
2109
3101
3105(2)
3105 (807)
720 5/17B-20(b) 905(1)
720 5/17B-25 CA
720 5/17B-30 CA
720 5/18-1(a) 1501(1)
720 5/18-1(b) 1501(2)(b)(ii) 
& (2)(c)
720 5/18-2 1501 (and 
7101)
[Art. 1100]
[Art. 1200]
720 5/18-3(a) 1501(1)
720 5/18-3(b) -
720 5/18-3(c) 1501(2)(a)(ii)
720 5/18-4 1501(2)(b)(ii)
1501 (and 
7101)
[Art. 1100]
[Art. 1200]
720 5/18-5(a) 1501(2)(b) 
(iv)
720 5/18-5(a-5) 1501 (and 
1200)
720 5/18-5(b) 1501(2)(b) 
(iv)
720 5/19-1 2302
720 5/19-2 808
720 5/19-3 2302
720 5/19-4 2303
720 5/20-1 2201
2102(2)(d)
720 5/20-1.1 2201
720 5/20-1.2 2201
720 5/20-2 2205
720 5/20.5-5(a) 2204(1)(a)
720 5/20.5-5(b) 2201(2)(b)
2204(5)
720 5/20.5-5(c) 2204(1)(c)
720 5/20.5-6 2204(1)(b)
720 5/20.5-6 2205
720 5/21-1(1)(a) 2206(1)(a)
2207(1)(a)
720 5/21-1(1)(b) 2206(1)(b)
2202(1)(b)
720 5/21-1(1)(c) 2202(1)(b)
720 5/21-1(1)(d) 2206(1)(a)
720 5/21-1(1)(e) 6103(1)(c)
720 5/21-1(2) 2202(2)
2206(3)(a) 
to (f)
2206(3)(h)
2207(3)
720 5/21-1(3) CA
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720 5/21-1.1 2206
2207
720 5/21-1.2(a) & (b) 2206(3)(h)
720 5/21-1.2(c) CA
720 5/21-1.3(a) 2206(1)(a)
720 5/21-1.3(b) 2206(3) (CA)
720 5/21-1.4 808
2206 (801)
5302 (801)
720 5/21-1.5 CA
720 5/21-2 2111
2303
720 5/21-3(a) 2303(1) & (2)
2303(4)(a)
720 5/21-3(b) -
720 5/21-3(c) 2303(1)
720 5/21-3(d) 2303(4)(b)
720 5/21-3(e) CA
720 5/21-3(f) 2303(4)(b)
720 5/21-4(1) 2201(3)
2202(2)
2206(3)
720 5/21-4(1)(a) 2206(1)(a)
720 5/21-4(1)(b) 2201(1)(a)
2206(1)(a)
720 5/21-4(1)(c) 2202(1)(b)
720 5/21-4(1)(d) 6103(1)(c)
720 5/21-4(2) -
720 5/21-5(a) 2303
720 5/21-5(b) -
720 5/21-6 CA
[Art. 7100]
720 5/21-7 2303(2)(b)
720 5/21-8 2303
720 5/21.1-1 -
720 5/21.1-2 2304(1)
720 5/21.1-3 2304(2)
720 5/21.2-1 -
720 5/21.2-2 6101(1)
6103(1)
6110(1)
720 5/21.2-3 -
720 5/21.2-4 6101(2)
6103(3)
6110(2)
720 5/21.2-5 -
720 5/21.2-6 -
720 5/21.3-5 CA
720 5/24-1 CA
[Art. 7100]
720 5/24-1.1 CA
[Art. 7100]
720 5/24-1.2 -
720 5/24-1.2-5 -
720 5/24-1.5 -
720 5/24-1.6 CA
[Art. 7100]
720 5/24-2 CA 
[Art. 7100]
720 5/24-2.1 CA 
[Art. 7100]
720 5/24-2.2 CA 
[Art. 7100]
720 5/24-3 CA 
[Art. 7100]
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720 5/24-3.1 CA 
[Art. 7100]
720 5/24-3.2 -
720 5/24-3.3 CA 
[Art. 7100]
720 5/24-3.4 CA
720 5/24-3.5 -
720 5/24-3.6 -
720 5/24-3A -
720 5/24-4 CA
720 5/24-5 CA 
[Art. 7100]
720 5/24-6 CA
720 5/24-7 CA
720 5/24-8 CA
720 5/24-9 CA 
[Art. 7100]
720 5/24.5-5 et seq. CA 
[Art. 7200]
720 5/24.6-5 -
720 5/24.6-20 1203
6105
720 5/25-1(a) 6101(1)
720 5/25-1(b) to (d) 6101(2)
720 5/25-1(e) 6102
720 5/25-1(f) CA
720 5/25-1.1 CA
720 5/25-2 -
720 5/26-1(a)(1) 6103(1)
720 5/26-1(a)(2) 5208(1)
6104(1)
720 5/26-1(a)(3) 5208(1)
6104(1)
720 5/26-1(a)(4) 5204(1)
6104(1)
720 5/26-1(a)(5) 2403(1)(a)
720 5/26-1(a)(6) 6105(1)
720 5/26-1(a)(7) 5204(1)
720 5/26-1(a)(8) 5204(1)
720 5/26-1(a)(9) 5208(1)
6104(1)
720 5/26-1(a)(10) 5204(1)
720 5/26-1(a)(11) 5208(1) 
6104(1)
720 5/26-1(a)(12) 5204(1)
5208(1)
6104(1)
720 5/26-1(b) 2403(3)
5204(2)
5208(2)
6103(3)
6105(2)
720 5/26-1(c) CA
720 5/26-2 5303
720 5/26-3 CA
720 5/26-4(a) & (a-5) 2403(1)(b)
720 5/26-4(a-10) -
720 5/26-4(b) 2403(1)
720 5/26-4(c) 2403(1)
720 5/26-4(d) 2403(3)
720 5/26-5(a) to (i) 6207
720 5/26-5(j) to (m) CA
720 5/28-1 et seq. CA
720 5/29-1(a) 3111
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720 5/29-1(b) & (c) CA
720 5/29-2 3111
720 5/29-3 -
720 5/29A-1 3109(3)
720 5/29A-2 3109(1)
720 5/29A-3 3109(4)
720 5/29B-1 CA 
[Art. 7300]
720 5/29D-5 et seq. CA 
[Art. 7300]
720 5/30-1 -
720 5/30-2 -
720 5/30-3 -
720 5/31-1(a) 5302(1)
5302(3)(a)
720 5/31-1(b) 5302(2)
720 5/31-1a 5302(3)(a)
720 5/31-3 5304
720 5/31-4 5301
720 5/31-5 5306
720 5/31-6(a) to (c-6) 5307
720 5/31-6(d) 5307 (and 
7101)
720 5/31-7(a) to (e) 5307 (301)
720 5/31-7(f) 5308
720 5/31-7(f-5) & 
(f-6)
5307(2) (301)
720 5/31-7(g) 5307 (and 
7101)
720 5/31-8 5305
720 5/31A-1.1(a) 5309(1)
720 5/31A-1.1(b) 5309(1)
720 5/31A-1.1(c)(1) 5309(2)(a)
720 5/31A-1.1(c)(2) 5309(2)(b)
720 5/31A-1.1(d) 
to (j)
5309(3)(a)
720 5/31A-1.1(k) 5309(1)
720 5/31A-1.1(l) 5309(1)
720 5/31A-1.1(m) CA
720 5/31A-1.2(a) 
to (c)
5309(1)
720 5/31A-1.2(d)(1) 5309(2)(a)
720 5/31A-1.2(d)(2) 5308(2)
720 5/31A-1.2(d)(3) -
720 5/31A-1.2(d)(4) 5309(2)(b)
720 5/31A-1.2(e) 
& (f)
5309(3)(b)
720 5/31A-1.2(g) CA
720 5/32-1 -
720 5/32-2(a) to (c) 
& (e)
5201
720 5/32-2(d) CA
720 5/32-3 5201 (301)
720 5/32-4(a) 5310
720 5/32-4(b) 5101
5310
720 5/32-4a(a) & (b) 1203
5310
6105
720 5/32-4a(c) 1201(3)(b)
720 5/32-4b 5101 (CA)
720 5/32-4c CA
720 5/32-4d CA
720 5/32-5 5205 (CA)
720 5/32-5.1 5205
720 5/32-5.2 -
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720 5/32-5.3 5205
720 5/32-6 5206
720 5/32-7 5207
720 5/32-8 5203
720 5/32-9 5203
720 5/32-10(a) to (b) 5311
720 5/32-10(c) CA
720 5/32-10(d) 104
720 5/32-11 -
720 5/32-12 -
720 5/32-13(a); (b) 
& (c-5)
5202
720 5/32-13(c) &  (d) -
720 5/33-1 5101
720 5/33-2 5102 (CA)
720 5/33-3 5103
720 5/33-4 CA
720 5/33-5 CA
720 5/33A-1 et seq. 7101
720 5/33B-1 et seq. CA
720 5/33C-1 5202 (CA)
720 5/33C-2 3106
5202
720 5/33C-3 5303
720 5/33C-4 2103
2109
720 5/33C-5 -
720 5/33D-1 4105
720 5/33E-1 & -2 CA
720 5/33E-3 3110 (CA)
720 5/33E-4 3110 (CA)
720 5/33E-5 5103 (CA)
720 5/33E-6 5103 (CA)
720 5/33E-7(a) & (c) 5101
720 5/33E-7(b) & (c) 5102
720 5/33E-7(d) CA
720 5/33E-8 5101
720 5/33E-8(b) 5102
720 5/33E-9 5103 (CA)
720 5/33E-10 CA
720 5/33E-11 3110 (CA)
5202
720 5/33E-12 5103 (CA)
720 5/33E-13 CA
720 5/33E-14 3110 (CA)
5202
720 5/33E-15 5203 (CA)
720 5/33E-16 5103 (CA)
720 5/33E-17 5103 (CA)
720 5/33E-18 3110 (CA)
720 5/33F-1 et seq. CA 
[Art. 7100]
720 5/34-1 102(3)
720 5/34-2 102(4)
720 5/34-3 102(5)
720 5/34-4 101(2)
720 5/35-1 -
720 5/36-1 et seq. CA
720 5/37-1 et seq. CA
720 5/38-1 et seq. CA
720 5/39-1 et seq. CA 
[Art. 7300]
720 5/42-1 2102
2302(1)
ILL Code V II  Curr-Draft   366 7/2/03, 1:03:55 PM
367
Translation Tables
Conversion Table: Translation From Current Law to Draft
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
Draft
Provision
[Note: An entry of “CA” means that although the proposed Code does not itself incorporate the provision in question, 
it is anticipated that the provision will be preserved in the Illinois Statutes by means of a conforming amendment.]
720 5/42-2 2109
2302(2)
720 5/44-1 et seq. CA
720 5/45-1 -
720 5/45-2 1202
720 5/46-1(a) 2103
3106(1)(a)
720 5/46-1(b) 2109
3106(3)
720 5/46-1(c) 2109(7)
720 5/46-1(d) -
720 5/46-1.1(a) 2103
3106(1)(a)
5202(1)
720 5/46-1.1(b) 2109
3106(3)
5202(4)
720 5/46-2(a) 2103
3106(1)(a)
5202(1)
720 5/46-2(b) 2109
3106(3)
5202(4)
720 5/46-3(a) 2103(1) (803)
720 5/46-3(b) 804
720 5/46-3(c) 905(4)
720 5/46-3(d) 2109 (807)
720 5/46-4(a) 905(4)
2103(1) (803)
720 5/46-4(b) 804
720 5/46-4(c) 905(4)
720 5/46-4(d) 2109 (807)
720 5/46-5 CA
720 5/47-5 6103(1)(c) 
6105(1)(d)
6109(1)
(CA)
720 5/47-10 CA
720 5/47-15 2206
6103(1)(c)
6105(1)(d)
(CA)
720 5/47-20 6103(1)(c) 
(CA)
720 5/47-25 6103(3)
6105(2)
6109(5)
(CA)
720 110/1 -
720 110/2 -
720 110/3(a)(1) & (4) 2403(1)(b)
720 110/3(a)(2) & (3) CA
720 110/3(b) 2403(3)
(CA)
720 120/5 1202(1)
720 120/10 1202(2)
720 125/0.01 et seq. CA
720 130/1 to /2 4103 (CA)
720 130/2a -
720 130/3 CA
720 135/1 6105
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720 135/1-1 6105(1)(a) 
& (c)
(CA)
720 135/1-2 6105(1)(a) 
& (c)
720 135/1-3 -
720 135/1-4 CA
720 135/2(a) 6105(2)(b)
(CA)
720 135/2(b) (CA)
720 140/0.01 et seq. CA
720 145/0.01 -
720 145/1 2401
720 150/1 1202(1)
4103(1)
4105(1)
720 150/2 1202(1)
4103(1)
4105(1)
720 150/3 CA
720 150/3.1 CA
720 150/4.1 1202(1)
4103(1)
720 150/5 1202(2)
4103(3)
4105(3)
(CA)
720 150/5.1(A) 1301(2)
720 150/5.1(B) 1301(4)(f)
720 205/0.01 et seq. CA
720 210/0.01 et seq. CA
720 215/1 to /3 -
720 215/4(1) 2102
2206(1)(a)
720 215/4(2) 2102
2206(1)(a)
720 215/4(3) 2303(1)
720 215/4(4) 2302(1)
720 215/4(5) 2103(1)
2206(1)(a)
720 215/4(6) 2302(1)
720 215/5(a) 2109
2206(3)
2302(2)(b)
2303(2)
720 215/5(b) 2109 (807)
720 215/5(c) CA
720 215/6 CA
720 215/7 CA
720 215/8 CA
720 215/9 -
720 220/0.01 et seq. CA
720 225/0.01 et seq. CA
720 230/0.01 et seq. CA
720 235/1 2106
720 240/1 3112
720 245/0.01 et seq. CA
720 250/1 to /2.02 -
720 250/2.03 3108(2)(a)
720 250/2.04 to /2.14 -
720 250/2.15 3108(2)(b)
720 250/2.16 -
720 250/3 3106(1)(a)
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Translation Tables
Conversion Table: Translation From Current Law to Draft
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
Draft
Provision
[Note: An entry of “CA” means that although the proposed Code does not itself incorporate the provision in question, 
it is anticipated that the provision will be preserved in the Illinois Statutes by means of a conforming amendment.]
720 250/4 2102
2105
720 250/5 2108
720 250/6 2105
720 250/7 3108
720 250/8(i) 2103 (801)
2106 (801)
3101
3108
720 250/8(ii) 2103
2106
3108
720 250/9 2106 (301)
3108 (301)
720 250/10 2103 (301)
2106 (301)
3108 (301)
720 250/11 2103
2106
720 250/12 2103 (801)
2106 (801)
3101
3106(1)(a)
720 250/13 2105
720 250/14 3101
720 250/15 3101
3108 (801)
720 250/16 3101
3108 (801)
720 250/17 808
3101 (801)
720 250/17.01 2103
3101
720 250/17.02(a) 2102 (801)
2401
3101
720 250/17.02(b) 2102
720 250/17.03 CA
720 250/18 107(4)
720 250/19 905
720 250/20 -
720 250/24 -
720 290/1 3106(1)(g)
720 290/2 & /3 3106(1)(g) 
(CA)
720 295/1a 3106(1)(b) 
& (c)
720 295/1b 3106(1)(c)
(CA)
720 295/1c CA
720 295/1d CA
720 300/1 -
720 305/1 et seq. CA
720 310/1 et seq. CA
720 315/0.01 et seq. CA
720 320/1 et seq. CA
720 325/1 et seq. CA
720 330/0.01 et seq. CA
720 335/1 et seq. CA
720 340/0.01 et seq. CA
720 345/0.01 et seq. CA
720 350/0.01 et seq. CA
720 355/0.01 et seq. CA
ILL Code V II  Curr-Draft   369 7/2/03, 1:03:58 PM
370
Proposed Criminal Code Offi cial Commentary — Volume 2
Conversion Table: Translation From Current Law to Draft
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
Draft
Provision
[Note: An entry of “CA” means that although the proposed Code does not itself incorporate the provision in question, 
it is anticipated that the provision will be preserved in the Illinois Statutes by means of a conforming amendment.]
720 360/1 2207
720 365/1(a) & (b) 3108(1)
720 365/1(a) to (d) 2106
720 365/1(e) & (f) 2106 (301)
720 365/1(g) 2106
720 365/1(g) 2109
3108(4)
720 370/1 2102 (801)
720 370/2 -
720 375/0.01 et seq. CA
720 380/0.01 et seq. CA
720 385/0.01 et seq. CA
720 390/0.01 et seq. CA
720 395/1  et seq. CA
720 400/0.01 et seq. CA
720 505/1 CA
720 510/1 to /15 4107
720 513/1 et seq. -
720 525/1 to /5 4108
720 540/1 5201
720 530/0.01 et seq. CA
720 535/0.01 et seq. CA 
[Art. 7100]
720 545/0.01 et seq. CA [Art. 
7100]
720 550/1 et seq. CA 
[Art. 7200]
720 555/0.01 et seq. CA
720 560/1 et seq. CA
720 565/0.01 et seq. CA
720 570/100  et seq. CA 
[Art. 7200]
720 585/0.1 et seq. CA
720 590/0.01 et seq. CA
720 595/1 -
720 600/1 et seq. CA 
[Art. 7200]
720 605/0.01 et seq. CA
720 610/0.01 et seq. CA
720 615/0.01 et seq. CA
720 620/1 6111
720 620/2 -
720 620/4 -
720 625/0.01 et seq. CA
720 630/0.01 et seq. CA
720 635/0.01 et seq. CA 
[Art. 7200]
720 640/1 & /2 4105
720 645/1 & /2 5101
720 650/0.01 et seq. CA
720 655/0.01 et seq. CA
720 660/0.01 et seq. CA
720 665/0.01 et seq. CA
720 670/1 6204
720 670/2 6204
720 670/3 -
720 675/0.01 et seq. CA
720 680/1 et seq. CA
720 685/1 et seq. CA 
[Art. 7200]
720 690/0.01 et seq. CA 
[Art. 7200]
725 5/104-10 et seq. 604
725 5/110-2 5311
725 5/111-1 & -2 602(4)
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Translation Tables
Conversion Table: Translation From Current Law to Draft
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
Draft
Provision
[Note: An entry of “CA” means that although the proposed Code does not itself incorporate the provision in question, 
it is anticipated that the provision will be preserved in the Illinois Statutes by means of a conforming amendment.]
725 5/112A-3(3) 1201(3)(b) 
& (c)
730 5/3-6-4(a) 5307
730 5/3-6-4(b) 415(3)
730 5/5-5-1 901
730 5/5-5-2 902
730 5/5-5-3(c)(5) 903(10)
730 5/5-5-3.2(b)(1) 905(1)
730 5/5-5-3.2(b)(2) 905(3)
730 5/5-5-3.2(b)(8) 905(4)
730 5/5-5-3.2(b)(11) 905(2)
730 5/5-8-1(a) 903(1) to (6)
730 5/5-8-1(a)(1) 1101(2)
730 5/5-8-1(a)(1) 1102(3)
730 5/5-8-3(a) 903(7) to (9)
730 5/5-8-4 906
730 5/5-8A-4.1(a) 5307
730 5/5-8A-4.1(b) 5307
730 5/5-8A-4.1(c) 5307 (7100)
730 5/5-9-1(a) 904(2)
730 5/5-9-1(a)(1) 904(3)
730 5/5-9-1.3(a) 904(1)
730 150/10 5202(1)
735 5/1-109 5202(2)
740 147/10 905(5)(a)
750 16/15(a) to (b) 4106
750 30/1 4104(2)(a)
750 61/15(d) 5201
5202(2)
755 5/6-1(b) 3101
3102
755 50/8.1 6206
755 55/1.1 6206
760 55/17 2107
760 100/23 5201
765 86/10-25 3106(1)(b)
765 835/1(a) to (b-5) 2102
2206
765 835/1(f) 2303
765 1040/8 3101
810 5/9-315.01 3112
810 5/9-315.01(1) 2107
810 5/9-315.02 3112
815 5/2.1 3106(2)(c)
815 5/12 3106(1)(c)
815 5/12(E) 5202(1)
815 5/12(G) 2103
815 5/14 3106(3)
815 370/6 1201(2)
5303
815 505/2AA(j)(2) 2102
815 505/2AA(j)(4) 3106(1)(b)
815 515/3(a)(1) & (2) 3103
815 515/3(b)(1) 2206(1)(a)
815 515/3(b)(2) 3103
5205
815 515/5 2103
815 602/5-95 3103
815 602/5-110 3106(1)(b)
815 705/25 2103
3106(1)(a)
820 220/2(i) 5202(1) & (2)
5203(1)(a)
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375
Translation Tables
Conversion Table: Translation From Draft to Current Law
Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
101(1) 720 5/1-1
101(2) 720 5/34-4
102(1) 720 5/1-2
102(2) - -
102(3) 720 5/34-1
102(4) 720 5/34-2
102(5) 720 5/34-3
103 720 5/1-3
104 720 5/1-4
104 - see also 720 5/10-5(f)
105 720 5/1-5
105(1)(d) 720 5/8-6
106 720 5/1-6
107 720 5/3-1
107 720 5/3-2
108 720 5/2-3
108 720 5/2-4
108 720 5/2-8
108 720 5/2-10
108 720 5/2-13
108 720 5/2-15
108 720 5/2-15a
108 720 5/2-15b
108 720 5/2-17
108 720 5/2-18
108 720 5/2-19
108 720 5/2-19.5
108 720 5/2-21
108 720 5/2-22
108 720 5/15-1
108 - see also 720 5/11-9.3(c)(4)
5/12-12(b) & 
(d)
201 - -
202 - -
203 - -
204(1) 720 5/4-1
204(2) - -
204(3) 720 5/4-2
204(4) 720 5/2-2
205(1) 720 5/4-3(a)
205(2) 720 5/4-3(b)
205(3) 720 5/4-3(b)
205(4) 720 5/4-9
205(5) 720 5/4-3(c)
205(6) - -
206(1) 720 5/4-4
206(2) 720 5/4-5
206(3) 720 5/4-6
206(4) 720 5/4-7
207(1) 720 5/4-8(a)
207(2) - -
207(3) - -
208 - -
251 - -
252 - -
253 720 5/3-3
254 720 5/8-5
301(1) 720 5/5-1
301(1) 720 5/5-2
301(2) 720 5/5-2(c)
301(3) - -
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Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
301(4) 720 5/5-3
301(5) - -
301(6) 720 5/5-2(c)
301 - see also 5 312/3-103(d)
20 1605/15
50 105/4.5(3)
625 5/18b-108(c)
720 5/10-7(a)(i)
5/11-6.5(a)
5/16-10(a)(3) 
& (4)
5/16-12(a)
5/16D-3(a-5)
5/16F-4(a)
5/17-9(b)
5/17-10(b)
5/17-15
5/31-7(a) to (e)
5/31-7(f-5) & 
(f-6)
5/32-3
250/9
250/10
365/1(e) & (f)
302(1) & (2) 720 5/6-3(a)
302(3) - -
303 - -
304 720 5/4-8(c)
400 - -
411 - -
412 720 5/7-13
413 720 5/7-10
414(1) 720 5/7-5
414(2) 720 5/7-6
414(3) 720 5/7-9
414(4) 720 5/7-8
415(1) & (2) - -
415(3) 730 5/3-6-4(b)
415(4) to (6) - -
416(1) 720 5/7-1
416(2) - -
417 720 5/7-2
417 720 5/7-3
418(1) 720 5/7-4
418(2) 720 5/7-7
419 720 5/7-1
419 720 5/7-2
419 720 5/7-3
419 720 5/7-5
419 720 5/7-6
501(1) to (5) - -
501(6) 720 5/6-2(e)
501(6) 720 5/6-4
502 720 5/4-1
503 - -
504 720 5/6-2(a) & (b)
505 720 5/6-1
506(1) & (2) 720 5/6-3(b)
506(3) - -
506(4) - -
507 720 5/7-11
508 720 5/4-8(b)(1)
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Translation Tables
Conversion Table: Translation From Draft to Current Law
Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
509 720 5/4-8(b)(2) to 
(4)
510 - -
511 720 5/7-1 to -3; -5; 
-6; -9 & -13
601 - -
602(1) 720 5/3-5
602(2) 720 5/3-6
602(3) 720 5/3-8
602(4) 720 5/2-16
602(4) 725 5/111-1 & -2
602(5) 720 5/3-7
602(6) 720 5/2-16
603 720 5/7-12
604 725 5/104-10 et 
seq.
605 720 5/3-4(a)
605(1) 720 5/2-1
605(3) 720 5/2-5
605(5) 720 5/2-9
606 720 5/3-4(b)
606(1)(b) 720 5/3-3
607 720 5/3-4(c)
608 720 5/3-4(d)
701 720 5/5-4
702 720 5/5-5
801 720 5/8-4(a)
801 - see also 35 505/15(3.7)
320 25/9
720 5/11-18(a)(2)
5/12-1(a)
801 - see also 5/12-2(a) & 
(a-5)
5/12-4.2
5/12-4.2-5
5/16-3.1(a)
5/16A-3(b) & 
(c)
5/16B-2(b)
5/16C-2(a)
5/16D-5(a)(1)
5/17-1(B)(d) 
& (e)
5/17-1(C)(1) 
to (4)
5/17-3(a)(3)
5/17-9(a)
5/17-10(a)
5/17-11
5/17-11.1
5/17-15
5/17-16
5/17-20
5/17-21
5/17-23(a) & 
(b)
5/17-24
5/17B-15
5/21-1.4
250/8(i)
250/12
250/15 to /17
250/17.02(a)
370/1
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Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
802 720 5/8-1(a)
802 720 5/8-1.1(a)
802 720 5/8-1.2(a)
802 720 5/8-3
802 - see also 10 5/29-20(1) & (2)
720 5/11-6(a)
5/11-20.1(a)(4)
5/11-20.1(a)(5)
5/11-20.1(a)(7)
803 720 5/8-2(a)
803 720 5/8-3
803 - see also 35 200/21-
306(a)(4)
625 5/4-103.1
5/4-103.3
720 5/46-3(a)
5/46-4(a)
804 720 5/8-2(b)
805 - -
806 - -
807 720 5/8-1(b)
807 720 5/8-1.1(b)
807 720 5/8-1.2(b)
807 720 5/8-2(c)
807 720 5/8-4(c)
808 720 5/16-6
808 720 5/16-15
808 720 5/19-2
808 720 250/17
808 - see also 15 335/14A
15 335/14B
230 10/18(d)(10)
625 5/6-301.1(b)
625 5/6-301.2(b)
625 5/11-1301.6
720 5/14-2(a)(2)
5/16D-3(a-5)
5/16F-4
5/17-1(C)(2) 
to (4)
5/17-23(a) & 
(b)
901 730 5/5-5-1
902 730 5/5-5-2
903(1) to (6) 730 5/5-8-1(a)
903(7) to (9) 730 5/5-8-3(a)
903(10) 730 5/5-5-3(c)(5)
904(1) 730 5/5-9-1.3(a)
904(2) 730 5/5-9-1(a)
904(3) 730 5/5-9-1(a)(1)
905(1) 730 5/5-5-3.2(b)(1)
905(2) 730 5/5-5-
3.2(b)(11)
905(3) 730 5/5-5-3.2(b)(2)
905(4) 625 5/4-103.3
905(4) 720 5/46-4(a)
905(4) 730 5/5-5-3.2(b)(8)
905(5)(a) 740 147/10
905(5)(b) 705 405/5-105(3)
906 730 5/5-8-4
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Conversion Table: Translation From Draft to Current Law
Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
1101(1) 720 5/9-1(a)(1)
1101(2) 730 5/5-8-1(a)(1)
1102(1)(a) 720 5/9-1(a)(2)
1102(1)(b) 720 5/9-1(a)(3)
1102(2) 720 5/9-3.3(a)
1102(3) 720 5/9-3.3(b)
730 5/5-8-1(a)(1)
1103(1) 720 5/9-2(a)(1)
1103(1) 720 5/9-2(b)
1103(2) 720 5/9-2(c)
1103(3) 720 5/9-2(d)
1104(1) 720 5/9-3(a)
1104(2) 720 5/9-3(d)
1105 - -
1106(1) 720 5/9-1.2(a)
1106(1) 720 5/9-2.1(a)
1106(1) 720 5/9-3.2(a)
1106(2) 720 5/9-1.2(b) & (c)
1106(2) 720 5/9-2.1(d) & 
(e)
1106(2) 720 5/9-3.2(c) & 
(d)
1106(3)(a) 720 510/2(4)
1106(3)(b) 720 5/9-1.2(b)
1106(3)(b) 720 5/9-2.1(d)
1106(3)(b) 720 5/9-3.2(c)
1106(4) 720 5/9-1.2(d)
5/9-2.1(c)
5/9-3.2(b)
1107(1) 720 5/12-31(a)(1)
1107(2) 720 5/12-31(a)(2)
1107(3) 720 5/12-31(c)
1107(4) - -
1107(5) 720 5/12-31(b)
1108(1) 720 5/9-3.1(a)
1108(2) 720 5/9-3.1(c)
1109 720 5/9-1(b) to (j)
1201 720 5/12-33(a)(1) 
to (3)
1201(1) 720 5/12-3(a)
1201(2)(a)(i) 720 5/12-3.3
1201(2)(a)(i) 720 5/12-4(a)
1201(2)(a)(i) 720 5/12-4.1
1201(2)(a)(ii) 720 5/12-32
1201(2)(a)(iii) 720 5/12-34
1201(2)(b)(i) 720 5/12-4(c) & (d)
1201(2)(b)(ii) 720 5/12-4(b)(8)
1201(2)(b)(iii) 720 5/12-3.2
1201(2)(b)(iii) 720 5/12-4(b)(16)
1201(2)(b)(iv) 720 5/12-4(b)(16)
1201(2)(b)(iv) 720 5/12-30
1201(2)(c) 720 5/12-3(b)
1201(2)(d)(i) 720 5/12-4(b)(6)
1201(2)(d)(ii) 720 5/12-4(b)(11)
1201(2)(d)(iii) 720 5/12-4(b)(14)
1201(2)(d)(iv) 720 5/12-4(b)(10)
1201(2)(d)(iv) 720 5/12-4.3
1201(2)(d)(iv) 720 5/12-4.6
1201(3)(a) 720 5/2-3.5
1201(3)(b) 720 5/12-7.3(h)
1201(3)(b) 725 5/112A-3(3)
1201(3)(c) 720 5/12-7.3(h)
1201(3)(c) 725 5/112A-3(3)
1201(3)(d) 720 5/9-1(b)(14)
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Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
1201 (and 7101) 720 5/12-4.2
1201 - see also 20 1805/87
225 650/19(A)
505 90/22
720 5/12-4(d-5)
5/12-7.4
5/12-33
815 370/6
1202(1) 720 5/12-5(a)
1202(1) 720 5/12-2.5(a)
1202(1) 720 5/12-4.5(a)
1202(1) 720 5/12-4.9(a)
1202(1) 720 5/12-5.1(a)
1202(1) 720 5/12-5.5
1202(1) 720 5/12-16.2(a)
1202(1) 720 5/12-21.6(a)
1202(1) 720 5/45-2
1202(2) 720 5/12-2.5(b)
5/12-4.5(b)
5/12-4.9(b)
5/12-5(b)
5/12-5.1(b)
5/12-5.5
5/12-16.2(e)
5/12-21.6(a)
5/45-2
1202 - see also 20 1805/87
415 5/44(b) to (f)
510 5/26
610 100/1 & /2
625 5/11-501 & 
-503
5/18b-106.1 & 
-108
5/18c-7502
40/5-7
45/5-16
720 5/12-7.4
5/16D-4
120/5 & /10
150/1; /2; /4.1 
& /5
1203(1) 720 5/12-1(a)
1203(1) 720 5/12-2(a)
1203(1) 720 5/12-9(a)
1203(2) 720 5/12-1(b)
5/12-2(b)
5/12-9(c)
1203 - see also 720 5/12-4(d-3)
5/12-7.5
5/24.6-20
5/32-4a
1204(1) 720 5/12-7.3(a)
1204(2) 720 5/12-7.3(b)
5/12-7.4(a)(3); 
(b)
5/12-30(a) & (d)
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Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
1205 720 5/12-19(a)
1205 720 5/12-21(a)
1205 720 5/12-21.6
1205 - see also 720 5/12-33
1301(1) 720 5/12-13(a); 
5/12-14(a) to 
(c); 
5/12-14.1(a);
5/12-15(b) & 
(c); 
5/12-16(d) 
1301(1) - see 
also
720 5/11-18.1
1301(2) 720 150/5.1(A)
1301(2) - see 
also
720 5/11-20.1(a)(5)
1301(3) 720 5/12-12(f)
1301(4) 720 5/12-13(b);
5/12-14(d);
5/12-14.1(b); 
5/12-15(d);
5/12-16(g)
1301(4)(a)(i) - -
1301(4)(a)(ii) 720 5/12-14(a)(2)
1301(4)(a)(ii) 720 5/12-14.1(a)(2)
1301(4)(a)(ii) 
- see also
720 5/12-14(a)(7)
720 5/12-14.1(a)(3)
1301(4)(a)(iii) 720 5/12-14(a)(3)
1301(4)(a)(iii) 720 5/12-14.1(a)(2)
1301(4)(b)(i) 720 5/12-14.1(a)(1)
1301(4)(b)(ii) 720 5/12-13(a)(4)
1301(4)(b)(iii) 720 5/12-13(a)(1) 
& (2)
1301(4)(b)(iii) 720 5/12-14(b)(ii)
1301(4)(c) 720 5/12-16(d)
1301(4)(d) 720 5/12-14(b)(i)
1301(4)(d) 720 5/12-15(b)
1301(4)(e) 720 5/12-15(b)
1301(4)(e) 720 5/12-15(c)
1301(4)(f) 720 150/5.1(B)
1301 (and 
7101)
720 5/12-14(a)(1) 
& (8) to (10) 
1301 (and 
7101)
720 5/12-14.1(a) 
(1.1) & (1.2)
1302(1) 720 5/12-15(a) to 
(c) 
5/12-16(a) to 
(f)
1302(1) - see 
also
720 5/11-18.1
5/12-33(a)(4)
1302(2) 720 5/12-12(e)
1302(3) 720 5/12-15(d) 
5/12-16(g)
1302(3)(a)(i) 720 5/12-16(c)(1)(i)
1302(3)(a)(i) 720 5/12-16(c)(2)(i)
1302(3)(a)(ii) 720 5/12-16(a)(2)
1302(3)(a)(ii) 
- see also
720 5/12-16(a)(7)
1302(3)(a)(iii) 720 5/12-16(a)(5)
1302(3)(b)(i)(A) 720 5/12-15(a)
1302(3)(b)(i)(A) 720 5/12-16(c)(1) 
(ii)
1302(3)(b)(i)(A) 720 5/12-16(c)(2) 
(ii)
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Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
1302(3)(b)(i)(B) 720 5/12-16(d)
1302(3)(b)(i)(C) 720 5/12-16(f)
1302(3)(b)(ii) 720 5/12-15(b)
1302(3)(b)(iii) 720 5/12-15(c)
1302 (and 
7101)
720 5/12-16(a)(1)
1303(1) 720 5/11-9.1(a-5)
1303(2) 720 5/11-9.1(c)(1)
1304(1) 720 5/11-9.2(a); (b) 
& (f)(1)
1304(2) 720 5/11-9.2(g)(1)
1304(3) 720 5/11-9.2(c)
1305(1) & (2) 720 5/11-9.3(a) to 
(b-5)
1305(1) & (2) 720 5/11-9.4(a) to 
(c)
1305(3) 720 5/11-9.4(d)(4)
1305(4) 720 5/11-9.3(d)
5/11-9.4(e)
1306(1) 720 5/12-17(b)
1306(2) 720 5/12-18(b)
1401(1) 720 5/10-1(a)
1401(2) 720 5/10-1(b)
1401(3)(a)(i) 720 5/10-2(a)(1) 
& (b)
1401(3)(a)(ii) 720 5/10-2(a)(3) 
& (b)
1401(3)(b)(i) 720 5/10-2(a)(2) 
& (b)
1401(3)(b)(ii) - -
1401(3)(c) 720 5/10-1(c)
1401(4) 720 5/2-10.1
1401 - see also 720 5/10-5
5/11-19.2 
5/12-7.4
1402(1) 720 5/10-3(a)
1402(2)(a) 720 5/10-4(a)(2) 
& (b)
1402(2)(b) 720 5/10-3(b)
1402 - see also 720 5/12-7.4
1403(1) 720 5/10-5(b)(1); 
(2) & (9)
1403(1) 720 5/10-5(c)(1) 
& (2)
1403(1) 720 5/10-5.5(b)
1403(2)(a) 720 5/10-5.5(c)
1403(2)(b) 720 5/10-5(d)
1404(1) 720 5/12-6(a)
1404(2)(a) 720 5/12-6.1
1404(2)(a) 720 5/12-6.2(a)(1) 
& (b)
1404(2)(b) 720 5/12-6.2(a)(3) 
& (b)
1404(2)(c) 720 5/12-6(b)
1404 - see also 10 5/29-4
10 5/29-20(3)
720 5/12-7
720 5/12-7.2
1501(1) 720 5/18-1(a)
1501(2)(a)(i) - -
1501(2)(a)(ii) 720 5/18-3
1501(2)(b)(i) - -
1501(2)(b)(ii) 720 5/18-4(a)(1) 
& (2)
1501(2)(b)(iii) - -
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Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
1501(2)(b)(iv) 720 5/18-5(a)
1501(2)(b)(iv) 720 5/18-5(b)
1501(2)(c) 720 5/18-1(b)
1501(3) - -
1501(4)(a) - -
1501(4)(b) 720 5/2-7.5
1501 (and 
7101)
720 5/18-2
1501 (and 
7101)
720 5/18-4(a)(3) 
to (6)
2101 - -
2102(1) 720 5/16-1(a)(1)
2102(1) - see 
also
225 735/5(a) & (b)
230 10/18(d)(8)
240 40/15-45(b)
625 5/18c-7502(a)
720 5/16-5(a)
5/16A-3(a); (c) 
to (e)
5/16B-2(a)
5/16D-5(a)(2) 
& (3)
5/16E-3(a)(1); 
(2) & (4)
5/17B-5(i)
5/17B-10(a)
5/42-1
215/4(1); (2) 
& (5)
250/17.02(b)
815 505/2AA(j)(2)
2102(2)(a) 720 5/15-3
2102(2)(b) 720 5/15-7
2102(2)(c) 720 5/15-2
2102(2)(d) 720 5/16G-25
2102(2)(d) 720 5/20-1(b)
2102(2)(d) 720 5/16-4
2102(3)(a) 720 5/16-1.1
2102(3)(a) 720 5/16-3(b)
2102(3)(a) 720 5/16A-3(h)
2102(3)(a) 720 5/16B-2(d)
2102(3)(b) 720 5/16A-4(a)
2103(1) 720 5/16-1(a)(2)
2103(1) - see 
also
20 4020/22
35 105/14
35 145/8
225 41/15-75(a)(3)
60/53
203/90(a)(2)
410/4-20(2)
446/190(a)(3)
230 5/39(a)(2)
10/18(d)(6) & 
(9)
240 40/15-45(a)
305 5/8A-2
5/8A-3(a)
5/8A-4
5/8A-4A
5/8A-13(b)
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Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
2103(1) - see 
also
720 5/16-1.3(a)
5/16A-3(b) & 
(f)
5/16B-2(c)
5/16D-5(a)(3)
5/16G-15(a)
5/16G-20(a)
5/17-6(a)
5/17-13
5/17-17
5/17A-3
5/17B-5(ii)
5/33C-4
5/46-1(a)
5/46-1.1(a)
5/46-2(a)
215/4(5)
250/8(ii)
250/11 & 
/17.01
815 5/12(G)
515/5
705/25
2103(2) 720 5/15-4
2103(2) 720 5/16-1.3(b)(4)
2103(3) - -
2103(4) 720 5/16-1.2
2104(1) 720 5/16-1(a)(3)
2104(1) 720 5/16-1.3(a)
2104(1)(a) to 
(g)
720 5/15-5
2104(2) - -
2105(1) 720 5/16-1(a)(4)
2105(1) 720 5/16-1(a)(5)
2105(1) 720 5/16-16(a)
2105(1) 720 5/16-16.1(a)
2105(1) 720 250/4
2105(1) 720 250/6
2105(1) 720 250/13
2105(1) - see 
also
625 5/4-103(a)(1); 
(5)
5/4-103.2(a)(1) 
-(7)
5/4-105(a) 
5/18c-
7502(a)(iii)
45/3A-21
2105(3)(a) - -
2105(3)(b) 720 5/15-6
2105(4)(a) 720 5/16E-3(a)(3)
2105(4)(a) 720 5/16C-2(a)
2105(4)(a) 
- see also
625 5/4-103(a)(2) 
to (4)
2105(4)(b) to 
(d)
- -
2106(1) 720 5/16-3(a) & (b)
2106(1) 720 5/16-7(a)
2106(1) 720 5/16-8(a)
2106(1) 720 5/16-10(a)(2) 
2106(1) 720 5/16-11(a)
2106(1) 720 5/16D-5(a)(3)
2106(1) 720 5/16F-3(a)
2106(1) 720 5/16G-15(a)
2106(1) 720 5/16G-20(a)
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Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
2106(1) 720 5/17-6(a)
2106(1) 720 5/17-8(a)
2106(1) 720 235/1
2106(1) 720 250/8(ii)
2106(1) 720 250/11
2106(1) 720 365/1(a) to (d)
2106(1) 720 365/1(g)
2106(1) - see 
also
305 5/8A-2.5(b)
5/8A-3(a)
5/8A-13(b)
2106(2) - -
2106(3) - -
2107(1) - -
2107(1) - see 
also
15 520/21; /22
20 1605/10.3 & 
10.4
35 105/14
143/10-50
145/8
505/15
630/19
105 425/26(2)
225 410/2A-4(b)(2)
410/3B-4(2)
720 5/17B-10(a)
760 55/17
810 5/9-315.01(1)
2107(2) - -
2107(3) - -
2107(4) 720 5/17-1(A)(i)
2108(1) 720 5/16-2(a) to (c)
2108(1) 720 250/5
2108(2) 720 5/16-2(d)
250/5
2109(1) to (6) 720 5/16-1(b)
2109(1) to (6) 
- see also
720 5/16-3(c)
5/16-3.1(b)
5/16-5(c)
5/16-7(c)
5/16-8(b)
5/16-10(b)
5/16-11(e)
5/16-16(b)
5/16-16.1(c)
5/16A-10
5/16B-5(a) to 
(c)
5/16C-2(b)
5/16D-5(b)
5/16E-4
5/16F-3(b)
5/16G-20(e)
5/17-6(d)
5/17-8(b)
5/17-13
5/17-17
5/17A-3
5/17B-20
5/33C-4
5/42-2
5/46-1(b)
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Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
2109(1) to (6) 
- see also
5/46-1.1(b)
5/46-2(b)
215/5(a) & (b)
235/1
250/4
250/6
250/8
250/9
250/11
250/12 
250/13
250/17.01
250/17.02(b)
365/1(g)
2109(7) 720 5/15-9
2109(7) 720 5/46-1(c)
2109(8) 720 5/16-1.3(a)
2110 - -
2111(1)(a) 720 5/21-2
2111(1)(a) 620 5/43a
2111(1)(b) 720 5/16-3(b)
2111(1)(c) - -
2111(2) - -
2111(3) 620 5/43a
720 5/16-3(c)
720 5/21-2
2201(1)(a) 720 5/20-1(a)
2201(1)(a) 720 5/20-1.1(a)
2201(1)(a) 720 5/20-1.2(a)
2201(1)(a) 720 5/21-4(1)(b)
2201(1)(b) 720 5/20-1(b)
2201(2)(a) 720 5/2-6
2201(2)(b) 720 5/20.5-5(b)
2201(3) 720 5/20-1(c)
5/20-1.1(b)
5/20-1.2(b)
5/21-4(1)
2202(1)(a) 720 5/12-5(a)
2202(1)(b) 720 5/21-1(1)(b) 
& (c)
2202(1)(b) 720 5/21-4(1)(c)
2202(2) 720 5/12-5(b)
5/21-1(2)
5/21-4(1)
2203 - -
2204(1)(a) 720 5/20.5-5(a)
2204(1)(b) 720 5/20-2(a)
2204(1)(b) 720 5/20.5-6
2204(1)(c) 720 5/20.5-5(c)
2204(2) - -
2204(3) - -
2204(4) - -
2204(5) 720 5/20.5-5(b)
2204 - see also 720 5/12-4.1
2205(1) 720 5/20-2(a)
2205(1) 720 5/20.5-6(a)
2205(2) 720 5/20-2(b)
2205(2) 720 5/20.5-6(b)
2205 - see also 720 5/12-4.1
2206(1)(a) 720 5/16B-2.1
2206(1)(a) 720 5/16D-3(a)(3)
2206(1)(a) 720 5/16D-5(a)(2)
2206(1)(a) 720 5/21-1(1)(a)
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Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
2206(1)(a) 720 5/21-1.1
2206(1)(a) 720 5/21-1.3(a)
2206(1)(a) 720 5/21-4(1)(a) 
& (b)
2206(1)(a) 720 215/4(1) & (2)
2206(1)(a) 
- see also
225 735/5(b)
625 5/18c-7502(a) 
(i)
815 515/3(b)(1)
 2206(1)(b) 720 5/21-1(1)(b)
2206(1)(c) 720 5/16D-3(a)(4)
2206(1)(c) 720 5/16D-4(a)
2206(1)(c) 720 5/21-1.1
2206(1)(c) 720 5/21-1.5(a) & 
(b)
2206(1)(c) 
- see also
625 5/18c-7502(a) 
(i)
2206(1)(d) - -
2206(2) - -
2206(3)(a) to 
(f)
720 5/21-1(2)
2206(3)(a) to 
(f) - see also
720 5/16B-5(d) & 
(e) 5/21-1(2)
5/21-1.3(b)
5/21-1.5(c)
5/21-4(1)
215/5(a)
2206(3)(g) - -
2206(3)(h) 720 5/21-1(2)
5/21-1.2(a) & 
(b)
2207(1)(a) 720 5/16-14(a)
2207(1)(a) 720 5/16D-4(a)(1)
2207(1)(a) 720 360/1
2207(1)(a) 
- see also
720 5/21-1(1)(a)
5/21-1.1
2207(1)(b) - -
2207(1)(c) - -
2207(2) 720 5/16-14(b)
2207(3) 720 5/16-14(d)
5/16D-4(b)
5/21-1(2)
5/21-1.1
360/1
2301(1) 720 5/12-11(a)
2301(2) 720 5/12-11.1(a)
2301(3)(a) 720 5/2-6
2301(3)(b) 720 5/12-11(d)
2301(4) 720 5/12-11(c)
5/12-11.1(b)
2302(1) 720 5/19-1(a)
2302(1) 720 5/19-3(a)
2302(1) - see 
also
720 5/42-1
215/4(4) & (6)
2302(2)(a) 720 5/19-3(b)
2302(2)(b) 720 5/19-1(b)
5/42-2
215/5(a)
2303(1) 720 5/19-4(a)
2303(1) 720 5/21-3(a)
2303(1) 720 5/21-3(c)
2303(1) 720 215/4(3)
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Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
2303(2) 720 5/19-4(b)
5/21-3(a)
215/5(a)
2303(3) - -
2303 - see also 720 5/21-2
5/21-5(a)
5/21-7
5/21-8
2303(4)(a) 720 5/21-3(a)
2303(4)(b) 720 5/21-3(d) & (f)
2304(1) 720 5/21.1-2
2304(2) 720 5/21.1-3
2401(1) 720 5/14-2(a)(1)
2401(2)(a) - -
2401(2)(b) 720 5/14-1(e)
2401(2)(c) 720 5/14-1(a)
2401(2)(d) - -
2401(2)(e) 720 5/14-1(e)
2401(2)(f) - -
2401(3)(a) 720 5/14-2(a)(1)
2401(3)(b) 720 5/14-2(a)(1) 
& (3)
2401(3)(b) 720 5/14-2(b) & (d)
2401(3)(b) 720 5/14-3(f) to (h)
2401(3)(c) 720 5/14-3(i)
2401(3)(d) 720 5/14-3(j)
2401(4) 720 5/14-4(a)
2401- see also 720 145/1
250/17.02
2402 - -
2403(1)(a) 720 5/26-1(a)(5)
2403(1)(b) 720 5/26-4(a) & 
(a-5)
2403(1)(b) 
- see also
720 110/3(a)(1) & 
(4)
2403(1)(c) 720 5/14-2(a)(1)
2403(2) - -
2403(3) 720 5/14-4(a)
5/26-1(b)
5/26-4(d)
110/3(b)
2404(1) 720 5/16D-3(a)(1) 
to (3)
2404(1) 720 5/16D-5(a)
2404(2) 720 5/16D-3(b)
2404(2) 720 5/16D-5(b)
2404 - see also 215 5/1023
2405(1) 720 5/14-2(a)(3)
2405(2) - -
2405(3) 720 5/14-4(a)
3101(3) 720 5/17-3(d)
3101(1) 720 5/17-3(a)
3101(2)(a) 720 5/17-3(b)
3101- see also 5 175/10-140; 
/15-210; -220
15 335/14A
335/14B
20 1605/14.2
30 320/4
35 130/22; /23
135/28; /29
225 25/40
110/30
310/27
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Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
3101- see also 230 5/39(a)(2)
10/18(d)(9)
305 5/8A-2.5(a); 
-4; 4A
5/8A-15
625 5/4-103(a)(2) 
& (4)
5/4-105
5/6-301.1
5/6-301.2
45/3A-21(a) 
to (c)
720 5/16D-3(a)(5)
5/17-1(B)
5/17-17
5/17-18
5/17-23(a) & 
(b)
5/17B-5; -20
250/8
250/12
250/14 to /16
250/17.01
250/17.02
755 5/6-1(b)
765 1040/8
3102 - -
3102 - see also 10 5/29-6
5/29-20(4)
15 335/14A
230 10/18(d)(3)
305 5/8A-15
410 535/27(1)(b) 
& (c)
420 40/39(b)(2)
505 90/22
625 5/4-103(a)(2) 
to (4)
5/6-301.1
5/7-603
45/3A-21
720 5/17-11
5/17-11.1
5/17-20
5/17-21
755 5/6-1(b)
3103(1) 720 5/17-1(B)(a)
3103(2) 720 5/17-1(B)
3103 - see also 35 200/21-
306(a)(3)
50 105/4.5(2)
720 5/17-13
815 515/3(a)(1) & 
(2)
515/3(b)(2)
602/5-95
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Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
3104 720 5/17-4
3105(1)(a) 720 5/16G-15(a)
3105(1)(b) - -
3105(2) 720 5/16G-15(d)
3105 - see also 5 175/15-215
15 335/14(a)(2) 
to (4)
335/14A
335/14B
225 25/40
60/54
60/57
110/30
305/36(e)
310/27
325/39(b)(3)
330/43(d)
340/34(e)
745/160(b)(3)
305 5/8A-5A
410 535/27
505 90/22
625 5/6-301(a)(2) 
to (3)
5/6-301.1
720 5/17-2
5/17-3
5/17-6(a) & (d)
5/17B-5; -15 
& -20
3106(1)(a) 720 5/17-1(C)(1)
3106(1)(a) 
- see also
20 3520/45
4020/22
35 105/14
200/21-290(d)
215 5/134
220 5/6-106
225 41/15-75(a)(3)
203/90(a)(2)
410/4-20(2)
446/190(a)(3)
305 5/8A-2(a)
5/8A-3(a)
5/8A-13(b)(2)
320 25/9
720 5/17-6(a)
5/33C-2
5/33E-14
5/33E-15
250/3
250/12
815 705/25
3106(1)(b) 720 5/17-1(B)(c)
3106(1)(b) 720 295/1a & /1b
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Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
3106(1)(b) -
see also
225 15/26
60/49; /52 & /59
125/215 & 
/220
305/36(a) & (g)
325/39(b)(5)
330/43(f)
340/34(a) & 
(g)
745/160(b)(5)
305 5/8A-16
410 18/55(4)
765 86/10-25
815 505/2AA(j)(4)
602/5-110
3106(1)(c) 815 5/12
3106(1)(c) 
- see also
220 5/6-106
720 295/1a
3106(1)(d) 225 470/56(1)(A) & 
(2)(A)
3106(1)(e) 225 470/56(1)(E) & 
(2)(A)
3106(1)(e) 
- see also
240 40/15-45(a) & 
(b)
3106(1)(f) 225 470/56(1)(F)
3106(1)(g) - -
3106(1)(g) 
- see also
225 650/19(D)
410 620/3.1
720 290/1 to /3
3106(2)(a) - -
3106(2)(b) - -
3106(2)(c) 815 5/2.1
3106(3) 225 470/56(1) & 
(2)
720 5/17-1(B)
5/17-1(C)
295/1a & /1b
815 5/14
3107(1) 720 5/17-1(B)(d) 
& (e)
3107(1) - see 
also
35 105/14
143/10-50
145/8
3107(2) 720 5/17-1(B)(d)
3107(3) 720 5/17-1(B)
3108(1) 720 250/7
3108(1) 720 250/8
3108(1) 720 365/1(a) & (b)
3108(2)(a) 720 250/2.03
3108(2)(b) 720 250/2.15
3108(3) - -
3108(4) 720 250/7
250/8
365/1
3109(1) 720 5/29A-2
3109(2) - -
3109(3) 720 5/29A-1
3109(4) 720 5/29A-3
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Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
3109 - see also 230 10/18(d)(1) & 
(2)
305 5/8A-14
5/8A-16(b)(5)
3110 720 5/33E-3; -4; 
-11; -14 & -18
3110 - see also 30 500/50-25
3111(1)(a) 720 5/29-1(a)
3111(1)(a)
- see also
230 5/39(a)(1)
10/18(d)(1) & 
(2)
3111(1)(b) 230 5/36 & 5/37
3111(2) 720 5/29-2
3111(3) - -
3111(4) 720 5/29-1(a)
5/29-2
3112 810 5/9-315.01
3112 810 5/9-315.02
3112 - see also 720 5/17-14
240/1
3113 - -
3113 - see also 720 5/17-14
3114(1) 720 5/17-1(B)(b)
3114(2) 720 5/17-1(B)
3115(1) 720 5/17-7(b)
3115(2) 720 5/17-7(a)
3115(3) 720 5/17-7(b)
4101 720 5/11-11
4101 - see also 720 5/12-13; -14 
& -16
4102 720 5/11-12
4102 720 5/11-13
4103 720 5/12-21.5
4103 - see also 720 130/1; /2
150/1; /2; /4.1 
& /5
4104 720 5/10-6
4104 - see also 225 10/2.21
705 405/3-5
750 30/1
4105(1) 720 5/33D-1(a)
4105(2) 720 640/1
4105 - see also 720 130/1 
150/1; /2 & /5
4105(3) 720 5/33D-1(a)
640/2
4106 750 16/15(a) to (b)
4107 720 510/1 to /15
4108 720 525/1 to /5
5101(1) 720 5/33-1(d) & (e)
5101(2) 720 5/33-1(a) to (c)
5101(3) 720 5/33-1(f)
5101 - see also 10 5/29-1 to -3
225 650/19(B) & 
(B-5)
230 5/39(a)(1)
10/18(d)(1) & 
(2)
305 5/8A-3; -6; -14 
& -16
720 5/32-4
5/32-4b
5/33E-7(a) & (c)
5/33E-8
645/1 & /2
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Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
5102 720 5/33-2
5102 - see also 720 5/33E-7(b) & (c)
5/33E-8(b)
5103 720 5/33-3
5103 - see also 5 312/3-103(d)
15 520/21; /22 & 
/23
20 1705/44
30 230/2b
40 5/15-189
50 105/3 to /4
705/6.1(e)
55 5/3-11019
60 1/85-45
65 5/3.1-55-10
5/4-8-6
70 210/25.3
705/4
2605/11.18
105 5/10-9
110 805/3-48
210 45/3-212(a-1) 
& (a-2)
225 705/4.20 to 
/4.22
305 5/8A-5 & -6
605 5/6-411.1
720 5/17B-10(b)
5/33E-5; -6; -9; 
-16 & -17
310/1 & /2
5201 720 5/32-2
5201 - see also 10 5/29-10(a)
15 335/14C(a)(3)
50 105/4.5
55 5/1-5013
110 1010/4 & /8
205 657/25
657/90(h)
220 5/6-106
225 41/15-75(a)(6)
60/58
203/90
305/36(b)
325/39(b)(2)
330/43(b)
340/34(b)
410/4-20(4)
446/190(a)
745/160(b)(2)
235 5/7-1
5/10-1(c)
415 5/44(h)(1)
625 5/6-302(a)(3)
720 540/1
750 61/15(d)
760 100/23
5202(1) - -
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Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
5202(1) - see 
also
10 5/29-8
15 335/14A(b)(10)
335/14C(a)(1)
20 1605/14.2
1605/16
3520/45
4020/22
35 5/1301
105/14
130/22; /23 & 
/25
135/28; /29 & 
/31
143/10-50
145/8
505/15(6)
630/19
50 105/4.5(1)
55 5/1-5013
205 5/49
105/7-7(a)
620/8-1
635/4-4
657/90(h)
215 690/36
5/131.24(4)
220 5/134
225 5/6-106
25/40
41/15-75(a)(6)
60/56
5202(1) - see 
also
110/30
125/105(a)(1); 
(4);
(11) & /215
203/90(a)(2)
305/36(f)
310/27
325/39(b)(6)
330/43(c)
340/34(f)
225 410/4-20(2)
446/190(a)(3)
735/5(c)
745/160(b)(6)
230 30/12
235 5/10-1(c)
240 40/15-45(c)
305 5/8A-2(a)
5/8A-3(a)
5/8A-13(b)
5/8A-15
320 25/9
410 535/27(1)(a) 
& (c)
415 5/44(a); (h)(2) 
& (4); (j)(4)(A) 
& (C)
5/57.17
420 40/39(b)(1)
510 5/26
625 5/4-105(a)(5)
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Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
5202(1) - see 
also
5/5-402.1(f)
5/6-302
45/3A-21(d)
720 5/17-6(a)
5/17A-3
5/33C-1 & 
/33C-2
5/33E-14
730 150/10
815 5/12(E)
820 220/2(i)
5202(2) 30 500/50-5(d)
5202(2) 35 200/21-290(b) 
& (d)
5202(2) 205 657/90(h)
5202(2) 225 325/39(b)(6)
5202(2) 305 5/8A-2(b)
5202(2) 415 5/44(h)(6)
5202(2) 415 5/44(i)
5202(2) 415 5/44(j)(4)(A) 
& (C)
5202(2) 720 5/17-15
5202(2) 735 5/1-109
5202(2) 750 61/15(d)
5202(2) 820 220/2(i)
5202(3) - -
5202(4) 720 5/17-6(d)
5/17-22(b)
5/33C-1
5/33C-2
5/33E-14
5203(1)(a) - -
5203(1)(a) 
- see also
10 5/29-6
5/29-20(4)
15 335/14A(b)(8)
35 5/1301
105/14
130/14
130/25
135/22
135/31
143/10-50
145/8
505/15(3.5) & 
(6)
630/19
205 5/49
105/7-7(a)
215 657/90(h)
225 5/134
125/105(a)(11) 
& /215
240 40/15-45(c)
410 18/55(2)
535/27(1)(a)
415 5/44(h)(2) & (4)
5/57.17
420 40/39(b)(2)
505 90/22
510 5/26
625 5/4-105(a)(1) 
to (4)
5/4-105.1(a)
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Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
5203(1)(a) 
- see also
5/5-402.1(f)
5/6-301.1(b)(8)
5/6-302
5/7-603
45/3A-21(a) 
& (b)
720 5/33E-15
820 220/2(i)
5203(1)(b) 720 5/32-8
5203(1)(b) 720 5/32-9
5203(1)(b) 
- see also
10 5/29-6
5/29-20(4)
410 535/27(1)(b)
415 5/44(h)(3) & 
(5)
5203(2) 720 5/32-8
5/32-9
5/33E-15
5204(1) 720 5/26-1(a)(4); 
(7); 
(8); (10) & (12)
5204(1) - see 
also
325 5/4
625 5/4-103(a)(6)
720 5/16-3.1(a)
5/31-4(a)
5204(2) 720 5/16-3.1(b)
5/26-1(b)
5/31-4(d)
5205(1)(a) 720 5/32-5(a)
5205(1)(b) 720 5/32-5.1
5205(1)(c) 720 5/32-5.3
5205(1)(d) 720 5/32-5(b)
5205(2) 720 5/32-5(a) & (b)
5/32-5.1
5/32-5.3
5205 - see also 720 5/17-2
5/17-5(a)
815 515/3(b)(2)
5206 720 5/32-6
5207 720 5/32-7
5208(1) 720 5/26-1(a)(2); 
(3); 
(9) & (11)
5208(2) 720 5/26-1(b)
5301 720 5/31-4
5301- see also 415 5/44(g)
720 5/10-7(a)(ii) 
& (b)
5302(1) 720 5/31-1(a)
5302(2) 720 5/31-1(b)
5302(3)(a) 720 5/31-1(a)
5302(3)(b) 720 5/31-1a
5302 - see also 625 5/11-204; 
204.1
5/18b-103.1
5303 - -
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Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
5303 - see also 225 650/19(A)
735/5(g)
240 40/15-45(d) 
& (e)
415 60/15(7)
505 90/22
510 5/26(a)
720 5/33C-3
815 370/6
5304(1) 720 5/31-3
5305 720 5/31-8
5306 720 5/31-5
5307 720 5/31-6 (a) to 
(c-6)
5307 - see also 730 5/3-6-4(a)
5/5-8A-4.1(a) 
& (b)
5308(1) 720 5/31-7(f)
5308(2) 720 5/31A-
1.2(d)(2)
5308(3) 720 5/31-7(f)
5309(1) 720 5/31A-1.1(a); 
(b) & (k)
5309(2)(a) 720 5/31A-
1.1(c)(1)
5309(2)(a) 
- see also
720 5/2-14
5309(2)(b) 720 5/31A-
1.1(c)(2) & -
1.2(d)(4)
5309(2)(b) - 
see also
720 570/102(f)
570/201 et seq.
5309(3)(a) 720 5/31A-1.1(d) 
to (j)
5309(3)(b) 720 5/31A-1.2(a) to 
(c); (e) & (f)
5310 720 5/32-4
5310 720 5/32-4a(a) & 
(b)
5310 - see also 10 5/29-4 & 
-20(3)
720 5/12-9
5311 720 5/32-10(a) to 
(b)
5311 725 5/110-2
6101(1) 720 5/25-1(a)
6101(2) 720 5/25-1(b) to (d)
6101 - see also 720 5/21.2-2; -4
6102 720 5/25-1(d)
6103 720 5/21.2-2
6103 720 5/21.2-4
6103(1) 720 5/26-1(a)(1)
6103(2) - -
6103(3) 720 5/26-1(b)
6103 - see also 720 5/21.2-2; -4
5/47-5 to -25
6104 720 5/26-1(a)(2) to 
(4); (9); (11)
6105(1)(a) 720 135/1 to /1-2
6105(1)(b) - -
6105(1)(c) 720 135/1 to /1-2
6105(1)(d)
6105(2)(a) 720 5/12-30
6105(2)(b) 720 135/2
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Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
6105 - see also 720 5/24.6-20
5/32-4a(a) & (b)
5/47-5; -15; -25
6106 720 5/12-7.1
6107 - -
6108 - -
6109(1) 720 5/47-5(5)
6109(2) - -
6109(3) - -
6109(4) - -
6109(5) 720 5/47-25
6110 - -
6110 - see also 720 5/21.2-2 & -4
6111 720 620/1
6201 720 5/11-9
6201 720 5/11-9.1(a) & 
(c)
6202 720 5/11-14
6202 720 5/11-14.1
6202 720 5/11-18
6202 720 5/11-18.1
6203(1)(a) 720 5/11-16(a)
6203(1)(b) 720 5/11-15(a)
6203(1)(c) 720 5/11-17(a)
6203(1)(d) 720 5/11-20.1(a)(5)
6203(1)(e) 720 5/11-19(a)
6203(2)(a) 720 5/11-15.1
5/11-17.1
5/11-19.1
5/11-19.2
6203(2)(b) 720 5/11-15(b)
5/11-16(b)
5/11-17(b)
5/11-20.1(c)
6203(2)(c) 720 5/11-19(b)
6204(1) 720 5/11-20(a)
6204(2) 720 5/11-20(b)
6204(3) 720 5/11-20(e)
6204(3) 720 5/11-20.1(b)(4)
6204(4) 720 5/11-20(f)
6204(5)(a) 720 5/11-20.1(a)(1) 
to (3); (5) & (6)
6204(5)(a) 720 5/11-20.1(b)(1)
6204(5)(a) 720 5/11-20.1(c)
6204(5)(b) 720 5/11-20(d)
6204 - see also 720 5/11-21; -23
670/1; /2
6205 - -
6205 - see also 410 5/1 et seq.
18/1 et seq.
505/1 et seq.
510/1 et seq.
720 5/12-33(a)(7)
6206 720 5/12-20
6206 - see also 755 50/8.1
55/1.1
6207 510 70/3.01 to 
/3.03 & /16
6207 - see also 720 5/26-5(a) to (i)
7101 720 5/33A-1 et seq.
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Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
Draft
Provision
ILCS
Chap
ILCS
Provision
7101 - see also 720 5/10-2(a)(5) 
to (8)
5/10-3.1
5/10-4(a)(1)
5/12-4(b)(1)
5/12-4(d-3)
5/12-4.2
5/12-4.2-5
5/12-11(a)(1)
5/12-11(a)(3) 
to (5)
5/12-14(a)(1)
5/12-14(a)(8) 
to (10)
5/12-14.1(a) 
(1.1) & (1.2)
5/12-16(a)(1)
5/18-2
5/18-4
5/31-6(d)
5/31-7(g)
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